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1. Give me a fruitful error any time, full of seeds, bursting with its own corrections. You can keep 
your sterile truth for yourseE (Vilfredo Pareto, quoted in S. J. Gould, 1993, "Eight Litde 
Piggies. Reflection in Natural History." W.W. Norton & Company, New York.). 
2. In a market economy open to international competition, Associative Peasant Business Firms 
cannot improve on regular market exchanges when it comes to trading undifferentiated 
commodities in the spot and wholesale markets. Firms involved in non-traditional products and 
in markets with high transaction costs can have more of an economic impact on their members' 
farms and households. (This thesis). 
3. Effective Associative Peasant Business Firms are embedded in effective multi-agent networks. 
(This thesis). 
4. The systems of rules of Associative Peasant Business Firms must provide incentives for an 
adequate allocation of costs and benefits among the members, and between them and their 
organization. Free riding is pervasive if the first allocation fails. Decoupling small farmers from 
market signals is the result of failure in the second allocation. Both lead directly to the demise 
of the firm as a viable market-oriented organization. (This thesis). 
5. The social and geographical proximity that results from an Associative Peasant Business Firm 
being embedded in a rural community, reduces the cost of monitoring the members' compliance 
with agreements and obligations; reduces members' heterogeneity, in turn aiding the 
formulation of rules acceptable to all; enhances the social consequences to members of not 
complying; ensures fairer treatment of those who break the rules; and provides greater and 
better participation in the organizations' affairs. Formal business management approaches and 
techniques cannot replace these advantages. (This thesis). 
6. When the government's strategy of signing international trade treaties left us aside, we were left 
with two options, to sell the land or to change. And we chose the latter. (Rafael Castro, small 
farmer and member of Sociedad Agricola y Ganadera El Sobrante). 
7. Learning and adaptive management cannot occur in rural development if governments, donors 
and NGOs do not openly accept the political cost of failure. 
8. In the rapidly changing context of Latin American societies, NGOs that do not make a sustained 
effort to unlearn their old approaches become part of the problem of rural poverty. 
9. Y asi, del poco dormiry del mucho leer, se le seed el cerebro de manera que vino a perder el 
juicio (And so it was that from too little sleep and too much reading, his brain dried out and he 
lost his wits). (Miguel de Cervantes, Don Quijote). 
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vi Summary 
SUMMARY 
The research context 
Since 1990 the government of Chile has made a major effort to support the participation of small-scale 
agriculture in one of the most liberalized and competitive economies in the developing world. In 
particular, the Agricultural Development Institute (INDAP), an agency of the Ministry of Agriculture, 
has spent close to $ 1.5 billion on technical assistance and investment programs to enhance 
smallholders' capacities and to link them to more dynamic and profitable markets. A key aspect of this 
effort has been the formation and development of Empresas Asociativas Campesinas (EACs, or 
Associative Peasant Business Finns). 
EACs are legally constituted organizations whose members or owners are exclusively or mainly small 
farmers and peasants who control the organization's decision-making process. Such organizations 
carry out marketing or value-adding activities directly linked (upstream or downstream) to then-
members' primary production, and their main purpose is to improve the performance of then-
members' farms as economic units engaging in market transactions. 
About 780 of these EACs have been formed in the past decade, with a total membership of 
approximately 58,000 small farmers (about one-fifth of all small farms in the country). Their gross 
sales in 1998 amounted to about $ 100 million. 
This program reflects a new approach to improving the economic performance of small farms and the 
well-being of peasant households. It is a significant move away from the traditional strategy, which 
took a transfer of technology approach to agricultural innovation, and emphasized yield increases of 
undifferentiated commodities. This new approach, which has gradually evolved since the early 1990s, 
instead emphasizes: (a) promoting market-driven small-scale farming, which in Chile means 
diversifying into non-traditional enterprises and value-adding; (b) replacing the linear research-
extension-farmer arrangements with more complex and diverse private-public networks and alliances; 
(c) recognizing EACs as the primary social agents of peasant agricultural development; (d) developing 
new facilitation approaches to support the new strategy. 
The research questions 
The research focused on the following questions: (a) Have EACs achieved their purpose of improving 
the performance of their member's farms and the income of their households?; (b) Are EACs 
sustainable as economic organizations?; (c) What is the relationship between the institutional and the 
economic performances of these EACs, and; (d) What changes in public policies are needed to 
improve the impact and sustainability of these EACs? 
Conceptual framework and methods 
A multi-disciplinary approach is used in this research, taking advantage of various theoretical 
perspectives, including: the concepts of agricultural knowledge and information systems, and of 
innovation as the product of social learning within multi-agent networks; the concept of transaction 
costs advanced by neoinstitutional economics; the theory of social capital; and the concept of design 
principles of institutionally robust organizations for collective action, proposed by comparative 
institutional analysis. 
The research combines descriptive and analytical quantitative methods applied to large data sets 
obtained from national surveys of peasants households, small farms and EACs, with 14 qualitative in-
depth case studies of specific organizations engaged in milk, potato, vegetable and raspberry 
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production, marketing and value-adding. 
Main results 
The main findings are as follows: 
1. Small farmers' participation in EACs depends more on market and policy incentives than on the 
assets at their disposal. The exception is the poorest strata of peasant households, who tend not to 
participate in these organizations. Market incentives are closely linked to farmers' transaction 
costs. EAC participation is higher among small farmers working in product markets with high 
transaction costs. 
2. Community groups and organizations facilitate the formation of EACs, as they provide the initial 
fora where alternatives can be discussed, weighed and decided upon. These local groups 
'incubate' EACs. However, a local tradition of rural organization on its own does not seem to 
have a decisive influence, as many regions with high levels of civic organization have low levels 
of EAC membership, and vice versa. 
3. The support of external agents (such as NGOs, private extension firms, etc.) is essential for the 
emergence of EACs. While local leaders build on farmers' willingness to question the status quo 
and to take action, external agents provide 'road maps' for collective action, as well as the 
networks needed to obtain information, expertise and financial resources. 
4. Hence, EACs emerge through the interplay between all these actors: individual farmers, rural 
communities, external facilitators, governments, and markets. The nature of that initial interaction, 
and the balance of each agent's contribution, has a major influence on the E A C s characteristics 
and future performance. 
5. EAC participation only has a significant positive impact on members' farms' net profit margins 
when it operates in markets with high transaction costs, such as the dairy sector. An EAC cannot 
offer any increased benefits for small farmers operating in markets with low transaction costs, 
such as the spot markets for undifferentiated commodities like wheat or potatoes. 
6. EAC participation does not have a significant impact on members' total household income, even 
where markets with high transaction costs are involved. Whatever income gains are derived from 
on-farm production, they are undermined by the corresponding loss of non-farm employment and 
income opportunities. 
7. A large majority of EACs would not be viable without significant public subsidies. Only around 
one-fifth of EACs could survive if the current government programs were suddenly discontinued; 
an additional 15% could probably consolidate their position reasonably quickly if they changed 
their way of doing things. 
8. EACs established primarily to trade undifferentiated commodities in spot or wholesale markets 
tend to fail. They do so when members default on their agreements regarding the collective 
marketing of their produce. Members' commitment wanes when they realize that under these 
types of markets, the EAC cannot improve on market prices or other market benefits, whilst being 
a member implies additional costs and risks compared to individuals trading alone. Moreover, 
members withdraw selectively; they may work alone to market their products, yet still take 
advantage of other EAC services, usually access to public programs and subsidies. Under such 
conditions, these EACs are rapidly undermined. 
9. On the other hand, EACs can be successful when their core activities aim at: (a) differentiating the 
members' raw products through value-adding; (b) providing price and market information when 
such information is costly to obtain and when obtaining a good price can be difficult without it; (c) 
overcoming investment, technology, or knowledge and management market access barriers; and 
(d) expanding the portfolio of clients, especially where highly perishable products are concerned. 
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10. Effective EACs are part of effective multi-agent networks. Linkages to actors outside the rural 
communities are crucial when operating in dynamic and competitive markets. 
11. When EACs are embedded in a rural community, this aids more effective and less costly internal 
rules and decision-making processes, because of their members' close social and geographic 
proximity. For example, it makes monitoring members' compliance with agreements and 
obligations cheaper; reduces members' heterogeneity, in turn aiding the formulation of rules 
acceptable to all; enhances the social costs and consequences to members of not complying with 
agreements and obligations; ensures just and appropriate treatment of those who break the rules 
(due to better local information about the context in which the violation occurred); and provides 
greater and better organizational participation. However, such close social and geographic 
proximity can also undermine an E A C s operational rules; for example, when enforcement of 
agreements is hampered by family obligations or when those with greater power in the community 
exert an undue influence within the EAC. 
12. An EAC will ultimately fail if its system of rules 'shields' members from market signals. Effective 
internal rules systems must address not only the allocation of costs and benefits between the 
individual members (i.e., the free riders problem), but also their distribution between the members 
as individual and independent farmers, and the EAC as a business-oriented organization. The 
balance between the E A C s economic and financial performance and sustainability, on the one 
hand, and the impacts of the collective effort on individual farms and households, on the other, 
depends on how this dual allocation problem is solved. Only when the rales clearly transmit 
market signals to individual members, and when such rules effectively reduce the transaction costs 
of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements between the EAC and its members, can this 
problem be solved. 
Thinking about the future 
The policies and programs designed during the past decade have run their course. Dozens of EACs are 
currently in crisis, signaling the need for a revised strategy to improve the quality of the existing 
EACs. Such EACs must be: (a) more effective in improving their members' performance as 
independent farmers in a market economy; (b) increasingly sustainable and autonomous as business 
firms, and; (c) institutionally robust as social platforms for collective action. To achieve these goals, 
revised policies: 
1. Should develop alternatives for the thousands of smallholders who produce traditional agricultural 
commodities and who lack the capacity to diversify into new products and markets. For many, 
these alternatives are to be found in new rural non-farm activities. If the options for rural 
development continue to be restricted to agriculture, then the political pressures to set up 
ineffective EACs will be irresistible. 
2. Should not assume that forming an EAC is always the answer. EACs are only effective under 
certain conditions and can only achieve a narrower set of goals than was thought 10 years ago. 
EACs are not a panacea for developing 'social capital' and civic participation in the countryside. 
This is true even for those policies and programs designed to improve the productive, 
technological and economic development of small fanners. To achieve such goals public programs 
must work with a broader set of rural organizations and groups, and not just rely on EACs. 
3. Should promote social learning as part of EAC development. While significant progress has been 
made in moving away from the linear transfer of technology approach, it is still not enough. To a 
large extent, many continue to see the development of EACs as the outcome of pre-conceived 
social engineering initiatives. This study has found that successful EACs are the result of gradual 
and complex processes of innovation involving multiple agents with different perspectives. We 
need to invest more in finding approaches and methods to facilitate social learning processes in 
EAC formation and development. 
4. Should invest in human capital. The effort to develop the human capital relevant to EACs has been 
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negligible compared to the hundreds of millions of dollars invested in 'brick and mortar' projects. 
We urgently need to decide how to provide all relevant actors with the knowledge, capacities and 
skills indispensable to their new domains of activity. 
5. Should think and act in terms of networks. Effective EACs are part of effective multi-agent 
networks. We need to find out how to work with EACs in the context of these wider networks. We 
need new concepts, methods and tools to support such work. 
6. Should understand that EACs only succeed if they transmit clear market signals. EACs offer an 
organizational platform for small farmers to access more dynamic and profitable markets; this 
almost always means that they will be subject to more, not less, intense competition. 
Understandably, public programs in support of peasant farmers want to somehow protect them 
from the adverse consequences of moving into fiercely competitive markets. Whilst no-one could 
question the need for mechanisms to ease the transition, the question is how we do it. Until now 
we have relied almost solely on direct subsidies and subsidized loans which very often decouple 
EACs from the market signals they are supposed to respond to. What are the insurance systems, 
the risk-sharing private-public contracts, the training programs, the government regulations and 
legal frameworks, that can help small farmers and their EACs learn their way in the new markets, 
but which do not create artificial 'bubbles' that burst when the external funding stops? We must 
stimulate and support institutional experimentation with this question in mind. 
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CHAPTER! INTRODUCTION 
Cuando la estrategia del gobierno de firmar tratados internacionales nos dejd al 
margen, nos quedaron dos opciones como era vender las tierras o cambiar. Y nos 
inclinamos por lo ultimo. 
When the government's strategy of signing international [trade] treaties left us aside, 
we were left with two options, to sell the land or to change. And we chose the latter. 
Rafael Castro 
Member of Sociedad Agricola y Ganadera El Sobrahte 
1.1 Presentation 
This book is about the experience of thousands of small farmers who, like Rafael Castro, decided to 
walk the difficult and uncertain path of innovation in order to survive in Chilean agriculture in the 
context of one of the most open and liberalized economies in Latin America. It is also about the 
policies and the public and private organizations that stimulated and supported this change. 
I look at one aspect of the changes made by these small farmers: the formation, development and work 
of economic organizations, known in Chile as Empresas Asociativas Campesinas (EACs), or 
Associative Peasant Business Firms. 
I define an EAC as: 
a legally constituted organization whose members or owners are exclusively or mainly small 
farmers and peasants and who control the decision-making process in the organization; the 
organization carries out marketing or value-adding activities directly linked (upstream or 
downstream) to its members' primary production, and its main purpose is to improve the 
performance of its members 'farms as economic units engaging in market transactions. 
In Chile, as in other Latin American countries, economic collective action by small farmers and 
peasants has grown in the last 10 or 15 years in response to the simultaneous processes of economic 
liberalization, opening up of national economies to international competition, and privatization or 
outright elimination of many agricultural public services. 
Economic collective action is one strategy used by small farmers and peasants in a context where 
market competitiveness determines the survival of any small farm that is substantially or primarily 
market-oriented (Berdegu6 and Escobar, 1997). Such economic collective action can take a variety of 
forms, and might include: 
• the once-a-year collective purchase of seeds, fertilizers and other inputs in order to be able to 
negotiate lower prices; 
• forming a local committee to hire a private veterinarian to improve milk production; 
• negotiating local farmers' production contracts with a private agribusiness firm; 
• establishing a processing firm to add value to fresh vegetables through grading, packaging and 
labeling; 
• organizing a peasant-owned business firm capable of exporting non-traditional products such as 
flowers to countries in the North; 
• establishing a municipal savings and loans committee to partially replace some of the financial 
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services that used to be provided by a now-extinct public agricultural development bank. 
Economic collective action can be conducted by groups and organizations formed solely for that 
purpose, or by others involved in many diverse activities, such as providing social services, political 
and social representation, improving local public infrastructure, or managing natural resources. 
EACs are a particular type of economic collective action organization. They differ from a conventional 
private firm in that their own objectives, even those of an economic nature, are subsidiary to their 
fundamental purpose of improving the economic performance of their members' farms. They differ 
from informal groups because their organizational objectives and obligations are different to their 
individual members' and because they can participate in formal and enforceable contracts with market 
and non-market agents. And, finally, they differ from other small farmers' organizations and groups 
that provide agricultural support services such as credit or technical assistance, in that their core 
activities focus on processing their members' raw products and/or on marketing of inputs or products 
required or generated by their members' farming systems. However, they can and often do provide 
additional services in support of agricultural production. 
Since 1990, but increasingly since around 1993, Chile's Agricultural Development Institute (INDAP), 
the national public organization charged with developing small-scale agriculture, began to move away 
from its conventional promotion of primary production of traditional crops. Its new focus was on 
'reconverting1' peasant agriculture by: 
(1) linking peasant farms to more dynamic and profitable markets; 
(2) diversifying away from traditional commodities towards non-traditional crops and enterprises, and; 
(3) placing a much stronger emphasis on farm management, marketing and value-adding, in contrast 
to the traditional almost exclusive reliance on the technological improvement of on-farm primary 
production. 
This new strategy required three major institutional changes. First, it required the development of 
strong, business-oriented small farmers' organizations. An individual peasant could not expect to 
approach a non-traditional market in the same isolated manner as he or she would a commodity 
market. Second, it meant developing multi-agent networks, since the old linear arrangements of agents 
based on the Transfer of Technology (ToT) approach simply could not even begin to deal with the 
organizational and institutional complexity implicit in the new strategy. Third, new approaches to 
facilitation were needed, since those that were part of the ToT school proved inadequate for dealing 
with the more complex processes of change and innovation that were being stimulated. 
Several hundred EACs were formed in Chile with the stimulus of the new policies and their 
concomitant incentives. A decade since this strategy was launched, the time is now ripe to assess its 
results, achievements, failures and limitations. 
1.2 The research questions 
1.2.2 Public policy perspective 
From the point of view of public policies, I attempt to answer the following questions through this 
research: 
(1) Have EACs achieved their purpose of improving the performance of peasant agriculture in the 
1 The label 'reconversion' has lost favor in Chile in recent years, as it tended to be interpreted by many as excluding 
traditional crops, enterprises or activities. However, I still think it is an appropriate concept to describe the purpose and 
objectives of the new policies put in place since the 1990s. I define this reconversion policy as an attempt to 'retool' peasant 
agriculture with the human, financial, physical, natural, social and political assets needed to survive and develop as a viable 
economic and social agent in the context of an urbanized society and an internationally competitive market economy. 
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context of a market economy open to international competition? 
(2) Are EACs sustainable as economic organizations, or, as is often the case in many Latin American 
countries, are they simply dependent appendices of the public programs that created them? 
(3) What changes or adjustments to public policies and their instruments are needed to improve 
EACs' impact and sustainability? 
These questions are important for the 58,000 small farmer members of the 778 Chilean EACs, for 
whom these organizations constitute the main, or one of the main, vehicles for accessing different 
markets for goods and services. From their point of view, better designed and implemented public 
policies and instruments in support of their organizations should result in greater benefits from their 
collective efforts. 
These questions also matter to the Government of Chile and especially to INDAP, who is investing 
around $ 160 million 2 per year to support small-scale agriculture, much of it in programs directly 
targeted at EACs. It is quite obvious to anyone familiar with Chile that INDAP still has a long way to 
go in designing more pertinent, efficient and effective policies and programs to help small farmers 
consolidate their position in the country's new economic and institutional context. 
These questions are also important because major flaws are coming to light in the policies and 
programs designed in the early and mid-1990s. A large number of the EACs formed in the past five to 
10 years are failing and falling apart, and many people are becoming increasingly and justifiably 
skeptical about the policies' continued effectiveness. Unfortunately, much of the current debate, while 
necessary and even indispensable, is weakened by an almost complete lack of research to enlighten the 
discussion and separate the many myths, political preferences and expressions of self-interest from the 
more substantive and grounded criticisms. 
Very few people in Chile would today question the need for in-depth reform of the current policies 
and instruments which support EACs. Nor would they question the need for a new generation of 
policies to improve their pertinence, efficiency and impact. To me it seems that there is no better place 
to start this dialogue than by taking a hard look at what has actually occurred over the past decade. 
1.2.3 Conceptual perspective 
From a conceptual point of view, the main aim of this research is to understand the relationship 
between the institutional and the economic performance of these EACs. Hence the title of the book: 
Cooperating to Compete. 
By 'institutional performance' I refer to two complementary processes: 
(1) Internal institutional performance: the development of rules governing the interactions between 
EAC members, allowing them to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their collective 
action. 
(2) External institutional performance: the formation of networks used by the organization to interact 
with the broader rural community, with governmental programs and policies, with market agents, 
and with intermediate organizations and agents involved in promoting agricultural and rural 
development. 
2 All monetary figures in this book are in US dollars, unless otherwise stated. The exchange rate to the Chilean peso is the 
rate published by the Central Bank of Chile for the last day of the month to which the figure corresponds. Whenever a 
monetary sum is mentioned in one of the interview quotations included in the book, it has also been converted into US 
dollars, even if the person quoted actually mentioned Chilean pesos. 
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There are many 'technical' factors that can have a strong impact on the effectiveness and sustainability 
of an EAC. For example, good or bad management can make or break a business-oriented 
organization. Similarly, most would agree that if you are operating in a competitive market 
environment, it is important to do the right things and do them right in terms of the technologies and 
processes used by the EAC, in order to turn out a product that conforms to the demands, preferences 
and requirements of your clients or consumers. 
While the social capital literature has recently drawn attention to the relationship between rules, 
norms, networks and economic performance3, few studies demonstrate how these two factors relate to 
each other in the case of small farmers' organizations trying to compete in a developing country with a 
market economy. 
As I will discuss in the next chapter, several studies show how rural economic organizations with 
'bridging' social capital are better able to capture more resources from external agents (Woolcock and 
Narayan, 2000; Bebbington, 1997). This will make sense to anyone familiar with rural development 
programs, either of the type designed by governments, international donors and agencies, or by local 
NGOs: those better organized tend to be favored in the allocation of resources. By the same token, 
often these same institutional and organizational qualities prove insufficient when it comes to 
managing these resources in a way that sustains the organization when the external support comes to 
an end. 
There is also an abundant literature showing how institutionally 'robust' communities and 
organizations tend to manage common property resources better, especially when there has been a 
long-standing association between these resources and their managers (Ostrom, 1990; Uphoff and 
Wijayaratna, 2000). 
But few of these publications explore the specifics of the relationship between the institutional and the 
sustainable economic performance of business-oriented rural organizations. My research aims to 
contribute to filling this knowledge gap. 
1.3 The context 
1.3.1 The economic and social context4 
It is vital to stress that the formation and development of EACs has taken place in a national context of 
rapid economic growth and of very significant improvements in most social indicators. This favorable 
environment is very different to many other Latin American countries, where rural economic 
organizations have to struggle against a backdrop of economic and social stagnation or even 
involution. 
After 17 years of military rule and extreme neoliberal economic policies, in 1990 the new democratic 
government headed by Patricio Aylwin and his Center-Left coalition established a program of 
economic and social policies labelled "Growth with Equity". This program called for the maintenance 
of the fundamental aspects of the neoliberal macroeconomic policies put in place under the military, 
complemented by an aggressive expansion of social policies to tackle the very high poverty rates and 
great inequality inherited from the dictatorship. This basic development strategy has been maintained 
by the last two democratic administrations (Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, 1994-2000, and Ricardo Lagos, 
2000-2006). 
This program led to an average 8% annual growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 1990s, 
to an increase of 66% in the per capita GDP between 1989 and 2000, and to a rapid reduction of the 
3 For a recent review, see Woolcock and Narayan, 2000. 
4 Section based on official data from Chile's Central Bank (www.bcentral.cl) and Ministry of Planning and Cooperation 
(www.mideplan.cl). 
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annual inflation rate to around 4% from two-digit levels. The economy is increasingly export-oriented, 
and the value of exports grew in the '90s by about 90%. 
Because of the positive performance of the economy and also due to the strong growth in public social 
expenditure (up by 140% in the 1990s, reaching US$ 747 per capita in 1999), the percentage of poor 
households fell from 39% in 1990 to 22% in 1998, and the rate of extreme poverty also dropped in the 
same period from 13% to 6%. Rural poverty has fallen from 40% to 28%, and rural extreme poverty 
also dropped from 15% to 9%. Even in areas where rural poverty is concentrated, the real per capita 
income of poor households grew by over 50% between 1996 and 2000 (Ramirez et al., 2001). 
Illiteracy has been low for many years, and in 2000 it affected only 5% of the population. Essentially 
all children attend and complete primary education, and about 90% of those in the relevant age group 
attend secondary schools, even in the lowest two income quintiles. 
Age expectancy at birth is 78 years for women and 72 years for men. The child mortality rate is only 
10 per 1000 and decreasing. About 80% of the population is affiliated to one of the two health 
systems: one public, the other private. 
However, there has been no progress whatsoever in the reduction of inequality: in 1990 the richest 
one-tenth of the population had an income 14 times larger than the poorest one-tenth; a difference that 
by the year 2000 had grown to 15.3. 
It is also important to understand that Chilean society is highly urban. In the year 2000, 86% of the 
population of 15 million people lived in urban locations. Even those households whose main source of 
income is agriculture are rapidly becoming urban dwellers. In 1996, 40% of those 'agricultural 
households' lived in urban areas, compared to 30% only six years before (Berdegu6 et al., 2001). 
1.3.2 Agriculture in the 1990s5 
Chilean agriculture has experienced significant growth since the mid-'80s, with an average annual rate 
of growth of 6% between 1985 and 1997. Since agricultural growth is slower than the economy as a 
whole, its contribution to the national GDP dropped from 8% in 1990 to only 6% in 1997. 
Employment in agriculture also decreased from 22% in the mid-'80s, to 14% in the late '90s. The gap 
in labor productivity between agriculture and the economy as a whole has continued to expand 
steadily, and by the mid-'90s the difference was 42% between both indicators. In a context of growing 
employment outside agriculture and increasing educational standards among the rural population, this 
gap in labor productivity creates a tremendous incentive for agricultural workers and members of 
farmers' households to look for jobs outside the sector. 
However, these average figures mask the considerable heterogeneity within Chilean agriculture. The 
same economic and institutional policies that created a very favorable environment for the expansion 
of export agriculture, have led to the decline of the 'traditional' agricultural sector, i.e., the production 
of basic food commodities for the domestic market. 
Chilean agricultural exports more than tripled in value between 1987 and 1996, while the positive 
agricultural trade balance more than doubled in the same period. Fresh fruit and forest products each 
represented slightly less than half of the total value of agricultural exports in 1987, but 10 years later 
their relative contribution had dropped, showing the increasing diversification in exports, with the 
growing importance of the agroindustrial sector. In any case, all of these non-traditional exports have 
grown by between 300% and almost 600% since the mid-'80s. 
In contrast with the very successful expansion of export agriculture, the area under traditional 
commodity crops for the domestic market shrank by almost one-third in the decade prior to 1996. In 
5 Section based on data from Chile's Ministry of Agriculture, Office of Agrarian Studies and Planning (www.odepa.gob.cl), 
Central Bank (www.bcentral.cl) and Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (www.mideplan.cl). 
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part, this is due to significant growth in yields, allowing Chile to more or less maintain production 
levels of domestic crops, despite using less land. 
However, the main factors behind the relative stagnation of traditional agriculture have been: 
• opening the economy to international competition through a unilateral reduction of import tariffs 
and the signing of bilateral free trade agreements with a large number of countries, and, 
• the appreciation (by over 30%) of the Chilean peso against the US dollar; paradoxically the 
outcome of Chile's success in its export-promotion policies and in attracting direct foreign 
investment. 
For these reasons, real prices for the main traditional products dropped sharply between 1987 and 
1997: wheat by 37%; sugarbeet by 36%; potatoes by 43%; maize by 28%; and dry beans by 48%. 
During the same period, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) increased by over 350%. The CPI more or 
less reflects the cost of the inputs and consumer products that small farmers need to buy given the 
decreasing income from their crops. 
Clearly then, since the early 1990s peasant agriculture in Chile has been subjected simultaneously to 
'push' (decreasing value and profitability of traditional crops) and 'pull' (increasing economic 
attractiveness of non-traditional enterprises) incentives to move away from the traditional crops that 
almost completely dominated its farming systems 10 or 15 years ago. Rafael Castro, the small farmer 
quoted at the start of this chapter, was referring to this when he said: "to sell the land or to change. 
And we chose the latter." 
As I will discuss later in this chapter, agricultural development policies aimed at small farmers picked 
up these signals in the early 1990s and shifted from the conventional emphasis on increasing 
commodity yields to supporting the 'reconversion' of peasant agriculture into non-traditional and 
high-value products. 
1.3.3 Peasant agriculture in Chile 
According to the 1997 Agricultural Census, Chilean agriculture is composed of about 330,000 farms, 
of which about 8% belong to medium and large capitalist farmers and agribusiness firms. As in any 
other Latin American country, there are many different types of peasant farms and farming systems 
(CEPAL, 1984; Escobar and Berdegue, 1990), but these can be simplified into two very broad 
categories: 
(1) minifundia, where the household engages in subsistence agriculture to supplement other farm and 
non-farm sources of employment and income, and; 
(2) market-oriented small farms, where family-based agricultural production is the central activity 
around which the household's livelihood strategies are structured and organized. 
Most of the minifundia have their origin either in the early occupation during colonial times by 
impoverished Spaniards and mestizos of the areas surrounding the large Haciendas, or in the forced 
relocation of the native people a few decades after independence, in the early 20th century. 
A recent study based on 1997 data states that the minifundia category includes 102,766 farms (31% of 
all farms in Chile) covering 1.2 million hectares of land (2% of the total), of which slightly less than 
half is used for agricultural production. This gives an average of slightly more than five hectares of 
crops and pastures per farm (ODEPA, 2000). Other authors put the number of these subsistence farms 
at about 130,000 (Echenique, 2000). Most of these households are poor or extremely poor; their 
income is increasingly dependent on non-farm rural employment (Berdegue et al., 2001) or on being 
hired by commercial farms (Ramirez et al., 2001). In the past 10 years or so, monetary and non-
monetary subsidies from different social programs have grown in importance in the composition of the 
total income of these households. Out-migration by these households' younger members is high, as an 
expanding economy and better educational standards offer them non-rural employment opportunities 
(Ramirez et al., 2001). 
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According to ODEPA (2000), market-oriented small farms number about 176,000, or about half of all 
farms in Chile, although Echenique (2000) puts their number at around 100,000. They cover eight 
million hectares (16% of the national total), of which slightly more than 40% are under crops or 
pasture (ODEPA, 2001). According to ODEPA (2001), market-oriented small farmers in Chile control 
around 40% of the area under annual crops, vegetables, and grapes, and between one-quarter and one-
third of fruit orchards and improved and seeded pastures. These farmers also own around one-third of 
the bovine cattle, dairy cows, and sheep, and an even higher proportion of the goats and pigs. Over 
two-thirds of these farms originated during the expansion of the agricultural frontier in the late 19th 
and early 20th centuries, while the remaining third or so are survivors of the agrarian reform process 
(1964-73) and its liquidation under the military dictatorship in the mid-'70s (Box 1.1). 
Box 1.1 Land reform in Chile 
The agrarian reform was designed to create collective farms (asentamientos) from the Haciendas expropriated 
from the large landowners. The members of the asentamientos were basically extremely poor landless peasants 
who worked for the Haciendas under a pre-capitalist system known as Inquilinato. After the military coup in 
1973, the new government dissolved the asentamientos, returned a large fraction of the land to the original 
owners, and sold the rest to the peasants as private farms (parcelas de Reforma Agraria). More than half of the 
new parceleros eventually lost the land they received, either because they could not pay the government back, 
or simply because they could not survive the radical neo-liberal policies of the military dictatorship and the 
concomitant lack of public agricultural support services. Those market-oriented small fanners w h o 
survived are thus the veterans o f an extreme liberalization process, and many o f them evolved, in less 
than one generation, from illiterate, social ly marginalized landless servants under the Hacienda 
system, to small-scale entrepreneurs operating in a liberalized and internationally competit ive market 
economy. 
1.3.4 The Agricultural Development Institute (INDAP) 
A brief history 
The Agricultural Development Institute (Instituto de Desarrollo Agropecuario, INDAP) was founded 
in 1962 as part of a number of timid agrarian reform measures taken by Jorge Alessandri's right-wing 
government. This government was under pressure from the Kennedy administration in the USA and its 
Alliance for Progress, in response to the Cuban revolution. From 1964 under Eduardo Frei 
Montalva's6 Christian Democrat administration, and to a greater extent under Salvador Allende's left-
wing Popular Unity government, INDAP's political, financial and technical roles were expanded as 
part of the agrarian reform process. After the 1973 coup the military government put an abrupt end to 
INDAP's political role of supporting the emerging class of peasant landowners. It was reduced to a 
small and extremely weak agency providing extension services and small loans to fewer than 15,000 
small farms, although its coverage was expanded in the late 1980s to a total of about 25,000 
beneficiaries. In 1978, INDAP pioneered the semi-privatization or outsourcing of extension services, 
in an arrangement in which private consultant firms were subcontracted and paid with public funds to 
deliver technical assistance to small farmers (Berdegue, 1998). 
By the end of the military dictatorship in 1990, INDAP was limited to managing a rather small credit 
program and the outsourced extension service for small farmers. Its focus was strictly on providing on-
farm support for improving yields. To be fair, between 1984 and 1990, many commodities of great 
importance to small-scale farmers were achieving rather favorable prices, so it made economic sense 
for these growers and their advisors to put their energy into improving their yields as a way to increase 
income. 
6 Not to be confused with his son, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, who was President of Chile between 1994 and 2000. 
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INDAP's extension approach at this time was based on the Training and Visit system, promoted under 
the auspices of two consecutive World Bank loans that supported the 'voucher system' of semi-
privatized extension. As has been described elsewhere in detail (Berdegue, 1998), after an initial 
period of minimum governmental supervision of the work of the extensionist that ended in disaster, 
INDAP's Technology Transfer Program became rigid in its approach, fixing such parameters as the 
numbers of farmers per extensionist, or the number of farm visits and field days per year per farmer, 
and valuing the number of activities conducted over the actual results achieved. Farmer participation 
did not enter into the picture at all, except where individual extensionists were bold enough to deviate 
from official prescriptions. The private consultant firms were selected and hired by INDAP through a 
restricted bidding system that excluded any agency (such as NGOs) that could be remotely suspected 
of not being sympathetic or at least neutral to the military regime. 
During the mihtary regime the formation of any sort of grassroots organization was strictly forbidden, 
so INDAP's extension approach emphasized working primarily with individuals. INDAP's loans were 
all given to individuals, never to an organization, and were mostly short-term to finance the direct cost 
of the annual production cycles. There were few and limited financial instruments to support long-
term investments on-farm. 
With the return to democracy, the new ESTDAP authorities pushed for a new law to allow the institute 
to work with farmers' organizations, and to provide new forms of support. As soon as the law was 
approved, INDAP declared that one of its three main objectives was to strengthen farmers' 
organizations (INDAP, 1992). These organizations were now allowed to be subcontracted by INDAP 
to deliver extension services to their members and other small farmers and began to receive short and 
long-term loans so they could carry out economic activities on their own. 
The system of working through private organizations to deliver INDAP technical support services was 
maintained, but participation was immediately opened to NGOs, farmers' organizations, universities 
and to any other agency that could legally provide these types of services to small farmers. Extension 
methods were soon revised and updated. 
However, between 1990 and 1993 or so, a tension arose in INDAP's work with farmers' 
organizations. This tension was between its social representation role (an important policy objective in 
the years immediately following the return to democracy), and its role as a platform for the economic 
development of its members. This debate not only touched the public sector institutes, but also the 
farmers' organizations, as well as NGOs, academic centers, and so on. 
This debate was tied up with discussion about the basic strategy that Chile should take to support 
peasant agricultural development. On the one hand, some argued that public policies should emphasize 
broad social objectives and should develop institutional and economic barriers to partially isolate and 
protect small farmers from the effects of the country's free market policies. Others - myself included -
thought that an agricultural or rural development policy going against prevailing trends and processes 
in the wider society and in the economy in particular, could not hope to succeed. Instead, we argued 
that development policies should create incentives, transfer assets, and support the emergence of new 
skills so that small farmers could have a better chance of being successful market agents. 
The debate began to settle down as the crisis in traditional agriculture - in which most peasants were 
involved - worsened. With the accelerated opening of the economy and agriculture to international 
competition and the drop in the prices of most agricultural commodities for the domestic market, it 
became increasingly clear that unless action was taken peasants, and in particular those who were 
already market-oriented, would soon find themselves in an untenable position. The need to diversify 
away from traditional commodities and to gain new positions in the value-adding chain, was 
spontaneously recognized by a growing number of small farmers who started to loudly demand that 
INDAP reorient its support in that direction. 
In 1992 INDAP and the Ministry of Agriculture approved an official document that called for the 
restructuring of the technical assistance services along those lines. By 1993 the training program for 
extensionists was revised to give top priority to learning about non-traditional crops. More or less 
simultaneously, a number of new technical and financial instruments were designed and approved to 
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stimulate the formation and strengthening of EACs as the key organizational platforms through which 
small farmers could link to new, more dynamic and profitable markets. A new Marketing and 
Agroindustry Department was formed in INDAP to support market studies and the formulation and 
evaluation of investment projects in those areas. A huge effort was launched jointly by INDAP and 
FOSIS to expand small-scale irrigation systems, essential if small farmers were to move away from 
wheat and potatoes into vegetables, fruit and flowers. 
In 1994 a fresh INDAP administration strengthened this new approach through three strategies: 
(1) an acceptance that the productive orientation of small-scale farming was market-driven (which, in 
the conditions of Chile at that time, meant among other things diversification away from 
commodities into non-traditional enterprises and value-adding); 
(2) the replacement of the linear research-extension-farmer arrangement by more complex and diverse 
private-public networks and alliances, organized within a clearly-defined rural territory and geared 
towards giving peasant farmers access to a clearly identified 'market opportunity', and; 
(3) the recognition of business-oriented farmers' organizations (EACs) as the primary social agents 
for peasant agricultural development policies (TNDAP, 1994 and 1995). 
At first, these strategies were implemented via Microregional Development Projects (LNDAP, 1995); 
projects in which one or more EACs, operating in a well-defined territory, would interact with as 
many private and public agents as necessary to compete successfully in a clearly identified market. 
Each of these projects would involve a fairly large number of small farms (500 to 1000 or so). Instead 
of channeling its different technical and financial instruments individually, INDAP would provide all 
the necessary support in one single decision, against a well evaluated project proposal designed at the 
local and regional levels, with greater (but, in practice, limited) participation of the farmers through 
their EACs. Several of the EACs discussed in this book emerged from one of these Microregional 
Development Programs. 
At about the same time, INDAP began working on what were unofficially called 'mega-investment 
projects', projects costing US$ 1 million or more, to develop the production, marketing, processing 
and organizational infrastructure required to give small farmers access to particularly demanding and 
competitive markets, such as processed fruit and vegetables or cut flowers for export. While working 
for INDAP in 1994,1 was directly responsible for designing and implementing the first of these large 
projects (to produce top quality fresh vegetables for the upmarket supermarkets in Santiago). This 
project, and most others of its kind, failed miserably for reasons that will be discussed later. 
By 1995 it was clear that the formulaic approach of the Microregional Development Projects was too 
rigid, given the diversity within rural areas. In particular, LNDAP and the EACs soon learned that most 
market opportunities could not accommodate dozens or hundreds of small farmers, and that in many 
instances the relatively complex organizational arrangements were too cumbersome to manage and 
almost inevitably escaped the control of the farmers themselves, even when organized. 
LNDAP thus abandoned this last attempt to apply a formula to implement its strategies. From then on, 
any arrangement would be supported provided that: (a) it was based on an EAC, and (b) it was market-
driven and market-oriented. 
Since INDAP was already working with over 100,000 households by 1994, the integration of 
individual farmers into the new scheme was necessarily gradual, if nothing else because of the 
limitations of human and financial resources. A given local group of farmers - usually working with 
one of the private extension consultants - would first receive partial support for two or three years to 
gradually develop a market-oriented project and an EAC. After that period of time, if the group did not 
manage to achieve these objectives, INDAP would discontinue its support. This policy decision 
proved to be a grave mistake since it induced farmers to artificially form EACs even when they did not 
need or want one, or simply needed more time for their project to mature. Those farmers who did form 
an EAC (nearly all of them given the incentives), could then benefit from better technical and 
financial support to implement their market-oriented project. 
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INDAP's programs and instruments 
INDAP has developed a large number of programs and instruments to deliver the basic strategies 
outlined above. Table 1.1 briefly describes the main programs and instruments operating in 1999. 
One INDAP policy instrument used by many EACs to launch their projects was the Contest of 
Projects for the Modernization of Peasant Agriculture (Table 1.1). Instead of having to apply to each 
program separately, an EAC could enter a project into this contest. Their application could include 
funding for all types of technical and financial support required to launch their market-oriented 
project: legal services, technical assistance, management and administration staff, working capital, 
long-term loans to buy, build or equip any sort of productive, marketing or processing infrastructure, 
market studies, etc., without limit. When an EAC expressed its interest in participating in the contest, 
INDAP would hand out a grant so that it could hire the technical staff necessary to formulate the 
project proposal. The recipient of these grants and loans would be the EACs themselves, who of 
course retained the full right to select and hire whatever technical or managerial staff they required for 
their project. About 940 of these proposals were approved between 1995 and 2000 7 . Many of the 
EACs studied for this book launched their projects using this facility. 
The effectiveness of this instrument was constrained by inadequate and insufficient human resources 
within and outside LNDAP to formulate good market-oriented projects and to then be able to 
distinguish the good ones from the bad ones. In addition, very often when the technical staff rejected a 
project proposal during the evaluation phase, the EAC would use their newly acquired political power 
to publicly denounce this result, in many instances forcing a reversal of the technical decision. 
All of the policies and programs listed in Table 1.1 were possible thanks to the sustained growth of the 
INDAP budget, growing at an average annual rate of about 6% in Chilean pesos, adjusted for inflation. 
In 1998, INDAP had a budget of US$ 164 million, nearly two-thirds of the total budget of the Ministry 
of Agriculture. 
During President Eduardo Frei's term (1994-2000), LNDAP spent or invested close to US$ 900 million 
to support about 150,000 small farmers and their households8. Of this amount, about 6% corresponds 
to long-term loans and 4% to short-term loans to rural organizations (including EACs, but not 
restricted to them). Approximately two-thirds of the loans to rural organizations were allocated 
through the Contest of Projects for the Modernization of Peasant Agriculture. Slightly more than one-
third of the budget during 1994-2000 was allocated to individual small farmers - of which about 40% 
were EAC members - through long and short-term loans (37% and 63%, respectively). An additional 
15% financed the cost of the technical assistance services provided by private subcontractors, in many 
cases the EACs themselves. About 8% of the budget is spent on a number of subsidies to EACs, other 
rural organizations and individual farmers, for a number of professional services (e.g., market studies 
and evaluation of investment projects) and farm and off-farm investments. INDAP's administrative 
overhead is around 19% of its budget, and about 10% goes to paying the foreign debt of the Institute 
(essentially the World Bank loans). The remaining 5% is spent on a number of smaller programs. 
Around 33% to 40% of INDAP's annual budget is financed by the recovery of loans to farmers and 
organizations, a similar proportion through fresh funds from the Ministry of Finances, 14% through 
foreign loans, and the rest through the sale of INDAP assets and various other sources. 
7 Plus an additional 400 that were approved under individual projects. 
8 These and the following budget data come from the Annual Reports published by INDAP. The annual accounts are audited 
by the National Comptrollers Office and can be trusted to closely reflect actual expenses. 
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Table 1.1 Programs and instruments operated by ENDAP in 1999 
Area Program or instrument Description 
Financial 
services 
Short-term loans to 
individuals 
Finances all types of annual crop and animal production expenses, with 
loans up to US$ 7,772 and an annual interest rate adjusted for inflation of 
7.8% 
Short-term loans to 
organizations 
Finances all types of annual crop and animal production, marketing, and 
processing expenses. There is no maximum limit to the amount that can be 
lent. The interest rate is the same as that for individual loans. 
Long-term loans to 
individuals 
Finances all types of investment projects related to agricultural production, 
marketing, processing, machinery, equipment, buildings, etc., up to US$ 
18,660. The annual interest rate adjusted for inflation is 7.8% 
Long-term loans to 
organizations 
Finances all types of investment projects related to agricultural production, 
marketing, processing, machinery, equipment, buildings, etc. There is no 
maximum limit to the amount that can be lent. The annual interest rate 
adjusted for inflation is 7.8% 
National Contest for the 
Modernization of Peasant 
Agriculture 
Competitive fund that in a single decision allocates all the forms of support 
necessary to carry out a predefined development project. The contest gives 
priority to projects that will allow a farmer or group of farmers to carry out 
innovative economic activities. The project investments are financed with 
75% long-term loans, 15% in a direct subsidy to offset the risk of 
innovation, and 10% that is contributed by the beneficiaries. The 
professional services required by the project are subsidized with up to US$ 
500 per direct participant. TNDAP also subsidizes the cost of the professional 
services required to prepare the project proposal. 
Irrigation and Drainage 
Program 
This program operates under two arrangements: (a) Direct financing of 
minor projects, in which INDAP allocates up to US$ 3,111 per project in the 
form of a direct subsidy to the beneficiaries, (b) Law 18,450. This law 
established a subsidy to stimulate private investments in irrigation or 
drainage by any farmer in Chile; the subsidy is administered by a special 
agency, and funding is allocated through a competitive system. To facilitate 
the access of small farmers to the benefits of this law, INDAP subsidizes the 
cost of the engineering and economic evaluation studies, and then provides a 
bridging loan of up to USS 750,000 per project. INDAP is paid back by the 
farmers after they receive the subsidy established by this law, once the 
irrigation or drainage system is built according to specifications. 
Program for the 
Development of Small-
scale Animal Production 
Systems 
This program, known as BOGAN, provides a direct subsidy to projects that 
involve: (a) improvement of infrastructure for animal production or for 
processing and marketing of animal products (up to USS 3,111 for on-ferm 
investments, and up to USS 31,000 for off-farm associative projects), and/or 
(b) improvement of the herds (up to USS 1,867 per farmer). 
Program for the 
Recuperation of 
Degraded Soils 
This program subsidizes investments carried out by small farmers to control 
or revert soil degradation processes. It considers several different 
subprograms, such as restoration of natural pastures or building of works to 
control soil erosion. Depending on the nature of the investment, it subsidizes 
between 50% to 80% of the total cost, with a maximum of USS 6,900 per 
farm. To access this program, the farmer must submit a Soil Management 
Plan. The subsidy is allocated after the plan has been implemented according 
to its specifications. INDAP can give a loan to the farmer to carry out the 
investments, and the loan is paid back with the subsidy. 
Subsidy for Financial 
Articulations 
The purpose of this subsidy is to stimulate private banks to give loans to 
small farmers. The subsidy offsets the higher transaction costs of lending to 
a small farmer. Through a system of public biddings, INDAP gives a 
subsidy of USS 175 per client to the private banks. 
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Area Program or instrument Description 
Forestry Subsidy Law 19,561 establishes a subsidy to stimulate forest plantations and 
management. The subsidy is administered by another agency. The subsidy is 
allocated once the project has been implemented according to specifications. 
In the case of small farmers, INDAP provides a bridging loan so they can 
carry out the project. The loan is paid back with the subsidy. The amount of 
the loan (and subsidy) differs according to regions and types of forests, but 
in the case of small farmers it is calculated so that it can pay up to 75% of 
the total cost of planting up to 15 hectares per farmer. 
Professional and 
technical 
services 
Entrepreneurial Advisory 
Services 
This program subsidizes the cost of the advisory services provided to small 
farmers or their organizations by private subcontractors (private consultants, 
NGOs, •farmers organizations, universities or technical departments of 
municipal governments). The program includes three main arrangements: (a) 
Local Advisory Services (SAL), pays up to 90% of the cost of the 
professional services, with a maximum of US$ 373 per farmer. It is aimed at 
supporting local informal groups who for the first time receive technical 
assistance and who, in a period of up to two years, must formulate a concrete 
market-oriented development project (b) Advisory Services to Projects 
(SAP), pays between 90% (year 1) and 70% (year 5) of the cost of the 
professional services, with a maximum of USS 560 per farmer. It is designed 
to support the implementation of the projects formulated during the previous 
two year phase, (c) Specialized Advisory Services (SAE), provides an 
annual subsidy of up to US$ 68,500 per economic organization, with a 
ceiling of USS 311 per member. SAE is allocated to formal economic 
organizations (EAC) that are already involved in the full implementation of 
their business. 
In all cases, the professional services can be of whatever nature is required 
by the group, organization or project, including agronomists, business 
managers, etc. 
Management Centers 
(CEGE) 
The CEGE are specialized units that provide management and 
administration services and advice to economic organizations. The CEGE 
are owned by one or more farmers' organizations, but the services are 
subcontracted to qualified agencies such as universities. The costs of the 
CEGE are variable and are almost fully subsidized by INDAP, although the 
CEGE is expected to generate income. 
Fund for Entrepreneurial 
Development (FODEM) 
This subsidy is allocated through a competitive bidding process. It pays for 
the costs of specialized external advisors who help farmers' organizations 
carry out a diagnosis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats, 
followed by the formulation of Strategic and Business Plans. The whole 
process can last for up to two years. The amount of the subsidy varies. 
Fund to Support the 
Development of Farmers 
Organizations (GESTOR-
FONDAC) 
This instrument subsidizes the cost of the advisors and facilitators involved 
in the initial development stages of an economic organization. It can pay for 
such activities as participatory diagnosis and planning, training, training of 
leaders, legal costs, and so on. 
INDAP-TELEDUC 
Training Program 
A TV-based distance education program implemented in coordination with a 
specialized department of one of the most important universities. It is aimed 
at farmers who are already receiving the support of the Entrepreneurial 
Advisory Services, and it focuses on farm management and administration. 
Between 1997 and 1999 it trained 12,000 farmers, with a total cost of USS 
1.3 million. 
INDAP-PRODEMU 
Training Program for 
Rural Women 
This program is run in collaboration with another specialized agency. It 
organizes training workshops to develop skills, mostly in income-generating 
non-rarm activities. Between 1996 and 2000 it trained 22,000 women with a 
per capita cost of USS 160. 
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Area Program or instrument Description 
Price and Markets 
Information System 
This system is managed by a network of national and regional agencies. It 
provides price and market forecasts for all major products of small-scale 
agriculture, as well as several regional daily price and market bulletins 
which can be accessed by phone, fax or the Internet. The bulletins are also 
faxed daily to many EACs who usually post them on a bulletin board for 
public consultation. 
Local Development 
Service for Poor Rural 
Communities 
(PRODESAL) 
PRODESAL is the standard program providing technical assistance to poor 
and extremely poor households, at a cost of US$ 250 per household. Each 
PRODESAL unit is managed by the municipal government. The services are 
provided by private subcontractors, who carry out activities in three main 
domains: agricultural production, natural resource management, and 
facilitation of access by poor households to any type of economic 
development program or social service provided by the government or the 
private sector. In 1999 PRODESAL was working with about 20,000 
households through 166 Cooperation Agreements with municipal 
governments. 
Chile Norte and Chile 
Austral Projects 
These two projects provide services to 1600 households in poor rural areas 
in the extreme north and south of the country, at a total cost of USS 1.1 
million, donated by the European Union. 
Project for the 
Development of Peasant 
Communities in Region 
rv (PRODECOP-IV) 
PRODECOP-rV is partially funded with a loan from the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IF AD). It provides technical and financial 
services to some of the poorest rural communities in Chile, benefiting 7,400 
households at a total cost of USS 14 million. Two of its strongest areas are 
natural resource management and the development of rural micro-
enterprises, some of which have had considerable success. It pioneered an 
institutional innovation called CDL (Local Development Committees), 
which bring together multiple stakeholders under the umbrella of the 
municipal government, to plan and direct local development strategies and 
activities. The CDL have been adopted by other INDAP programs. In the 
year 2001 it received a prize from the Ford Foundation for "institutional 
innovations in the fight against poverty". 
Project for the 
Development of Peasant 
Communities in the 
Dryland Areas 
(PRODECOP-Secano) 
PRODECOP-Secano is partially funded with a loan from the World Bank. It 
provides technical and financial services to 8,000 poor households in the 
dryland areas of six regions, at a cost of USS 15 million. It focuses on 
natural resource management and the development of small-scale irrigation 
systems linked to productive diversification projects. 
Over the past seven years or so, the main budget trends relevant to our discussion have included: 
• a continuous growth that has more than doubled the proportion of loans given to organizations as 
opposed to individual farmers, especially those allocated through competitive mechanisms; 
• a higher rate of growth of long-term loans compared to short-term credit; 
• a higher rate of growth of subsidies to EACs and individuals to pay for professional services and 
investments, compared to financing through loans. 
1.4 Organization of the book 
After this introductory chapter, this book is organized as follows: 
• Chapter 2 reviews the literature and presents the conceptual framework on which this research is 
based. 
• Chapter 3 outlines my research methods. 
• Chapter 4 describes the EACs, based on a survey of424 organizations. 
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• Chapter 5 analyzes the characteristics of EAC members in terms of their households and farms, 
and compares them with a control sample. It also analyzes the variables that affect the probability 
of a small fanner joining an EAC. 
• Chapter 6 assesses the impacts of EAC membership on farms' economic performance and on the 
income of participating households. 
• Chapter 7 analyzes the balance sheets and income statements of 410 EACs, to understand their 
financial sustainability. 
• Chapters 8 to 12 look at several case studies to analyze the factors that have led to the relative 
success or failure of 14 EACs. Here I present and discuss the relationship between EACs' 
institutional and economic performance and their sustainability. The case studies have been 
ananged in different chapters based on the types of products, activities and markets involved: 
0 Chapter 8: milk collection centers who sell their production to small and medium-sized cheese 
factories; 
• Chapter 9: milk collection centers working with contracts with large dairy agribusiness firms; 
• Chapter 10: EACs marketing potatoes for the wholesale market; 
• Chapter 11: cooperatives marketing fresh vegetables, and; 
• Chapter 12: EACs processing and marketing raspberries. 
• Chapter 13 discusses the main conclusions of this research. 
1.5 A word about myself and the subject of this book 
I warn the reader that I do not write this book as an external and detached observer, but as someone 
who has been thoroughly involved in, and committed to supporting, designing and implementing the 
public policies and programs for developing these EACs. Between 1984 and 1990, during the years of 
the mibtary dictatorship in Chile, I worked for an NGO that earned out various farming systems 
research and development projects; our experience, together with that of many other NGOs and a few 
of the surviving local rural organizations, provided many of the initial ideas for the agrarian program of 
the democratically elected government inaugurated in 1990. 
In 1989 I was a member of the Agrarian Commission in charge of preparing the Program of 
Government of Mr Patricio Aylwin (President of Chile 1990-1994), and coordinated the committee to 
design the governmental program for rural development and small-scale agriculture. At that time, 
many of us were already saying that the major macroeconomic and institutional changes occurring 
were largely irreversible and that we therefore needed to implement strategies that challenged the 
conventional way of promoting rural and agricultural development, especially those most directly 
affecting small-scale farming. It seemed clear that small-scale farmers would increasingly have to 
compete on the domestic and international markets, and that it was folly to think that rural and 
agricultural development policies could be powerful enough to protect peasants from the wider 
macroeconomic and institutional context. In addition, we argued that most small farmers would never 
compete with large-scale capitalist producers by continuing to focus on increasing their productivity in 
traditional agricultural commodities. 
In 1991-1992,1 coordinated a public-private Commission based at the Ministry of Agriculture. Its aim 
was to reform one of the main small-scale agriculture policy instruments, LNDAP's Technology 
Transfer Program (PTT). This Commission was the first to target public policy and its instruments at 
the 'reconversion' of small-scale agriculture. This process was actively supported by the public sector, 
and aimed to strengthen the individual and collective capacities of small-scale farmers, and to give 
them effective access to the different markets for goods and services. The ultimate aim was for small 
farmers to achieve adequate levels of competitiveness in a market-oriented and globalized economy. 
This policy had four areas of action, each aimed at overcoming one of the obstacles to small farmer 
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competitiveness: 
(1) Markets: emphasizing the need to improve small farmers' market orientation and marketing 
options, particularly supporting value-adding and processing of their primary products; 
(2) Technologies: including what we called 'hard' (primary production focused) and 'soft' 
(management and administration focused) technologies. They all aimed to help small farmers 
move away from traditional commodities towards new farm enterprises; 
(3) Financing: substantially increasing the flow of long-term funding, through loans and subsidies, to 
support the investments required to reconvert small-scale agriculture towards new and more 
profitable enterprises; and 
(4) Organization: developing strong economic organizations to allow small farmers to overcome their 
limitations of scale of production, access to all sorts of resources, lack of political power, and so 
on. 
Between 1992 and 1995 I was INDAP's Chief of Agricultural Development, a position more or less 
equivalent to being Director of Operations. Under two different National Directors, I was part of a 
group of people responsible for designing and managing the policies and programs dealing with 
technology, marketing, agro-processing, irrigation and credit for small-scale farmers. This job gave me 
major responsibility for implementing the reconversion strategy for small-scale agriculture. 
Many changes, large and small, were implemented during those four years. As this book will show, 
many of them led nowhere due to poor diagnosis, bad design, faulty implementation or friction with 
the surrounding contexts, policies, institutions and organizations. In many instances, I had direct or 
even sole responsibility for these mistakes. But I think that most observers would agree that the many 
hundreds of people involved in promoting these changes, did manage to change the nature of the 
development policies that supported small-scale farming, to the extent that today very few would want 
to return to the old policies and strategies. There is of course a lot of discussion in agrarian circles in 
Chile today, but by and large that debate centers on how to do things in a better way, with very few 
questioning what needs to be done. Few would argue with Rafael Castro, the member of the EAC El 
Sobrante, when he says that given the macroeconomic and institutional context, small farmers have to 
change to survive. Public policies should aim at stimulating and supporting this change. 
Since leaving INDAP in 1995, I have worked for RIMISP (the International Farming Systems 
Research Methodology Network), a Latin American network of public and private research and 
development organizations with projects in several countries in the region. Together with several 
collaborating institutes, RIMISP has been evaluating some of the programs in Chile which I helped to 
design. Part of the field data and information on which this book is based was obtained as part of those 
studies. 
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CHAPTER 2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
This study aims to understand the economic and institutional performance of EACs in Chile and their 
impact on their small farmer members. This is an important objective because 10 years into a new 
government strategy for small-scale agriculture - in which EACs figure prominently - there are clear 
signs of trouble. As will be shown in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, many of these EACs have failed and their 
contribution to their members' competitiveness and welfare is not as strong as we had expected a 
decade ago. Understanding the conditions under which these EACs can perform well will inform the 
debate on how to improve future public pobcies and programs for small-scale agriculture in Chile. 
I have taken a multi-disciplinary approach to this research. This includes various theoretical 
perspectives on the economic behavior of individuals and firms, on the institutional conditions for 
economic cooperation, and on the networks and learning processes required for EACs to succeed in 
their commercial ventures. 
Critiques by Niels Roling and colleagues of the linear paradigm of agricultural innovation and 
Roling's concept of Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems (AKIS) underpin my analysis 
of the public policies that facilitated EAC emergence in Chile from the mid-90s, as well as for 
conceptualizing the networks in which they participate as (potential) multi-agent soft systems (Roling, 
1988; Roling and Engel, 1991, Roling and Jiggins, 1998). Closely associated with this theoretical 
tradition, the notion of social learning (LEARN Group, 2000) has allowed me to interpret the process 
through which some EACs develop effective networks and systems of rules to govern their own and 
their members' performance. 
From neo-institutional economics (North, 1990, 1996; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1998, 2001; Stiglitz, 
1986; Bardhan, 1989b; Williamson, 1985) I have used the concept of transaction costs to structure my 
analysis of the market conditions under which EACs can succeed and make a contribution to the 
economic performance of their members as independent small farmers. 
I apply the theory of social capital (Putnam, 1993; Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Uphoff, 1999) to 
analyze how the norms, values, attitudes and beliefs that predispose people toward cooperation have 
affected EACs' perfomance. I also draw on that theory to understand how roles, rules, precedents, 
procedures and social networks facilitate cooperation and collective action (Uphoff, 1999). 
From Ostrom's (1990, 1992, 1999) comparative institutional analysis I have taken the concept of 
design principles of institutionally robust organizations for collective action, to structure my analysis 
of EACs' internal systems of rules and of how such rules condition the performance and effectiveness 
of these organizations. 
In the sections which follow I first analyze the limitations of the conventional linear approaches to 
small farmer agricultural development. I then discuss the market conditions under which EACs can 
improve their members' farms and the welfare of their households. Next I discuss the roles of multi-
agent networks in the emergence and performance of EACs. Finally, I look at how social capital and, 
in particular, internal systems of rules, affect the emergence and performance of EACs. 
2.2 Cochrane's treadmill and the Chilean response 
EACs in Chile are part of a broad set of programs to help small farmers escape "the agricultural 
treadmill" (Cochrane, 1958, 1979). This concept can be explained as follows. A large number of 
farmers produce the same undifferentiated product None of them is large enough to influence market 
prices, and all are price-takers. Those who are early adopters of new technologies can raise their 
productivity and make a windfall profit. The new technologies eventually diffuse to many farmers, 
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average productivity rises, production levels increase, and prices drop. The main effect of late 
adoption is essentially to reduce prices, and hence, the profits of all farmers. The cycle goes on and on. 
Those farmers who lag behind in the continuous adoption of new technologies are unable to compete 
on this treadmill and are eventually forced out of the market. 
Cochrane's theory originally applied to products that face low elasticity of demand. Sunding and 
Zilberman (2001) argue that late adopters will also be driven out of the market when agricultural 
commodities have high elasticity of demand. This is because increased profitability caused by the 
introduction of a new technology will increase land rents, thus reducing the profits of late adopters and 
increasing those of early adopters. 
intimately this type of technological change leads to the accumulation of resources by a minority of 
farmers who have the assets and capabilities to lead the innovation process, while the majority 
migrates out of agriculture (Sunding and Zilberman, 2001). Firms producing the technologies also 
benefit from Cochrane's treadmill, since, recognizing the dynamics of adoption, they will adjust then-
economic behavior accordingly and take advantage of their monopolistic power (Stoneman and 
Ireland, 1983). 
The vast majority of Chilean small farmers produce just a few commodities: wheat, maize, sugarbeet, 
potatoes, and grain legumes. The very limited support programs for small-scale farming that survived 
the dictatorship years were totally focused on improving yields. INDAP's Technology Transfer 
Program (PTT), loosely based on the Training and Visit system, was completely oriented to this goal. 
Extensionists essentially spent most of their time promoting a few simple technologies (fertilizers and 
improved varieties, and sometimes, planting dates and weed control practices) that research had 
identified as solutions to the main yield-limiting constraints of the major crops. Subsidized credit 
programs provided partial funding to purchase those inputs. Extension and credit were made available 
to small farmers who were thought to be 'viable' (a term that was explicitly used by public officials 
until 1990) under market conditions. 
The support policies for small-scale agriculture that began to take shape in the early-90s, after the 
return to democracy, have aimed to help farmers escape Cochrane's treadmill by stimulating their 
diversification away from undifferentiated products9. 
Roling et al. (1998) and Hubert et al. (2000) have analyzed the symbiotic relationship between 
Cochrane's agricultural treadmill and the assumption that innovation can be stimulated by delivering 
to farmers standardized technology packages developed by research systems. They have highlighted 
the critically important undesirable effects that have resulted from the emphasis on high yields, such as 
the intensification of the environmental impacts of agriculture, the loss of biodiversity, threats to 
consumer health, and the disruption of regional economies and rural communities. They have also 
argued that the conventional linear paradigm of agricultural innovation cannot deal with the complex 
problems facing many small-scale farmers. Complex problems and objectives cannot be tackled 
through the adoption of ready-made solutions, but through concerted action involving social learning 
by a wide diversity of actors. 
Such was the task at hand in Chile. Breaking away from the perception of small farmer development 
involving increasing yields of agricultural commodities, demanded much more than simply 
transferring a different set of technologies. To begin with, it involved facilitating the emergence of a 
shared new perspective on agricultural development among a diverse group of actors (farmers, 
extensionists, researchers, and government officials). It also required networks to be built linking 
rural communities with market agents (agroindustries, export firms, commercial banks) who were 
often perceived by small farmers, extensionists and government officials, as threats, rather than 
potential partners. This effort meant building new types of organizational platforms for new forms of 
9 This was always seen as a necessarily gradual process as small farmers lacked the resources to make a complete transition 
out of commodities and into new enterprises, value-adding and marketing activities, and markets. The assumption was that if 
small farmers take the first step towards a new venture, that - coupled with proactive public policies and support programs -
would create the incentives and generate the capacities to sustain the process. 
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market-oriented collective action; such platforms were not traditional institutions among Chile's rural 
people. It required new concepts and methods to facilitate these processes to be leamt by extensionists 
who knew how to teach farmers 'how to do' things, but little of how to support communication, 
learning, and iterative decision-making processes in uncertain environments. 
Thus extensionists were no longer expected to deliver ready-made technologies to 'beneficiaries'. 
They were now expected to engage with local farmers' groups and other stakeholders to identify 
market opportunities, and to design and implement 'medium-term plans' (with a three to five year 
horizon) to facilitate concerted action so as to achieve their objectives. The extensionists' 'annual 
work plans', with their detailed lists of farm visits, demonstration plots, and field days, were simply 
thrown away. To be sure, the initial alternative designs were still based on the notion that new 
technical knowledge and leadership 'delivered' to rural communities and organizations would be the 
key to solving their problems. But it did not take long to learn that this assumption was very wrong. 
Extensionists and government officials jumped into the fray unarmed, lacking the necessary skills 
needed for these new circumstances. Even today, this problem continues to have dire consequences. 
Yet, only one year after launching the new approach, a review of the 'medium term plans' showed that 
42% of the 1,109 small farmers' local groups participating in the extension system were intending to 
introduce new commercial crops and farm enterprises; 47% were engaged in marketing activities; and 
11% had set up the facilities to add value to primary products before reaching the market (Berdegue 
and Marchant, 2000). A 1997 impact assessment study of the small farmers' extension program using 
data from that season concluded that 48% of the participants (compared with 25% of the non-
participants) had started to diversify their farming systems away from commodity production 
(Ministerio de Economia and Ministerio de Agriculture, 1998). 
To support this process, new programs were created to substantially expand irrigation on small farms 
(indispensable for the production of vegetables, fruits, flowers, vegetable seeds, and so on); to provide 
long-term loans and subsidies to finance farm and off-farm investments; to support market studies and 
the evaluation of investment projects, etc. 
Traditional commodities did have one advantage: practically any small farmer acting alone could sell 
his or her production. This was not so simple when the product was flowers or raspberries, rather than 
wheat, especially if the farmer wanted to grade, process, package, or label the raw products before 
taking them to market, or if he or she wanted to enter into long-term contractual arrangements with 
supermarket chains or medium and large agroindustries and export firms. EACs were needed as the 
basic organizational platforms for carrying out value-adding activities and accessing the new markets. 
I therefore define an EAC as a legally constituted organization whose members or owners are 
exclusively or mainly small farmers and peasants who control the decision-making process in the 
organization, which carries out marketing or value-adding10 activities directly linked (upstream or 
downstream) to its members' primary production, and whose main purpose is to improve the 
performance of its members' farms as economic units that engage in market transactions". 
This definition contains one important difference from the critiques of the agricultural treadmill and 
the linear paradigm of agricultural innovation by Roling et al. (1998) and Roling and Jiggins (1998). 
They disagree with the notion of economic competitiveness as a guiding principle of agricultural 
For the purpose of this study, I use the term 'value-adding' in the broad sense of the business strategy and management 
literature, to include actions along the chain from farm production through distribution, processing and marketing, with the 
goal of differentiating products for specific market segments. According to this view, value-adding is not limited to 
downstream (from the farm) processing activities that transform a raw product, as it can also include actions upstream, at the 
ferm level, and downstream, and not only restricted to processing. 
1 1 Although applicable to Chile, definitions similar to this one have been adopted in other countries, even some with very 
different conditions. For example, the Committee for the Integration of Peasant Economic Organizations of Bolivia (CIOEC-
B) in a recent document demands the development of a legal framework that can accommodate "all the peasant organizations 
that are formed to participate in the transformation, industrialization and marketing of rural production." (CIOEC-B, 2000, 
p. 2). 
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development. This is not the case in my approach. In my view, achieving competitiveness is necessary 
if small-scale agriculture is to become a viable social and economic sector in Latin America (Berdegue 
and Escobar, 1997). Stepping off the agricultural treadmill does not imply doing away with economic 
rationality (Petit, 2000), but mobilizing, through social learning and adaptive management, those 
characteristics of small-scale farming and rural communities which can become competitive 
advantages vis-a-vis certain differentiated products and markets. 
2.3 Market conditions under which EACs can be effective 
Implicitly or explicitly, peasant agricultural development strategies assume that if peasants organize, 
they will be better off than if they don't. At a general level, this thesis of rural development is correct. 
In Latin America, where societies are characterized by such high inequality and exclusion, peasants 
are subject to economic, social, ethnic and political discrimination (and increasingly in many rural 
areas given the feminization of agricultural labor, to gender discrimination as well). Any effort to 
redress this condition requires the state to strengthen the bargaining power of the less favored. We 
have seen in the past 20 or 30 years that strategies based on direct intervention in the economy were 
usually hi-jacked by the politically and economically powerful: "... without political and social 
empowerment, which is by no means indifferent to economic performance, it is foreseeable that under 
the new conditions of deregulation and flexibility in production organization, the farmers and the 
rural poor - without the strength of a democratic organization and participation - will face greater 
disadvantages resulting from the opening of the economies and the influence of entrenched local 
powers" (Gordillo, 1999, p. 3). 
Latin American agrarian markets are notoriously imperfect or non-existent. In this environment, the 
value and productivity of poor people's assets are significantly reduced. It has been shown that 
farmers' and rural organizations can at least partly substitute for these imperfect or missing markets 
(de Janvry and Sadoulet, 2001; Stiglitz, 1986, 1989). 
It has also been argued that as rural markets become more liberalized and integrated into the global 
economy, local communities will need to develop new skills for interacting - often impersonally - with 
a broader set of actors whose decisions and actions will undoubtedly have growing repercussions for 
their own livelihoods (Berdegue and Escobar, 1997; Bebbington, 2001). Traditional local institutions12 
are unlikely to be able to structure these new interactions. The new rural economic organizations, 
often closely linked to, or embedded within traditional social structures, provide local communities 
with the networks required to operate in an increasingly global context. 
However, fhese general statements do not ensure that an individual EAC will always be effective in 
meeting its members' needs. It is this gap between the general and the specific that my research aims 
to address. 
As the above definition of an EAC makes clear, the purpose of these organizations - recognized as 
such not only by public policies but also implicitly or explicitly by most farmers and farmers' leaders 
whom I have talked to - is to improve the economic performance of members' farms as economic 
units engaged in market transactions. It is important to discuss the market conditions under which an 
EAC could theoretically achieve this purpose. 
2.3.1 Overcoming transaction costs 
The first factor to consider is that participating in an EAC is not a cost- or risk-free option. The fact 
Institutions are "the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. They are made up of formal constraints 
(rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of behavior, conventions and self-imposed codes of conduct), and 
their enforcement characteristics " (North, 1996, p. 344). 
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that most farmers in Chile have not joined EACs (Chapter 5) is no accident. Aside from the tangible 
costs of participation (membership fees and so on), farmers who join an EAC have to evaluate the 
likely outcome of their participation, which in turn depends on the behavior of their co-members. 
Participation may open new options to the members, but they also lose flexibility in certain areas of 
decision-making, where 'sovereignty' is transferred from the individual household to the collective. 
Game theory and the concepts of "the tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968), Prisoner's Dilemma 
(Dawes, 1973) and "logic of concerted action" (Olson, 1965), show that under many circumstances 
individuals' narrow self-interest will undermine collective action. Factors external to the organization 
also add to the risk involved in participating in a collective action initiative, such as, for example, the 
volatile nature of certain markets, the consequences of new trade agreements, or the changes in the 
political climate. The experience of Chilean small farmers' organizations over the past three decades is 
a reminder of the likelihood of failure, and its serious and enduring consequences. 
Core benefits 
Thus EACs need to offer clear benefits to members to offset the tangible and intangible costs of 
participation. Sexton and Iskow (1988) argue that voluntary organizations such as agricultural 
cooperatives will only be successful if they provide benefits to their members in excess of what is 
available elsewhere. They also argue that such organizations offer no advantage in the context of a 
competitive market, i.e., one where there are (a) a large number of buyers and sellers that preclude 
collusion; (b) no barriers to entry and exit; (c) no product differentiation, and; (d) equal availability of 
all relevant information to all market agents. 
Ruben (1997, p. 315), in his study of land reform cooperatives in Honduras, takes a similar position: 
"there is no reason to belong to a cooperative organization if income and employment expectations 
cannot be satisfied. Cooperative farms are first and foremost economic organizations that should 
contribute to the satisfaction of the members' objectives". Under the conditions of his study, Ruben 
found that these cooperatives were responses to labor and commodity market failures, and that their 
principal function was to protect small farmers from risk by offering a set of contractual choices 
between collective and individual production, or what he calls a "modernized version of the well-
known sharecropping agreement" (Ruben, 1997, p. 305). Yet Ruben concludes that a competitive 
market environment is one of the major external factors required for these cooperatives to succeed, 
and that, on the contrary, market environments characterized by high transaction costs 1 3 and high risks 
are a failure factor. 
De Janvry and Sadoulet (1998) analyzed a number of disadvantages faced by smallholders wanting to 
integrate into markets, all of them related to market imperfections: 
• undefined or weak land property rights; 
• lack of formal collateral limiting their access to credit markets; 
• risk coping through costly mechanisms that are ineffective under certain circumstances, such as 
large shocks; 
• lack of insurance markets that drive households into risk management strategies that reduce the 
return of their economic activities; 
• shallow markets with high negative covariation between production and prices; 
• high unit costs in market transactions, and 
• land markets biased against smallholders. 
Transaction costs are "the costs of measuring the valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs ofprotecting 
rights and policing and enforcing agreements" (North, 1990, p.27). 
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In addition to these market failures, there are other disadvantages that relate to new markets' standards 
requirements, with implications for technologies and equipment (refrigerated trucks, special 
warehouses, processing equipment, etc.), and for knowledge (managers, traders, specialized 
technology advisors, legal advisors, accountants, and so on). The stronger the market imperfections, 
the higher the transaction costs faced by small farmers, to the point where they may be driven out of 
the market altogether and forced to rely instead on non-market institutions. 
Holloway et al. (2000) argue that small-scale milk producers in East Africa face large transaction costs 
that preclude their participation in the milk market. These include: high marketing costs, the dispersion 
of milk markets, and the high risk of marketing perishables under those conditions. Their study 
confirms that the establishment of milk collection centers increases smallholders' participation in fluid 
milk markets, in part by reducing transaction costs. Yet these institutional innovations are by 
themselves insufficient to catalyze entry into the market, and they need to be accompanied by the 
provision of other inputs, including infrastructure and assets accumulated by the households. 
As transaction costs increase with a specific product and market, one would expect to observe an 
increasing impact of EAC membership on various household or farm-level indicators. Non-traditional 
agro-exports are widely considered to have high transaction costs due to complex contractual 
arrangements, high labor supervision costs, high production and marketing risks, and the need for a 
plethora of costly inputs. Carletto et al. (1999) studied the diffusion of non-traditional agro-exports in 
a number of villages in the area of influence of a peasant cooperative. The average time to adoption 
was three times longer for non-members than cooperative members, and the former tended to 
withdraw from these crops much sooner than members. The authors conclude that "the cooperative 
was thus the fundamental institutional mitigating factor to small holder bias in adopting [non-
traditional agro-exports], in a context of transaction costs and imperfect information" (Carletto et al., 
1999, p. 366). 
In Chapter 6 I discuss the impacts of membership on members' household and farm incomes, and in 
Chapters 8 to 12 I explore this through 14 case studies. These analyses will show that an EAC's 
impact depends on the product and the market. Thus, I will now link the above discussion to the 
specific products and markets included in my research. Table 2.1 summarizes the main points. 
Wheat and potatoes 
Table 2.1 shows that of the six products and markets relevant to my study, two (wheat and potatoes) 
have very low transaction costs, as these markets are among the closest in Chile to being perfectly 
competitive. Both products are undifferentiated commodities; large numbers of buyers and sellers 
congregate in their markets; there are no entry or exit barriers for those farmers wanting to trade, even 
if they have small amounts of product; and information about all relevant market conditions is widely 
available to all traders. 
Given the nature of these commodity markets, what could an EAC offer to farmers to make them 
choose to sell their harvest through the organization rather than through a middleman? By pooling the 
production of a number of farmers the EAC could theoretically help them achieve economies of scale 
in the spot market. But most EACs in Chile are way too small to achieve this goal. A single medium-
sized commercial potato farmer, for example, will produce more potatoes than 75 to 100 of the small 
farmers who typically make up an EAC's membership. To achieve economies of scale, an EAC would 
need to organize and coordinate the production of hundreds of small farmers. However, if the farmers 
live in remote and inaccessible areas, it is likely that a very small number of buyers can impose prices 
that are significantly lower than market prices; under these conditions an EAC will be able to offer 
some clear advantages. 
By and large, however, one would expect farmers to derive few, if any, benefits from participating in 
EACs set up to market undifferentiated products in these spot and wholesale markets. To make a 
difference in such a context, an EAC would have to engage in value-adding activities, such as grading, 
packaging and/or labeling potatoes to sell to supermarkets, restaurants or fast food chains rather than 
in spot markets. In this case, the situation is very similar to that of fresh vegetable producers discussed 
Table 2.1 Factors influencing transaction costs in selected products and markets in Chile 
Product traded 
by EAC 
Wheat Potatoes, bulk Milk, fluid, precooled, 
with quality control 
Vegetables, bulk Vegetables, graded, 
packaged and labeled 
Raspberries, graded, 
processed (frozen), 
packaged and labeled 
Market In which 
EAC operates 
Wholesale, local or 
regional mills 
Wholesale market in 
main cities outside the 
region 
Large 
processing plants 
Wholesale market in 
large city in the region 
Supermarkets Processing and export 
firms 
International markets 
Alternative 
markets 
theoretically 
available to 
individuals 
None Middlemen who buy on 
the farm 
Wholesale market in 
main cities 
Middlemen who buy on 
the farm 
Informal retail market in 
nearby cities with door 
to door delivery 
Middlemen who buy on 
the farm 
Wholesale market in 
large city in the region 
Middlemen who buy on 
the farm 
Wholesale market in 
large city in the region 
Middlemen who buy on 
the farm 
Mechanism 
through which 
market prices 
are set 
International prices, 
moderated by national 
price band system. 
Reference price 
announced prior to 
planting season 
Supply and demand with 
thousands of producers 
and hundreds of buyers 
International prices, 
with charges of 
collusion between few 
large firms dominating 
the market 
Supply and demand with 
thousands of producers 
and hundreds of buyers 
Supply and demand, 
with price reference 
given by wholesale 
market 
International prices 
Price advantage 
to farmer of 
EAC's actual 
market vs 
alternative 
markets for 
single individual 
None Net price to farmer is 
higher in alternative 
market since 
intermediaries do not 
deduct value added tax. 
Advantage is even 
higher if farmer takes 
crop to wholesale 
market 
High if EAC can meet 
industry quality, volume 
and seasonality 
standards 
No less than 30% to 
100% higher 
Up to 100% higher Low due to very high 
competition for product, 
particularly if of good 
quality, and because 
middlemen do not 
deduct value added tax 
Barriers to 
individual small 
farmers 
accessing EACs' 
markets 
None None Very high. Processing 
firms will only buy 
precooled, quality 
controlled fluid milk. 
Cost of individual 
cooling equipment is 
high. 
None Extremely high, due to 
cost of processing and, 
in particular, to 
preference of 
supermarkets for year-
round suppliers. 
Absolute, due to cost of 
processing which 
requires very large 
investments 
Product traded by 
EAC 
Wheat Potatoes, bulk Milk, fluid, precooled, 
with quality control 
Vegetables, bulk Vegetables, graded, 
packaged and labeled 
Raspberries, graded, 
processed (frozen), 
packaged and labeled 
Cost of obtaining 
price and market 
information 
Very low to none Very low to none Very low to none High, large daily 
fluctuations. Very 
difficult to predict in 
advance 
High, must already be a 
supplier 
Very low to none 
Processing costs 
for EAC product 
Not applicable Not applicable Fixed costs very high due 
to investment in 
equipment 
Not applicable Not too high; could be 
done with basic 
equipment and family 
labor 
High due to cost of 
equipment. 
Transportation 
and marketing 
costs 
Moderate Production is usually sold 
on the farm. Can be up to 
one third of gross price if 
product is taken to 
wholesale market 
High, especially if using 
refrigerated trucks which 
are vital for obtaining 
best prices 
High fixed costs, makes 
selling low volumes 
unattractive unless prices 
are very high 
Relatively high fixed 
costs 
Not applicable, produce is 
sold on the farm 
Risk of not selling 
product in 
alternative 
market 
None None Very high, farmers 
typically complain of up 
to 10% losses per year 
Very high, produce can 
be left unsold if there is 
over-supply that day 
Very high, produce can 
be left unsold if there is 
over-supply that day 
High to very high, 
depending on quality and 
location 
Perishability Very low Very low Very high, must be sold 
same day 
High, produce must be 
sold within a few days 
High, produce must be 
sold within a few days 
Extremely high as top 
quality condition can be 
lost in just a few hours 
Cost of enforcing 
trade agreements 
in alternative 
market 
None, crop is paid cash 
on delivery 
None if sold cash on 
delivery. Higher if paid 
with check 
There are disputes over 
quality control 
measurements done by 
industry labs. 
None if sold cash on 
delivery. Higher if paid 
with check 
Moderate. Supermarket 
often postpones payment 
and imposes a number of 
additional costs to its 
suppliers 
None if sold cash on 
delivery. Higher if paid 
with check 
Credit Technically, any small farmer can get credit from INDAP. In practice, EAC members have better access. Since 2000 there is also crop insurance which INDAP can 
build into a loan application. Larger 'small' farmers can get credit from a State Bank or even a private bank, especially short-term loans. 
Professional 
services 
Mostly organized farmers (not necessarily in EACs) have access to technical assistance from INDAP. 
Other services Many EACs provide additional services such as collective purchasing and delivery of inputs. 
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below, but with the added difficulty that the EAC would need to operate in different regions across the 
country to assure supply throughout the year, a condition demanded by supermarkets and other 
retailers. 
Milk 
Under Chile's current industry conditions, small milk producers face the highest transaction costs, as it 
is virtually impossible for a dairy farmer to access the formal market if his or her milk does not meet 
certain quality standards. These can only be achieved by investing in equipment that would be 
prohibitively expensive to anyone without a relatively large scale of production. The alternative 
market options, such as selling milk in the urban informal market or on-farm to middlemen, are clearly 
very unfavorable and a farmer forced into these markets is increasingly likely to shift to other crops or 
enterprises. 
Under such conditions an EAC has a clear and significant role. The most important role is to give 
farmers access to contracts with the medium and large dairy plants (which reduce risk exposure), 
cooling tanks, and refrigerated delivery trucks. EAC membership then becomes a very attractive 
option for a small farmer if it can ensure access to these goods and services. 
Raspberries 
Conditions for small raspberry producers are little different, if slightly better than dairy farmers. While 
they do have the option of selling their crop on farm to middlemen, their bargaining position is very 
weak as they must sell their produce the same day it is harvested, or else take a sharp drop in prices as 
quality deteriorates within hours. 
The goods and services that small raspberry producers could not obtain acting alone depend on how 
far they want to go along the value-adding chain. If they only want to reduce their risk exposure whilst 
marketing unprocessed primary products, they would need to have a refrigerated warehouse. This is 
too large an investment for a small farmer with only a half to two hectares of raspberries. If the farmer 
wants to grade, package, freeze and label his or her produce before selling it to an exporter in order to 
capture a larger share of the final price, then the investments are even larger. In this case the farmer 
would need access to rather specialized technical and managerial expertise. And finally, if the farmer 
wants to export directly to Europe or the USA, then he or she would need to have access to 
sophisticated financial services, to highly skilled traders and managers, and to links with a whole array 
of service providers and clients. It is thus very clear that a small farmer needs an EAC as soon as he or 
she wants to go beyond the very basic step of selling to the two or three local middlemen who may be 
in the area on the day he or she is harvesting his or her crop. 
Vegetables 
Fresh vegetable producers are in an intermediate position. Whilst the supermarket chains would pay 
them much better prices, they are more or less in the same position as milk producers: entry barriers 
are almost insurmountable for an individual small producer. The farmer in this case would need to be 
able to sign a supply contract or option with the supermarket. Yet this is nearly impossible for a small 
producer who can deliver only a relatively small volume of produce during only a few weeks of the 
year. He or she would also need to have access to grading, packaging, labeling, warehouse and 
transport facilities, all of which require costly investments. Since the supermarkets only pay their 
suppliers 60 to 90 days after delivery, the farmer would need credit to finance the operation. Finally, it 
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is possible that the farmer would also need to hire managers and accountants, as well as high quality 
technical advisors to help him or her produce the quality goods that supermarkets require. Clearly, a 
small fresh vegetable producer wanting to reach the more profitable retail markets must operate 
through an EAC, since none of these goods and services will be provided by the market to an 
individual small producer. 
However, small vegetable farmers supplying the wholesale market often can and do operate alone. For 
these farmers there are four main advantages to EAC membership: 
(1) Most importantly, EACs can set up and finance storage, information, management, and delivery 
systems that allow the members to better regulate their supply according to the very large price 
fluctuations that characterize this market, even on a day-to-day basis; that is, an EAC reduces the 
risk exposure of an individual small farmer in these markets. 
(2) An EAC can build or purchase warehouses, delivery trucks, establish a fixed post at the wholesale 
market in one of the large cities, and pay the staff in charge of managing the marketing operation, 
thus spreading these high fixed costs across a larger volume of produce. 
(3) Because of the greater stability of supply that an EAC can enable, it is more likely to acquire a 
regular portfolio of clients, a factor that is of great importance if one considers the high rate of 
unsold produce that characterizes this market. 
(4) EACs engaged in the fresh vegetable market can also diversify their clients: they can sell part of 
their product in bulk to the wholesale market, but they often also process (grade, package, and 
label) part of it to sell to supermarkets or restaurant chains. 
Thus, while a small fresh vegetable farmer supplying the wholesale market can work alone, there are 
clear benefits to be obtained from EAC membership. 
On the other hand, all EAC members in Chile have better access to a number of different support 
services than unorganized small farmers. Of these, three are most important: 
(1) subsidized credit provided by LNDAP at preferential interest rates, and with the de facto option of 
defaulting with very low costs or consequences to the borrower; 
(2) collective purchase of agricultural inputs. Whilst this does not always mean obtaining a much 
better price, it normally involves low cost delivery to their farms or a nearby location, as well as 
perhaps better payment conditions, and; 
(3) almost completely subsidized technical assistance from INDAP private contractors. 
However, it is important to highlight that access to these services is a relative and not an absolute 
advantage over unorganized farmers. For example, in the case of credit and technical assistance most 
INDAP beneficiaries are not EAC members. In other words, joining an EAC gives you a slightly 
better chance of accessing these services, but it is likely that you could obtain the same or similar 
support without being a member. 
Thus far, the answer to my question is that EAC membership can significantly reduce small farmers' 
transaction costs by improving value-adding, market integration and increasing the direct benefits they 
receive. The higher the transaction costs, the greater the advantages the EAC offers. On the contrary, 
there is little that an EAC can do for small farmers producing commodities to be sold in spot or 
wholesale markets which are reasonably competitive. This explains why most recently established 
EACs tend to be engaged in diversifying away from traditional commodities, not only in Chile but in 
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the rest of Latin America as well (Berdegue, 1999). 
Other benefits 
However, the direct economic benefits from EACs' core marketing or value-adding activities cannot 
entirely explain why farmers join these organizations. First of all, as the sources of household income 
and the functions and services provided by the EACs diversify, it becomes more difficult to apply the 
transaction costs framework wholesale to understand the organization's contribution to an individual 
household. A model in which one household has one and only one source of income from one 
agricultural product, and where the full range of tangible or intangible costs and benefits derived from 
membership in an EAC can be ascribed to that single flow of income (as in Table 2.1), is far too 
simplified. 
In Chile, as for Latin America as a whole, employment and income diversification are increasing 
among rural households (Reardon et al, 2001; Berdegu6 et al., 2001). The implication is that under 
these conditions, EACs can contribute to enhancing other employment and income opportunities 
available to the household, and this could increase the attractiveness of an EACs services. Examples 
of such non-core benefits include buying farm machinery and transport vehicles that are then used by 
some of the members to sell services to medium and large farms; building or repairing rural roads that 
not only help the EACs' marketing activities, but which also help local farmers get work in nearby 
rural or urban communities; rural electrification and communication projects that stimulate new local 
small non-farm businesses to emerge; accounting and legal support systems to help formalize many 
local micro-enterprises, in turn increasing their access to credit and to different fiscal benefits; training 
EAC members in business management skills, which are applied not only to running the farm but to 
other small businesses; etc. 
These indirect benefits stem from two important assets which EACs give their members and rural 
communities: access to networks linking them to external agents, and greater political power. Both 
these factors help EACs access services that are only partly used to improve their core activities. 
Consequently an EAC can still be an attractive option to a small farmer even if operating in a perfectly 
competitive market. The fanner may derive little additional benefit from selling his product through 
the EAC, but he or she may value the access to the other, non-core assets or services provided by the 
organization. As will be seen in several of the case studies in Chapters 8 to 12, this situation is 
common in Chile. It means that EACs need rules to ensure that members do not participate selectively 
in those non-core activities to the neglect of the organization's central business. Designing and 
enforcing such rules is extremely difficult when the EAC is engaged simply in the marketing of 
undifferentiated commodities in the spot or wholesale markets. 
2.4 Networks and the emergence and performance of EACs 
As will be shown in Chapters 4 and 5, even for those products/markets which have high transaction 
costs, most small farmers have still not joined EACs. Counteracting the effects of imperfect and 
missing markets does not provide enough incentives to catalyze the emergence of EACs. Figure 2.1 
presents a conceptual model that shows that an EAC is part of a network involving many different 
public and private agents. It proposes that the emergence and performance of an EAC is facilitated by 
the coexistence of a complex sets of factors provided by several different types of actors. Like all 
models of its kind, Figure 2.1 oversimplifies reality. But it offers a heuristic device for a discussion of 
Figure 2.1 Model of networks required for the emergence and effectiveness of EACs 
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the importance of multi-agent interaction for the emergence and performance of EACs. 
Roling's (1988) notion of Agricultural Knowledge and Information Systems (AKIS) can be used to 
understand these networks. As Roling and Jiggins (1998, p. 304) point out, "It has become common 
practice to speak about 'agricultural knowledge systems', i.e., to use a (soft) systems approach for 
looking at the interaction among the (institutional) actors operating in a 'theatre of agricultural 
innovation'. Innovation emerges from this interaction and is no longer seen, as was customary in the 
'transfer of technology perspective', as the end-of-pipe product of a sequential process. The knowledge 
system perspective looks at the institutional actors, within the arbitrary boundary of what can be 
considered the theatre of innovation, as potentially formins a soft system. A soft system is a social 
construct in the sense that it does not exist. One cannot, therefore, say that such actors as research, 
extension and farmers are a system. In all likelihood they are not, in that there is no synergy among 
their potentially complementary contributions to innovative performance, but by looking at them as 
potentially forming a soft system, one begins to explore the possibilities of facilitating their 
collaboration and hence the possibilities for enhancing their synergy and innovative performance." 
The model in Figure 2.1 is not a knowledge system in the strict sense of Roling's definition, as it not 
only involves the social construction and exchange of knowledge, but also of goods, services, and 
therefore, value. In this sense, I think that the model in Figure 2.1 is more strategic than Roling's 
AKIS. But, in common with AKIS, it depicts a potential soft system a platform for potential 
coordination and cooperation leading to innovation in a given domain of human existence. In the case 
studies presented in Chapters 8 to 12,1 will show that as collaboration and concerted action in these 
networks become more effective, an EAC's performance improves, while, on the contrary, the failure 
to construct balanced synergistic relations with public and private actors is a characteristic of failed 
EACs. 
Evans (1996) and Ostrom (1996) have proposed the concepts of 'embeddedness' and 'co-production' 
to refer to specific ways in which coordination and cooperation can be organized across the public-
private divide so as to enhance efficiency, effectiveness and the satisfactory accommodation of 
potentially conflicting objectives and goals. 
In her research on effective public policies and programs in north east Brazil, Tendler (1995, 1993a, 
1993b) has provided compelling evidence that cooperation and coordination across different societal 
divides is key for overcoming the frictions and inertia that hamper so many well-intentioned 
development efforts. In his analysis of a range of rural and agricultural development initiatives in 
Asia, Uphoff (1993, p. 613) found that "in a comparative study of 16 countries ... [those] which had 
the best linkage between central government and rural communities through a network of local 
institutions, had the best performance in agriculture and in social indicators." 
In summary, the emergence and performance of EACs requires synergistic relationships between rural 
individuals and communities, markets, governments, and intermediate agents across a number of 
social divides. The nature of the new EAC will be greatly influenced by this exchange, i.e., by the 
relative combinations of the different actors' contributions. 
In Figure 2.1, government and markets are sources of incentives14 to small farmers to form an EAC. 
Rural communities, households, and individuals contain certain capacities to respond to these 
incentives, which are derived from their sets of natural, human, physical, financial, and social assets. 
Intermediate agents (in Chile, largely NGOs and private consultant firms) play a catalytic and 
facilitation role. I will now describe these roles and how they relate to EAC formation and 
performance. 
1 4 Incentives are "the positive and negative changes in outcomes that individuals perceive as likely to result from particular 
actions taken within a set of rules in a particular physical and social context" (Ostrom et al., 1993, p. 8). 
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Government 
The most obvious support provided by government agencies is resources channeled through public 
programs such as those described at length in Chapter 1. In Chile these resources are often made 
available through intermediate private agents. A key point is that through their design and 
implementation, these resources constitute not only assets of the EAC, but also sources of incentives 
in that they affect the perceived and the actual costs, benefits, and risk of different options available to 
the EACs, and thus always favor certain responses and courses of action over others. 
In his analysis of the relationship between collective action and politics, Tarrow (1994) concludes that 
the former is likely to emerge in response to changes in opportunities that reveal potential allies. 
Collective action of the sort we are describing is a political act, in the sense that it always implies a 
challenge to the status quo. Challenging the status quo is stimulated by shifts in ideology, knowledge, 
power and/or resources (White and Runge, 1995). These shifts counterbalance other factors favoring 
the maintenance of the status quo. By creating a favorable political environment, government officials 
and agencies acting as political entrepreneurs in effect question the legitimacy of the status quo and 
reduce the uncertainty of the outcomes of collective action. 
Thus, a second, less tangible but perhaps more powerful incentive provided by government, has been 
called by Fox (1996) "political opportunity." Political opportunity is generated by proactive public 
policies and reformist public servants, and it serves the function of "bufferfingj the negative sanction 
that other state actors usually deploy against autonomous collective action beyond the village level" 
(Fox, 1996, p. 1090). In the case of EACs, Fox's analysis should be extended to buffering the 
perceived risks of engaging with new market agents and new forms of market exchange. Government 
agencies are perceived by the farmers engaged in the EAC as allies that can help them counterbalance 
the power of markets. As will be seen in the case studies, only the more successful EACs can close the 
loop, by using their links with market agents to counterbalance the power of the state. 
Government agencies derive benefits from their engagement with EACs. First, they gain efficiency, as 
working with and through local organizations simultaneously expands the reach of public programs, 
and reduces the cost of their implementation. Second, governments working with EACs expect to gain 
legitimacy among the rural population, a political objective. Governments and government employees 
sometimes also derive other less legitimate benefits by supporting EACs, such as undue influence and 
control over rural communities through political patronage and clientelism; from this follows the 
importance of effective and successful links with market agents as a counterweight to the power of the 
state. 
Markets 
In the previous section we have already discussed how markets create incentives for collective action 
when transaction costs are high enough to impede or limit individual smallholders' market exchanges. 
Relative prices linked to different products and markets are also a powerful incentive to challenge the 
status quo, as will be shown at length in the case studies: by observing more favorable production or 
market options and comparing them with their present practices, farmers are stimulated to change. An 
example is the case of raspberries (Chapter 12), where small wheat producers rapidly learned about the 
profit potential of the new crop when it was introduced locally by commercial farmers. 
Government and market incentives can of course reinforce or negate each other. In Chile, for example, 
diversification, new marketing options and value-adding activities really accelerated among small 
farmers once the main agricultural support programs, and the public policy discourse, shifted their 
focus away from promoting higher yields in basic commodities. In the absence of this public-market 
synchrony, small wheat producers wanted to diversify into raspberry production, but their options 
were limited as long as technical assistance and financial support kept focusing on wheat yields. Yet, 
when the interests and objectives of the public sector are synchronized with market signals, the 
response can be phenomenal. For example, in the case of the Milk Collection Centers (Chapters 8 and 
9), a shortfall in supply relative to demand led the dairy industry to pay attention to small farmers. The 
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public sector acted rapidly by providing the necessary support to respond to the market demand, with 
the result that within four or five years about half of the small milk producers in the country had 
become organized in dozens of EACs. 
The two-way arrows between EACs and markets in Figure 2.1 show that their interaction is subject to 
the rules of market transactions. This seems obvious, but it is amazing how often this simple statement 
and its practical outcomes are poorly understood, with the consequences that the reader can imagine. 
For example, a smallholder who stops selling his or her vegetables to middlemen and instead gains 
access to more profitable outlets such as a supermarket chain, can only expect to capture the additional 
benefits if he or she, together with the other farmers in the EAC, are capable of meeting the stringent 
quality standards that are characteristic of the new market. 
The incentives generated through government programs sometimes distort the nature of the 
relationship between EACs and markets. An example may clarify this point: as explained in Chapter 1, 
investments by small farmers and their EACs are very often heavily subsidized in Chile 1 5, and, in 
addition, there is a long-established tradition of condoning defaulted public loans. Both policies in 
effect transfer a large share of the economic risk of a given investment project from the farmers to the 
public sector. Thus they create an incentive to engage in enterprises that have a low probability of 
success. This policy-driven disassociation between market risks and potential rewards sometimes leads 
to EACs engaging in what can only be called adventures (as opposed to properly evaluated business-
oriented projects), and it explains many of the observed failures. 
Intermediate agents 
I tarn now to discussing the interaction between EACs and intermediate agents. In Chile, these are 
largely NGOs and private consultant firms working under contract to government agencies to organize 
and manage the delivery of public services to rural communities and small farmers' groups and 
organizations. 
As mentioned before, the emergence of an EAC is a political act in that it implies social mobilization 
to challenge the status quo. The status quo is challenged when a community acts on the perception that 
the current state of affairs is inefficient, or unfair, or both. Such a challenge implies questioning the 
present distribution of rights and duties, of costs and benefits; an alteration of power and authority 
(White and Runge, 1995). 
The challenge to the status quo will not just come about through dissatisfaction with current 
conditions; there is also a need for some form of "political entrepreneurship" (White and Runge, 
1995). Bebbington (1996, 1997) and Berdegue (1999) have shown that generally in Latin America 
successful cases of local collective action are induced and supported by external intervention, 
increasingly coming from private commercial and not-for-profit organizations. 
Such intermediate agents usually operate by facilitating a social dialogue on the nature of the problem; 
by providing organizational models and information about alternative solutions; by contributing an 
ideological, moral or knowledge basis for challenging the status quo; by setting performance 
standards; and by fully or partially offsetting the transaction costs of cooperation and coordination 
(White and Runge, 1995). In exchange, intermediate agents derive benefits such as social legitimacy 
which open up new income opportunities. 
Individuals 
EACs' networks link the organizations to individual farmers, each with certain 'capabilities', or 
" Although compared to the subsidies received by farmers in the OECD countries, the magnitude of the support is child's 
play. In a recent press conference, the Commissioner for Agriculture of the European Union put the annual subsidies received 
by USA farmers at $ 11,000 per year, and those obtained by European farmers at "only" S 4,500 per year (source: 
Agroenlinea.com, August 2001). 
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capacities "to be and act" (Bebbington, 1999). Capabilities grow out of the 'assets' held by these 
agents (de Janvry et al., 1991; Bebbington, 1999; Uphoff and Wijayaratna, 2000; Uphoff, 1999): their 
human, natural, physical, financial and social capital. 
An individual's human, physical, financial and natural assets define their relevant and feasible courses 
of action. As we will see in the case studies, many farmers choose not to join an EAC because it does 
not deal with their products or markets (the proposed action is not relevant), or because they cannot 
afford to participate (the proposed action is not feasible). For these reasons, better-off small farmers 
tend to participate more in EACs than their poorer neighbors. 
If public policies are founded on the vision that EAC membership is always, under any circumstances, 
better than not being a member, then non-participation by the poor and subsistence farmers can only 
be characterized as exclusion. But if we acknowledge that deciding to join an EAC involves weighing 
costs and benefits, and if we accept that costs may sometimes be higher than benefits, then non-
participation by the poor can sometimes be a rational and voluntary decision. However, the poor are 
sometimes excluded involuntarily. For example, in several of the case studies in Chapters 8 to 12, 
farmers explain that many of those originally involved in forming the EAC did not join because they 
could not afford the initial membership fees. 
It has also been well established that a household's assets influence its perception of risk and its risk 
avoidance or risk management strategies (de Janvry et al., 1991; de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1998; Ruben, 
1997). EAC participation means that members must evaluate the probable behavior of the other 
participants, as well as the likely outcomes of the various alternatives (White and Runge, 1995). 
Individual's differences in assets enhance the uncertainty under which this evaluation takes place. As 
the conditions of uncertainty and the perception of risk increases, all other factors being equal, it is 
less likely that the individual will choose to participate. 
2.5 Social capital and systems of rules 
Metaphors such as the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968), Prisoner's Dilemma (Dawes, 1973) 
and "logic of concerted action " (Olson, 1965) predict that individuals' 'rational choices' will usually 
undermine collective action institutions. In these theories, collective action aims at the production or 
consumption of public or common goods, where the cost of excluding non-cooperating individuals 
will range from very high to infinite (Hardin, 1982). They assume that the incentives to 'free ride' in 
collective action are such that individuals will do so in order to maximize their own benefits. Since all 
individuals face the same incentive to 'free ride', under most circumstances no collective benefit will 
result. These theories are essentially pessimistic about the likelihood of collective action being 
successful: collective goods usually end in collective tragedies. 
As we will see in several of the following chapters, this argument is not without substance. Yet, some 
of the EACs I studied manage to constrain the pervasiveness of this sort of opportunistic behavior and 
to achieve their objectives. How do they do this? 
The more recent studies of game theorists have identified a number of group situations and 
characteristics that can lead to successful collective action (Nugent, 1993). The Prisoner's Dilemma 
situation, in which defection is the dominant strategy of each player, no matter what the other one 
does, can be avoided when (Bardhan, 1993): 
• Assurances can be built into the game so that one player defects if the other defects, but 
cooperates if the other cooperates 
• The costs of monitoring and controlling free riders are low 
• The consequences of defection are so bad that either of the players would rather do the work 
himself if the other does not cooperate 
• Actors repeatedly face the same or similar decisions about cooperating or defecting (dynamic or 
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iterative prisoner's dilemma game situations) 
• Pre-game communication is allowed 
• There are credible threats and commitments to retaliatory actions against non-cooperators and free 
riders 
• Social norms, values, beliefs and attitudes induce cooperation 
• Exit options are not readily available 
In recent years the concept of social capital has been used to explain social interaction among 
individuals, groups and communities against the predictions of'rational-choice' theories. 
As with many other concepts that suddenly become fashionable in the development hterature, 'social 
capital' has become a catchword that is used by many with different contents and diverse purposes. It 
is thus very important to be precise about what is meant by 'social capital' in this book, and for this 
purpose I have chosen to follow Uphoff s (1999) definitions of cognitive and structural social capitals. 
First, it is necessary to highlight that Uphoff links the concept of social capital with the proposition 
that the resulting social interaction should lead to mutually beneficial collective action. However, as 
Portes and Landolt (1996) have shown, there are also downsides to social capital. These also apply to 
the performance of EACs: closely bound groups may exclude new potential participants; strong social 
networks based on ethnic or village-based identities can constrain exchange with outsiders (Nagengast 
and Kearney, 1990); roles and precedents may stifle innovation, initiative, and competing leaderships; 
solidarity and reciprocity can camouflage the interests of the more powerful; trust can weaken 
monitoring and enforcement of agreements. The social institution of cacicazgo16, which pervades rural 
Latin America, is perhaps the best example of what Rubio (1997) has called "perverse social capital." 
2.5.1 Cognitive social capital 
Uphoff (1999) proposes the concept of cognitive social capital to refer to norms, values, attitudes and 
beliefs that predispose people towards cooperation. 
The starting point for collective action must be fhe willingness or predisposition of individuals to 
commit themselves to such behavior. Roling (2000, p. 10) contrasts social learning, soft systems and 
overcoming social dilemmas with "rational choice" behavior. The former are "processes by which 
individual cognitive agents realize their common fate and agree to engage in collective action," while 
the latter induces individuals to act strategically in response to their own individual interests. 
Collective cognition, rather than rational choice behavior, is needed for "perceiving, intentional and 
reasoning individuals to engage in collective action" to overcome social dilemmas (Roling, 2000, 
p. 12). In this view, effective collective action requires "shared sense-making, conflict resolution, 
negotiated agreement and accommodation ... [and] collectively learning about and controlling our 
own collective behavior" (Roling 2000, p.35). Roling and Jiggins (1998) state that social learning of 
new perspectives can lead to consensual decision-making based on the accommodation of interests. 
Two social norms (i.e., standards of behavior shared by members of a social group) are recognized in 
the literature as being particularly important for predisposing people towards cooperation and 
collective action. These are trust and reciprocity, which are developed through recurrent social 
interaction (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000; Putnam, 1993). 
Reciprocity 
The decision to cooperate depends on perceptions of the probable behavior of others. People tend to be 
cooperative when others are. Reciprocity is a norm of fairness: people are not expected always to 
1 6 The social relations built around individuals who hold great power in rural communities and even regions, and exert 
control and almost domination over social, political and economic life. 
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cooperate, but must do so when others do so (Sugden, 1984; Coleman, 1988; Bardhan, 1993). The 
actual behavior of the individual engaging in collective action is influenced by the interaction between 
the moral limits and social obligations imposed by norms of reciprocity and the logic of self-interest 
(Bardhan, 1993; Taylor, 1982). Fafchamps (1992) claims that there is no contradiction between 
solidarity as a moral obligation and subsistence as a right grounded in rational behavior. 
Reciprocity is not always balanced, because individuals are linked with each other in a multilayered 
social system. For example, landless peasants in Haiti contribute a very high share of the labor to build 
erosion checkdams because of their membership in other labor sharing arrangements, not directly 
related to the problem of land degradation or erosion control (White and Runge, 1995). The 
expectations and obligations created through reciprocity are exchangeable across areas of activity, as 
well as over time (Coleman, 1988). Putnam (1993) has shown that repeated exchange over a period of 
time fosters "generalized reciprocity", which is a particularly efficient counterweight to opportunistic 
or free-riding behavior. Reciprocity, according to Putnam (1993), is the most important of the social 
norms that facilitate the building of trust. 
Trust 
Trust, "the belief or confidence in the honesty, goodness, or skill..."!? of another individual or group of 
individuals, predisposes potential EAC members to engage in collective action because it reduces their 
uncertainty about others' probable behavior, or about the rewards of collaboration. The existence of 
trust may be particularly valuable when formal institutions for protecting and enforcing one's rights, 
such as efficient judicial systems, are not readily accessible (Lyon, 2000). Trust promotes civic 
engagement (Putnam, 1993; Evans, 1996) by helping build "mutual interdependence" (Bardhan, 
1993), "interdependent utility functions" (Uphoff, 1993), or "welfare interdependence" (White and 
Runge, 1995); concepts which are well captured in Bates' (1987) proposition that "in a world in which 
there are prisoners' dilemmas, cooperative communities will enable rational individuals to transcend 
collective dilemmas." 
Uphoff (1993, p. 609) stresses that at the local, community and group levels, people have "face-to-
face relationships and are likely to have multistranded connections - as members of a common church, 
as buyers at the same market, as relatives through extended families, etc. This provides a better basis 
for collective action." In a totally different context - modem Italy - Putnam (1993, p. 167) also states 
the same: "Spontaneous cooperation is facilitated by social capital." 
Cooperation is also made possible by the fact that collective action institutions solve different 
problems for different individuals. Ostrom (1996) explains that successful co-production (a form of 
public-private cooperation) encourages citizens to develop other horizontal relationships, with many 
positive spillover effects for other activities. Collective action institutions can address multiple needs 
because the "utility junction" of each member is the result of a large set of arguments, displayed over 
a time dimension which is not necessarily the same as that of the collective action itself. 
2.5.2 Structural social capital 
Structural social capital comprises the roles, rules, precedents, procedures and social networks that 
facilitate cooperation and collective action (Uphoff, 1999). 
Structural social capital facilitates the formation of EACs because it reduces the transaction cost of 
the exchange by simplifying the processes of finding information, negotiating and enforcing 
agreements, and protecting the rights of the participants. Social networks reduce the cost of acquiring 
information. Roles, rules, and precedents built over repeated social exchange limit the set of choices 
available to the individuals and reduce the complexity of decision-making in uncertain environments. 
Precedent, i.e., practical knowledge about the potential benefits of cooperation, derived from previous 
practical experiences of working with and through local organizations and institutions, is one of the 
Cambridge International Dictionary of English. 
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most powerful motives for an individual to cooperate in collective action (Walters et al., 1999). 
As will be shown in detail in Chapters 8 through 12, rules are an element of structural social capital of 
particular importance to the development and performance of EACs, and thus they should be 
discussed in detail. 
Rules 
Ostrom (1990, 1992, 1999), and Ostrom et al. (1994a, 1994b) have analyzed a large number of 
collective activities at different levels. They found that some systems were more institutionally robust 
in that the day-to-day operational rules "have been devised and modified over time according to a set 
of collective-choice and constitutional-choice rules" (Ostrom, 1990, p. 89) 1 8 . According to their 
analysis, the specific operational rules vary greatly across these robust systems, but a set of seven 
"design principles" can be found in most of them . "A design principle is defined as a conception 
used consciously or unconsciously by those constituting and reconstituting a continuing association of 
individuals about a general organizing principle" (Ostrom, 1999, p. 1). 
I have adapted Ostrom's design principles (1990, p. 90-101) to the specific case of EACs: 
(1) Clearly defined boundaries. It must be clear who can benefit from the organization. It must 
also be clear what the organization wants to achieve in terms of the common good. These 
boundaries define who must contribute and who can benefit, and what they have to contribute 
to or benefit from. 
(2) Congruence between appropriation and provision rules, and market conditions. Rules defining 
benefits ('appropriation') are congruent with rules defining costs ('provision'), and both are 
related to the conditions of the markets in which the EAC will participate. Operational rules 
based on this principle ensure that the rewards obtained by the different participants in the 
collective action are clearly related, in a way that is acceptable to the participants, to the 
efforts and contributions made by each individual. In turn, both the efforts and contributions 
of each individual, as well as the rewards that he or she can extract, must be in balance with 
the conditions of the markets in which the EAC is participating. 
(3) The individuals affected by the day-to-day operational rules can help modify them. This 
allows the EAC to tailor its rules to its own circumstances. It also gives these rules social 
legitimacy. White and Runge (1995) have shown that compliance with rules is enhanced and 
the costs of monitoring and enforcement are lowered, when the participants believe that rules 
are fair. 
These three design principles allow the members of the EAC to define a set of operational, day-to-
day rules, and to agree in principle with them. The following two principles provide additional 
incentives for the members to actually follow the rules they have designed: 
(4) Low cost systems for monitoring compliance should be in place, and those who carry out the 
monitoring must be members of the organization, or accountable to them. 
(5) Sanctions on those who violate the operational rules should be graduated, depending on the 
seriousness and context of the offense. 
In an EAC, the costs of monitoring must be low, or more precisely, lower than the benefits derived 
from enforcement. Sanctions should be graduated because enforcing them entails a cost. If the 
Operational rules guide decisions of appropriation, provision, monitoring and enforcement; collective-choice rules define 
policy making, management and adjudication; constitutional-choice rules address formulation, governance and modification 
(Buck, 1998). 
19 
For larger, more complex systems, Ostrom (1990) proposes an eighth design principle: systems, appropriation, provision, 
monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance activities are organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises. 
I have left this principle out of my analysis because it does not apply to most EACs. 
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costs of monitoring and enforcement are as low as possible and in balance with each other, and if 
the information produced by the monitoring system is accepted as 'true' or reliable, then it is more 
feasible to achieve what Levi (1988) calls quasi-voluntary compliance with the rules. Following 
Levi, Ostrom (1990, p. 94) states that "She [Levi] uses the term 'quasi-voluntary compliance'to 
describe taxpayer behavior in regimes where most everyone pays taxes. Paying taxes is voluntary 
in the sense that individuals choose to comply in many situations where they are not being directly 
coerced. On the other hand, it is 'quasi-voluntary' because the non-compliant are subject to 
coercion—if they are caught." 
(6) Low cost internal mechanisms should be readily available to solve conflicts between members 
of the organization or between them and their officials. In an EAC there are many cases of 
ambiguity in the applications of the rules. Many rules are open to interpretation, and the 
seriousness of an offense often depends on the context in which it takes place and on the past 
history of the violator. If operational rules are to be kept as simple as possible, there must be 
mechanisms to solve the conflicts that can emerge from their interpretation and enforcement. 
(7) The right of members to devise and enforce their own internal rales should be recognized and 
respected by external authorities. If external authorities constantly interfere in an EAC's 
system of operational, collective-choice and constitutional-choice rules, it will become almost 
impossible for organizational learning to take place; such learning is necessary for the 
progressive improvement of these institutions. 
2.5.3 Learning processes and the development of systems of rules 
Systems of rules, like other forms of social capital, are created through social interaction over time. 
Hirschman (1984) has proposed (hat individuals and cooperative groups continually transform 
themselves to deal with new social problems, so that there is an accumulation of knowledge about 
collective action, when it is feasible, what the probable outcomes are, if and which parts of the 
community will become involved, etc. Communities with a deeper tradition of collective action have a 
better chance of addressing common goods or common resource problems successfully. Putnam 
(1993) reaches the same conclusion from a different level of social aggregation, in his study of civic 
institutions and regional governments in modem Italy. 
EACs design, assess, and revise their systems of rules through organizational learning processes 
(Argyris, 1992; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Cohen and Prusak, 2001; Axelrod and Cohen, 1999). 
Often social exchange among the members began before the organization was officially formed; in 
this case, the learning process leading to effective systems of rules also precedes the emergence of an 
EAC. 
EACs learn by comparing expectations with outcomes, by interpreting changes in their external 
environments, from observing similar organizations and other relevant experiences, and by drawing 
lessons from unpredicted and surprising events (I. Guijt, personal communication, May 2001). The 
information and knowledge derived from this analysis modifies the behavior of the EAC and its 
members, and, eventually, may be codified into new or modified procedures and rules. 
All EACs have the opportunity to convert lessons into procedures and rules, but only some actually do 
this. Others do not seem capable of adapting, even in the face of failed expectations, changing 
environments, 'best practice' examples or surprising events. 
The ability of an EAC to incorporate learning into progressively more effective sets of rules, depends 
on how it emerged (Figure 2.1), especially the balance between the incentives provided by 
governments and markets, the capabilities of the individuals, households and communities involved, 
and the support given by intermediate agents. 
If one of these elements is missing or undermined by another of the elements, the EAC is unlikely to 
be able to generate effective rules for countering opportunistic behavior. It would take the onset of a 
major crisis to alter its institutional development path and to give it an opportunity to amend its system 
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of rules. 
When the EAC is forming, the assets of the individuals involved may or may not be sufficient to 
achieve the common objectives. This can occur, for example, because the organizational models 
contributed by intermediate agents, or the design of the public programs impose certain boundaries 
which do not correspond with the EAC's objectives. In several of the case studies discussed in 
Chapters 8 to 12, we will see how the EACs were initially artificially enlarged to satisfy the 
requirements of certain pubbc programs. The result is likely to be great difficulty, if not impossibibty, 
in devising a system linking rewards and contributions that is fair to all the members. Some members 
become 'enforced free riders' simply because their capacity prevents them from meeting the rules 
guiding contributions. In turn, this creates an incentive for other members to defect. 
Figure 2.1 shows that markets provide incentives for EAC formation through relative prices. Such 
prices are a major consideration when potential EAC participants are assessing the likely costs and 
benefits of collective action. The nature of government incentives to stimulate or support EAC 
formation can radically alter this assessment, for example, by externalizing certain costs. If the 
government incentives are on-going, then there is a good chance that appropriation and contribution 
rules will not concur with each other or with the market signals. In other words, the system of rules 
will not transmit the appropriate market signals to individual members, and the EAC will rapidly 'lose 
touch' with the market. Under these conditions, all members will have a strong incentive to defect, as 
was the case for EACs engaged in potato marketing (Chapter 10). 
The same can occur when external agents offer misleading organizational models. For example, many 
NGOs, extensionists or private consultants believe that EAC membership will always improve a small 
farmer's results when marketing his or her produce. Farmers can be easily be convinced by this 
argument; they almost universally feel that the prices they receive are unfair because of their lack of 
power in negotiating with traders, and that pooling their resources in an EAC will increase their 
chances of influencing market prices. Furthermore, if members of a new EAC lack a common history 
of collective action, they will also lack norms and precedents for rule-making. This will make them 
more likely to accept models imposed or proposed by external agents. 
Social capital can also undermine the rule development process. Strong leaders or tight core leadership 
groups within emerging EACs can weaken broad member participation in defining rules for guiding 
contributions and appropriations, or can block the process of monitoring and enforcing compliance 
with agreements and obligations. Communities with particularly strong internal networks and well-
established roles ("bonding social capital", Woolcock and Narayan, 2000), may be less able to adapt 
rules to make them relevant to economic activities. Family ties among EAC members can undermine 
the enforcement of agreements through graduated sanctions. The effects of social capital at the onset 
can sometimes occur in a way which runs counter to what much of the literature predicts. For 
example, lack of trust among members can actually result in better-designed and more effective rules 
for monitoring compliance. If the EAC is not embedded in a rural community, it will not benefit from 
many low-cost compliance monitoring and enforcement rules that are based on close physical and 
social proximity. 
The types of rules designed at the EAC's inception create incentives for certain courses of action by 
members and discourage others. This pattern of behavior reinforces the original set of rules, creating a 
cycle. An EAC's behavior tends to follow one of three broad paths, each exemplified by the various 
case studies in Chapters 8 to 12: 
(1) Very soon after the formation of the EAC (even by the time of the first collective effort of 
marketing or value-adding), all or most of the members default on their commitments and 
obligations and the collective action fails. This tends to happen when the operational rules 
governing decisions on costs (contributions) and benefits (rewards) did not concur with the 
conditions of the relevant markets, either because the EAC's activities or business-plan were 
designed based on false assumptions (e.g., "if 30 smallholders get together they will surely force 
middlemen to pay them a higher price compared to that received by non-members"), or because 
government subsidies to the EACs and/or its members are so large that they completely distort 
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market signals. The EAC may only survive if members want to maintain access to resources 
provided by the government or by intermediate agents, such as loans, grants or technical advice. 
As these external supports are withdrawn or come to an end, the EAC collapses. This sort of 
situation can be seen in Chapter 10, where the cases studies of potato-marketing EACs are 
discussed. 
(2) Some of the members free ride on others' contributions. No sanctions are applied because of the 
internal power relations within the EAC, or because the costs of sanctions are too high. Those that 
bore the cost of the opportunistic behavior are discouraged from contributing further. They may 
defect if there are exit options available, or they may remain within the organization if the 
perceived cost of defecting is higher than sustaining the free riders. The result is a lack of 
incentives to improve their contributions for either the free riders or for those who sustained the 
cost of their opportunistic behavior, and the EAC will gradually lose its market competitiveness. 
Any change in rules will be resisted by the free riders. The rules are only likely to be changed if a 
crisis either allows the contributing members to get rid of the free riders, or if it greatly increases 
the perceived or actual cost of the free riders' behavior. We can see examples of this situation in 
some of the case studies of the Milk Collection Centers (Chapters 8 and 9), and, to some extent, in 
two of the EACs dedicated to processing and marketing raspberries (Chapter 12). 
(3) All or most of the members abide by the rules. The system of rules is reinforced and improved 
over time. The EAC is likely to be sustained even in the face of disappointing results, as long as 
the members continue to perceive that the outcomes are not due to behavior against the rules. The 
EAC can become an effective and sustainable economic organization, if other factors (aside from 
its institutional performance) also contribute to its achieving positive economic and financial 
results. Examples of this situation are given in Chapters 8 and 9 (milk), 11 (vegetables) and 12 
(raspberries). 
Before I use this conceptual framework to analyze the information gathered for this study, I first 
discuss the methods and materials used in my research (Chapter 3). 
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CHAPTER 3. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
This research combines descriptive and analytical quantitative methods applied to large data sets 
obtained from national surveys of peasant households, small farms and EACs. It also includes a series 
of qualitative case studies of specific organizations. 
It was very important to include quantitative analysis of large data sets. This is because given the 
current public policy debate in Chile, hard data is needed to establish the magnitude, effects and 
sustainability of the phenomena under study. After a decade of very large public investments to 
develop and strengthen EACs, it was simply not enough to ask how things could be done better 
without first understanding the actual impacts of policies defined 10 years ago. To make a credible 
argument for the need to improve public policies for EACs, I needed hard evidence to support my 
arguments. Have the efforts to date had any impact? Are we on the right track? Or do we need to 
fundamentally revise current strategies because we are not accomplishing what we set out to do? 
Once I answered those questions, I could then identify the key factors needed to improve public 
policies for EACs. To do this I explored several case studies of EACs in great detail, looking at the 
issues of institations, social interactions, meanings and perceptions, as well as the links between these 
factors and the economic performance and sustainability of the EACs. 
The main methods used are as follows (all the methods I used are summarized in Table 3.3 at the end 
of this chapter): 
3.1 Describing EACs in Chile (Chapter 4) 
Surprisingly, despite investing hundreds of millions of dollars to support them, no-one in Chile could 
describe an EAC with any degree of precision before this research. My first task was to explore the 
characteristics of these organizations in Chile, which I had already defined as follows: 
Legally constituted organizations whose members or owners are exclusively or mainly small 
farmers and peasants and who control the decision-making process in the organizations; the 
organizations carry out marketing or value-adding activities directly linked (upstream or 
downstream) to their members' primary production, and their main purpose is to improve the 
performance of their members'farms as economic units engaging in market transactions. 
In October 1998 I distributed a questionnaire to all the INDAP local and regional offices, the regional 
offices of the Solidarity and Social Investment Fund (FOSIS), and to all the rural organizations, NGOs 
and consulting firms registered in INDAP. The questionnaire went to a total of 1,050 rural 
organizations that I had identified by name and tax code from INDAP records. The purpose of this 
questionnaire was to obtain basic descriptive information that would allow me to identify those 
organizations which met the definition of an EAC. The questionnaire covered such aspects as when 
the EAC was formed and when it started operating, its size by number of members and gross annual 
sales, the products and markets it was working with, the services it provided to its members, the types 
and numbers of paid employees, and so on. 
This questionnaire was completed by 407 organizations. I asked the INDAP local and regional offices 
to review these responses and to correct any mistakes. I also asked them to point out additional 
organizations missing from the list of 407. Through this process an additional 221 organizations were 
identified, giving a total of 628 organizations. 
I sent a second questionnaire directly to the 628 organizations, asking them to complete, revise or 
approve the information. With considerable effort I managed a response rate of 85%. This allowed me 
to remove duplications, as well as organizations that were no longer functioning or that did not meet 
my definition of an EAC (i.e., they did not have a legal status, or their primary objectives were not of 
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an economic nature). The end product was a list of 424 organizations, crossed-checked twice, which 
met my definition of an EAC. Chapter 4 is based on this data set. 
That still left 422 organizations out of the initial list of 1,050 that did not respond to either 
questionnaire. With the help of LNDAP staff and contacts in the different regions, I eliminated 68 of 
these organizations because they seemed to be other forms of rural organizations or associations, such 
as trade unions, committees, and so on, rather than EACs. 
This analysis allowed me to estimate the number of EACs in Chile (778), and to cross-check the 
representativeness of the sample of 424 EACs for which I did have descriptive information (about 
50% of all EACs). 
3.2 Description of EAC members (Chapter 5) 
In the second semester of 1997 I coordinated a survey of 3000 small farms and households to evaluate 
the impact of INDAP's Technology Transfer Program (General Survey - see Table 3.3). This was 
under contract to the Ministries of Economics and of Agriculture, and was done with a team of experts 
from RIMISP and other organizations. The survey sample is statistically representative of farms 
smaller than 12 equivalent irrigated hectares2 0, in 15 agroecological and agroeconomic zones in five of 
Chile's administrative regions, which is where 72% of all small farms are located. The same impact 
study surveyed a sub-sample of 602 of these farms using a larger questionnaire covering detailed farm 
and off-farm production costs and income (Costs Survey, Table 3.3). These two surveys have yielded 
the best and most representative recent data set on small farms and households in Chile by far. 
One of the sections in the survey allowed me to identify farms and households affiliated to an EAC, 
and to compare them with a control group comprised of non-members of these organizations. One 
crucial limitation of my data set is that I do not have information to compare EAC members before 
and after they joined the organization. For some factors such as size of the farm or education of the 
household members, this may not be an important consideration, for one can reasonably argue that in a 
period of five or six years an EAC is highly unlikely to have such a great impact that it could alter 
these types of variables. But for other variables, such as for example annual income or access to credit, 
that is not the case, as theoretically participation in an EAC could cause a significant change even in a 
relatively short period of time. 
Therefore, the results of Chapter 5 should be interpreted carefully, resisting the temptation to imply 
that there is causality between participation in an EAC and a given variable. For example, if we were 
to observe that EAC members are less poor than non-members, we cannot say whether membership 
caused a reduction in poverty rates, or if the poor were excluded from EAC membership. 
After a descriptive section in Chapter 5,1 analyze the survey data for the effect of different variables 
on the probability of a small farmer being an EAC member. For this purpose 1 used a Probit model, 
where participation in an EAC is the dependent variable, and the independent variables were: 
(1) Location, represented by a total of 14 dummy (yes/no) variables for geographic location relative to 
a 15th site (e.g., does being located in zone Z affect the probability of being an EAC member, 
relative to being located in zone 15?). In my model, location is a proxy for natural capital and 
economic environment, and the 15 zones have been defined so that they account both for 
agroecological and agroeconomic differentiation. Each of the 15 zones is readily recognizable by 
anyone familiar with the Chilean countryside; they are defined by their specific bio-physical and 
socio-economic characteristics. 
2 0 An Equivalent Irrigated Hectare (HRB) is a measurement unit defined during the agrarian reform. It uses soil and climate 
variables to establish a production potential equivalent throughout the country. It is formally defined as the number of 
hectares needed in each zone to yield the same production as one irrigated hectare in the Maipo river valley. Detailed 
conversion tables are available for most rural areas in the country. The limit of 12 HRB is the legal ceiling for a farmer to be 
an DSDAP beneficiary. The limit is widely used for broad demarcations of small-scale agriculture in Chile. 
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(2) Product orientation, represented by a series of dummy variables that show whether the farmer 
produces milk, potatoes, wheat or beans; these being the most common crops in small-scale 
agriculture in Chile for which I had sufficient data. 
(3) Human capital, represented by variables that measure the age, sex and education of the head of the 
household, as well as the number of household members. 
(4) Physical capital, represented by two variables: total farm size and percentage of the farm with 
access to irrigation. 
(5) Access to agricultural advisory services. 
(6) Position of the household relative to the official poverty line, represented by dummy variables that 
show whether the household is poor or extremely poor. 
I tested the auto-correlation between 'access to agricultural services' and each of the different 'product 
orientations' (e.g., milk producers might get more advice than potato producers), and found that the 
correlation coefficients were not statistically significant. Using Hausman's test, I analyzed the model 
for endogeneity2 1 for the variables 'access to agricultural services', 'household is poor', and 
'household is extremely poor'. All of the variables were shown to be exogenous, that is, uncorrelated 
with the error term of the model. 
In July 1998 I held a three-day workshop for EAC leaders to explore the most significant factors in 
their decision to set up an EAC. Twenty-seven EACs participated, each represented by one board 
member. The 27 participants had already been chosen as potential case studies for this research (see 
Section 3.5.1 in this chapter for a detailed description of the selection method). Participants worked in 
three groups based on their enterprise: milk, potatoes, fruit and vegetables. All groups were given the 
same questions for each session; a note-taker recorded the results and conclusions, but was not 
allowed to join in the discussion. In Chapter 5 I report the results of the session dedicated to the 
question: "What were the most important factors that stimulated the formation of the EACs present in 
this group?" The participants of each group were asked to identify and list all the factors that they 
thought were relevant, and then to rank them in order of importance. 
3.3 Analysis of impacts on farm and household income (Chapter 6) 
I used three sources of information to determine the relationship between EAC participation and 
members' farm and household income: 
(1) During the field work for the case studies (Chapter 8 and Section 3.5.1 below) I surveyed 223 
small farmers involved with the 16 case study EACs, and 234 small farmers who live in the 
neighborhood but who do not work with the EACs (Case Study Survey - see Table 3.3). As part of the 
survey I asked farmers to identify the costs and benefits of EAC involvement. I have pooled their 
answers to compare the opinions of EAC members and non-members. I should emphasize, however, 
that the results from this 'quasi-opinion poll' cannot be extrapolated to any population other than the 
457 farmers who were asked the questions. 
(2) To test whether participation in an EAC affects members' farms' net margin (operational revenue 
minus direct and fixed costs), as well as annual household income, I analyzed the data from the two 
farm and household surveys described in Section 3.2 (General and Costs Surveys) using Heckman's 
two-stage procedure (Heckman, 1979). Heckman's approach allows the impact of a program to be 
controlled for the possible effect of selection bias, as I shall explain below. 
The conceptual model is as follows: the net profit margin of a small farm, or the annual income of the 
household, will be affected by the human, financial, physical and natural capital of those households 
One key assumption of valid regression models is that the explanatory variables in the model will vary independently of 
each other, including the error term. If this assumption is met, it is said that the models fulfill the condition of exogeneity. 
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and farms, as well as by participation in an EAC. The hypothesis to be tested is whether the farm's net 
margin or the annual household income increases with greater access to any of these assets, and with 
participation in an EAC. These assets are represented in my model by the size of the household and 
the number of its members in the labor force; by the age, gender, and educational level of the 
household head; by the size of the farm and the proportion under irrigation; by its location in an 
agroecological region; and by a dummy variable for participation in an EAC. 
One way to test this conceptual model would be through a regression model where the dependent 
variable (the net margin of the farm or the household's annual income) would be explained by the 
factors mentioned above. However, the conceptual framework (Chapter 2) and findings reported in 
Chapters 4 and 5 indicated that EAC participation may depend on the specific markets in which the 
EAC operates (i.e. for milk, potatoes or wheat). Thus, I needed to control for this potential bias and to 
do this I used Heckman's two-stage procedure. If one has reason to believe, for example, that milk 
producers' income-generating behavior is fundamentally different from that of wheat producers, then 
the two sets of households should be modeled separately. However, if one just segregates the two 
groups and runs regressions separately, there is an implicit selectivity bias (that is, one is not 
controlling for the conditional probability of a household being included in a particular group). 
Heckman's two-stage procedure uses a Probit analysis to determine the factors that condition whether 
a household is in a particular group, say potato producers; the algorithm then calculates, for each 
household, an observation on a variable called the inverse Mill's ratio (MR); the observation is the 
conditional probability of the household being included in the potato-producers group. The second 
stage is, in our case, the income multiple regression equation, estimated with the Ordinary Least 
Squares procedure (OLS), only for, for example, the potato-producing households. In that equation, 
the M R is included on the right hand side to control for selectivity bias. If the coefficient of the IMR 
is not significant, this indicates that the selectivity bias is not statistically significant. The second stage 
also includes EAC membership as an independent variable. This approach ensures that the results for 
the independent variable 'participation in an E A C are not confounding effects that in fact are due to 
the crop or enterprise. 
To make sure that participation in an EAC is not endogenous to the farm's net margin or the 
household's annual income, I also ran a test of endogeneity using Hausman's procedure. This test 
confirmed that participation in an EAC is exogenous to both the farm's net margin and the household 
annual income. I could not show income before and after EAC membership because the data come 
from a cross section survey. 
(3) In 1996, the Universidad Austral de Chile was contracted by the Ministry of Planning and 
Cooperation (MIDEPLAN) to survey rural households in 15 areas spread across six regions (V 
through X) in Chile's interior and coastal dryland zones (MIDEPLAN, 1999). This large area is 
characterized by much higher poverty levels than other rural areas. Agriculture is facing a sharp 
decline here due to its dependence on traditional crop and livestock systems which are increasingly 
unable to compete with imports. 
In the year 2000 LNDAP contracted RMISP to conduct a survey of 779 of these households, covering 
51 municipalities in five regions (VI through X) (Ramirez et al., 2001). Of the 779 original 
households, we were able to re-contact 617 (79% of the original wnDEPLAN-Universidad Austral 
sample). Of these, about 60 had such large and inexplicable discrepancies between the 1996 and 2000 
data that we removed them from the data set. Thus, we ended up with 555 households with consistent 
data for 1996 and 2000 (Drylands Panel Survey - see Table 3.3). Of these, 193 were households with 
access to land (owned, rented, sharecropped, etc.), while the remaining 362 were rural households but 
not farmers. I have therefore limited my analysis to the 193 small farmer households. Of those 193 
households, 76% were not members of an EAC. I use these data to compare EAC members and non-
members, in terms of the changes in a number of income variables between 1996 and 2000. This 
analysis allows to me discuss the impact of EAC membership on household income in poor and 
marginalized rural regions. 
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3.4 Economic and financial performance of EACs (Chapter 7) 
In early 2000, LNDAP contracted RLMISP to conduct an appraisal of the economic and financial status 
of EACs in Chile. I coordinated this study. I asked the INDAP local and regional offices to supply me 
with the balance sheets and income statements of the 1,050 small farmers' organizations that had 
outstanding loans with INDAP in 1999. We received 543 balance sheets and income statements. 
According to the information provided by the local and regional officials, the remaining 507 
organizations did not maintain such accounts. 
I hired a team of six Certified Public Accountants to help me analyze these documents. Of these 543 
balance sheets and income statements, 133 were incomplete or had obvious errors and thus were not 
useful for our analysis. As we did not have the resources to conduct an external audit of each of the 
remaining 410 reports, we proceeded with our analysis on the assumption that the information they 
contained was complete and correct. Unfortunately, the conditions under which I obtained 
authorization to use this information severely restrict how I can use the data; in particular, I cannot use 
the variables that would have allowed me to cross-reference this data set with that described in Section 
3.1 above, matching individual EACs or even to disaggregate the analysis by crop or enterprise to 
relate it to the analysis on the impact of EACs on farm and household income (Chapter 6). 
It is probable that there are biases in the final sample of 410 EACs, but it is not easy to establish with 
any certainty the direction of the bias. On the one hand, one may think that the EACs that were less 
successful as business-oriented organizations, would be less willing to make their accounts public. On 
the other hand, well informed sources at five of 12 INDAP regional offices and 12 of the 100 or so 
local offices, told me that many of the EACs that do not maintain proper accounting books are among 
the smallest and most simple in their operations; they do not feel the need to spend scarce resources on 
paying an accountant to keep their books. According to these sources, one can not conclude that these 
EACs are less successful than those that do keep proper accounts. Still, as this issue could not be 
settled, the reader is advised to avoid extrapolating from the results for these 410 EACs. 
Fortunately, as I was finishing writing this book, I had access to the results of an in-depth study 
conducted independently by a consultant firm (FUNDES Chile, 2001). Their study focused on 156 
EACs that INDAP considers to be among the most financially exposed. The FUNDES study's 
methods included a proper audit of the books and accounts of these EACs, as well as an expert 
assessment of operational and management issues. The FUNDES results can therefore be used to 
indirectly cross-check my study's results. Their conclusions are more optimistic than mine concerning 
the economic and financial viability of EACs as business-oriented organizations. 
Each of the 410 balance sheets and income statements was processed using standard accounting 
procedures to calculate the values of the variables required for this analysis. These variables are listed 
in Table 3.1. Using these variables, three performance indicators were calculated as shown in the last 
three rows of Table 3.1: 
(1) Operational performance: measures whether an EAC is capable of generating sufficient income to 
cover its expenses. 
(2) Financial performance: measures the E A C s degree of indebtedness relative to its assets. 
(3) Financial dependence: measures the extent to which an EAC relies on public programs and 
agencies to generate its income, either through direct transfers, grants or services sold to them. 
One should note that I do not propose a threshold level above or below which an EAC should be 
considered sustainable or unsustainable. However, if an EAC has an income much higher than its 
expenses, has a low level of indebtedness, and has little or no dependence on public subsidies, 
common sense dictates that it will be more sustainable in the short run than one which cannot cover its 
expenses, is highly indebted, and is highly dependent on external grants. 
All of the information refers only to the EACs' own accounts; that is, these accounts do not include the 
income, expenses, assets or liabilities of the EACs' members. From a legal and managerial point of 
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view, the EAC is a separate entity from its members. It is of course linked functionally to its members 
through different exchange operations, but this in no way affects the fact that EACs are separate legal 
and management units from their members' farms and households. Of course, the transactions 
between an EAC and its members will be reflected in the EACs accounts; for example, the cost of the 
products sold by the members to the EAC is reflected in the organization's operating expenses, and the 
price charged by the EAC for the services provided to its members constitutes part of its sales revenue. 
In addition to this analysis, I was able to obtain official information from INDAP about the amount 
owed by 1,050 small farmers' organizations (SFO). These SFOs not only include EACs as defined in 
my study, but also other types of peasant and small farmers' groups and organizations. Since INDAP 
protected the identity of these 1,050 SFOs, I cannot cross-reference this information with that obtained 
from the balance sheets and income statements. 
Table 3.1 Definitions of economic and financial indicators 
Variable Definition 
Current assets Assets expected to be consumed or converted into cash during the next 
operating cycle. Include cash, amounts receivable, inventories, etc. 
Non-current assets Assets expected to be consumed or converted into cash after the next operating 
cycle. Include fixed assets, non-current receivables and long term investments. 
Total assets Current plus non-current assets. 
Current liabilities Funds payable during the next 12 months. 
Non-current liabilities Funds payable after 12 months. 
Total liabilities Current plus non-current liabilities. 
Net assets Total assets minus total liabilities. 
Sales revenue Income from sales of goods and services that constitute the EACs stock-in-
trade. 
Revenue from other sources Income from sales and sources that do not constitute the EACs stock-in-trade, 
such as interest. 
Total revenue Sales revenue plus revenue from other sources. 
Operating expenses Expenses incurred in activities that constitute the EACs stock-in-trade. 
Non-operating expenses Expenses incurred in activities outside the EACs stock-in-trade, including 
depreciation, provision for taxes, etc. 
Financial costs Interest expense. 
Total expenses Operating plus non-operating expenses plus financial costs. 
Operating income Sales revenue minus operating expenses. 
Income from public sources Income from public programs and agencies (grants plus sales of services to 
INDAP programs). 
Indicator of operational performance Total revenue / total expenses. 
Indicator of financial performance Total liabilities / total assets. 
Indicator of financial dependence Income from government programs / total revenue. 
3.5 Case studies (Chapter 8) 
My case study approach corresponds to what Stake (1994, p. 237) has defined as collective 
instrumental case studies: "a particular case is examined to provide an issue or refinement of theory. 
The case is of secondary interest; it plays a supportive role, facilitating our understanding of 
something else... with even less interest in one particular case, researchers may study a number of 
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cases jointly in order to inquire into the phenomenon, population or general condition." 
3.5.1 Selection of case studies 
I selected the 16 EAC case studies in the following way: 
( 1 ) 1 started with the registry of424 EACs described in Section 3.1 above. 
(2) To reduce field work costs, I excluded EACs in the more remote northern and southern parts of 
the country. 
(3) I also excluded all EACs with fewer than 10 members. 
(4) After applying these screening criteria, the database was left with 107 records from which I 
randomly chose 10 EACs from each of the following product areas: milk, potatoes, fresh market 
vegetables, and raspberries22. This gave me a total of 40 EACs. 
I chose milk, potatoes and vegetables because they are the EACs' most common products in Chile. I 
also included raspberries because they are a new product and the whole chain from production to 
export is still taking shape. I thought it would enhance the study to observe how EACs fared in this 
environment of intense change and innovation. 
The 40 EACs were invited to a workshop in July 1998, although 13 did not attend since they had 
decided not to participate in the study. At the workshop I gathered additional information from each of 
the 27 remaining EACs, and found that seven did not really meet my selection criteria. Of the 
remaining 20 ,16 were happy for me to do the field work. 
Table 3.2 describes these 16 case study EACs. In Chapter 8 I discuss the results of 14 of these case 
studies. I dropped one of them because I could not get reliable information about its financial and 
economic performance. I decided not to include the second one because it was so different to the other 
case studies in terms of size and organizational complexity. 
3.5.2 Field methods 
For each of the 16 case studies, I sent a detailed letter to the formal head of the EAC, the intermediate 
agencies that worked with them (e.g., an NGO, an extension firm), the head of the local LNDAP 
offices, and representatives from the market agents with whom the EAC interacted (e.g., the buyers of 
their products). The letter detailed the work involved, the objectives of the study, the type of 
information required, and my methods. I then phoned each of these people to answer any questions or 
doubts, and to arrange a date to do the field work. 
I conducted the following field activities for each case study: 
(1) Individual interviews. For each study I interviewed: 
• farmer members on the EAC board (usually two or three) 
• farmer members who were not and had never been members of the board (usually three to 
five) 
• local farmers who were not members of the organization (usually two or three) 
• hired technical and management staff, if any 
• the head oflNDAP's local office 
Unfortunately, the opportunity to do the financial and economic analysis of 410 EACs described in Section 3.4, arose when 
the case studies where almost finished. Otherwise, I would have undoubtedly used the results from that analysis to guide me 
in the preliminary selection of the potential case studies. 
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Table 3.2 Description of the 16 case study EACs 
Name Year of 
birth 
Major 
enterprises 
Services provided Members Annual 
sales 
Centra de Acopio 
Lechero Ranchillo 
1997 Milk Milk collection, cold storage, marketing 10 $ 130,000 
(1998) 
Centra de Acopio 
Lechero Lo Ovalle 
1994 Milk Milk collection, cold storage, marketing 10 $ 76,000 
(1998) 
Golden Berries S.A. 1997 Raspberries Cold storage, quality control, packaging, 
marketing, technical assistance, input 
supplies 
339 $ 1.5 
million 
(1998) 
Cooperativa 
Campesina El 
Renacer del Caj6n 
Ltda. 
1991 Tomatoes Marketing, seedling production, 
accounting, quality control, technical 
assistance 
10 $ 84,000 
(1998) 
Cooperativa 
Campesina We 
Tekucan Ltda 
1996 Fresh vegetables Quality control, marketing, technical 
assistance, investment projects (drip and 
sprinkle irrigation) 
27 $ 530,000 
(1998) 
Cooperativa 
Campesina 
Intercomunal Peumo 
Ltda. 
1969 Citrus, 
vegetables, 
cereal grains 
Marketing of products and agricultural 
inputs, gas station, technical assistance, 
investment projects 
405 $ 4 million 
(1998) 
Central Campesina 
Talagante 
1982 Garlic, 
raspberries 
Technical assistance, marketing (directly 
for export) 
120 Unknown 
Agricola y Comercial 
Coyam Ltda. 
1996 Milk Milk collection and cold storage, 
marketing 
44 $ 250,000 
(1998) 
Cooperativa 
Campesina El 
Arrayan Ltda. 
1995 Milk Milk collection and cold storage, 
marketing 
74 $ 225,000 
(1998) 
Agricola y Comercial 
Chirre Ltda. 
1997 Milk Milk collection and cold storage, 
marketing 
47 $210,000 
(1998) 
Agricola Santa 
Barbara S.A. 
1996 Milk, potatoes Milk collection, cold storage and 
marketing (starting a new milk quality 
control laboratory) 
40 $ 140,000 
(1998) 
Frutas de Guaico S.A. 1997 Raspberries Storage, processing, marketing, technical 
assistance 
44 $ 600,000 
(1998) 
Fratas de Romeral 
S.A. 
1995 Raspberries Storage, processing, marketing, technical 
assistance 
48 $ 1.2 
million 
(1998) 
Sociedad 
Agroindustrial y 
Comercial Agrocamp 
S.A. 
1995 Potatoes, milk Technical assistance, marketing of inputs, 
supplies and products, supermarket 
530 $ 1.1 
million 
(1998) 
Agricola y Comercial 
Carahue Ltda 
1997 Potatoes Marketing 10 $ 8,500 
(1998) 
Cooperativa 
Campesina Pullallan 
Ltda 
1996 Potatoes Marketing, technical assistance 32 $ 17,000 
(1998) 
64 Chapter Three 
• staff from the INDAP office with close working relationships with the particular EAC 
• staff from the intermediate agencies (NGO, extension consultant firms) who dealt directly 
with the EAC, and 
• at least one, and often more, purchasing clients. 
I personally conducted these interviews following a flexible checklist of open questions and 
topics, specific to the type of person being interviewed. There were six of these checklists: one for 
intermediate agency and INDAP staff, one for EAC board members, one for EAC members not on 
the board, one for non-member farmers, one for market agents, and one for the EAC's technical 
and management staff. Each interview lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. I conducted a total of 
240 individual interviews for the 16 case studies. 
(2) Half-day group meetings with the EAC board and with members who were not on the board. I 
facilitated these meetings, which focused on the salient points of the interviews. 
(3) A survey of a random sample of EAC members and a random sample of non-members from the 
area (Case Study Survey - Table 3.3). The members were picked at random from the EAC 
membership list. I obtained the information to compile a list of non-member farmers at the end of 
the individual interviews with the member farmers. In several cases when I was in doubt about 
the 'representativeness'23 of the non-members, I checked with some of the other sources (e.g., the 
local extensionist). My aim was to compile a list of all the small farmers who lived near the 
members, and to pick a random sample from this list. 'Near' was defined in each case by the 
people who helped to compile this list, but in general it meant the immediate area where the 
members lived, usually within a radius of perhaps 1 to 3 km. 
I must emphasize that while the sampling method is likely to have resulted in reducing sampling bias, 
the result is not a statistically representative sample of the population of members and non-members of 
each particular EAC, much less of all EACs within a certain category (e.g., all Milk Collection 
Centers). Lack of resources meant I could not afford to have statistically representative samples in 
each case study. And more important than that, the choice of a case study approach meant that I did 
not have pre-established hypotheses that I wanted to test through statistical analyses. The surveys in 
this case are only a method of inquiry that helped me understand better and cross-check the 
information that I was receiving from the in-depth interviews and workshops. This seemed necessary 
because much of the conversation was focused on issues in which quantities are important. Hence, the 
interpretation of these quantitative data depends on the qualitative information I received from the 
persons I talked to, and not on a formal statistical analysis. 
The survey included the following sections: 
• relationship with the EAC 
• household composition and characteristics of the individuals 
• access to land and land markets 
• access to irrigation 
• roads 
• farm management practices 
• fixed and quasi-fixed capital assets 
• animal production 
In the sense that with the information available, I had reason to suspect that these farmers would perhaps not be 
comparable to those who were EAC members (e.g., their farms were substantially larger or smaller, they were engaged in 
different crops or enterprises, etc.). 
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• crop and forestry production 
• manufactured and processed goods 
• fixed costs 
• direct costs for main crops or animal production systems 
• access to credit 
• access to technical assistance 
• participation in organizations and collective action projects 
• opinions about costs and benefits of organizations 
• multiple choice questions on trust and reciprocity, changes in technology, off-farm and non-farm 
income and unearned income (i.e., income from social subsidies and remittances). 
The survey was conducted by two teams of consultants with more than five years of experience in this 
type of work. Each team was supervised by a RIMISP staff member. Each household was visited first 
to agree a convenient time and place for the survey. In each case, we explained that we would like to 
interview both the head of the household and his/her spouse, although usually only the head of the 
household was present during the interview. Each questionnaire took about two hours to answer. Each 
survey form was revised by the field supervisor to try to detect any apparent error before the team left 
the area; when there were doubts, the household was visited again. A computer program was prepared 
by a programmer using criteria defined by me, to check most answers for internal and external 
consistency against a set of rules (e.g., if question A = 102, then question Z cannot be less than 50). A 
total of 234 non-member and 223 member surveys were retained for data analysis out of 246 and 254 
conducted in total. 
(4) Analysis of available documentation. In all cases but one (which was subsequently dropped from 
my analysis), I had access to the EACs' accounting information, such as the balance sheets and the 
income statements, and, in a few cases, to external audits. In many cases I also obtained copies of 
reports prepared by consultants, INDAP staff, etc., which often contained useful information. 
(5) I also interviewed other people who could provide specific information relevant to the case 
studies. For example, experts were interviewed about the milk, potato, fresh vegetable and 
raspberry markets. People knowledgeable about the policies and activities of INDAP in a certain 
region, or who had an external view of the EACs, were also interviewed. 
All the field activities took place in the second semester of 1999 and the first semester of 2000. I 
analyzed the qualitative and quantitative information between March 2000 and February 2001. 
3.6 Summary 
For easy reference, Table 3.3 summarizes my research methodology. 
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Table 3.3 Summary of the methodology 
Chapter Hypothesis/aim Methods / information source Sample size 
4 To describe EACs and to estimate 
their number and membership 
Two postal questionnaires Questionnaire 1 was directed at 
1050 rural organizations and was 
completed by 407. Questionnaire 2 
was sent out to 628 organizations 
and was completed by 534. Of 
those, 424 met the definition of an 
EAC and the data was used for the 
analysis in Chapter 4. 
5 To describe and compare EAC 
members and non-members in 
terms of household and farm 
characteristics. 
Survey of household and farm 
characteristics (General Survey). 
3000 households and farms. 
Sample is statistically 
representative of the population of 
small farms in five regions of 
Chile (where 72% of all small 
farms in the country are located) 
5 To compare EAC members and 
non-members' farm net margins 
and household annual income. 
Farm production costs and 
household income composition 
survey (Costs Survey). 
602 households and farms, sub-
sampled from the sample of 3000 
households and farms. 
5 To identify factors that contribute 
to a small farmer being an EAC 
member. 
Probit analysis using data from the 
General and Costs Surveys 
described above. 
471 households and farms with 
complete information from the 
general and costs surveys. 
5 To identify factors influencing the 
decision by farmers to set up an 
EAC. 
Three-day workshop with farmers 
belonging to 27 EACs. 
27 farmers from the same number 
ofEACs. 
6 To analyze the perception by 
farmers of the costs and benefits 
of EAC membership. 
Multiple choice questions 
included in a survey applied to 
farmers during case studies of 16 
EACs (Case Study Survey). 
223 small farmers who are 
members of 16 EACs, and 234 
neighboring non-member small 
farmers (control group). 
6 To test whether EAC membership 
has a statistically significant effect 
on: (a) a farm's net margin, and, 
(b) the household's annual 
income; controlling for the EACs 
product orientation. 
Heckman's Two-Stage Procedure, 
using data from the General and 
Costs Surveys. 
298 farms and households with 
complete information. 
6 To test the impact of EAC 
membership on total household 
income and its composition by 
sources of income, specifically for 
farmers in poor and marginalized 
areas. 
Survey in 1996 and again in 2000, 
applied to the same farms and 
households in the dryland areas of 
51 municipalities in five regions 
(Drylands Panel Survey). T-test 
comparison of means between 
EAC members and non-members 
193 households and farms with 
complete information for 1996 and 
2000. 
7 To analyze (1) EACs' operational 
performance, (2) EACs' financial 
performance, and (3) the relative 
importance of income generated 
from public programs. All these 
analyses were for 1999 fiscal year. 
Un-audited balance sheets and 
income statements of EACs for 
1999. Analysis by Certified Public 
Accountants of the information 
contained in these documents. 
Balance sheets and income 
statements were requested from 
1050 rural organizations. 410 of 
them provided complete 
information. 
8 through 
12 
To understand the main factors 
conditioning the performance and 
sustainability of EACs, and to 
analyze the relationship between 
institutional and economic 
performance. 
Qualitative case studies, using 
individual and group interviews 
with different stakeholders, half-
day workshops, analysis of 
available documentation, and a 
survey of members and non-
members (Case Study Survey). 
16 case studies ofEACs involved 
in milk (6 case studies), potato (3 
case studies), vegetable (4 case 
studies) and raspberry production 
(3 case studies), processing and/or 
marketing. Results of 14 case 
studies are reported. 
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CHAPTER 4. THE EACs IN CHILE 
4.1 Introduction 
This is a descriptive chapter, in which I characterize the EACs in terms of age; membership; location; 
size according to sales, employees, services they provide to their members; and the markets, crop and 
animal enterprises with which they work. 
4.2 Method 
The methods used in this chapter are described in detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.1. 
Hypothesis/aim Methods / information 
source 
Sample size 
To describe EACs and to 
estimate their number and 
membership 
Two postal questionnaires Questionnaire 1 was directed 
at 1050 rural organizations 
and was completed by 407. 
Questionnaire 2 was sent out 
to 628 organizations and was 
completed by 534. 
Of those, 424 fit the definition 
of an EAC and the data was 
used for the analysis in 
Chapter 4. 
4.3 Characteristics of EACs in Chile 
I estimate the number of EACs in Chile to be around 778, with a total membership of approximately 
58,000 small farmers. These figures come from a careful, line by line analysis of the available 
information for each of the 1,050 rural organizations which were receiving some form of financial 
support from INDAP in December 1999. While I am fairly confident that the organizations I excluded 
did not meet my definition of an EAC, it is possible that among the remaining 778 some more would 
be excluded given more information. Thus, this is an overestimation of the number of EACs and their 
members. However, on the other hand, I am not counting those EACs that may exist but which have 
never had access to INDAP's services, although admittedly these must be very few. 
Gomez (2001) addresses this issue in a recent study of all rural organizations in Chile. He separates 
EACs from cooperatives and trade associations (Asociaciones Gremiales), while in my own definition 
a local cooperative or a trade association can be an EAC if its primary purpose is to engage in 
marketing or value-adding activities. That is, Gomez uses the specific legal status of the organization 
as a distinguishing criterion, while I do not. After adjusting Gomez' figures according to my own 
definition, I arrive at a total of 55,000 members of what he calls EACs, cooperatives and trade 
associations, a sum similar to my own estimates. 
Of the estimated 778 EACs in Chile, my two postal questionnaires yielded detailed information for 
4 2 4 . 1 have found no evidence that could suggest that this sample is biased in any particular direction, 
although I have to admit that this is a rather subjective assessment, based on my own experience, and 
that I simply do not have any hard evidence to prove that the 354 EACs which did not answer my 
questionnaires are not systematically different from those included in my sample. What follows is 
based on the information for the 424 EACs which replied. 
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Figure 4.1 shows that the vast majority of the existing EACs formed since the return of democratic 
government in 1990. Clearly the formation of EACs in Chile has been directly and strongly facilitated 
by public policies that, since 1990, have explicitly aimed at fostering the formation of economic 
organizations of this sort, at stimulating the incorporation of as many small farmers as possible, and at 
prioritizing these economic associations as the primary counterparts of several public agencies (such 
as LNDAP, FOSIS, or CORFO). 
25,0 
1934 1964 1967 1969 1979 1983 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
Year 
Note: 1998 includes only first semester 
Figure 4.1 Year of legal constitution of EACs 
Table 4.1 shows how the regional distribution of EACs closely follows the distribution of subsistence 
and market-oriented small farmers. 
Table 4.1 Regional distribution of EACs in Chile (percentages) 
Region % of EACs in 
region 
Small Farms' 
Subsistence Market-oriented Total 
1 1.2 0.8 1 0.9 
2 0 0.6 0.5 0.6 
3 1.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 
4 3.3 7.5 3.8 5.2 
5 10.7 6.2 5.9 6 
6 10.2 9.4 10.2 9.9 
7 9 12.7 13.8 13.4 
8 13.7 17.7 18.9 18.4 
9 23 16 23.5 20.8 
10 19.9 25 15.6 19.1 
11 0.7 0.3 1 0.7 
12 1.7 0.2 0.4 0.3 
13 5 2.8 4.8 4.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source of number of small forms and their regional distribution: ODEPA, 2000, based on data from the 1997 Agricultural 
Census. 
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The 424 surveyed EACs declared that they work with a total of 31,500 small farmers. If we 
extrapolate the average number of members of these 424 EACs to the 778 EACs that I estimate exist 
in Chile, we would come up with a total membership of around 58,000 small farmers, or around 21% 
of all small farms in Chile, or one third of the number of market-oriented small farms in the country. 
These estimates agree with my survey of 3,000 small farmer households (see Chapter 5), which found 
that 22% claimed to belong to an EAC, as well as with the results of Gomez (2001). 
The average number of members and clients 2 4 of the surveyed EACs is 74.7, ranging between three 
and 3,000. However, Figure 4.2 shows that about half of the EACs work with less than 30 small 
farmers, and that larger EACs, with more than 100 or 150 members or clients, are not very common in 
Chile. I cannot explain the dip in the number of EACs with members between 75 and 100 members. 
1 to 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101201 
5 to to to to to to to to to to + 
15 25 35 45 55 65 75 85 95 150 
Number of farmers per EAC 
Figure 4.2 Size of EAC according to number of farmer members 
The total declared value of sales in 1998 of the 424 surveyed EACs was $57 million, or $ 1,800 per 
small farmer client. According to the total value of declared sales in 1998 (goods and services), the 
largest EAC had annual sales of $4.2 million. The average value of sales was $ 135,000. However, as 
shown in Figure 4.3, most EACs' sales were less than about $ 35,000 at the time of the survey; only 
28% had sales of more than $ 100,000. 
The 424 EACs in our survey directly employ 1,757 people made up of 122 managers, 241 
administrative staff, 280 technical staff, 115 promoters, and 999 'other' types of employee. 46% of 
EACs do not have any paid employees, and an additional 32% have between one and three paid 
employees (Table 4.2). This makes an average of 4.4 employees per EAC, with a minimum of zero 
and a maximum of 190 (a large milk cooperative). However, an average of 6.7 persons per EAC work 
ad honorem, meaning that the members themselves are most often in charge of management, clerical, 
or technical tasks within the organization. In fact, most volunteers work in management. 
4 Members are those who have a legal right in the EAC (e.g., shareholder), while clients are farmers who are regular users of 
the services of the EAC, regardless of the legal status of their relationship to the organization. 
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Annual Sales per EAC (Million Chilean $) 
Note: $ 1 = Chilean Pesos 453 at time of survey 
Figure 4.3 EACs' annual sales (1998) 
Table 4.2 EAC employees 
Percentage of424 EACs 
Number of employees Managers Administrative Technical Promoters Other 
0 77.6 67 75.2 94.3 73.3 
1 to 3 21.9 31.2 20.5 3.5 17.9 
4 to 5 0 1.1 1.4 1.1 3.8 
6 to 10 0.4 0.4 2.3 0.2 1.1 
More than 10 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 3.9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
In relation to the markets to which EACs have access, the most important category is local markets 
(Table 4.3). This basically means a combination of selling goods and/or services to local people, or 
that the EACs are acting as a first-stage intermediary between the individual farmer and traders that 
travel in the countryside buying agricultural products. However, almost half of the EACs operate in 
national markets, and 13% are involved with exports. Furthermore, most EACs operate at two market 
levels on average (e.g., regional and national, local and regional, etc.). 
Table 4.3 Types of markets accessed by 424 EACs in Chile 
Type of market Percentage of424 EACs 
Members' households 27.7 
Local 78 
Regional 57.2 
National 46 
International 13 
Note: The total is greater than 100% because a single EAC can operate in two or more market types 
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Table 4.4 shows that most EACs are involved with more than one crop or animal product. Livestock 
production (milk and meat) is more important than crop production. This undoubtedly reflects the 
influence of the Milk Collection Centers that were widely promoted in the early 1990s. 
Table 4.4 EACs and their enterprises 
Enterprise Percentage of424 EACs 
Milk 37.3 
Fresh vegetables 32.3 
Potatoes and other extensive field vegetables 28.5 
Meat 19.3 
Basic cereals 13.2 
Leguminous grains 11.8 
Berries 9.7 
Flowers 8.5 
Temperate fruits 8 
Vegetables for agro-industrial processing 7.1 
Seeds 6.6 
Honey 6.4 
Agro-tourism 5.4 
Handicrafts 4.2 
Wine 3.3 
Forest products 3.3 
Others 12 
Traditional enterprises in Chilean small-scale farming 114.3 
Non-traditional enterprises in Chilean small-scale farming 87.3 
Note: The total is greater than 100% because a single EAC can work with two or more enterprises 
Fresh vegetables are the EACs' main crop. On the contrary, crops such as basic grains and legumes -
very common in peasant farming systems - have a limited presence in the portfolio of EAC activities. 
This could mean that there are disincentives to collective action associated with these crops and their 
markets. Activities involving non-traditional crops are carried out by 87% of EACs, emphasizing the 
significant role these organizations play in diversifying peasant agriculture into more profitable areas. 
EACs provide a wide array of services to small-scale agriculture (Table 4.5), including members and 
clients. Support to crop and livestock production is the predominant activity, despite the fact that 
during interviews EAC leaders and managers, marketing and post-production support were mentioned 
as top priorities. Nevertheless, marketing of supplies and products, and other services directly related 
to marketing (such as storage, transportation and price and market information systems), are very 
important areas for EACs. Value-adding through processing is still a relatively small area of activity. 
In other Latin American countries, credit provision is one of the most important services provided by 
EACs, but not so in Chile, as in this country members of these organizations almost automatically 
have access to INDAP's credit programs. 
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Table 4.5 Services provided by 424 EACs to small farmers 
Service Percentage of EACs 
Agricultural production 57.3 
Marketing of products 48.6 
Storage 34 
Animal production 30.9 
Machinery services 21.9 
Marketing of inputs 21.2 
Technical assistance and extension 20.5 
Agro-industrial processing 17.7 
Preparation of investment projects 14.9 
Price and markets information 13.4 
Training 12.5 
Credit 11.8 
Accounting 10.6 
Legal services 9.4 
Forest production 8 
Assistance to agro-tourism 5.2 
Other services 9.9 
Note: The total is greater than 100% because a single EAC can provide two or more services 
4.4 Discussion 
The main conclusions from this survey are as follows: 
(1) The pro-active policies of three successive democratic governments have been instrumental in 
stimulating the formation of EACs, most of which have emerged since the return to democratic 
rule in 1990. Such policies have created two complementary incentives: (a) a climate of favorable 
political opportunities, where the organization of rural people has been encouraged as a means to 
strengthen civil society and to promote public participation in civic life; and (b) promotion by 
rural and agricultural development agencies of small farmer economic organizations to incorporate 
small-scale agriculture into the market-oriented economy. As we have seen in Chapter 1, these 
policy objectives led to very large amounts of public funds (subsidies and loans) being made 
available to support EAC formation. 
(2) EACs are engaged in supporting small farmers' strategies to diversify products, markets and 
services. Historically, small-scale agriculture in Chile has concentrated on a number of 
'traditional' crop and animal products (e.g., milk, small grains, grain legumes, vegetables and a 
handful of industrial crops such as sugarbeet). Most of these products are sold locally through 
middlemen. However, my findings show that a very large proportion of the EACs are involved in 
non-traditional production systems, services and markets. 
(3) Small farmers have avoided repeating the trend prevailing until the 1973 military coup, of forming 
large-scale organizations with hundreds of members. While this probably enhances the internal 
cohesion of these EACs, it may lead to important problems of scale of operations for several of 
their products and markets (e.g., wine, flowers, fruits). 
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CHAPTER 5. THE MEMBERS OF EACs 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I address three questions: (a) Who are the EAC participants? (b) Are all small farmers 
equally likely to participate in these business-oriented organizations? and (c) Do the poorest farmers 
have an equal participation rate as the wealthier farmers? 
These are important questions for at least two different policy objectives: 
(1) Reducing rural poverty: it is important to know if the poor and the extremely poor are being 
included in these organizations. 
(2) Diversifying small-scale agriculture away from traditional commodities and towards more 
competitive and profitable enterprises: it is important to know if all small-scale farms are equally 
likely to participate in these organizations regardless of their type of production or productive 
capacities. 
Current public policies, in particular those of EMDAP, make no de jure discrimination between 
different types of farmers in terms of the support they can receive if they want to set up an EAC. It is 
assumed that all small-scale farmers can take advantage of the instruments and programs which 
support EAC development. Yet not all small farmers may be equally interested in participating in 
these organizations, and/or some farmers who would like to join may face de facto barriers to doing 
so. 
In this chapter I assume that the participation of a small farmer in an EAC is determined by the 
interplay between a number of factors, discussed in detail in Chapter 2: 
• the incentives he or she faces to engage in collective economic action; 
• the resources or assets that the household and its participants command; and 
• the household's predisposition towards participating in such organizations, which, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, is influenced by their previous experience of collective action and other institational 
issues. 
Chapter 2 mentioned three types of incentives for a farmer to engage in collective economic action: 
(1) market incentives (i.e., market characteristics or signals that justify a household's investment in 
the time and other resources required to join and participate in an EAC; see Chapter 2 and 
especially Table 2.1); 
(2) political incentives (i.e., policies and public resources that create the political opportunity and 
lower the costs and uncertainties involved in a decision to join an EAC); 
(3) incentives provided by intermediate agents, such as NGOs, technical advisors and extension 
agents, etc. (who provide leadership in signalling alternatives to the status quo; models of 
organization; technical and entrepreneurial expertise; access to information and to networks 
extending outside the rural communities; and sometimes financial resources, all of which lower 
the direct and transaction costs of organizing). Faced with such incentives, the capacity of a 
household to respond depends on its capital assets, including natural, human, physical, financial, 
and social capital. 
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5.2 Method 
The methods used in this chapter are discussed in detail in Chapter 3, section 3.2. 
Aim Methods and information source Sample size 
To describe and compare EAC 
members and non-members in 
terms of household and farm 
characteristics. 
Survey of household and farm 
characteristics (General Survey). 
3000 households and farms. 
Sample is statistically 
representative of the population of 
small farms in five regions of Chile 
(where 72% of all small farms in 
the country are located). 
To compare EAC members and 
non-members in terms of farm net 
margin and household annual 
income. 
Farm production costs and 
household income composition 
survey (Costs Survey). 
602 households and farms, sub-
sampled from the sample of3000 
households and farms. 
To identify factors that contribute 
to a small farmer being an EAC 
member. 
Probit analysis using data from the 
General and Costs Surveys 
described above. 
471 households and farms with 
complete information, from the 
General and Costs Surveys. 
To identify factors influencing the 
decision by farmers to set up an 
EAC. 
Three-day workshop with farmer 
leaders belonging to 27 EACs. 
27 farmers from the same number 
of EACs. 
5.3 Comparison between EAC participants and non-participants 
In this section I compare the characteristics of the individuals, households and farms of EAC 
participants with those of non-participants. The data come from a cross-sectional survey and I do not 
have information on the characteristics of the individuals, households, and farms before they decided 
to join an EAC. As discussed in Chapter 3 (Section 3.2), the reader should be aware that correlations 
between participation in an EAC and any of the variables included in the analysis, do not imply 
causation. 
5.3.1 Levels of participation by type of organization and region 
Nearly three-quarters of all rural households are affiliated to an organization of some kind (e.g.., for 
economic, social, recreational or religious purposes), but only one-fifth of them are in an EAC. One-
third of the participants of rural organizations belong to an EAC. The participation in EACs is 
statistically independent of participation in rural organizations of some kind. 
Table 5.1 shows that there are strong regional variations in the degree of participation, both in rural 
organizations and in EACs. Moreover, there are regions with high participation in rural organizations 
and low levels in EACs, and vice versa. There are also regions where participation is either high or 
low in both types of organizations. Statistically speaking, the correlation between the degree of 
participation in rural organizations and EACs, by regions, is low and non-significant. High levels of 
civic participation do not necessarily lead to similar degrees of participation in economically-oriented 
organizations. I would hypothesize that a high density of civic organizations aids the formation of 
EACs by providing leadership, accustoming people to working with others, providing information 
about which individuals can or cannot be trusted, or providing a forum where people can discuss new 
collective action initiatives. But these activities do not necessarily foster collective economic action; 
just as in an urban setting being a member of the same sports club as another person does not 
necessarily mean that one will become his or her business partner. 
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Table 5.1 Participation in rural organization and in EACs by region (percentage of households) 
Region Rural organization EAC 
V irrigated 50 25 
VI irrigated N/A N/A 
VI dryland N/A 14.3 
VII north irrigated 90.9 48.5 
VII south irrigated 87.2 12.8 
VII dryland 79.2 16.7 
VII piedmont 87.5 28 
Vri-VTHrice 69.6 4.3 
Vm irrigated 82.4 13.7 
Vm dryland 51.2 4.9 
VIII piedmont 60.9 0 
X red clays 69.2 34.6 
X nadis 81.1 47.3 
X trumaos 57.4 34.4 
X Chiloe 76.7 6.7 
Total 73.1 21.5 
Note: Nadis and trumaos are local names for particular soil types. The area where these soils are prevalent are known by the 
same name. ChiloS is a large island in Region X. 
High civic and economic participation occur in only a few regions; those where the farming systems 
and markets used by small farmers create incentives for economic collective action (e.g., VU irrigated 
region North, with its fruit, vegetables and berries; and X region Nadis, where milk production is a 
primary enterprise). High civic participation and low EAC participation occurs in some areas with a 
strong rural identity and culture, such as the island of Chiloé, but where subsistence potato, wheat and 
sheep farming are also very important. In fact, there are a couple of regions with lower than average 
levels of civic participation and higher than average participation in EACs (e.g., the trumaos area in 
the X Region, where potato is the predominant crop of small-scale farming). These results are 
consistent with the discussion in Chapter 2 of market conditions under which EACs can make an 
effective contribution to their members. 
5.3.2 EAC participation and cropping systems 
According to the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2 (in particular Table 2.1), a household's 
interest in joining an EAC partly depends on the incentives derived from its specific productive or 
market environment. 
Table 5.2 shows that participation of milk producers in EACs is significantly higher than would be 
expected statistically if product and market orientation is not influencing such a decision. For many of 
them these organizations are the only way they can respond to the new grades and standards being 
enforced by the dairy industry. For them, the only alternatives to collective action would be to 
purchase an individual cooling tank (which requires a certain scale of production as well as the 
financial capacity to invest), or to remain in the informal milk market. 
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Table 5.2 Participation in EACs by enterprise (percentage of households who produce a given 
product) 
Enterprise Participation in EAC 
Milk 54.6** 
Wheat 14.5** 
Beans 19.6 
Potatoes 24.4 
Total 21 
Chi-square test significant at 1% 
In the case of wheat and bean producers, there is no advantage to organizing for marketing these 
commodities (Table 2.1 in Chapter 2). There are no significant market entry barriers; the price is set 
through fairly transparent mechanisms; there are plenty of buyers even in the most remote areas; there 
is no way to differentiate one's own product; transaction costs are very low; and economic risk in 
wheat is regulated in Chile through the operation of 'price bands' that attenuate the year-to-year 
fluctuations of international prices. Under these conditions, farmers would have little to gain from a 
marketing organization. 
Potato producers face more or less the same market conditions as those engaged in wheat and bean 
production. In fact, a recent study (Vargas and Foster, 2000) which examined the market conditions 
for the 15 most important Chilean agricultural products found that the potato market is the closest one 
can find to a 'perfectly competitive' market. However, in this case there are two conditions that may 
create an incentive for joining an organization: potato prices fluctuate widely from year to year, so the 
degree of economic risk is rather high; and if an organization can differentiate and process its product, 
it may be able to access the supermarket outlet, where prices can be significantly higher than in the 
spot market. However, for an EAC to be able to intervene in any of these two levels, it would have to 
be able to market an extremely large volume of potatoes more or less constantly throughout the year. 
Achieving this goal is probably beyond the means of most, if not all, the existing local or regional 
potato-marketing EACs. 
5.3.3 Rural poverty 
Chile uses the concept of an official poverty line to monitor poverty. A household is considered 
extremely poor if its per capita income is not sufficient to cover the cost of a 'basic food basket', and 
is defined as poor if the income can meet food needs but not those of clothes, housing and basic 
services. At the time of the survey, the rural poverty line was set at $ 636 per capita/year, and the 
extreme poverty line was $ 363 per capita/year. 
There are statistically significant differences in the degree to which these different kinds of households 
participate in EACs (Table 5.3). Participants in EACs are concentrated in the non-poor category, with 
a much lower representation of extremely poor households than in the control group. Yet EACs do 
have a higher proportion of poor households than the non-participant category2 5. 
At this point it is particularly important to remind the reader that the data do not permit us to establish any causality 
between participation in an EAC and the position of the households in this classification of poverty. From this result we 
cannot conclude that participation in an EAC results in a household overcoming poverty, or if in fact the poorest participate 
less, either by their own free will or by being excluded. 
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Table 5.3 Poverty and participation in EACs 
Type of household Participants Non-participants 
(%) (%) 
Non-poor 59.1 51.5 
Poor 18.3 13.3 
Extremely poor 22.6 35.2 
Total 100 100 
Chi2 significant at 5% level 
5.3.4 Human capital 
The heads of households which participate in EACs tend to be, as a group, somewhat better educated 
than the non-participants. Among non-participants, 73% of household heads have no schooling or only 
incomplete primary education, as compared to 57% in the EAC participants group. These differences 
are statistically significant in a Chi2 test. 
However, there are no other important differences in other human capital variables, such as household 
size, age of the household head, number of members in the labor force, dependency ratio 
(economically inactive / active members of the household), or, surprisingly, percentage of female-
headed households (Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4 Human capital and participation in EACs 
Variable Non-participants Participants 
Household size (average number of members) 3.92 3.94 
Household members in the labor force (average number) 2.7 2.8 
Non-working / working household members (average number) 1.4 1.3 
Age of head of household (average years) 55.3 57 
Female-headed households (%) 10.4 8.7 
Head of household, no schooling (%) 7.6 7 
Head of household, incomplete primary education (%) 65.1 49.6 
Head of household, complete primary education (%) 14 20 
Head of household, incomplete secondary education (%) 5.2 8.7 
Head of household, complete secondary education (%) 6.7 7.2 
Head of household, further education (%) 9 7.5 
5.3.5 Farm size 
Participants in EACs have larger farms than non-participants (Table 5.5). However, this conceals a 
location effect, since most participants tend to be located in the south where farms are larger but less 
productive per hectare due to soil and climate constraints. When controlled by agroecological zone, 
the differences in farm size are only statistically significant in one of the regions. Also, there are no 
statistically significant differences between members and non-members of EACs in the number of 
irrigated hectares per farm, nor in the proportion of the farm under irrigation. 
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Table 5.5 Farm size and EAC participation 
Variable Non-participants Participants 
Average farm size (ha) 17.6 28.7 
Average irrigated farm area (ha) 2.9 3 
Share of farm under irrigation (%) 29.2 23.9 
5.3.6 Crop yields and prices 
I was able to analyze mean yields for six crops. EAC participants have significantly higher yields for 
oats, potatoes and beans. There are no statistically significant differences between EAC participants 
and non-participants in the yields of corn, sugarbeet or wheat. 
I examined the mean price received by EAC participants and non-participants for 83 different 
products. The conclusion is clear. EACs have not been able to negotiate better prices for their 
members' production. Participants in EACs only received statistically significant higher prices for 
short-grain rice, dry green peas and garbanzo; all of which are rather minor crops in peasant farming 
systems. In no case did EAC participants receive lower prices than non-participants. 
5.3.7 Diversification into non-traditional crops and farm enterprises 
Traditional crops in Chile are those that were predominant in the country until the late 1970s. The 
most important traditional crops are wheat and maize; grain legumes; the so-called traditional 
industrial crops (sugarbeet, oil crops, and tobacco); traditional varieties of wine; and potatoes. 
Traditional animal enterprises include milk and meat from double-purpose cattle, and milk from dairy 
cattle. Non-traditional crops are those produced for the export market, agroindustries, and retail market 
(supermarkets and restaurant chains). They include fruit, fresh vegetables produced under intensive 
cropping systems, agroindustrial vegetables (e.g., tomatoes for tomato paste), quality wine, flowers, 
and seeds. Non-traditional animal products include all specialized systems using modem technologies. 
As the reader will rapidly see, this is a confusing classification, in that the same crop can be 
considered both traditional and non-traditional, depending on the market it is destined for and the 
production technology used. However, I am using this classification because it is the one applied in 
Chile. 
Diversification away from traditional commodities has been an important objective of public policies 
and private investments. This is a reaction to macroeconomic and trade policies that have significantly 
decreased Chile's competitiveness in these non-traditional products. However, there are no significant 
differences between EAC participants and non-participants in the number of hectares growing non-
traditional crops per farm (in both cases, an average of less than 1 ha per farm). 
5.3.8 Access to non-traditional markets 
Traditionally most small Chilean farmers rely on middlemen to buy part of their harvest at the 
farmgate. Given EACs' emphasis on marketing, it is surprising that there are no significant differences 
between EAC participants and non-participants in terms of the share of their production that is sold in 
formal markets, such as supermarkets, restaurant chains, or agroindustries. Around 25% of the harvest 
(by gross value) is sold in these markets for both members and non-members. There are also no 
significant differences between EAC participants and non-participants when one looks at the 
percentage of households that have production contracts with agroindustries (around 12% in both 
cases). This means that in 1997 many EACs were still selling their members' products in traditional 
markets. 
When I do this same analysis separately for milk, potato and wheat producers (the three products for 
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which I have sufficient data points), then I find that milk producers who participate in EACs, on 
average sell slightly less than half of their production in formal markets (mostly large dairy plants), 
while non-members on average only sell a quarter of their production in those markets, the rest going 
to the middlemen. The difference is highly significant from a statistical point of view. On the other 
hand, the results for potato and wheat producers show no differences between EAC participants and 
non-participants. These results are in line with the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 2 and in 
particular in Table 2.1. 
5.3.9 Access to technical assistance services and credit 
In Chile, agricultural technical assistance is provided to small farmers by non-governmental agencies 
(NGOs, private consultant firms and individuals, and small farmers' organizations), under contract to 
government agencies, the most prominent of them being INDAP. As shown in Figure 5.1, the vast 
majority of small farmers who participate in EACs have access to these INDAP services, while half of 
the non-participants receive this type of support. Seen from another angle, almost three-quarters of the 
small farmers who receive technical assistance from INDAP, are not participating in an EAC. All 
these results are statistically significant. What this means is that participation in EAC does increase the 
access of a small farmer to technical assistance and advice, but that being a member of these 
organizations is not a sine qua non condition for receiving these services. 
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Participant Non-participant 
Participation In EAC 
• Has access DDoes not have access 
Figure 5.1 EAC participation and access to INDAP technical assistance services 
More or less the same trends are observed for credit provided by INDAP, except that there is even less 
discrimination against non-participants, since two-thirds of them still have access to loans (Figure 5.2). 
Close to three-quarters of all INDAP credit customers are not members of EACs. Of those EAC 
participants who have access to INDAP credit, 42% receive long-term loans, as opposed to only 26% 
of the non-participants who are financed by INDAP. All these differences are statistically significant 
As can be seen in these results, INDAP does not condition loans on being an EAC member. Some 
loans require collateral and others do not, but this is not contingent on being an EAC member. When 
required, the collateral is requested directly from the loan recipient (whether an individual, an EAC or 
some other type of rural organization). EACs must commit their own assets as collateral - and 
sometimes that of the members as well, depending on the size of the loan - only when they are the 
direct recipients of the loan. Interest rates are exactly the same for all types of loans. Loans to EACs 
do have some advantages, such as higher loan size limits. EACs often process as one single loan 
application the sum of the individual loans required by their members; this reduces the cost of the loan 
process both to the members and to INDAP. 
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Participant Non-participant 
Partlcpation In EAC 
• Has access DDoes not have access 
Figure 5.2 EAC Participation and access to credit from INDAP 
5.3.10 Farm and household income 
Table 5.6 shows that the net annual household income of EAC-participating households is 43% higher 
than that of non-participants. The net annual farm income of EAC participants is 96% higher than that 
of non-participants. The main reason for these annual results is the much higher gross value of 
production (78%) achieved by participants. 
Note in Table 5.6 that the ratio of direct costs (labor plus agricultural inputs) to gross value of farm 
products is only slightly higher for participants (63%) than for non-participants (58%). This indicates 
that their profit rates are roughly similar. Also, there are no statistically significant differences between 
participants and non-participants in the ratio of gross value of farm output to on-farm labor (whether 
from their own households or hired); yet, participants do invest more household labor in on-farm 
activities. 
Table 5.6 Farm and household income and EAC participation 
Variable Non-participants Participants 
Net annual household income ($) 3,385 4,230 * 
Net annual farm income ($) 1,132 2,223** 
Gross value of farm output ($) 5,285 9,397 ** 
Direct costs of farm production ($) 3,088 5,888 ** 
Fixed costs of farm production ($) 1,065 1,285 
Off-farm income ($) 807 869 
Unearned income ($) 484 576 
Value of on-fann household labor ($) 449 793 ** 
* = t-test significant at 5%; ** = t-test significant at 1% 
EAC participants derive a lower proportion of their gross income from off-farm sources (18%), as 
compared to non-participants (24 %); the difference is statistically significant. However, this is not 
due to participants having a significantly lower income from off-farm sources. Whilst participants and 
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non-participants receive more or less the same gross income from off-farm sources, participants have a 
much higher total gross income, so the share is lower. In both cases the main source of off-farm 
income is wage employment in agriculture. There are no differences in unearned income between both 
groups of households, meaning that they have equal access to social subsidies. 
5.4 Deciding factors in the decision to establish an EAC 
As described in Chapter 3, a three-day workshop was held with farmer leaders of 27 EACs. The 
participants were divided into different groups according to their EAC's main product focus. All the 
groups were asked the same question: "What were the most important factors that stimulated the 
formation of the EACs present in this group?" In this section I first present the results of the workshop 
(see Section 5.1) classified by producer group (milk, potato, and fruit and vegetable EACs), and then I 
compare the different groups. 
5.4.1 Potato producers' perspectives 
Potato producer EAC leaders felt there were three main factors involved in establishing an EAC: 
(1) The most important factor is the presence of a leader or a small group that can take the initiative to 
form an organization. In all cases, these leaders first formed informal groups to do things other 
than marketing potatoes, such as receiving technical assistance in forest management; sharing the 
costs of and transport for agricultural supplies and inputs; improving a road or some other similar 
investment in local infrastructure or services. 
(2) The second factor relates to the markets in which they operate. By selling their potatoes 
themselves, small farmers receive low and unfair prices. Small farmers joined their EAC so that 
they could negotiate collectively with buyers, and thus obtain better prices for their product. 
Markets demand larger volumes and higher quality; EACs can help small farmers meet these 
market demands. 
(3) The third factor, according to this group, is the support received from public agencies and 
programs. In all cases, the informal groups that had carried out successful and largely non-
economic initiatives were approached either by municipal governments or by national agencies 
such as INDAP and FOSIS (the Solidarity and Social Investment Fund), to invite them to 
participate in programs that required the formation of an EAC. In most of these cases, such 
programs involved the availability of loans and subsidies to finance investments, working capital 
and technical assistance, and these resources are what captured the interest of the members of the 
informal organizations. 
5.4.2 Fruit and vegetable producers' perspectives 
This group felt that two factors were important: 
(1) Most important was intervention by intermediaries, such as traders, NGOs, the National 
Confederation of Cooperatives, the local priest, and a private technical assistance consultant 
working under contract with INDAP. In the view of this group, these agents "motivated the 
community, brought in financial support, and trained us to work together in EACs". 
(2) The second most important factor was the need to access new markets. In many cases, this was 
due to farmers having recently embarked on growing new fruit or vegetable crops, such as cherries 
or raspberries. The new market opportunities were in most cases identified by a member of the 
local organization or by the intermediary agents, who "learned something", or "knew someone". 
With this information and the support of the intermediate agents, the group began to get going. 
This group felt that working together created links between neighbors that were then useful when 
forming an EAC. Kinship links also played a role. However, in the case of some of the vegetable 
producers, social relationships were initially strained because of having to compete against each other 
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in limited local markets. 
5.4.3 Milk producers' perspectives 
This group identified a very long list of factors that brought about an early decision to form an EAC 
(in all cases, these were Milk Collection Centers): 
(1) Market factors: A few years ago, all the dairy agribusinesses began to reject milk that had not been 
cooled. There was no way to escape this new standard, since all the factories had the same policy. 
Many sectors were being left out of the itineraries of the milk collection trucks, due to low volume 
and because the milk they picked up was not cooled. 
At the same time, some dairy plants were offering to set up Milk Collection Centers, sometimes 
even contributing the cooling tank, offering to pay a higher price for higher volume, and, in some 
cases, even subsidizing the cost of transport. In some cases, two plants would compete with each 
other to serve a group of small farmers. One of the medium-large dairy agribusinesses (COLUN) 
is a cooperative owned by farmers, and they were more supportive than the largest firms (e.g., 
Nestle and Soprole). 2 6 
The dairy plants did not want to be responsible for administrating these Milk Collection Centers, 
and so there was a need for the farmers to establish a formal organization to own, set up and run 
the center. 
(2) Intermediate agents: Technical advisors working as INDAP contractors told farmers about the new 
dairy agribusiness grades and standards policies. They argued that if the farmers did not organize 
and set up Milk Collection Centers, they would be left without a market. They knew about centers 
already working in other parts of the country or region, and had technical and economic 
information to design the new ones. These technical agents also knew how to approach INDAP 
and FOSIS - and, in some cases, the dairy firms - to tap the resources (loans and subsidies) 
available for setting up a center. 
(3) Government agencies: INDAP and FOSIS provided the loans, subsidies and technical assistance 
required to set up a Milk Collection Center. INDAP insisted that in order to set up a Milk 
Collection Center, a group would need to establish itself as a formal EAC (e.g., to be able to buy 
the land and equipment, contract the electricity services, receive the payments from the dairy 
plant, etc.). INDAP would often subsidize in part or in full the legal costs involved in establishing 
an EAC. In many cases, INDAP insisted the group receive technical assistance from private 
contractors before agreeing to give out a start-up loan. 
(4) Rural communities: In all cases, the farmers perceived the new grades and standards policies as a 
threat. Under these conditions, "a hidden leader", a member of the community or a small group, 
took the initiative to mobilize other farmers to respond to the threat. In only one case, the 
community as a whole reacted, because they already had an informal neighborhood organization 
that had carried out many projects to improve the local school, roads, church, etc.; this group was 
able to react very fast to the offer by one of the dairy firms to set up a Milk Collection Center, 
while the communities that lacked these organizations needed more time to start up the process. 
Individuals within the communities are also important because in almost all cases, one of the 
neighbors donated the piece of land (usually around 0.5 ha) needed for housing the cooling tank. 
5.4.4 Common factors 
The three groups in the workshop identified the same factors behind their early decision to organize, 
By "more supportive", the farmers basically mean that COLUN had a more helpful attitude to finding solutions to the 
problems that the farmers could have in setting up the EACs, while the largest firms simply would establish their conditions 
and then it was up to the farmers to meet them in whatever way they could. However, prices, grades and standards are more 
or less the same across these different dairy firms. 
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but with differing emphases on their relative importance. 
The process of setting up the milk, fruit and vegetable producer EACs was catalyzed by new market 
trends. In the case of milk, a change in grades and standards in the dairy industry threatened to put 
them out of business. For fruit and vegetables, the traditional markets were insufficient or inadequate 
to absorb diversified products. 
Potato producers emphasized the role of pre-existing community organizations as platforms to 
facilitate the start-up of economic collective action. Market conditions were also a factor, referring to 
the long-standing aspiration of small farmers of being able to negotiate better prices with the 
traditional local merchants and traders. 
All the groups highlighted the importance of community organizations and of individual or collective 
leaders. The former provide the initial fora for debating alternatives. These community groups, 
whether formal or informal, 'incubate' the initiatives that will become an EAC. Individual and 
community leaders played a clear role in all the cases present in the workshop. Participants appeared 
to place greatest emphasis on the role of these persons or groups in motivating other farmers. This 
attitudinal or political leadership provided by local leaders is complemented by the more 'technical' 
leadership of external agents. If local leaders build on farmers' willingness to question the status quo 
and to take action, external agents provide the 'road map' for collective action, as well as the networks 
needed to obtain information, knowledge, expertise and financial resources. 
The role of government agencies was mentioned by all three groups. It appears to be stronger or more 
decisive for potato growers, where the market stimulus is weaker, but is also very important in the 
case of milk and fruit and vegetable producers who require the financial and technical support of 
government agencies to set up their organizations and start their operations. In other words, for potato 
growers, public programs both stimulate and facilitate economic collective action, while for milk and 
fruit and vegetable producers, the stimulus comes from the market and government provides the 
means to respond. 
5.5 Factors affecting the probability of being an EAC member 
Table 5.7 shows the results of the Probit regression analysis, using the data from the 1997 survey of 
small farms and households (see Chapter 3). The conceptual model is as follows: 
(1) There will be significant location effects, as location is related to factors that create incentives or 
disincentives to becoming a member of an EAC, such as access to markets and the structure of 
farming systems. 
(2) Milk producers are more likely to join EACs, since there are significant barriers to market access 
in the dairy industry if a farmer is not organized. There will be no effects, or the effect will be 
negative, when the farmer is a potato, wheat or bean producer, as farmers can produce and sell 
these commodities in the spot market, without needing to work through an organization. 
(3) All the human capital variables have a positive effect on the probability of being an EAC member, 
since these households will tend to be wealthier, more informed and more involved in social 
networks that extend outside their communities. Households headed by women are less likely to 
be EAC members as these households face very significant constraints on their capacity to invest 
time and other resources in any but the most indispensable production and domestic activities. 
Education will have a positive effect on the probability of EAC membership, as better educated 
households have access to more information and contacts and have higher income and other 
assets. 
(4) Total farm size and access to irrigation will both have a positive effect on the probability of being 
an EAC member, as these households will be wealthier, more linked to market and non-market 
networks, and more dependent on farm income. 
(5) Access to technical assistance will have a positive effect on the probability of being an EAC 
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member, as farm advisors provide a strong link to the public programs and instruments available 
to support EACs. 
(6) Being poor and extremely poor will diminish the probability of a household being a member of an 
EAC, as they derive a large fraction of their income from non-farm sources and their farming 
systems are oriented not to market exchange but to household food security. 
Table 5.7 Determinants of EAC participation 
Number of observations = 471 
LR Chi2 = 196.9 Prob. > Chi2 = 0.0000 
Log likelihood = -163.3451 Pseudo R 2 = 0.3761 
Variable Coefficient Standard 
error 
z P>|z| 
Location in Northern irrigated VTI Region1 (1 = yes) 1.26 .73 1.72 0.085 
Location in the Nadis area of the X Region1 (1 = yes) .83 .51 1.61 0.100 
Milk producer? (1 =yes) 1.30 .22 6.00 0.000 
Potato producer? (1 = yes) -.35 .19 -1.82 0.069 
Wheat producer? (1 =yes) -.11 .20 -0.54 0.589 
Bean producer? (1 = yes) .00 .26 0.01 0.995 
Number of household members .04 .05 0.90 0.370 
Age of head of household .02 .01 2.18 0.029 
Gender of head of household? -.06 .28 -0.20 0.840 
Incomplete basic education? (1 = yes) -.25 .34 -0.72 0.470 
Complete basic education? (1 =yes) .11 .38 0.30 0.764 
Incomplete secondary education? (1 = yes) .02 .46 0.03 0.973 
Complete secondary education? (1 = yes) .07 .45 0.15 0.884 
More than complete secondary education? (1 = yes) .64 .54 1.20 0.231 
Total farm size (ha) .00 .01 0.97 0.333 
Percentage of farm with irrigation .00 .01 0.291 0.771 
Receives technical assistance from INDAP? (1 = yes) 1.33 .20 6.81 0.000 
Poor but not extremely poor? (1 = yes) .21 .24 0.86 0.391 
Extremely poor? (1 = yes) -.33 .19 -1.70 0.090 
Constant -3.25 .82 -4.00 0.000 
The remaining 12 location variables are not shown in this table, as they are all non-significant 
The model is robust, and all the signs are as predicted in the conceptual model: 
• Farmers in the northern part of the irrigated valley of the VII Region have a high probability of 
being EAC members. Here many small farmers are engaged in high risk, non-traditional crops 
(vegetables, fruits, berries, wine grapes, etc.) sold in markets with strong access barriers and high 
transaction costs. Also, being located in the Nadis area of the X Region, where milk production is 
important means farmers have a very strong incentive to organize in order to have access to the 
dairy industry market. 
• Milk producers have a high probability of being EAC members. As mentioned before, the quality 
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grades and standards imposed by the dairy industry more or less force most small farmers to 
organize. Being a potato producer has a strong negative effect on the probability of being a 
member of an EAC; recent research has shown that this is one of the agricultural markets that 
works best in Chile, and small farmers would have little incentive (and plenty of disincentives) to 
join an EAC if the purpose is to market this product in spot markets. The coefficient of the 
variable for being a wheat producer also has a negative sign, but in this case it is not statistically 
significant. The constant of the variable for being a bean producer is positive but very low and 
non-significant. In short, milk producers have incentives to join an EAC, while potato producers 
have disincentives to do so, with less distinct results for wheat and beans. 
• All the human capital variables, aside from gender of the head of household, have a positive sign, 
but only the age of the head of household is statistically significant, meaning that older households 
tend to participate more in EACs. The variable for having a female-headed household is not 
significant, showing that the gender of this individual does not affect the probability of being an 
EAC member. 
• Surprisingly, neither farm size nor access to irrigation have a statistically significant effect, 
although in both cases the sign of the coefficient is positive, as expected. This means that 
participation in an EAC is neutral with respect to these types of assets. 
• Having access to the technical assistance services provided by private consultant firms acting as 
subcontractors for INDAP has the largest positive effect on being a member of an EAC. Those 
farmers who receive these services will have greater support for EAC formation and development. 
• Being poor does not have a significant impact on being an EAC member, relative to not being 
poor: in fact, the sign of the coefficient is positive. However, being extremely poor does have a 
negative and statistically significant effect on membership. That is, there is some degree of social 
exclusion, but this applies only to the most disadvantaged households. Whether this is due to the 
poorest having the incentive but lacking the capacity to participate, or simply to the fact that the 
poorest tend to derive a smaller fraction of their income from farm sources and engage less in 
market transactions, is a question that the model does not address. 
• Finally, the constant term of the model has a negative sign and is statistically significant, meaning 
that an individual who does not have the attributes shown in the model to be statistically 
significant (e.g., being a milk producer, having access to technical assistance, etc.), has a very low 
probability of being a member of an EAC. 
5.6 Discussion 
At the start of the chapter I asked three questions: (a) Who are the EAC participants? (b) Are all small 
farmers equally likely to participate in these business-oriented organizations? and (c) Do the poorest 
farmers have an equal participation rate as the wealthier farmers? 
I will answer these questions with reference to incentives and assets. 
5.6.1 Incentives 
Among the incentives, the leaders of 27 EACs highlighted the importance of certain market 
characteristics, in particular: (a) what they perceive as unfair prices resulting from unbalanced power 
relationships with intermediaries and traders; (b) quality standards that require the use of technologies 
that an individual small farmer cannot acquire alone; and (c) the need to access new markets for 
diversified commodities. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, market incentives depend on the product. Both the qualitative and 
quantitative results in this chapter confirmed that small farmers working in markets with higher 
transaction costs (such as for milk, fruits and vegetables), have a stronger incentive to join an EAC 
than those who operate in spot markets with no entry barriers and with a large number of buyers and 
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sellers (as in the case of traditional commodities such as potatoes, beans or wheat). I would especially 
like to highlight the results in Section 5.3.2 which showed that milk producers have a higher 
participation rate than potato farmers, who in turn have a higher participation rate than wheat and bean 
producers. 
The desire to extract better or 'fair' prices by acquiring a better bargaining position vis-a-vis 
middlemen and traders is mentioned by almost all the EAC leaders as an important motivation to set 
up and join an EAC. In fact, in almost all of the dozens of interviews with individual farmers that I 
conducted for this research, this usually came out as the first answer to the questions "Why do small 
farmers need an EAC?" or "Why did you join an EAC?". However, as seen in Section 5.3.6, this goal 
is elusive. In a market economy, 70 or so small farmers (the average membership of an EAC as shown 
in Chapter 4) are almost always as powerless as a single farmer to influence market prices. 
Public agencies and their programs are also powerful sources of incentives to participate in EACs. 
Many small farmers participating in the workshop stated mat the new policies favoring the 
organization of small farmers, and the new subsidies and loans associated with these policies, helped 
catalyze EAC formation. This opinion is supported by the analysis in Section 5.3.9, that showed that 
members of EACs do have greater access to agricultural support services. 
Intermediate agents (including representatives from national organizations of small farmers, NGOs, 
priests, extension agents and political leaders) were also identified by the EAC leaders as key players 
in stimulating EAC formation. In all cases, they appear to have contributed leadership by informing 
farmers about ways of organizing themselves, as well as providing access to the necessary contacts 
with public agencies or markets. In many cases they also contributed financial resources and technical 
expertise. Where small farmers were facing strong and very specific market incentives to organize 
(e.g., with milk, and fruits and vegetables), public and intermediate agents pointed out concrete ways 
to move forward. When the market incentives were less clear (e.g., with potatoes), the stimulus of 
available pubbc funds appears to have been most influential in getting the process started. 
5.6.2 Assets 
With respect to assets and capacities, the presence of pre-existing community organizations and 
informal groups appears to be an important precondition for EAC formation. These organizations 
provide a social setting where alternatives can be discussed, weighed and decided upon. These 
community groups 'incubate' the imtiatives that will result in an EAC. However, the statistical 
analysis in Section 5.3.1 shows that while pre-existing community groups can ease the formation of 
EACs, they do not always lead to the formation of these organizations. 
Extremely poor households - but not those that are only 'poor' according to Chilean standards - tend to 
be excluded from participating in EACs. It is possible that these households have less need for an 
EAC, as much of their income comes from non-farm sources and only a small fraction of their 
agricultural production is destined for the market. For these very poor small farmers, the perceived 
costs of membership may be higher than the perceived benefits, as discussed in Chapter 2. However, 
we cannot exclude the possibility that the design of public policies is in fact a disincentive for these 
very poor farmers to join an EAC. For example, the amount of money that ESJDAP lends to very poor 
farmers is lower than that which is available for less poor ones, and the intensity of technical 
assistance is also significantly lower. 
Surprisingly - and within the limits discussed above - access to assets such as land, irrigation, or 
education, does not appear to have a significant impact on EAC participation. The same is true for the 
head of household's gender. 
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5.7 Conclusions 
Returning to the questions asked in this chapter, the quantitative and qualitative evidence shows that 
not all small farmers are equally likely to participate in an EAC. Incentives (from markets, 
government support programs, and intermediate agencies) appear to have a stronger influence on the 
decision to participate than a household's assets. A key exception is that the poorest farmers will 
participate significantly less either because of de facto exclusion due to the design of the public 
support programs, and/or because they have less need for an organization whose purpose is to engage 
in market transactions. A local tradition of forming rural organizations appears to facilitate the 
formation of EACs, but does not, on its own, seem to have a decisive influence as many regions with 
high levels of civic participation show low levels of EAC membership. 
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CHAPTER 6. EFFECTS OF EACs ON SMALL FARMERS 
6.1 Introduction 
Public policies which support EACs aim to make small-scale farming more profitable and to increase 
farmers' household income. To assess the effectiveness of these policies, therefore, we need to look at 
their impact at the farm and household levels. 
Most of the EAC leaders and members to whom I talked agreed that the EACs were not an objective 
in themselves, but the means for improving their members' farming and living standards. This came 
out clearly, for example, when we talked about how to deal with the frequent tension between 
maximizing the performance of the EACs themselves, and transferring the benefits to the members. 
The almost unanimous opinion was that EACs should prioritize benefits to farmers, subject to the 
constraints necessary to assure the sustainability of associated businesses. 
In this chapter I ask two questions: (a) Have the EACs contributed to increasing the profits for their 
members' farms?, and; (b) Does participation in an EAC contribute to higher income for members' 
households? 
6.2 Method 
The methods used in this chapter are described in detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.3. 
Aim Method/sources of information Sample size 
To analyze the perception by 
fanners of the costs and benefits of 
EAC membership. 
Multiple choice questions included 
in a survey applied to farmers 
during case studies of 16 EACs 
(Case Study Survey). 
223 small farmers who are 
members of 16 EACs, and 234 
neighboring non-member small 
formers (control group). 
To test whether EAC membership 
has a statistically significant effect 
on: (a) a farm's net margin, and, 
(b) the household's annual income; 
controlling for the E A C s product 
orientation. 
Heckman's Two-Stage Procedure, 
using data from the General and 
Costs Surveys. 
298 farms and households with 
complete information. 
To test the impact of EAC 
membership on total household 
income and its composition by 
sources of income, specifically for 
farmers in poor and marginalized 
areas. 
Survey in 1996 and again in 2000, 
applied to the same farms and 
households in the dryland areas of 
51 municipalities in five regions 
(Drylands Panel Survey). T-test 
comparison of means between 
EAC members and non-members 
193 households and farms with 
complete information for 1996 and 
2000. 
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6.3 Effects and impacts 
6.3.1 Farmers' opinions 
Table 6.1 summarizes the responses of 457 small farmers to 23 questions about the costs and benefits 
of being an EAC member. 
Table 6.1 Costs and benefits of EAC membership 
Benefits and costs Non-participants Participants Chi 2 test 
n = 234 n = 223 
Not true True Nottrne True 
% % % % 
Benefits: 
Improved household income 43 37 23.8 21.8 *# 
Improved yield and production 43.7 44.7 17.6 65.5 ## 
Crop and livestock diversification 61.8 32.4 42.3 49.8 ** 
Improved marketing of products 61.8 28.4 38.7 35.7 ** 
Improved prices of products 72.5 17.6 57.1 25.6 *# 
Lowered production costs 56.4 24.8 41.8 38.5 * 
Farm improvements 52 38.2 33.9 58.9 ** 
Improved quality of life of family 37.6 48.5 24.4 56.3 ** 
Improved quality of live of women 36.7 53.1 30.3 57.5 * 
Improved quality of life of youth 41.2 47.4 34.4 47.6 ns 
Optimistic view of the future 40.6 39.6 21.1 56.9 
Improved relations with government agencies 45.1 31.4 31.9 45.6 * 
Improved relation with municipal government 50.5 34.7 38.9 39.7 * 
Improved relations with neighbors 35 52 12.7 70.5 ** 
Doing better as a small former 35.6 42.6 18.8 61.1 ** 
Costs: 
Has to incur in debts 45.5 42.4 17.6 72.7 ** 
Has to pay membership fees 49.5 40.6 21.3 76.2 ** 
Greater risks in agriculture 58.6 27.3 30.9 51.1 ** 
Loss of time in meetings 52 28.4 41.4 38.5 * 
Share of product prices taken by organization 60.6 25.3 34.8 59.9 *# 
Worsened relationships with neighbors 82.4 5 82.8 5 ns 
Some take advantage of the rest 39 48 38.7 49.3 ns 
Less trust in the future 54.5 30.3 48.9 31.6 ns 
* = Chi 2 test significant with p > 5%; ** = Chi2 test significant with p > 1%; ns = Chi2 test not significant. 
Difference between 100% and the sum of'Not true' and 'True', is due to answers of "More or less" and "No opinion" 
The most striking result is the significant difference of opinion between participants and non-
participants. EAC participants are consistently more optimistic than the non-participants about the 
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benefits of EAC membership. 
A clear majority of participants agree that working with an EAC leads to improved yields and 
production, to being able to make improvements to the farm, to improved quality of life for the family 
and for women in particular, to having better relations with their neighbors, to having a more 
optimistic view of their future as small farmers, and to doing better as a small farmer. 
When it comes to the costs of EAC participation, members are more aware of the direct economic 
costs: higher debts and higher risks, membership fees, and the fee charged by the EAC (a percentage 
of the products' prices) to cover its services. 
In contrast, most non-participants do not think it is true that EAC participation can result in crop and 
livestock diversification, improved marketing, better prices for their products, or lower production 
costs. All of these issues relate to the economic benefits of participation; thus, non-participants do not 
think that working with an EAC can improve their performance or results as small farmers. 
A majority of both groups agree that EAC participation is unlikely to help them obtain better prices for 
their products. But most agree that EAC participation improves the quality of life for women, as well 
as relationships with their neighbors. 
ha short, participants recognize economic and non-economic benefits, while non-participants foresee 
few benefits and only of a non-economic nature. As regards costs, participants stress the economic 
costs of participation, while most of the non-participants do not realize the types of costs that a small 
farmer would face if he/she joined an EAC. 
6.3.2 Effect of participation on a farm's net margin 
In this section I test the hypothesis that EAC participation increases member farms' net margins (i.e., 
gross value of production, whether sold or consumed by the household, minus direct and fixed costs). 
As explained in the methods chapter (Chapter 3, Section 3.3), I analyzed small farms engaged in milk, 
potato and wheat production separately (Tables 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4). 
In all cases the test using Heckman's Two-Stage Procedure confirms that there was a selection bias for 
product, and that using standard regression techniques would have yielded biased results. This result 
supports the hypothesis that the effect of EAC participation is influenced by the specific product. 
Controlling for product, EAC participation increased net margins for milk producers, but not for 
potato or wheat farmers. This result is consistent with Chapter 5, where we observed that the 
percentage of organized milk producers was much higher than the national average EAC membership 
among small farmers, while those of potato and wheat producers was around the average (potato) or 
lower (wheat). As we will see in detail in the discussion of the case studies of specific EACs (chapters 
8, 9, and 10), this result is also consistent with the opinions of the members of the case study milk and 
potato EACs. 
Let us now examine the effect of other factors on a farm's net margin: 
• Location. While location has a significant effect on a farmer's choice of production, it has less 
impact on the farm's net margin, with the exception of milk producers. This may be because the 
productivity of small-scale potato and wheat farming tends to be low to very low throughout the 
country, including a very large number of farms where these two crops are destined solely for 
household consumption. 
• Human capital. The number of household members in the labor force has a positive influence on 
milk farmers' margins, but not for potato and wheat producers. This probably reflects prevailing 
production technologies: beyond a certain niimmum level, increased potato or wheat productivity 
requires access to machinery, while there appears to be a greater potential for labor-based 
production in the case of milk. As expected, the farm's net margin is in all cases negatively related 
to the household head's age, but this effect is only statistically significant in the case of wheat 
production. For milk producers, the farm's net margin will be lower when the household head is a 
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woman; this probably reflects a lower availability of labor in female-headed households. The 
effect of the level of schooling is never significant, a fact that has been established by other studies 
in Chile (L6pez, 1996; Ramirez et al., 2001); under present conditions, small-scale agriculture 
does not reward higher educational levels, and better educated individuals in rural households can 
expect to generate higher income only if they move to other types of employment. 
• Farm size and access to irrigation. As expected, these two variables have positive and significant 
effects on the profitability of small-scale farming. 
Table 6.2 Effect of EAC participation on the farm's net margin: milk producers 
N= 298; censored obs. = 230; Uncensored obs. = 68 
Wald Chi2 (13) = 67.93 
Log likelihood = - 180.160 Prob > Chi 2 = 0.0000 
Variable Coefficient Std. error z P>z 
Dependent: LogNof farm's net margin 
Participant in EAC? (l=yes) 0.498 0.170 2.930 0.003 
Location North of X Region 2.069 0.688 3.006 0.003 
Household members in labor force 0.269 0.111 2.470 0.016 
Age of head of household -0.001 0.009 -0.899 0.369 
Square of age of head of household -0.000 0.000 -0.550 0.582 
Gender of head of household (0=female) -1.974 0.408 -4.834 0.000 
Primary education, incomplete (l=yes) 0.214 0.474 0.452 0.652 
Primary education, complete (l=yes) 0.622 0.537 1.158 0.247 
Secondary education, incomplete (l=yes) 0.124 0.545 0.228 0.820 
Secondary education, complete (l=yes) -0.509 0.594 -0.857 0.391 
More than secondary (l=yes) 0.372 0.604 0.616 0.538 
Farm size (hectares) 0.007 0.003 2.201 0.028 
Percentage of farmland with irrigation 0.000 0.006 0.034 0.973 
Constant 15.657 0.949 16.492 0.000 
Dependent: Milk producer? (l=yes) 
Location in irrigated valleys V through VUI regions -1.479 0.350 -4.220 0.000 
Location in dryland areas VI through VUI regions -2.152 0.373 -5.765 0.000 
Household members in labor force -0.062 0.083 -0.742 0.458 
Farm size (hectares) 0.007 0.003 2.176 0.030 
Percentage of farmland with irrigation 0.002 0.004 0.705 0.481 
Constant 0.0178 0.244 0.073 0.942 
Rho -0.913 0.127 
Inverse Mill's ratio -0.934 0.336 
LRtest of independent equations (rho = 0): Chi 2(l) = 1.40 Prob. > Chi 2 = 0.237 
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Table 6.3 Effect of EAC participation on the farm's net margin: potato producers 
N= 298; censored obs. = 233; Uncensored obs. = 65 
Wald Chi 2 (12) = 21.70 
Log likelihood = - 241.603 Prob > Chi 2 = 0.041 
Variable Coefficient Std. error z P>z 
Dependent: LogN of farm's net margin 
Participant in EAC? (l=yes) 0.255 0.395 0.646 0.518 
Location North of X Region 0.236 0.481 0.491 0.623 
Household members in labor force 0.011 0.136 0.085 0.932 
Age of head of household -0.015 0.012 -1.184 0.236 
Square of age of head of household -0.001 0.001 -1.436 0.151 
Gender of head of household (0=female) 0.359 0.391 0.920 0.358 
Primary education, incomplete (l=yes) 0.432 0.540 0.800 0.424 
Primary education, complete (l=yes) -0.362 0.743 -0.487 0.626 
Secondary education, incomplete (l=yes) -0.114 0.804 -0.142 0.887 
Secondary education, complete (l=yes) 0.046 0.937 0.050 0.960 
Farm size (hectares) 0.015 0.006 2.304 0.021 
Percentage of farmland with irrigation 0.012 0.004 3.070 0.002 
Constant 12.910 1.903 6.782 0.000 
Dependent: Potato producer? (l=yes) 
Location in irrigated valleys V through VR1 regions -0.515 0.273 -1.883 0.060 
Location in dryland areas VI through Vm regions -0.266 0.224 -1.187 0.235 
Household members in labor force 0.087 0.061 1.420 0.156 
Farm size (hectares) -0.004 0.003 -1.504 0.133 
Percentage of fermland with irrigation 0.000 0.002 0.168 0.867 
Constant -0.671 0.210 -3.189 0.001 
Rho 0.132 1.432 
Inverse Mill's ratio 0.126 1.391 
LR test of independent equations (rho = 0): Chi 2(l) = 0.01 Prob. > Chi 2 = 0.933 
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Table 6.4 Effect of EAC participation on the farm's net margin: wheat producers 
N= 296; censored obs. = 167; Uncensored obs. = 129 
Wald Chi2 (15) = 82.44 
Log likelihood = - 332.496 Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 
Variable Coefficient Std. error z P>z 
Dependent: LogN of farm' net margin 
Participant in EAC? (l=yes) 0.072 0.260 0.279 0.780 
Location in irrigated valleys V through VIII Regions 1.117 1.103 1.012 0.311 
Location in dryland areas V through VIII Regions 0.110 0.948 0.116 0.908 
Location in rice-growing area VII and Vm Regions -0.414 0.994 -0.416 0.677 
Household members in labor force 0.005 0.056 0.092 0.926 
Age of head of household -0.019 0.008 -2.329 0.020 
Square of age of head of household -0.002 0.000 -3.171 0.002 
Gender of head of household (0=female) 0.112 0.380 0.296 0.767 
Primary education, incomplete (l=yes) 0.513 0.331 1.551 0.121 
Primary education, complete (l=yes) 0.259 0.331 1.551 0.121 
Secondary education, incomplete (l=yes) 0.259 0.379 0.685 0.493 
Secondary education, complete (l=yes) 0.457 0.453 1.009 0.313 
More than secondary (l=yes) -0.660 1.005 -0.657 0.511 
Farm size (hectares) 0.025 0.005 4.910 0.000 
Percentage of farmland with irrigation 0.005 0.007 0.705 0.481 
Constant 13.373 1.425 9.379 0.000 
Dependent: Wheat producer? (l=yes) 
Location in irrigated valleys V through VIII regions 2.172 0.285 7.619 0.000 
Location in dryland areas VI through VHI regions 1.783 0.230 7.737 0.000 
Household members in labor force 0.007 0.060 0.122 0.903 
Farm size (hectares) 0.003 0.003 1.017 0.309 
Percentage of farmland with irrigation -0.015 0.002 -5.592 0.000 
Constant -1.043 0.226 -4.603 0.000 
Rho 0.033 0.865 
Inverse Mill's ratio 0.031 0.808 
LR test of independent equations (rho = 0): Chi 2(l) = 0.00 Prob. > Chi 2 = 0.970 
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6.3.3 Effect of participation on a household's annual income 
I used the same approach to test the effect of EAC participation on a household's annual income. The 
household's annual income is the sum of the on-farm income, plus other non-farm revenue, including 
off-farm wage labor in agriculture, non-agricultural employment, public subsidies, pensions and 
transfers. Tables 6.5 to 6.7 show the results for milk, potato and wheat producers respectively. 
EAC participation does not have a positive and statistically significant impact on annual household 
income, although there is a somewhat stronger (but non-significant) positive effect on milk producers 
than on wheat and potato farmers. 
This result is consistent with the findings of other researchers (Berdegue et al., 2001; Ramirez et al., 
2001), who have established that for a very large proportion of rural households, on-farm income is 
only one (and sometimes, a rather low) component of the total household income. Households who 
choose to engage in small-scale farming usually receive a higher proportion of their income from that 
source, but show a lower share of income from other employment sources. The net effect on total 
household income therefore tends to be neutral and, in many cases, even negative if one considers that 
other livelihood strategies (such as permanent off-farm employment, particularly in non-agricultural 
jobs) could offer higher economic rewards. 
As in the case of the previous analysis for the farm's net margin, farm size and access to irrigation also 
generally have a positive and significant impact on the household's net annual income. This result is 
consistent with the findings of Berdegu6 et al. (2001), who found that these assets had a positive 
impact not only on the economic returns from agricultural production, but also on non-farm income. 
This is because households with more agricultural assets can either extract capital to start other rural 
non-farm businesses in the services or manufacturing sectors, or can invest in labor-saving 
technologies and free up household members for other employment. 
6.3.4 Effect of EAC participation on households in poor regions 
This section is based on data from the panel study for the years 1997 and 2000 of 193 households 
living in poor rural dryland areas of Regions VI to X. First of all, it is important to clarify that for 
these households there are no statistically significant (and almost no arithmetic) differences between 
EAC participants and non-participants in such characteristics as number of household members, age of 
the head of the household, number of household members in the labor force, number of children 
lagging in school with respect to the standard for their age, years of schooling of the head of 
household, percentage of the households headed by women, access to drinking water and electricity, 
farm size, or distance to the main road. 
As shown in Table 6.8, the increase in total average annual household income between 1996 and 2000 
for EAC participants was $756 (adjusted for inflation), and for non-participants was $635; the 
difference is not statistically significant. However, the differences are statistically significant when it 
comes to farm income (gross value of production minus direct costs); EAC non-participants lost an 
average of $158 between 1996 and 2000, while participants gained $344. 
This difference between household and farm income is because those households who were not EAC 
members between 1996 and 2000 tended to be more reliant on working as waged laborers (mainly in 
the agricultural sector). The increased income from wage labor for the non-participants is $448, much 
higher than the $36 higher earnings by the EAC participants for wage labor. The non-participants' 
higher wages more than compensate for their lost farm income. As reported by Ramirez et al. (2001), 
in these poor areas of Chile livelihoods based on wage labor have generally been much more 
successful at improving total household income and getting these people out of income poverty than 
have livelihoods basedbn farming. 
In summary, in these poor rural regions most small farmers increased their household income 
substantially between 1996 and 2000. Those who participated in EACs raised their farm income but 
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Table 6.5 Effect of EAC participation on a household's annual net income: milk producers 
N= 298; censored obs. = 230; Uncensored obs. = 68 
Wald Chi 2 (11) = 28.04 
Log likelihood = - 185.365 Prob > Chi 2 = 0.0032 
Variable Coefficient Std.error z P>z 
Dependent: LogNofnet annual household income 
Participant in EAC? (l=yes) 0.312 0.186 1.673 0.094 
Location North of X Region 0.912 0.754 1.209 0.227 
Household members in labor force 0.141 0.103 1.370 0.171 
Age of head of household -0.000 0.009 -0.020 0.984 
Primary education, incomplete (l=yes) 0.427 0.448 0.953 0.341 
Primary education, complete (l=yes) 0.742 0.501 1.479 0.139 
Secondary education, incomplete (l=yes) 0.300 0.492 0.609 0.542 
Secondary education, complete (l=yes) -0.104 0.564 -0.185 0.853 
More than secondary (l=yes) 0.423 0.579 0.731 0.465 
Farm size (hectares) 0.008 0.003 2.410 0.016 
Percentage of farmland with irrigation -0.000 0.006 -0.077 0.939 
Constant 13.143 0.794 16.543 0.000 
Dependent: Milk producer? (1-yes) 
Location in irrigated valleys V through VHI regions -1.384 0.344 -4.014 0.000 
Location in dryland areas VI through VTII regions -2.298 0.415 -5.533 0.000 
Household members in labor force -0.046 0.083 -0.555 0.579 
Farm size (hectares) 0.006 0.003 2.060 0.039 
Percentage of farmland with irrigation 0.001 0.003 0.493 0.622 
Constant -0.025 0.242 -0.105 0.916 
Rho -0.165 0.624 
Inverse Mill's ratio -0.116 0.451 
LR test of independent equations (rho = 0): Chi 2(l) = 0.05 Prob. > Chi 2 0.825 
96 Chapter Six 
Table 6.6 Effect of EAC participation on a household's annual net income: potato producers 
N= 298; censored obs. = 233; Uncensored obs. = 65 
Wald Chi 2 (10) = 22.18 
Log likelihood = - 230.745 Prob > Chi2 = 0.014 
Variable Coefficient Std.error z P>z 
Dependent: LogN of net annual household income 
Participant in EAC? (l=yes) 0.268 0.333 0.804 0.422 
Location North of X Region -0.202 0.335 -0.603 0.547 
Household members in labor force 0.065 0.099 0.653 0.514 
Age of head of household 0.011 0.009 1.207 0.227 
Primary education, incomplete (l=yes) -0.086 0.431 -0.201 0.841 
Primary education, complete (l=yes) -1.130 0.605 -1.866 0.062 
Secondary education, incomplete (l=yes) -0.532 0.657 -0.809 0.418 
Secondary education, complete (l=yes) -0.200 0.763 -0.263 0.793 
Farm size (hectares) 0.008 0.004 1.822 0.068 
Percentage of farmland with irrigation 0.009 0.003 2.902 0.004 
Constant 12.976 1.223 10.04 0.000 
Dependent: Potato producer? (l=yes) 
Location in irrigated valleys V through VIII regions -0.520 0.273 -1.899 0.058 
Location in dryland areas VI through VIII regions -0.267 0.224 -1.190 0.234 
Household members in labor force 0.087 0.061 1.422 0.155 
Farm size (hectares) -0.004 0.003 -1.514 0.130 
Percentage of farmland with irrigation 0.000 0.002 0.181 0.857 
Constant -0.671 0.210 -3.197 0.001 
Rho 0.235 0.916 
Inverse Mill's ratio 0.194 0.788 
LR test of independent equations (rho = 0): Chi 2(l) = 0.05 Prob. > Chi2 = 0.828 
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Table 6.7 Effect of EAC participation on a household's annual net income: wheat producers 
N= 298; censored obs. = 167; Uncensored obs. = 131 
Wald Chi2 (11) 48.58 
Log likelihood = -315.439 Prob > Chi2 = 0.000 
Variable Coefficient Std. error z P>7. 
Dependent: LogN of net annual household income 
Participant in EAC? (l=yes) 0.188 0.204 0.924 0.356 
Location North of X Region -0.888 0.301 -2.945 0.003 
Household members in labor force 0.032 0.057 0.565 0.572 
Age of head of household 0.008 0.005 1.407 0.159 
Primary education, incomplete (l=yes) 0.041 0.241 0.170 0.865 
Primary education, complete (l=yes) -0.302 0.287 -1.051 0.293 
Secondary education, incomplete (l=yes) 0.329 0.340 0.969 0.333 
Secondary education, complete (l=yes) 0.108 0.350 0.309 0.757 
More than secondary (l=yes) -0.915 0.727 -1.259 0.208 
Farm size (hectares) 0.013 0.004 3.011 0.003 
Percentage of farmland with irrigation 0.013 0.002 5.006 0.000 
Constant 14.582 0.539 27.008 0.000 
Dependent: Wheat producer? (l=yes) 
Location in irrigated valleys V through VIII regions 2.288 0.252 9.061 0.000 
Location in dryland areas VI through VTfI regions 1.586 0.224 7.053 0.000 
Household members in labor force -0.015 0.054 -0.276 0.783 
Farm size (hectares) 0.004 0.003 1.386 0.166 
Percentage of farmland with irrigation -0.016 0.002 -6.397 0.000 
Constant -1.003 0.216 -4.641 0.000 
Rho -0.995 0.047 
Inverse Mill's ratio -0.981 0.128 
LR test of independent equations (rho = 0): Chi 2(l) = 10.02 Prob. > Chi2 = 0.0016 
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tended to stay away from the wage labor market. Those who didn't participate in EACs have 
experienced a drop in farm income on average, but have made significant gains in income from wage 
labor. 
The conclusion is that in these regions EAC participation makes economic sense for rural households 
whose livelihoods depend on small-scale agriculture. 
Table 6.8 Changes in average household income and income composition (1996-2000) for small 
farmers in the dryland areas of the VI, VH, VHI, LX and X Regions ($) 
Item Participants Non-participants 
Change in household income 756 635 
Change in farm income **344 -158 
Change in non-farm income, self-employment 24 41 
Change in income from wage labor, permanent *43 359 
Change in income from wage labor, seasonal *-7 90 
Change in income from wage labor, total ** 36 448 
Change in income from pensions and public transfers 354 303 
* = t-test significant p > 5%; ** = t-test significant p > 1 % 
6.4 Discussion 
At the start of this chapter I asked two questions (1) Have the EACs contributed to higher profits for 
their members' farms? and (2) Does EAC participation give members' households higher incomes? 
The answers are: 
(1) For a rural household whose livelihood is largely dependent on non-farm employment, EAC 
participation does not make much economic sense; in fact, these households tend not to participate 
in these organizations. This conclusion is common sense: EAC participation always involves some 
costs and risk; a household has little incentive to incur these when the financial benefits promise to 
be few. 
(2) EAC participation does not seem to have an effect on total annual household income, regardless of 
the E A C s product orientation. Apparently, whatever gains can be made in on-farm income 
through EAC participation will be negated by reduced income from off-farm employment. 
(3) For those households who continue to make their living from small-scale agriculture, the effect of 
EAC participation on their finances will depend on their product. 
(4) According to 457 small farmers, EAC participation can bring important non-economic benefits, 
such as better relations among neighbors and improved quaUty of life for women. 
Conclusions (1) and (2) together have important policy consequences. Despite the fact that rural public 
policies in Chile continue to assume that 'rural' equals 'agricultural', the truth is that rural non-farm 
income represents just over 40% of total rural income (Berdegué et a l , 2001). Farm-based economic 
collective action is relevant only to those rural inhabitants who continue to base their livelihoods on 
small-scale farming. 
The results of the statistical analysis for milk, wheat and potato producers are fully consistent with the 
views of the farmers I interviewed for the case studies reported in Chapters 8, 9 and 10. For potato 
marketing EACs, the leaders and managers complained that in most seasons their members would 
continue selling their produce to traditional traders and middlemen, and that only a small fraction of 
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the total production was marketed through the organization27. Only when there was a particularly bad 
season, with extremely low prices and lower demand, would the members demand that the 
organization buy their potatoes at a higher price! 
The leaders felt that this conduct reflected a lack of "compromiso" (commitment) on the part of the 
members, or an individualistic attitude that favored individual over collective action. To them, this 
was an attitudinal, rather than an economic, problem that could be corrected by greater training and 
'conscientization' efforts. Yet the grassroots members of a potato-marketing EAC explained to me 
that the prices the EAC paid were no better than those paid by the middlemen, and that often the net 
price was somewhat lower because: (a) the EAC discounted at least a fraction of the Value Added Tax 
(18%) from the market price, while the traders, who largely evade this tax, do not apply this discount; 
(b) the traders normally pay cash on the spot, while the EAC frequently paid up to 30 or 45 days later, 
after the potatoes had been sold; (c) the traders would normally take the whole year's production, 
while the EAC imposed stricter quality standards, and; (d) if farmers handed over their potatoes to 
their organization for marketing, then they would need to ensure that the transactions had been done in 
an efficient and transparent manner, and that the final costs and prices reported by the leaders were in 
fact the real ones. 
This was never an issue for the Milk Collection Centers. Here, leaders and members had other 
problems and concerns, but in the many interviews I held with these farmers, they never questioned 
that the EAC was the best (or, at a minimum, the least bad) option for marketing their production. The 
discussions in these EACs were centered on how performance could be improved, but no one 
questioned that selling their milk through the organization was a better deal than the non-organized 
alternative. 
Whilst I did not do a case study of a wheat-focused EAC, COOPEUMO, one of my vegetable case 
studies, has also operated as a wheat broker for many years. COOPEUMO leaders and members were 
clear on one point: COOPEUMO was just one alternative on offer to small farmers, but prices and 
conditions for wheat were essentially the same as those offered by any other medium or large broker 
working in the region. 
As I have discussed before (Chapter 2), economic collective action through an EAC offers no 
advantages (but plenty of risks and costs!) when a farmer is operating in a market that approaches the 
concept of being 'perfectly competitive'. For example, in the case of potatoes and wheat, there are no 
barriers to market access, there are large numbers or buyers and sellers so there is no room for 
oligopolic or oligopsonic behavior, transaction costs are low or non-existent as most operations are 
conducted in the spot market. For these reasons, in this case a small farmer would usually be better off 
working directly through market channels when selling his produce. In fact, under these conditions an 
EAC imposes additional operational, financial and transaction costs. The members of the potato-
marketing organizations arrived at the same conclusion, choosing to sell their produce to middlemen 
instead of channeling it through their organizations. 
Milk producers, on the other hand, have important market incentives to organize and sell their milk 
collectively. The dairy industry will no longer buy milk that is not cooled soon after milking, and the 
prices they pay are directly and clearly linked to the quality of milk, which in turn cannot be 
maintained if the farmer has no access to a cooling tank. For most small farmers, purchasing a cooling 
tank is out of the question, due to cost and scale of production. Even if a farmer did have a cooling 
tank, many live in areas not reached by the trucks from the dairy firms, or would be charged a 
substantial transportation fee to collect their milk. The same problem applies to veterinary services and 
the supply of veterinary products. The Milk Collection Centers offer a convenient solution to these and 
other production and marketing constraints; the alternative for most non-organized farmers is to move 
out of this enterprise or to limit themselves to the informal market of the 'tarreros28'. 
2 7 An exception that corroborates these findings is that of small potato producers who live in remote and relatively isolated 
areas, where only one or two middlemen work. These farmers will sell a much higher share of their harvest through their 
EAC than those who live nearer rural towns or main roads. 
2 8 Middlemen who buy the milk on-farm to be sold in the informal markets in nearby towns and cities. 
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One has to be very precise in stating that it is the market and not the product per se that makes the 
difference. For example, an EAC would make perfect sense for a group of small potato farmers 
wanting to access the supermarkets rather than the wholesale market. In the case of supermarkets, an 
individual small farmer working alone would face insurmountable barriers to selling his or her 
potatoes through that channel. Expensive equipment would be needed to clean, grade and package the 
produce; lots of time would have to be invested to obtain a contract and to enforce it against the much 
more powerful buyer; the supermarket would require constant delivery throughout the year of a large 
volume of potatoes; and the financial cost of marketing through supermarkets, who pay only after 60 
to 90 days after delivery, would surely ruin a small farmer. 
Summing up, we can conclude that economic collective action through EACs makes sense to only a 
fraction of Chilean peasant households: those whose livelihoods depend on on-farm income, and who 
operate in markets characterized by high economies of scale, strong market access barriers and/or high 
transaction costs. 
Unfortunately, lack of data means I cannot calculate with any precision the size of this population 
relative to the total number of peasant households. However, at least two-thirds of subsistence farmers 
(25% of all peasant households in Chile) produce crops such as wheat and potatoes. For these farmers 
EAC participation is pointless so we can subtract them from the target population for public policies 
supporting EACs. Of the market-oriented small farmers, perhaps 50% or more primarily grow wheat, 
potatoes or agro-industrial fruit and vegetable crops 2 9. Removing them from the target population 
leaves, optimistically, around 125,000 small-scale farming households, about 40% to 50% of the 
peasantry sector, who could potentially benefit from EAC participation. 
Thus the assumption held by most policy-makers (including myself when I was in that position), that 
EAC participation is a pertinent and necessary strategy for most, if not all, peasant households, needs 
to be urgently revised. But while we must refine the targeting criteria of public policies, there is still a 
large number of peasant households who could potentially benefit from EAC participation who have 
yet to join. 
Finally, there are the non-economic benefits identified by the 457 small farmers in my opinion poll. 
There is little doubt that in many cases, women EAC members place great value on some of the social 
and cultural consequences of participation. In one workshop I held with about 15 women EAC 
members, they were adamant that having the opportunity to generate income was of greater 
significance than the income itself. Participation in an EAC often opens a new dimension in the life of 
rural women; when they can obtain a loan to start a business, when they find that they can produce 
flowers that are of such quality that exporters become interested in them, this has an impact on their 
life and on their self-esteem that goes way beyond economic rewards. Perhaps this is why most of the 
extensionists, public officials and even farmers' leaders that I interviewed agreed that in general EACs 
that included a large proportion of women tend to be much more hard-working and more efficiently 
and rigorously run than those of their male counterparts. It would be worth studying in the future 
whether the gender of the members makes a difference to the institutional and economic performance 
ofEACs. 
2 9 In Chile, most fruit and vegetable agroindustries refuse to contract production to organized groups of farmers. This is not 
the case in other Latin American countries where there are many examples of group-based production contracts. 
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CHAPTER 7. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF EACs 
7.1. Introduction 
Are the EACs viable business-oriented organizations, or are they dependent on the political and 
financial support of EMDAP and other government agencies? Latin America is full of examples of 
unsustainable 'bubbles' created by the political will and resources of a government, foreign donor or 
an NGO. These 'bubbles' grow and glow while the artificial environment in which they live endures, 
but burst as soon as the political winds change and the flow of subsidies dries out. 
To endure in a competitive market economy, a firm will need to be able to innovate, to link to new and 
dynamic markets, to anticipate new developments, to increase its productivity, to learn and to harness 
knowledge to improve its strategies. 
But even before these difficult objectives are met, in the short run a firm will only be sustainable if its 
income can meet its expenses and if its assets have a higher value than its debts. In the context of a 
government-funded effort, another important indicator of sustainability will be the degree to which the 
firm is independent of public subsidies to fund its expenses or its investments. In this chapter I look at 
these three indicators to answer the question posed above. 
7.2 Method 
The methods used in this chapter are described in detail in Chapter 3, Section 3.4. 
Aim Method/Information source Sample size 
To analyze (1) EACs' operational 
performance, (2) EACs' financial 
performance, and (3) the relative 
importance of income generated 
from public programs. All these 
analyses were done for the 1999 
fiscal year. 
Un-audited balance sheets and 
income statements of EACs for 
1999. Analysis by Certified Public 
Accountants of the information 
contained in these documents. 
Balance sheets and income 
statements were requested from 
1050 rural organizations. 410 of 
them provided complete 
information. 
Also of importance here are the definitions given in Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1 Definitions of economic and financial indicators 
Variable Definition 
Current assets Assets expected to be consumed or converted into cash during the next 
operating cycle. Include cash, amounts receivable, inventories, etc. 
Non-current assets Assets expected to be consumed or converted into cash after the next operating 
cycle. Include fixed assets, non-current receivables and long term investments. 
Total assets Current plus non-current assets. 
Current liabilities Funds payable during the next 12 months. 
Non-current liabilities Funds payable after 12 months. 
Total liabilities Current plus non-current liabilities. 
Net assets Total assets minus total liabilities. 
Sales revenue Income from sales of goods and services that constitute the EAC's stock-in-
trade. 
Revenue from other sources Income from sales and sources that do not constitute the EAC's stock-in-trade, 
such as interest. 
Total revenue Sales revenue plus revenue from other sources. 
Operating expenses Expenses incurred in activities that constitute the EAC's stock-in-trade. 
Non-operating expenses Expenses incurred in activities outside the EAC's stock-in-trade, including 
depreciation, provision for taxes, etc. 
Financial costs Interest expense. 
Total expenses Operating plus non-operating expenses plus financial costs. 
Operating income Sales revenue minus operating expenses. 
Income from public sources Income from public programs and agencies (grants plus sales of services to 
TNDAP programs). 
Indicator of operational performance Total revenue / total expenses. 
Indicator of financial performance Total liabilities / total assets. 
Indicator of financial dependence Income from government programs / total revenue 
7.3 Operational performance 
The operational performance of an EAC refers to its capacity to generate sufficient income to cover its 
expenses. The indicator is the ratio of total revenue to total expenses. Table 7.2 shows that in 1999, 
44% of the 410 EACs for which we have information had much higher total expenses than their total 
revenue. Just over a third of these EACs had total expenses that were either 10% below or above their 
total revenue, and thus could be considered to be more or less in equilibrium, with a small profit or a 
small loss respectively. Only about one-fifth of the EACs had revenues that were significantly higher 
than their costs and thus could be considered to be profitable30. 
It may be interesting to compare these results with the fact that only 20% of US farmers made a profit in 1999 (personal 
communication, Dr. T. Reardon, Dept. of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, August 2001). 
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Table 7.2 Operational performance of 410 EACs in 1999 
Indicator of 
operational performance 
Number of EACs Percentage of EACs Cumulative percentage of EACs 
0 (very bad) 19 4.6 4.6 
0.10-0.25 30 7.3 12 
0.26 - 0.50 29 7.1 19 
0.51-0.75 57 13.9 32.9 
0.76 - 0.90 47 11.5 44.4 
0.91 -1.10 140 34.1 78.5 
1.11 - 1.20 20 4.9 83.4 
1.21-1.50 25 6.1 89.5 
1.51 + (very good) 40 9.8 99.3 
N.A. 3 0.7 100 
Total 410 100 
7.4 Financial performance 
The indicator of an E A C s financial performance measures the organization's degree of indebtedness 
relative to its assets (total liabilities/total assets). Table 7.3 shows that in 1999 over one-third of EACs 
had extremely high levels of debt relative to assets, to the point where 24% were technically bankrupt. 
In Chile, many analysts agree that a liabihty/assets ratio of less than 0.6 shows that a firm is in a 
healthy financial condition; one-third of the EACs could be placed in this category at the end of 1999. 
An additional 29% of the EACs were in between these two states. 
Table 7.3. Financial performance of 410 EACs in 1999 
Indicator of 
financial performance 
Number of EACs Percentage of EACs Cumulative percentage of EACs 
1.25 +(very bad) 30 7.32 7.32 
1.24-1.10 31 7.56 14.88 
1.09-0.90 83 20.24 35.12 
0.89 - 0.75 70 17.07 52.20 
0.74 - 0.60 49 11.95 64.15 
0.59 - 0.30 65 15.85 80 
0.29-0.0 (very good) 71 17.32 97.32 
N.A. 11 2.68 100 
Total 410 100 
An additional indicator of the financial condition of Chilean small farmers' organizations in 1999 
(including, but not limited to, EACs), is the total amount they owed to INDAP and the amount 
involved in defaulted loans (Table 7.4). This official information (audited by Chile's General 
Comptroller Office) was provided to me directly by INDAP. As of 31 December 1999, the 1,050 small 
farmers' organizations had a total debt with INDAP of $49.4 million. Of that amount, $39.4 million 
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were loans in good standing, while the rest ($10 million) were defaulted (20% of the total). Of the 
1,050 organizations, 279 (27%) had defaulted on their loan payments. 
The 598 organizations (57% of the total) with debts of less than $20,000, owed a total debt of $4.2 
million (8.5% of the total). Of these, 21% had defaulted on their loans, giving a total of $0.5 million 
owed (5% of the total amount defaulted by all organizations, and 10% of the total debt of this group). 
The number of organizations defaulting is somewhat lower than average for this group of smaller 
debtors, and the amount of money involved is significantly lower than for other groups. 
The 45 organizations (4% of the total number) with debts of $200,000 or more, had a combined debt 
of $21 miUion (42% of the total). Of this group, 21 (47%) had defaulted, and the amount involved 
added up to $6.1 million (61% of the amount defaulted by all organizations, and 30% of the total debt 
within this group of largest debtors). The top 10 organizations in terms of debt accumulated US $4.1 
million in defaulted loans (41% of the total amount defaulted by all organizations)31. 
One should be very careful in extrapolating from this information to the conditions of most EACs. The 
largest loans are associated with very special projects and, as can be seen, are highly concentrated in a 
few very large EACs. These special 'megaprojects' - as they were unofficially called - have been 
subject to different decision-making procedures and to special support programs, than the vast 
majority of EACs. 
In my interviews with many of the leaders and managers of these very large organizations, and with 
INDAP staff familiar with these cases, I generally received the same explanations for the failure of 
these large projects: (a) they were linked to very profitable but highly risky and dynamic markets (e.g., 
flowers for export); (b) they entailed complex organizations; (c) most of those involved (members, 
managers, advisors, INDAP staff) lacked the experience, contacts and expertise to run these complex 
firms; and (d) the public systems lacked the agility to respond to the early signs of trouble, both 
because of bureaucratic rigidity and also due to the political cost of having to recognize failure and act 
consequently. 
Table 7.4 Debts owed to INDAP by 1054 small farmers' organizations (31 December 1999) 
Size of loan ($) Number of 
organizations 
Outstanding loans Defaulted loans Total 
$ S % $ % 
200,000 - 2,028,895 45 14,549,102 70.4 6,141,715 29.6 20,690,816 
100,000- 199,999 64 7,581,535 87.2 1,113,335 12.8 8,694,870 
50,000 - 99,999 130 7,442,372 84.1 1,405,516 15.9 8,847,889 
20,000 - 49,999 217 6,103,389 87.7 862,290 12.4 6,965,679 
21 - 19,999 598 3,765,577 89.2 458,907 10.1 4,224,484 
Total 1.054 39,441,975 79.8 9,981,764 20.2 49,423,739 
7.5 Financial dependence 
The indicator of financial dependence measures the extent to which an EAC relies on public programs 
and agencies to generate its income, either through direct transfers, grants or services sold to them 
More precisely, the indicator is defined as income from government programs / total revenue. 
Some EACs may divert part of these grants to cover some of their operational costs, but typically 
EACs use this income to cover the costs of the technical advisory services that the organizations 
provide to their members, to pay for market studies and the preparation of investment projects, and to 
3 1 At the time of writing this chapter, INDAP had begun actions to liquidate several of these larger EACs. 
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hire external consultants for management and technical advice. Hence, funding from government 
programs does not always constitute a subsidy to core operational expenses. In fact, most grants are 
certainly used for what can only be called very legitimate, appropriate, and necessary services 
provided by the EACs to their members. One cannot always, or even most of the time, attach a 
negative connotation to this type of income. 
However, experience from many countries in Latin America over the past decades tells us that if 
EACs are very dependent on this type of income, they will be vulnerable if such support is suddenly 
withdrawn or policies suddenly changed. 
Table 7.5 shows that almost a quarter of EACs generate all their income from government programs 
and agencies; these EAC are totally dependent on the prevailing political climate for their survival, 
and they have been completely incapable of linking to any market client in the private sector. If one 
adds those that generated 60% or more of their income from these non-market sources, the percentage 
of EACs overly dependent on government programs rises to about 32%. 
At the other extreme, 37% of the 410 EACs in 1999 did not generate any income from public grants or 
from sales of services of any kind to government (although they may have received loans from public 
agencies); 100% of their revenue came from market sources. If one adds those that received funds 
from government to make up less than 10% of their revenue, the percentage increases to about 45%. 3 2 
In between these extremes lie 23% of EACs who are quite, but not extremely, dependent on 
government. 
Table 7.5 Financial dependence of 410 EACs in 1999 
Indicator of Financial Dependence Number of EACs Percentage of EACs Cumulative percentage of EACs 
1.00 (very dependent) 100 24.39 24.39 
1.00-0.80 15 3.66 28.05 
0.79 - 0.60 15 3.66 31.71 
0.59 - 0.40 25 6.10 37.80 
0.39 - 0.20 41 10 47.80 
0.19-0.10 28 6.83 54.63 
0.09 - 0.01 33 8.05 62.68 
0.00 (fully independent) 153 37.32 100 
Total 410 100 
7.6 Combined analysis 
To be sustainable in the short run, an EAC should meet all three conditions: its expenses should be 
lower than its revenue, its liabilities should be much lower than its assets, and its independence from 
government funding must be high. How many of the 410 EACs meet these conditions? 
I have classified these 410 EACs into four categories (ranging from 'A': very good, to 'D': very bad) 
according to their performance against these three indicators (Table 7.6). These categories depend on 
subjective threshold values of what constitutes 'good' or 'bad' performance in each of the three 
dimensions: 
3 2 As a comparison, it may be interesting to note that the subsidy rate (share of total farm income) for US fanners in 1999 
was 45%. Personal communication, Dr. T. Reardon, Dept. of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University, August 
2001. 
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• Operational performance: an EAC is doing 'better' if the index is greater than or equal to 1.00; 
that is, if the EAC was at least capable of meeting its total expenses from its own sales revenues 
(not including income from public sources) in 1999. 
• Financial performance: an EAC is doing 'better' if the index is less than 0.60; that is, if its 
liabilities represent no more than 60% of its assets. This threshold value was suggested by several 
financial analysts whom I consulted, and it can also be found in some accounting and financial 
management texts (Amat, 1998). 
• Financial dependence: an EAC is doing 'fine' or 'better' if the index is less than 0.15; that is, if at 
least 85% of the organization's total revenue comes from market sources. This is the most 
arbitrary of the three threshold values that I have chosen, but it appears likely that a firm can cope 
with the sudden loss of a client who represents less than 15% of its total revenue. 
Table 7.6 shows that, according to the balance sheets and income statements provided by these 410 
EACs, only 11% of them perform well in all three indicators. If one relaxes the threshold values a 
bit 3 3, an additional 20 organizations (5% of the total) could be considered to be 'almost As'. Hence, 
according to my evaluation method, only around 15% of the EACs are in reasonable shape. 
Table 7.6 Evaluation of short term sustainability of 410 EACs 
Category/Subcategory Explanation Number of EACs Percentage of EACs 
A (very good) High performance in all three 
indicators 
46 11.2 
B Low performance in one of 
three indicators 
111 27.1 
Bl Low in operational 
performance indicator 
27 6.6 
B2 Low in financial performance 
indicator 
52 12.7 
B3 Low in financial dependence 
indicator 
32 7.8 
C Low in two of three 
indicators 
152 37.1 
CI Only fine in operational 
performance indicator 
73 17.8 
C2 Only fine in financial 
performance indicator 
45 11.1 
C3 Only fine in financial 
dependence indicator 
34 8.3 
D (very bad) Low performance in all three 
indicators 
101 27.7 
At the other extreme, 28% of the EACs fail to meet the standards in all three categories, and an 
additional 37% fail in two of the three. Thus at least 65% of the 410 EACs are in a bad to critical 
financial and economic condition. It is likely that they would fail if the policies and programs that are 
supporting them now were discontinued. 
As I was finishing writing this chapter, I was able to compare my results with those of a major review 
done by a consultant firm under contract to INDAP (FUNDES Chile, 2001). In this study, 156 
To 0.90 in operational performance, 0.75 in financial performance, and 0.25 in financial dependence. 
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EACs' 4 balance sheets and income statements were subjected to an in-depth audit, each taking several 
months of work. FUNDES also assessed their operations and management. The study's most 
important conclusion is that 21% of these EACs "demonstrated an acceptable financial condition, 
that is, these EACs can meet their financial obligations without problem, their liabilities are under 
control, and their normal operations yield sufficient resources to sustain their business." The study 
also concluded that an additional 14% of these EACs could become viable business-oriented 
organizations if INDAP agreed to restructure their loans and cancel part of the accumulated interest. 
An additional 36% would need more in-depth support, including cancelling a substantial share of the 
loan owed to INDAP, as well as significantly restmcturing their business plans, management and 
organizational structures. The remaining EACs were unlikely to survive even if they underwent an in-
depth restrucmring. 
These results are more optimistic than mine. Since their study focuses on the most financially-exposed 
EACs, and since their analysis was much more in-depth than mine in this part of the study, I would 
tend to think that their results probably reflect better the true condition of at least these group of EACs. 
What are the characteristics of the best performing EACs, compared to the B , C and D categories? 
Table 7.7 shows that, on average, they have larger than average assets, sales revenues, and operating 
incomes than most of the 410 EACs. They also have very low levels of income derived from public 
sources. Their total liabilities are not much lower than average, so it seems that it is not how much 
debt they have that determines success or failure, but rather their ability to gain access to markets 
where they can generate sufficient income to cover their expenses and reduce or eliminate their initial 
dependence on public support. 
Table 7.7 Accounting factors of EACs according to performance categories (US dollars for fiscal year 
1999, average per EAC per category) 
Category Number of 
EACs 
Total 
assets 
Total liabilities Sales 
revenue 
Operating 
income 
Income from 
public sources 
A 46 317,363 126,389 394,460 139,287 3,751 
B 111 152,378 89,164 107,319 26,831 10,878 
C 152 173,902 149,524 196,659 35,745 11,421 
D 101 67,048 67,364 32,755 6,139 17,519 
Total 410 157,848 110,348 158,089 37,655 11,916 
This information contradicts the opinion of many EAC leaders and, especially, advisors whom I 
interviewed, who stated that the reason for the failed EACs was the lack or insufficiency of public 
subsidies. It also runs counter to the opinion of many INDAP staff and managers, many of whom feel 
that in order to be successful, EACs should be financed through grants rather than loans. From the 
point of view of a business-oriented organization, the key factor shown in Table 7.7 is that the more 
successful EACs are distinguished by their ability to generate income from market sales that are 55% 
higher on average than their costs, and 100 times higher than the subsidies they receive from 
government. 
7.7 Discussion 
At the start of this chapter I asked "Are the EACs viable business-oriented organizations, or are they 
dependent on the political and financial support of INDAP?". I think the evidence shows quite 
conclusively that at the end of 1999 only about one-fifth of EACs were viable. 
The 156 EACs chosen for the study were those judged to be particularly exposed due to the size of their total liabilities. 
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The EACs that perform poorly are highly dependent on public sources of support. Since subsidies are 
always scarce, their total income is very low and is not sufficient to cover their financial costs and 
often not even their operating expenses. 
The message to farmers and government advisors is clear: do not start an EAC unless you can be sure 
that it will be able to tap into sufficiently large and profitable markets very rapidly, so that it can break 
or significantly reduce its dependency on public funds. 
Whilst the data for the 1,050 small farmers' organizations (including but not limited to EACs) show 
that the projects which require very large start-up loans are more likely to fail, the analysis of the 410 
EACs shows that the most successful ones are, on average, more in debt than the majority of poorer 
performers. This is a very important finding because recently there has been a tendency in Chile to 
extrapolate to all EACs from the failure of almost all of the special 'megaprojects' set up in the past 
six or seven years. One should not compare these megaprojects even with the larger, more 'normal' 
types of EACs. So, while it is wise to beware storming ill-prepared into large and complex business 
initiatives that require assets, access to networks and to highly specialized expertise not normally 
found in the sphere of public programs for small farmers, it would be a mistake to extrapolate that 
lesson to the point where only the smallest initiatives receive support. 
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CHAPTER 8. THE LO OVALLE AND RANCHILLO MILK COLLECTION 
CENTERS 
8.1 Introduction 
In Chapters 8 to 12 I analyze 14 EACs in detail. Following Stake (1994), my emphasis is on what can 
be learned from each case, with no attempt at generalization. The purpose is to identify factors that in 
each case influence the EAC's performance. Each case study chapter compares a subset of the 14 case 
studies. The idea is to help the reader visualize more clearly the differences in performance and the 
importance of the various factors that determine or influence them: 
• Chapter 8 analyzes two EACs involved in value-adding and marketing milk, whose clients are 
medium-size cheese factories. 
• Chapter 9 discusses four Milk Collection Centers in the south of the country, each of them a 
supplier of fluid milk to large dairy firms. 
• Chapter 10 deals with three potato-marketing EACs, also in the south. 
• Chapter 11 presents the cases of two fresh vegetable marketing EACs, one of them selling to 
supermarkets in the south, the other one to wholesale markets in the Central region. 
• Chapter 12 describes EACs involved in value-adding and marketing raspberries, located in the 
southern limit of the Central zone. 
Since most of the main findings are quite similar for all 14 case studies, I have left the overall 
discussion to the last chapter in the book (Chapter 13). 
In each chapter I describe the context in which these organizations work their history, how they relate 
to market and non-market agents, and how decisions are made in the organization. Then I describe 
these EACs' achievements at two levels: the organizations' economic and financial performance and 
the impacts on their members' households and farms. I then try to explain these results by looking at 
different factors such as the households and farms' assets, the EACs' systems of rules, and the 
networks in which they are involved. I close the chapter with my main conclusions and lessons. 
8.2 Method 
The method used to select and conduct the case studies is described in Chapter 3, Section 3.5. 
Aim Method/Source of information Sample size 
To understand the main factors 
conditioning the performance and 
sustainability of EACs, and to 
analyze the relationship between 
institutional and economic 
performance. 
Qualitative case studies, using 
individual and group interviews 
with different stakeholders, half-
day workshops, analysis of 
available documentation, and a 
survey of members and non-
members. 
16 case studies of EACs involved 
in milk (6 case studies), potato (3 
case studies), vegetable (4 case 
studies) and raspberry production 
(3 case studies), processing and/or 
marketing. Results of 14 case 
studies are reported. 
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8.3 Basic description of the Lo Ovalle and Ranchillo Milk Collection Centers 
The Milk Collection Centers (CAL, Centro de Acopio Lechero in Spanish,) of Lo Ovalle and 
Ranchillo are in Maria Pinto municipality, 74 km (about 90 minutes on good roads) from Santiago, 
and only 25 km from the provincial capital of Melipilla. These CALs are only three km apart. Then-
legal names are Sociedad Agricola Lo Ovalle, Limitada, and Agricola Ranchillo, Limitada. Both are 
Limited Liability firms. 
These two CALs, together with four others, jointly own a second tier EAC called UFOCO Ltda. 
(Union para el Fomento de la Competitividad, or Union for the Development of Competitiveness). 
UFOCO provides various agricultural services to the six CALs, their members, and other small 
farmers in the area. The most important of these services are technical advice (as a subcontractor for 
INDAP), agricultural machinery, and the supply of agricultural and veterinary inputs. 
CAL Ranchillo and Lo Ovalle's core business is to collect, test, cool, and market the milk produced by 
their members and other small fanners in the area. CAL Ranchillo has 10 members, all of whom are 
active. It also collects and markets the milk for a few other local farmers. The Ranchillo area has 10 
dairy farms, all of whom sell the bulk of their milk through this CAL. In addition to milk marketing, 
CAL Ranchillo buys bulk agricultural and veterinary inputs and supplies for its members, as well as 
selling these supplies to other local farmers. Four of CAL Ranchillo's members jointly operate a 
separate collective enterprise to provide specialized agricultural machinery services to small and 
medium farmers. 
CAL Lo Ovalle also has 10 members, of whom only seven or eight can be said to be active. They also 
receive milk from 11 other non-member suppliers. The link between the CAL, the community and the 
farmers of Lo Ovalle is rather weak, as only five of the 19 milk producers in the locality work with the 
CAL, while five of the members actually live in other localities in a 10 to 15 km radius. 
The farmers who make up these CALs were given land in 1977 as part of the final stages of the 
agrarian reform process. Previously, they or their parents had worked as inquilinos (peons) in the large 
haciendas that were later expropriated during the agrarian reform. Hence, their history as independent 
farmers is only 25 years old. 
8.3.1 The CALs' markets 
The CALs mainly sell their milk to medium-sized cheese factories in the region. When the CALs were 
launched, meetings were held with representatives of all the 15 or so local cheese factories, and with 
SOPROLE, the largest dairy agribusiness in the country and the dominating player in the milk market 
in the Santiago region. According to the General Manager of UFOCO, the main reason for choosing 
the cheese factory market was that SOPROLE refused to deal with the EACs and insisted on making 
individual payments to the members of each CAL. Also, while the cheese factories have lower quality 
standards than the large dairy agribusiness companies, they pay very similar prices for the milk. In 
fact, according to the General Manager of UFOCO, if one factors in the lower quality standard, the 
cheese factories probably offer a better price than the large agribusinesses. More recently, some of the 
cheese makers have begun offering a premium for better quality milk, and some of the CALs are 
actually responding to this incentive35. 
The grades and standards imposed by the cheese factories are not very stringent. They want a regular 
However, UFOCO's General Manager acknowledges that only two of the six CALs are capable of enforcing their own 
quality rules. Diluting milk is the most frequent problem, followed by acidity. 
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and dependable supply of milk, especially during the winter, and this milk must meet some very basic 
quality standards: it must not be diluted with water, and it must not be acidic. As they compete with 
SOPROLE for their milk supply, these factories must offer market prices for the milk they buy. 
The most common alternative market for small farmers are the tarreros, middlemen who roam the 
country roads buying milk with few questions asked. Their quality standards are even lower than the 
cheese factories, but, since there are numerous tarreros, the net price they pay is close to the market 
price. However, tarreros operate informally, and do not pay farmers Value Added Tax (VAT - 18%). 
As a result, farmers who sell to them without a legal invoice cannot recover at least part of the VAT 
they paid every time they bought an agricultural or veterinary input or paid a contract. During the 
spring and summer months when milk is abundant and prices are low, these tarreros often only buy 
part of the day's production; the rest is wasted. 
Another alternative market would be the large-scale dairy industry, which in this region is dominated 
by only one player, SOPROLE. This firm will of course pay the market price (baseline price), 
supplemented by a series of bonuses for sanitary quality, volume, pre-cooling of milk, stability of 
production during the winter/fall vs the spring/summer, and fat content36. If a farmer can meet all these 
standards to their maximum level, the final price per liter can be as much as 50% higher than the 
baseline price. Of course, achieving each of these standards requires important investments, and some 
(i.e., pre-cooling of milk and bonus for volume) have important scale effects. Hence, small farmers are 
at a great disadvantage with this pricing system. In addition, SOPROLE has been the least interested 
of all the medium and large diary processing firms in working with CALs, and their policy when these 
EACs were started in Maria Pinto was that they would collect the milk at the EACs' cooling tank, but 
would then deal with each farmer separately in terms of payments, quality controls, etc 
Clearly then, for these small farmers the cheese factory market has distinct advantages over the 
tarreros and SOPROLE. 
8.3.2 The birth of the CALs in Maria Pinto 
The initial stimulus for forming CALs was INDAP's credit and technical assistance programs, in 
particular INDAP's Programa de Transferencia Tecnologica (PTT, Technology Transfer Program).7 
The original idea of forming CALs in the Maria Pinto area came in 1993 from an extensionist working 
for an NGO acting as the local PTT contractor. She had heard of other CALs being established in the 
south of the country, also in the context of the PTT. Her idea was supported by a commercial firm 
(Alfa Laval) that manufactured and sold dairy equipment, including the milk cooling tanks that are the 
core equipment of a CAL. 
At the same time, small farmers in the Maria Pinto area were actively looking for alternatives to their 
traditional vegetable cropping systems. There had been an outbreak of cholera in Santiago, and the 
authorities had banned the production of fresh vegetables in many areas where irrigation water was 
contaminated (including Maria Pinto). Dairy farming was an attractive alternative due to the strong 
local tradition of milk production, as well as the high prices being paid for milk at the time. 
Also at this time INDAP started to move away from working with isolated local groups and a 
traditional commodity focus, towards an emphasis on stimulating 'microregional development' 
processes by linking larger groups of farmers with specific and clearly identified markets. 
Diversification away from traditional commodities was another important goal for INDAP at the time. 
See Section 9.1 in Chapter 9 for a more detailed discussion of the dairy industry in Chile. 
In fact, each of the six CALs evolved from a local group formed to participate in PTT activities. 
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In the Maria Pinto area, milk was chosen for this focus as it was a very attractive economic option, and 
also because the CAL had identified groups of farmers keen to shift from vegetables into milk 
production. A group of young INDAP employees designed the Maria Pinto Microregional 
Development Project, which was rapidly approved and launched in 1995. 
Both case study CALs emerged from the Microregional Development Project. CAL Lo Ovalle was 
one of the first to be started in 1995, while CAL Ranchillo was the last to be formed, in 1997. 
Hence, the stimuli for CALs in Maria Pinto came from many sources: local communities who already 
had a basic, though informal organization as a result of the action of a government program an 
extensionist who knew of the CAL model elsewhere in the country, a private firm interested in selling 
its equipment, a crisis in the traditional fanning system due to sanitary restrictions imposed by 
government, and the high price of milk. 
8.3.3 The CALs' steps towards independence 
INDAP originally contracted the School of Animal and Veterinary Sciences of the University of Chile 
to coordinate the new microregional project in Maria Pinto. This decision meant that the NGO behind 
the initial idea was removed from the area. INDAP felt that the university would provide better 
technical services, and they wanted the coordinating agency to emphasize not only production 
technology, but also farm management and entrepreneurship, areas in which the NGO had no 
experience. 
Some of those interviewed for this case study mentioned that INDAP also felt the NGO had developed 
too strong a sense of 'ownership' of the work in the area, and that this would hamper the active 
participation of the farmers in the decision-making process within the new microregional project. The 
policy behind the Microregional Development Projects stated that farmers should have a decision-
making role, and that the external advisory agencies would need to establish a contractual relationship 
with them, something that was not evident in the much more 'top down' tradition of the PTT. 
The Microregional Development Project was managed by a board (Directorio) consisting of six 
farmers (one from each of the five existing CALs, plus one from the Ranchillo group that was 
expected to join the project soon), plus one representative from each of the following agencies: the 
Municipal government, the university, and INDAP. This board selected a Project Manager and the 
field staff through a public contest. 
It did not take long for differences to appear between the university and the farmers. The latter 
complained that the university did not present the expense accounts to the board promptly; that the 
contents of the training workshops were not previously discussed with the farmers and that much of 
the training was not relevant or useful; and that the university gave greater importance to formal 
workshops while the farmers preferred to spend their time and the project's resources on other 
activities, such as field days and veterinarian visits to individual farms. "They gave us documents, but 
some of us cannot read, much less these long things " (a member of CAL Ranchillo). In addition, the 
fanners resented the overheads charged by the university: "with that 10% they took, we were able to 
hire another vet" (a UFOCO board member). 
The tension grew as the university did not react to the farmers' complaints and suggestions. With the 
support of the project's field staff, the farmers proposed to INDAP that they should take direct 
responsibility for managing the project, getting rid of the university, or, for that matter, any other 
external agency. For several months INDAP tried to stop this from happening, as it was felt that the 
organization and experience of the farmers was not sufficiently strong to take on this challenge 
without the permanent support of an external agency. 
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The farmers increased the stakes by creating UFOCO in 1996, to have an organization that could 
legally take over the contract and manage the project. INDAP could no longer resist the pressure from 
the farmers, and in August 1997, the coordination of the microregional project was turned over from 
the university to UFOCO. "When we took control of the technical assistance, for the first time we had 
to be responsible for our decisions. When others were in charge, our attitude was 'they will solve the 
problems'" (a farmer member of the UFOCO Board). 
8.3.4 The different dynamics between the two CALs 
Despite their joint participation in UFOCO, each CAL operates independently. Each is responsible for 
its relationships with its members and other milk suppliers, and each must negotiate with buyers. The 
community of Ranchillo - unlike Lo Ovalle - had a very well-established history of collective action, 
such as building a soccer stadium, improving roads and bridges, and so on. Four of the 10 members 
have, since 1993, been partners in another EAC supplying agricultural machinery services in the area. 
According to different people interviewed during the field work, this collective tradition goes back to 
the 1970s, and the agrarian reform. In addition, Ranchillo farmers were more innovative than Lo 
Ovalle farmers, and by the time the CAL was formed, several key technologies were firmly 
established (e.g., a second milking in the afternoon, and giving that milk to local women for their own 
income-generating projects). 
Community life in Lo Ovalle, in contrast, is very weak. Even the most basic form of rural organization 
found in Chile, the Neighborhood Committee (Junta de Vecinos), was only formed there in the late 
1990s. 
Ranchillo and Lo Ovalle's different community dynamics came to the fore during the formation of the 
CALs and the initiation of the microregional project. In Ranchillo, the decision to establish a CAL was 
discussed at length for two years. Discussions and disagreements ranged from the advantages and 
disadvantages of investing in a CAL as opposed to other projects, how the CAL would be managed, 
what would happen with the afternoon milk that was controlled by the women, how to repay the loan 
for building the CAL and buying the equipment, what type of building and what types of equipment 
were the most appropriate for their scale of operations and purposes, to whom they would sell the 
milk, etc. During all this time, INDAP kept putting pressure on the local organization to get the CAL 
going as soon as possible so that the local group could join the microregional project. However, the 
group took all the time it felt it needed to make this decision. 
By contrast, the future members of CAL Lo Ovalle met each other for the first time a few weeks 
before having to go to the Notary Public's office to sign the legal documents to establish their 
organization. All the work was done by one of the future members (the current president of the film, 
administrator and sole employee of the CAL), who knew the other partners from driving a truck for 
an NGO working in the area. One by one, he contacted a number of potential participants, and after 
only two meetings, convinced them to help form the CAL. A major argument was that given INDAP's 
new orientation (i.e., microregional projects), if they did not join they would have trouble getting 
credit and technical assistance. 
Thus, while these two groups have much in common: a similar and simultaneous origin as independent 
small farmers in the 1970s; similar locations, agroecological potential, educational levels, farm size, 
farming systems, access to technical assistance and credit services, relationships with the same 
network comprising private and public organizations (NGO, INDAP, a private dairy equipment firm, 
the University of Chile, and, later UFOCO); they differ in their tradition of collective action. 
These different traditions are also expressed in the running of these two CALs. While both have a 
formal Directiva for legal purposes, real decision-making takes place, in the case of CAL Ranchillo, at 
regular monthly meetings, supplemented by extraordinary meetings whenever needed. All those 
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interviewed agreed that CAL Ranchillo was by far the most independent of all the six CAL in its 
decision-making, concerning all sorts of issues. For example, they do not use the accounting services 
of UFOCO, but hire their own accountant so as to have direct control over this information; they 
negotiate directly with potential buyers; they deal with the repair and maintenance services to keep 
their equipment working; and they solve internal disagreements and conflicts with no external 
intervention whatsoever. According to the General Manager of UFOCO, "CAL Ranchillo almost never 
requests our assistance". 
The situation is quite different for CAL Lo Ovalle. All decisions are nominally taken by the President 
(who is also the administrator of the CAL, as well as its sole employee in charge of receiving the milk 
each day). He delegates (or tries to) almost all significant decisions to UFOCO, such as calculating 
and establishing the fee that will be charged to farmers for the services of the CAL, negotiating with 
buyers, repairing the equipment, and solving conflicts with the members. When the sector was flooded 
and the road was cut because of heavy rainfall, they sat and waited (losing several day's worth of 
milk) until help came from UFOCO and the municipality. Membership meetings are rare; there had 
been only two in the year prior to the field work. 
8.4 Performance and impacts of CAL Ranchillo and CAL Lo Ovalle 
In this section I discuss and compare the performance of both organizations at two different levels: (a) 
their economic and financial performance as businesses, and (b) the impact of CAL participation on 
members' households and farms. It will become clear that CAL Ranchillo is a successful organization 
from both points of view, while CAL Lo Ovalle is not. 
8.4.1 CAL Ranchillo and CAL Lo Ovalle's economic and financial performance 
Table 8.1 lists several indicators of CAL Ranchillo's economic and financial performance in 1998: 
(1) The operational results are modest but positive, as the firm is able to cover all of its costs 
(operational, aarninistration and financial) with its operational income. Its assets are being used in 
a very efficient manner, since each peso invested is generating a cash flow of more than seven 
pesos. 
(2) Its financial situation is very healthy. Almost all of its debts are long term, and it could easily 
cover its short and long term debts with its own assets. 
(3) Its operational dependency on government subsidies is down to zero. 
Table 8.1 also shows CAL Lo Ovalle's performance for three years (1996-98): 
(1) CAL Lo Ovalle's operational results are very precarious, as for the three years its costs have 
almost equaled its income, despite the fact that members have had to make extra biannual 
contributions to meet the costs. 
(2) As a result, its financial position has deteriorated gradually, although it has been able to pay part 
of its debts. It has tried to shore up its financial position by resorting to levying additional fees 
from its members, and by increasing the fees charged to non-members who used the CAL's 
services. However, as a result these non-members have been migrating to the nearby CAL 
Ranchillo, thus further undermining CAL Lo Ovalle's performance. 
(3) CAL Lo Ovalle does not receive any government subsidies to implicitly or explicitly pay any of 
its operational costs. This of course is a positive sign. 
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Table 8.1 Economic and financial performance, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo 
Item CAL 
RANCHILLO 
CAL 
LO OVALLE 
1998 1996 1997 1998 
Total income ($) 125,339 62,928 66,020 69,536 
Income (milk sales) ($) 116,498 62,928 66,020 69,536 
Income (agricultural and veterinary supplies) ($) 8,891 0 0 0 
Non operational income (subsidies from public 
agencies) ($) 
0 0 0 0 
Costs (not including depreciation of buildings or 
equipment) ($) 
121,355 62,955 65,305 70,017 
Operational result ($) 4,036 -26 714 -480 
Liquid assets ($) 22,233 21,928 19,453 15,920 
Fixed assets ($) 15,481 19,824 20,075 23,320 
Short term debt ($) 415 1,678 333 344 
Long term debt ($) 17,709 18,594 16,160 15,290 
Patrimony (capital plus operational results) ($) 14,650 20,073 16,513 14,890 
Debts/patrimony 1.21 0.93 0.98 1.03 
Income/assets 7.53 3.17 3.13 2.98 
Operational result/patrimony 27.55 -0.13 4.32 -3.22 
Operational capital (liquid assets - short term debts) 
($) 
21,818 20,250 19,120 15,576 
Liquidity (liquid assets/short term debts) 53.60 13.07 58.35 46.23 
In short, as of December 31, 1998 CAL Ranchillo was a rather successful organization from an 
economic and financial point of view, while CAL Lo Ovalle was facing a gradual decline and was 
struggling to make ends meet. 
8.4.2 Impacts on members' farms and households 
In this section I analyze the impact of these EACs on their members' farms and households in terms 
of: 
(1) Household income 
(2) Farm profits and production and sales values 
(3) Land use, technology adoption, management practices and yields 
(4) Access to technical assistance and to credit 
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Household income 
Table 8.2 shows that the net annual household income of CAL Ranchillo members is 70% higher than 
that of their control group or CAL Lo Ovalle members. The net annual household income of CAL Lo 
Ovalle members is also slightly higher than their control group, but in this case the difference is not 
statistically significant. 
About 80% of the net household income of CAL Ranchillo members comes from household members' 
on- and off-farm labor, the rest being made up mostly by pensions and government subsidies. In the 
case of CAL Lo Ovalle members, this figure is only 67%. In all cases, almost all the earned income 
comes from agricultural sources. 
Table 8.2. Income and income composition, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo ($, 1998-99 
agricultural year) 
INDICATORS CAL CAL 
RANCHILLO LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
Net hh income 25,827 15,199 15,446 11,187 
Earned net hh income 20,561 9,888 10,377 6,496 
Unearned net hh income 5,301 5,091 5,068 4,691 
Non-agricultural net income 1,239 1,240 1,285 1,196 
Farm net income 19,704 8,931 9,178 5,355 
Farm profits, production and sales 
CAL Ranchillo members' net farm income is more than double that of CAL Lo Ovalle members, as 
well as that of its own control group (Table 8.2). CAL Lo Ovalle members' farm net income is also 
higher than that of the control group, by 70%. 
By value, the members of CAL Ranchillo produce about twice as much as any of the other three 
groups (members of CAL Lo Ovalle, and farmers in the control groups for both CAL). In all cases, 
seeded forages and annual crops (of which forage maize for silage is a dominant component) make up 
more than 80% of the output of these farms. Fresh vegetables play a complementary role in these 
fanning systems (Table 8.3). 
It is important to also consider the economic performance of milk production. In the 1998-99 season, 
when prices were particularly low, only the CAL Ranchillo members achieved a positive gross margin 
for their milk production operations: $ 0.04/lt on costs of $ 0.15/lt. All the other groups had losses, of 
$ 0.06/lt, $ 0.04/lt and $ 0.08/lt, for the CAL Lo Ovalle members, the Ranchillo control group, and the 
Lo Ovalle control group, respectively. It is important to clarify that these figures include, as part of the 
direct costs, the opportunity cost of family labor which represents 68% of the total costs in the case of 
CAL Ranchillo members, 80% for their control group, 77% for CAL Lo Ovalle members, and 77% for 
their control. While these are indeed costs of milk production, they are also a positive flow when seen 
from the point of view of the household's total income (Table 8.4). 
Since the milk prices received by all these farmers were very similar (around $0.18/lt), the differences 
in gross margins are explained by the wide differences in the cost of producing one liter of milk: $ 
0.15/lt for the members of CAL Ranchillo, $ 0.22/lt for their control group, $ 0.24/lt for the CAL Lo 
Ovalle members, and $ 0.25/lt for their control group. These differences in production costs are mainly 
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driven by yield differences per cow and per hectare, as will be discussed later. 
Table 8.3. Gross value of production, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo ($, 1998-99 agricultural 
season) 
INDICATORS CAL RANCHILLO CAL LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
GVP Crops 7,111 2,488 4,438 2,466 
GVP Forages 3,692 2,638 1,912 3,037 
GVP Fresh vegetables 1,636 1,231 3,765 2,049 
GVP Total vegetable production 12,003 4,517 6,156 5,353 
GVP Total animal production system 9,244 4,795 3,595 4,544 
Table 8.4. Economic performance of milk production, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo (1998-99 
agricultural season) 
INDICATORS CAL RANCHILLO CAL LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
Direct costs ($) 6,418 4,312 4,016 4,786 
Gross income ($) 8,176 3,454 3,013 3,262 
Gross margin (S) 1,757 -859 -1,005 - 1,525 
Production (It) 44,355 19,537 17,066 19,032 
Direct cost per liter ($/lt) 0.15 0.22 0.24 0.25 
Gross income per liter ($/lt) 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 
Gross margin per liter ($/lt) 0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 
Lo Ovalle and Ranchillo's crop and forage farming systems (for members and non-members alike), 
are basically oriented to supplying feed to their dairy cattle. Little is sold outside the farm except for 
vegetables, most of which are sold in Santiago, either directly or through middlemen (tarreros) who 
buy them at the farmgate. Almost all the milk is also sold, and CAL Ranchillo's members generate a 
gross income of more than double that of CAL Lo Ovalle's members, and much higher than any of the 
control groups (Table 8.5). 
For members of both CAL, nearly all their milk is sold through their organizations, while the non-
members sell it on their farm to middlemen. As would be expected from the production figures, the 
gross income from CAL Ranchillo members' milk sales is twice as large as the other groups of 
farmers. 
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Table 8.5. Gross income from sales of agricultural products, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo ($, 
1998-99 agricultural season) 
INDICATORS CAL RANCHILLO CAL LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
Crops 1,149 933 2,278 955 
Forages 77 88 55 760 
Fresh vegetables 1,442 1,119 2,406 1,983 
Total vegetable production 2,285 1,094 2,704 2,075 
Land use, technology adoption and yields 
CAL Ranchillo's members farm much more intensively, using nearly all available land. By contrast, 
about a quarter on average of CAL Lo Ovalle's members' farm area is not under any production; a 
much lower intensity of use than Lo Ovalle's members' control group neighbors. One third of the 
farmland of CAL Ranchillo's members is under annual crops (mostly maize, used to prepare silage for 
winter feed for the cows), and an additional 50% is under seeded forages. This is a key decision that 
allows farmers to maintain milk production at a higher level during the winter months, when prices are 
highest. By contrast, the members of CAL Lo Ovalle are more dependent on natural pastures, which 
grow little during the winter (Table 8.6). 
Table 8.6 Land use, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo (1998-99 agricultural season) 
INDICATORS CAL RANCHILLO CAL 
LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-parts. Participants Non-parts. 
Crops (ha) 2.98 1.02 1.67 1.02 
Fruits (ha) 0 0 0 0 
Forages (ha) 4.59 3.39 2.91 3.82 
Fresh vegetables (ha) 1.61 1.54 2.27 1.59 
Agro-industrial fruits and vegetables (ha) 0.5 0 0 0 
Natural and improved pastures (ha) 6.5 10.8 6.5 10.3 
Forest plantations (ha) 0 0 0 0 
Total under production (ha) 9.23 11.83 8.06 11.94 
One of the most striking differences between CAL Ranchillo's members and their non-participating 
and CAL Lo Ovalle neighbors, is the degree to which the CAL Ranchillo participants have adopted 
technological innovations. While there are basically no significant differences in adoption of 
technological innovations between the CAL Lo Ovalle participants and their control group, the CAL 
Ranchillo members have much higher and statistically significant rates of adoption in crop 
diversification, marketing of agricultural products and inputs, use of new machinery and equipment, 
changes in construction and installations, crop varieties, use of fertilizers, weed control, improvement 
of cattle breeds, and introduction of artificial insemination. In nine of the 13 categories of 
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technological change, the members of CAL Ranchillo show statistically higher rates of adoption than 
their control group. The CAL Lo Ovalle members, on the other hand, show no significant differences 
compared with their control, except in marketing of products and inputs (Table 8.7). 
These differences in technology use express themselves in the yields. The members of CAL Ranchillo 
consistently get higher average yields than their control group and CAL Lo Ovalle members, while the 
latter's yields are very similar to their control group (Table 8.8). 
The members of both CAL are somewhat better than their control groups in using several good farm 
management practices asked about in the survey. In particular, they apparently operate more formally 
in fiscal terms, since almost all of them are legally registered as farmers and each month file their 
Value Added Tax (VAT) forms. In the case of the control groups, only about 70% of them show these 
characteristics. By participating in a CAL, these farmers enter into formal markets, meaning that they 
have to adapt to new fiscal conditions. From the point of view of the government, this is a positive and 
valuable result. From the point of view of the farmers, by declaring the VAT paid to them by the 
buyers of their milk, they become eligible to recover at least a fraction of the VAT paid by them when 
purchasing supplies, equipment or services (Table 8.9). 
Table 8.7 Technological changes implemented in past five years, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo 
INDICATORS CAL CAL 
RANCHILLO LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-parts. Participants Non-parts. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% % % % 
Crop diversification 53.8 5 6.7 0 
Contract agriculture 7.7 10 0.4 4.8 
Marketing of inputs and products 76.9 10 60 9.5 
Irrigation and drainage 30.8 10 26.7 14.3 
Machinery and equipment 61.5 10.5 26.7 10 
Constructions and installations 61.5 10 40 14.3 
Crop varieties and seed quality 69.2 11.1 40 10.5 
Use of fertilizers 53.8 11.1 13.3 10.5 
Weed control 61.5 11.1 13.3 10.5 
Insect and disease control 38.5 16.7 20 15.8 
Cattle breeds 69.2 10 20 9.5 
Reproduction of cattle 76.9 10 6.7 9.5 
Sanitary management of cattle 69.2 55 60.6 52.4 
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Table 8.8 Yields, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo (1999-99 agricultural season) 
INDICATORS CAL RANCHILLO CAL LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
Silage maize (kg/ha) 32,759 29,000 26,800 29,000 
Potatoes (kg/ha) 13,000 12,140 11,400 12,140 
Alfalfa (kg/ha) 9,637 9,600 7,550 9,637 
Vegetables (kg/ha) 8,400 5,928 5,930 5,958 
Milk (lt/cow/year) 5,661 1,790 1,925 1,737 
Milk (lt/ha/year) 2,891 1,550 3,546 1,718 
Table 8.9 Farm management practices, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo 
INDICATORS CAL CAL 
RANCHILLO LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-parts. Participants Non-parts. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% % % % 
Legally registered as farmers for fiscal purposes 92.3 70 93.3 71.4 
VAT accounting and filing 92.3 70 93.3 71.1 
Costs and income records 30.8 30 33.3 40 
Holds a bank account 100 100 100 100 
Legalized land titles 100 100 100 100 
Legalized water titles 100 100 100 100 
8.5 Explaining the performance differences 
The following factors may explain the differences in performance between these two EACs: 
• Exposure to a different set of policy, agroecological or market incentives 
• Different capacity of the individual members, in terms of human, financial or physical capital 
• Different capacity of the organizations themselves, in terms of social capital or management 
However, the first set of factors (incentives) does not differ for these two organizations as they are 
located in the same area, work within the same policy and institutional framework, and deal with the 
same products and markets. Hence, the varying performances of these two organizations can only be 
explained by differences in individual members' farms and households, or in the organizations 
themselves. 
8.5.1 Access to agricultural services 
All the participants of these two CALs receive technical assistance from UFOCO. In addition, 38% of 
Cooperating to Compete 121 
CAL Ranchillo's members receive other technical assistance from governmental agencies. About half 
of the non-members receive technical assistance from government agencies, while about 15% of them 
also receive support from UFOCO (Table 8.10 ). 
Table 8.10 Access to technical assistance services, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo 
INDICATORS CAL CAL 
RANCHILLO LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% % % % 
Tech. assistance from EAC 100 0 100 4.8 
Tech. assistance from government 38.5 50 6.7 47.6 
Tech. assistance from university 7 0 13.3 0 
Tech. assistance from private firm 7.7 0 0 0 
Tech. assistance from private advisor 15.4 15 0 14.3 
Table 8.11 Payments for technical assistance, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo 
INDICATORS CAL RANCHILLO CAL LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-parts. Participants Non-parts. 
Cost to farmer of TA from EAC ($/yr) 90 0 47 1 
Cost to fanner of TA from gov't ($/yr) 0 0 0 1 
Cost to farmer of TA from private adv. ($/yr) 21 0 0 0 
CAL Ranchillo's members pay 100% of the cost of UFOCO's technical assistance services , while 
CAL Lo Ovalle's members only pay about 50%, despite the fact that as shareholders of UFOCO their 
representative must have approved these charges. None of the other technical assistance services are 
paid for (Table 8.11). 
EAC participants are more indebted than non-members. In CAL Ranchillo, seven of the 10 members 
have debts, averaging $ 1,939, all of them with INDAP. All CAL Lo Ovalle's members have debts 
averaging $ 3,130, nine of them with INDAP, one with the State bank ($ 2,206) and one with a private 
bank ($ 11,028). Less than one-third of the surveyed non-members have debts, and the average 
amounts are significantly lower than those of the CAL members; all the non-members' debts are with 
INDAP. 
In summary: (a) CAL Lo Ovalle members are more prone to taking out loans, and for larger amounts 
than the members of CAL Ranchillo; (b) INDAP is the main and almost single source of credit for 
these farmers; (c) the members of these CALs either have greater access to and/or have a more open 
attitude towards taking out loans than non-members; (d) even in the case of CAL Lo Ovalle, the 
3 8 To be precise, the share of the cost that is supposed to be paid by the farmer, after the largest share is paid for by a subsidy 
financed by INDAP. 
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amounts these farmers owe is very small, almost insignificant, if compared with their assets (Table 
8.12). 
Table 8.12 Access to credit, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo (1998-99 agricultural season) 
INDICATORS CAL RANCHILLO CAL LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
N° $ N° $ N° $ N° $ 
Total loans 7 1,939 3 662 11 3,130 4 1,048 
Short term loans 5 1,544 2 551 9 1,229 3 1,103 
Long term loans 3 1,948 1 882 5 4,676 1 882 
INDAP loans 7 1,939 3 662 9 2,356 4 1,176 
State Bank loans 0 0 0 0 1 2,206 0 0 
Private banks loans 0 0 0 0 1 11,028 0 0 
8.5.2 CAL Ranchillo and CAL Lo Ovalle's members' assets 
Household characteristics (human capital) 
There are very strong similarities between participants and non-participants in terms of the household 
composition and their sex, age and educational characteristics, both in CAL Ranchillo and CAL Lo 
Ovalle. The only significant difference is that the schooling of the male members of the CAL 
Ranchillo households, and in particular that of males between 31 and 45 years of age, is considerably 
higher than that of the control group (7.47 vs 4.93 years at school for all males, and 10.10 vs 6.33 for 
31 to 45 year old males). This means that amongst CAL Ranchillo participants there is usually one 
person in the household who has an almost complete high school education. The participants in CAL 
Lo Ovalle tend to have somewhat fewer years of formal schooling than the CAL Ranchillo members, 
or any of the two control groups; however, none of the differences between the CAL Lo Ovalle control 
group are significant (Table 8.13). 
Physical and financial assets 
With respect to land resources, the members of both CAL own around 9 ha on average, with those in 
CAL Lo Ovalle having slightly larger farms than those of CAL Ranchillo, but those of CAL Ranchillo 
having a somewhat larger proportion of irrigated land. There is a small local market for land rental and 
sharecropping, which is used by members of both CAL to slightly increase the area under their 
management. In both cases, the non-participants own and manage larger land areas than the 
participants (Table 8.14). 
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Table 8.13 Household composition, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo 
INDICATORS CAL RANCHILLO CAL OVALLE 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
Members of household 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 
Female members 2.3 2.2 2.4 2.2 
Male members 2.2 2.1 1.9 2 
Members 0-12 yrs 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Members 13-18 yrs 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Members 19-30 yrs 0.4 1 1.1 0.9 
Members 31 -45 yrs 1.3 0.7 0.5 0.7 
Members 45-65 yrs 1.2 1 1.2 1 
Members 66+ yrs 0.7 0.9 0.6 0.8 
Schooling members 7 yrs or + 6.97 5.96 5.72 6.44 
Schooling members 15 yrs or + 7.17 6.11 5.70 6.58 
Schooling members 19-30 yrs 12.44 10.38 10.03 10.38 
Schooling members 3 \A5 yrs 10.10 6.33 5.90 7.30 
Schooling members 46-65 yrs 4 5.73 4.90 6.37 
Schooling members 66 or + 3.78 1.83 2.12 1.83 
Schooling of head of hh 5.46 4.15 4.06 4.71 
Schooling of spouse 4.53 2.45 3 3.09 
Schooling of sons/daughters 6.57 6.23 6.36 5.97 
Schooling of other members hh 2.33 2.68 2.82 2.55 
Schooling of female members hh 5.30 5.47 5.97 5.97 
Schooling male members of hh 7.47 4.93 5.65 5.46 
Age of head of hh 59.46 69.85 58.60 62.23 
Age of spouse 51.62 34.75 39.06 34.66 
Age of sons/daughters 34.69 30.40 28.73 28.95 
Dependency ratio 0.52 0.73 0.55 0.69 
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Table 8.14 Land assets, CAL Lo Ovalle and Cal Ranchillo 
INDICATORS CAL RANCHILLO CAL LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-parts Participants Non-parts 
Land owned by hh (ha) 8.36 11.08 9.86 11.22 
Land taken by hh, shareholding (ha) 0.07 0 0.26 0 
Land taken by hh, rental (ha) 1.15 0.50 0.53 0.47 
Land taken by hh, other contracts (ha) 0 0.68 0 0.64 
Land let by hh, shareholding (ha) 0 0.45 0.40 0.42 
Land let by hh, rental (ha) 0 0 0.70 0 
Land let by hh, other contracts (ha) 0 0.15 0 0.14 
Land under management by hh (ha) 9.55 12.46 10.36 12.53 
Irrigated land under management by hh (ha) 6.02 4.52 4.39 4.50 
Irrigated land owned by hh (ha) 8.43 7.74 6.99 7.66 
In terms of access to main roads and towns, there are no major differences. Houses and farms are 
between 0.5 and 2.0 km from the main road, and about 10 km from the town of Maria Pinto. Most 
farmers have motor vehicles and can reach Maria Pinto, any of the larger regional cities, or even the 
capital city of Santiago with little difficulty. 
In terms of the value of fixed or quasi-fixed assets, CAL members have less capital than their control 
groups, due basically to the greater value of non-participants' land assets. The individual interviews 
conducted during the field work confirmed that participants' farms tend to be somewhat smaller than 
those of non-participants. Since land is by far the most valuable asset of these farmers, the non-
participants have a greater total value of assets than participants (Table 8.15). 
Table 8.15. Fixed and quasi-fixed capital assets, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo ($) 
INDICATOR CAL RANCHILLO CAL LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
Value of buildings and infrastructure 28,117 17,958 16,333 20,386 
Value of machinery and equipment 5,869 18,284 6,469 7,746 
Value of land owned by household 133,022 187,825 159,000 191,385 
Value of livestock 8,527 4,844 3,683 4,713 
Total value of physical assets 187,953 234,811 162,458 243,488 
Although CAL Lo Ovalle members' total land assets are higher, they are lower than CAL Ranchillo's 
members in terms of the value of buildings, infrastructure such as milking sheds and livestock. 
Ultimately the members of CAL Ranchillo seem to have somewhat greater total assets than members 
of CAL Lo Ovalle, despite their unfavorable position with respect to land. This is probably because 
CAL Ranchillo members have been able to invest more in non-land assets over time, and this is 
Cooperating to Compete 125 
reflected in their better economic results and higher income (Table 8.15). 
In summary, there are no large differences between the members and the non-members of these two 
CALs in terms of human and physical capital, with the exception of the higher levels of education of 
certain categories of Ranchillo household members. Also, there are no major differences in location, 
access to roads and towns, climate, soil quality or access to irrigation, as would be expected from two 
communities that are only three km apart. These two organizations have also grown out of the same 
INDAP-supported development projects. Both communities have access to credit and technical 
assistance, from the same source and for the same period of time. Finally, the long term history of 
these two communities is also very similar, as is their origin in the agrarian reform process. 
It is therefore highly unlikely that the significantly different performances of these two EAC can be 
explained either by the set of incentives to which they have been subject, or by the structural assets of 
their members' farms and households. I will thus now explore the effect of social capital on these 
differences. 
8.5.3 Social capital 
I will discuss the effect of social capital on the EACs' different performance from four points of view: 
(1) CAL members' participation in other organizations 
(2) Prevalence of social norms amongst EAC members, such as trust and reciprocity, that could lead 
to better cooperation 
(3) Rules governing the relationship among members 
(4) Participation of the EACs in networks with public and private agents 
Participation in community and economic organizations 
CAL Ranchillo members tend to participate in more economic organizations (e.g., machinery services 
firms) than their control group and CAL Lo Ovalle members. On average, each member of CAL 
Ranchillo participates in six organizations (economic and non-economic), compared with an average 
of four for CAL Lo Ovalle members, and two for the control groups. 
When asked the open ended question "What should small farmers do to improve their situation? ", 
about a third of the CAL Ranchillo members and both control groups spontaneously mentioned 
participating in or forming economic organizations, while none of the CAL Lo Ovalle members 
mentioned this strategy. 
The participation of CAL Ranchillo members is significantly higher in organizations dealing with 
irrigation projects, soil conservation, pasture improvement and marketing of agricultural supplies. 
There is also a very high level of participation of women from the CAL Ranchillo households in 
projects and organizations that pursue economic objectives (including some, such as cheese-making 
and marketing using the afternoon milk, that put them in direct conflict with their husbands over the 
control of that resource). About 30% of the CAL Ranchillo members hold leadership positions in these 
other economic organizations. While the members of CAL Lo Ovalle also participate in many of these 
organizations, the degree to which they do so is not significantly higher than their control group (Table 
8.16). 
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Table 8.16 Participation in development projects and organizations, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL 
Ranchillo 
INDICATORS CAL CAL 
RANCHILLO LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-parts. Participants Non-parts. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% % % % 
Organizations or projects with economic objectives: 
Irrigation or drainage 38.5 10 13.3 9.5 
Marketing of products or purchasing of inputs 53.8 0 20 4.8 
Soil conservation and pasture improvement 30.8 5 20 9.5 
Storage of products 15.4 0 6.7 4.8 
Youth 0 0 6.7 4.8 
Women's 53.8 5 20 4.8 
Asociaciön Gremial 0 0 13.3 0 
Cooperative 0 0 13.3 4.8 
Held leadership position in any of the above 30.8 10 14.3 13.3 
Organization or projects with social development objectives: ^H)ltii,Ji 
Neighborhood Committee 76.9 50 66.7 47.6 
Sports, culture and recreation 46.2 40 38.1 46.2 
Housing or local improvement 0 5 0 4.8 
Participation in non-economic community organizations is similar across all the categories of 
households (members of both CALs and their control groups); participation is particularly high in the 
Neighborhood Committees and in sports and recreation organizations (Table 8.16). 
Despite the very favorable results discussed in Section 8.4.2, between one-fifth and one-third of CAL 
Ranchillo members consistently feel there are few benefits of EAC membership. This proportion 
increases to more than 60% when asked about impacts on prices and production costs (Table 8.17). 
This negative view is based on the downward trend in milk prices that started after the CALs were 
launched. The cost and income surveys confirm that accessing the market through these EACs has not 
influenced the average milk price. In the meetings held with CAL Ranchillo members, they expressed 
their frustration at not being able to extract higher prices. In fact, they mentioned that prices had 
dropped substantially since they had started their organization (due to market trends throughout the 
country). As one member of CAL Ranchillo put it, "this has been our failure.". 
In their opinion, the middlemen (tarreros), faced with the competition of six CALs in the area, 
immediately matched their prices. Since they operate without declaring VAT, these tarreros can easily 
match the net prices that the CALs pay their members and suppliers. Hence, the CAL members 
complain that they are performing an unrecognized public service for local farmers, who see their 
prices go up without having to go through the process and costs of organizing. They say that without 
the CAL, the tarreros would immediately lower their prices again, because an isolated small farmer 
does not have any other, market in which to sell their milk. 
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CAL members cannot understand why the tax authorities do not control the tarreros; if they had to 
pay taxes, they would have a harder time competing against the EACs: "The SII (Internal Revenue 
Service) actually checks more on us than on the tarreros, because it easier since we are always here " 
(a UFOCO board member). 
CAL Ranchillo members have a more optimistic view of the benefits of EAC participation when asked 
about diversification in crop and animal production, farm improvements, improved quality of life for 
the women in the household, and improved relations with the neighbors. In addition, most CAL 
Ranchillo members are also optimistic when they are asked if, in general, EAC participation has led to 
their doing better as small farmers (Table 8.17). 
One of the main conclusions of a meeting held with six of the CAL Ranchillo members was that being 
part of the CAL made them feel "more secure." When asked to specify why, four things were 
mentioned: without the CAL, the tarreros would lower prices; the tarreros would also not pick up the 
milk some days, as often happens during the spring and summer months; being organized makes it 
easier to access other public programs, such as credit from INDAP or subsidies to improve pastures; 
and by being organized they have been able to undertake other common projects, such as buying 
agricultural inputs together, which helps to reduce costs. 
These general trends are more or less the same for CAL Lo Ovalle. Many members do not believe that 
EAC participation has led to better prices or to improved product marketing. This was one of the main 
conclusions of a meeting I held with five of the CAL members: "Our profits have decreased because 
the price of milk is down, while our costs have increased because we are now paying the Chilean $ 9.4 
million (around $ 20,000) loan we took to build the CAL ". 
However, in contrast with the members of CAL Ranchillo, CAL Lo Ovalle members were much more 
positive when asked about the effect of participation on improving relations with the government, in 
particular at the municipal level. This probably reflects the fact that for the first time the Lo Ovalle 
area has a functional organization, allowing them to tap into certain municipal funds and services. On 
the other hand, the members of CAL Lo Ovalle are less optimistic about the effects of EAC 
participation on farm improvements, improved quality of life for women, their performance as small 
farmers, or their future as small fanners (Table 8.17). 
In a group meeting CAL Lo Ovalle members listed the following benefits of CAL membership: access 
to UFOCO technical assistance; a secure outlet for their milk ("during the spring and summer, the 
tarreros frequently refuse to take all the milk and some days they don't take any at all"); and access 
to a number of subsidized INDAP programs (pasture improvement, etc.) 
The same questions were asked to the CAL Ranchillo and CAL Lo Ovalle control groups who had 
participated in an economic organization of some sort. Their view was much more pessimistic than the 
CAL members; most denied that the economic organization in general would be of value for 11 of the 
15 questions, and in the reniaining four, the percentage of negative responses was between 40% and 
49% (Table 8.17). 
There is an even stronger contrast between EAC members and non-members in their perceptions about 
the costs of participating in an economic organization. Most CAL members very clearly recognize that 
participation costs include greater indebtedness, membership fees and giving a cut to the organization 
from the money received for their milk. Only a minority of the non-members recognize these factors 
as real costs of joining an EAC (Table 8.17). 
Thus non-members have a more pessimistic view of potential benefits, but a more optimistic (and less 
realistic!) opinion about the costs of engaging in this form of collective action. Even the group which 
has clearly benefited from EAC participation is pessimistic about the economic benefits. 
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Table 8.17 Perception of costs and benefits of participating in EAC, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL 
Ranchillo 
INDICATORS CAL RANCHILLO CAL LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
Not true 
% 
True 
% 
Not true 
% 
True Not true 
% 
True 
% 
Not true 
% 
True 
% 
Benefits: Sptfll lililB 
Improved household income 23.1 46.2 45 25 20 53.3 42.9 28.6 
Improved yield and production 23.1 46.2 60 30 20 60 57.1 33.3 
New crops and livestock 38.5 53.8 75 15 33.3 33.3 71.4 14.3 
Improved marketing of products 38.5 30.8 65 20 46.7 26.7 61.9 23.8 
Improved prices of products 69.2 23.1 70 20 53.3 13.3 66.7 23.8 
Lowered production costs 61.5 23.1 60 10 33.3 33.3 57.1 9.5 
Farm improvements 23.1 69.2 70 10 26.7 53.3 66.7 14.3 
Improved quality of life for 
family 
23.1 38.5 45 35 33.3 40 42.9 38.1 
Improved quality of life for 
women 
30.8 53.8 45 40 33.3 40 42.9 38.1 
Improved quality of life for youth 38.5 23.1 50 30 33.3 40 47.6 28.6 
Optimistic view of the future 23.1 53.8 50 30 26.7 40 47.6 28.6 
Improved relations with 
government agencies 
46.2 38.5 40 20 20 33.3 38.1 19 
Improved relation with municipal 
gov't 
53.8 23.1 55 20 20 53.3 52.4 23.8 
Improved relations with 
neighbors 
30.8 61.5 55 30 13.3 66.7 52.4 33.3 
Doing better as small farmers 30.8 61.5 50 25 33.8 40 47.6 28.6 
Costs: 
Incurring debts 15.4 61.5 60 15 20 •0 57.1 19 
Membership fees 15.4 69.2 55 20 26.7 53.3 52.4 23.8 
Greater risks in agriculture 38.5 23.7 70 10 26.7 20 71.4 9.5 
Loss of time in meetings 15.4 38.5 55 10 33.3 26.7 52.4 14.3 
Share of product prices taken by 
organization 
7.7 76.9 70 5 20 66.7 71.4 4.8 
Worsened relationships with 
neighbors 
76.9 7.7 80 0 60 20 78.8 3 
Some take advantage of the rest 7.7 61.5 40 35.5 33.3 53.3 42.9 33.3 
Less trust in the future 53.8 23.1 50 25.5 20 46.7 52.4 23.8 
Note: The difference between 100% and the sum of 'true' and 'not true' answers, is due to response of "More or less" and no 
response 
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Social norms that foster cooperation 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the literature on social capital highlights two important social norms that 
facilitate cooperation and collective action: trust and reciprocity. 
When asked whether the CALs tend to benefit a minority or majority of members, about 50% of the 
farmers in all the groups answered that they benefit a few or none. Surprisingly, the CAL Lo Ovalle 
members have a more optimistic view of how widespread these benefits are (Table 8.18). 
When asked about trust and reciprocity, very sizable majorities (around 70 to 80%) in all groups 
thought that one should not trust most people, and that most individuals only care about themselves, 
rather than being concerned for others. Again, the Lo Ovalle members were more optimistic about the 
likely behavior of other individuals (Table 8.18). 
A majority of the EAC members, to a much greater extent than non-members, thought that some of 
their partners would take advantage of others, given the opportunity. This perspective might be 
expected in the case of CAL Lo Ovalle, but is surprising in the case of CAL Ranchillo, with its long 
history of collective action (Table 8.18). Apparently, within the CAL Ranchillo group there has been 
some tension between some of the members; however, according to several of the people interviewed, 
this has been going on for a long time and "it does not affect us, because we know we have to be frank 
and open in our discussion, we try to reach consensus, and if we can % then we vote and we accept the 
decisions " (CAL Ranchillo member). 
The somewhat greater degree of trust amongst the CAL Lo Ovalle members recorded in the survey 
was confirmed in the meetings with members of both CAL. The members of CAL Lo Ovalle 
repeatedly emphasized their great trust in the President-Administrator of their organization. In fact, 
during the individual interviews prior to the meeting, all the CAL Lo Ovalle members spontaneously 
gave the same explanation when asked why they did not meet frequently or why was they were not 
more involved in the management of the CAL: "The Administrator is always there and he is perfectly 
well informed... He is a very honest person... Whenever he needs us, he calls us and we meet... He is a 
member just like any of us". Even the Administrator's nickname, 'Uncle Pedro', reflects this high 
degree of trust. 
The members of CAL Ranchillo take a different approach. They demand to be informed, review all 
major issues together, are informed in detail each month about costs and income, regularly monitor the 
quality of milk supplied by each member, etc. 
What I find, then, is that trust is operating in CAL Lo Ovalle as a form of perverse social capital: it 
leads to complacency, replaces monitoring rules, and it conveniently justifies the members' reliance on 
the efforts of a single individual. On the other hand, in CAL Ranchillo we see that a lower degree of 
trust, probably due to personal differences among the dominating personalities in the group, has 
resulted in strong monitoring and clear rales that are enforced when necessary. As one member of the 
group put it during an individual interview when explicitly asked if he trusted his fellow members 
"We do not need to have trust, because we all know what is going on, and each one knows the 
consequences of his actions ". 
Networks 
An EAC operates in the context of a network of formal market and non-market exchanges. In fact, 
EACs can be said to be co-produced (Evans, 1996) through the interaction of a set of private and 
public agents. The birth and performance of these two CAL can be explained by the interaction of 
favorable ideas, trends and/or actions by markets, governments, intermediate organizations (such as 
NGOs), rural communities and individual farms and households (Table 8.19). 
The high milk prices (pull factor) and the sanitary restrictions to vegetable production (push factor), 
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Table 8.18 Trust and reciprocity, CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo 
QUESTION CAL RANCHILLO CAL LO OVALLE 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
Ease of organizing with 
neighbors, compared to 10 
years ago 
More 
difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
More 
difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
More 
difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
More 
difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
7.7 76.9 30 50 13.3 46.7 28.6 52.4 
Household's degree of 
participation in organizations 
compared to neighbors 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
30.8 23.1 45 20 26.7 20 42.9 23.8 
Community and fanners' 
organizations are useful 
Never or 
almost 
never 
% 
Almost 
always or 
always 
% 
Never or 
almost 
never 
% 
Almost 
always or 
always 
% 
Never or 
almost 
never 
% 
Almost 
always or 
always 
% 
Never or 
almost 
never 
% 
Almost 
always or 
always 
% 
15.4 76.9 5 75 20 80 19 76.2 
For you and your family, 
participation in organizations 
is... 
Waste of 
time 
% 
Beneficial 
% 
Waste of 
time 
% 
Beneficial 
% 
Waste of 
time 
% 
Beneficial 
% 
Waste of 
time 
% 
Beneficial 
% 
15.4 53.8 10 80 13.3 66.7 9.5 81 
Fanners' and community 
organizations benefit... 
Only a 
few or 
none 
% 
The 
majority 
% 
Only a 
few or 
none 
% 
The 
majority 
% 
Only a 
few or 
none 
% 
The 
majority 
% 
Only a 
few or 
none 
% 
The 
majority 
% 
46.2 46.2 55 45 40 60 52.4 47.6 
Can you trust most people? 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
61.5 30.8 75 25 46.7 46.7 76.2 23.8 
Most people... 
Only care 
for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
Only care 
for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
Only care 
for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
Only care 
for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
76.9 23.1 80 20 46.7 26.7 81 19 
Most people... 
Take 
advantage 
of others 
% 
Try to be 
fair 
% 
Take 
advantage 
of others 
% 
Try to be 
fair 
% 
Take 
advantage 
of others 
% 
Try to be 
fair 
% 
Take 
advantage 
of others 
% 
Try to be 
fair 
% 
38.5 46.2 65 30 46.7 40 61.9 33.3 
Has your situation as small 
farmers compared to 10 years 
ago... 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
23.1 53.9 35 60 53.4 26.7 33.4 57.2 
In the next 10 years, will your 
situation as small fanners... 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
Worsen 
% 
improve 
% 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
7.7 53.8 25 50 13.3 40 23.8 47.6 
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Table 8.19 Networks in the formation and performance of CAL Lo Ovalle and CAL Ranchillo 
AGENT CAL RANCHILLO CAL LO OVALLE 
Government INDAP creates incentive with 'Microregional Development' programs that broke away from the 
traditional objective of supporting increased production and yields and emphasized market-
orientation and diversification of small-scale agriculture. The promotion of EACs was a key 
objective of such policies. INDAP also had the necessary instruments to provide technical and 
financial support to these projects. Maria Pinto's Municipal Government led by a reformist mayor 
whose political support base included small -farmers, created political opportunity. Health 
authorities restricted vegetable production in the Maria Pinto area due to a cholera outbreak, thus 
creating a sense of greater urgency for the diversification of production. 
Intermediate agents The NGO INPROA, the private firm Alfa Laval, University of Chile and UFOCO, acting at 
different times, provided political leadership (in the sense of questioning the status quo and 
presenting alternatives), organizational models (based on the experience of the CAL in the south 
of the country, in turn 'imported* into Chile by a university in the mid-1980s), technical and 
organizational expertise, resources (e.g. equipment donated by Alfa Laval for an initial 
demonstration CAL), and access to networks (initially to other farmers' groups in the region that 
were also working with INPROA, government agencies, dairy firms, etc.) 
Markets In the mid-1990s increased real income in Chile heightened demand for dairy products and led to 
a shortfall in supply, resulting in very high farm-gate prices for milk, as well as in strong 
competition among major firms to increase their share of milk supply. This made cooling tanks 
an attractive technology from the point of view of the large dairy industry firms, because that 
reduced the mobility of suppliers from one firm to the next. At the same time, due to health and 
sanitary constraints, the market for vegetables from the Maria Pinto area was particularly poor. 
Community Ranchillo had a long tradition of community-
based collective action, often for non-economic 
objectives (e.g., building a local soccer 
stadium). There was a group of farmers already 
involved in collective action with economic 
objectives. All members are neighbors in the 
same small village, with families who had 
fought together during the agrarian reform. A 
fairly homogeneous group. 
Future members of the CAL did not even know 
each other well before being called together to 
form a CAL. A very heterogeneous group (age, 
income, residence...). 
Individual farmers Forward-looking, better educated, younger and 
innovative farmers, who had already 
implemented changes in their farming systems. 
Traditional farmers, several of whom had major 
sources of income other than milk production. 
created market incentives for changing the status quo. Government (INDAP and the municipal 
government) also contributed to these incentives by designing policies that: 
(1) created the political opportunity for small farmers to act collectively, by making this an explicit 
public objective and by implying that groups who became organized would get preferential access 
to assets such as credit, technical assistance and other subsidies (in the case of farmers), and 
contracts (in the case of the NGO); and, 
(2) channeled resources which lowered the costs to farmers and intermediate agents for acting 
collectively. 
Intermediate agents (the NGO INPROA and the private firm Alfa Laval, and later the University of 
Chile and UFOCO) provided: 
(1) political leadership, by showing how farmers could actually challenge the status quo represented 
by their dependence on a disappearing vegetable market and on the tarreros; 
(2) models of organization, by bringing the experience of the more advanced southern CAL to Maria 
Pinto; 
(3) knowledge and technical expertise, in the form of advice given to the farmers by Alfa Laval for 
designing the first demonstration CAL; 
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(4) resources, in the form of donations of equipment for the CAL; 
(5) access to networks, since it was the extensionist from INPROA who provided the link with the 
municipal government, INDAP, FOSIS and the regional government, all of whom contributed 
political support and resources to get the CAL started. 
All of these factors were present in both case studies. The main difference between Lo Ovalle and 
Ranchillo is that the latter had a functional social group with a well-established history of collective 
action, both in the economic and non-economic domains. How much of this was due to the better 
educational levels of the Ranchillo members' households, and how much they achieved this better 
education because of the local progressive environment, is a chicken-and-egg question. 
In the interviews and workshops with the CAL Ranchillo members and several outside informants 
familiar with the experience, it soon became apparent that the outcome of that long history of 
collective action was more than just a new soccer field or brand new equipment for harvesting and 
bailing hay. It was also a catalytic community group, i.e. a set of individuals who could work 
collectively guided by explicit and implicit rules that emerged as very important byproducts of fheir 
previous collective activities. I return to this system of rules below. 
There is no such functional group in the history of CAL Lo Ovalle. In fact, at the beginning there was 
almost no group at all, but rather an artificial and perhaps quite accidental collection of individuals 
who shared little more than a common interest and a common set of incentives. The group in this case 
is replaced by an energetic individual. 
Systems of rules 
The rules guiding the conduct and action of the EAC members can be described according to the 
conceptual framework proposed by Elinor Ostrom (1990). In Chapter 2, Section 2.5,1 have discussed 
in detail how these systems of rules condition the performance and sustainability of EACs. Table 8.20 
summarizes much of the information collected through the individual interviews and group meetings. 
It is quite evident that the institutional performance of these two groups is conditioned by the way in 
which the organization was formed. CAL Ranchillo is an example of 'an established group starting a 
new project', as opposed to CAL Lo Ovalle, which is 'a group established to meet the needs of a pre-
existing project'. From the interviews and workshop with CAL Lo Ovalle members, it seems that the 
main factor holding this group together is their debt with INDAP. In the case of CAL Ranchillo, the 
individuals share a vision for a long-term development project, and they see this CAL as one step in 
that direction. 
My aim, however, is to explain how these different systems of rules affect the CALs' economic 
performance, as well as their impact on their members' households' income. 
CAL Ranchillo's operation is characterized by three important facts: 
(1) Most of the milk it markets (68% in December 1998) is produced by its own members. 
(2) The average productivity of its members is 216% higher than the non-members'. In fact, the 
interviews and workshops revealed that members' productivity has increased over the past three 
years, whilst non-members' productivity has remained constant and may even be decreasing as 
they drop some technologies as milk prices fall. 
(3) The rules guiding the calculation of service fees for members and non-members ensure that 
members always receive a higher net price per liter than the net price paid to non-member 
suppliers. 
The situation in CAL Lo Ovalle is quite different: 
(1) The total contribution of members to the amount of milk processed and marketed by the CAL has 
steadily decreased from 79% in December 1995, to 59% in December 1998. In fact, during the 
winter of 1998, most milk was supplied by non-members. 
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Table 8.20 Rules of CAL Rancbillo and CAL Lo Ovalle (based on Ostrom, 1990) 
RULES CAL RANCHILLO CAL LO OVALLE 
Clearly defined 
boundaries 
Membership is legally defined in the 
organization's bylaws. All members are active. 
Rules governing fees and charges favor 
members over non-members. 
Membership is legally defined in the 
organization's bylaws. Only a fraction of the 
members is active. The organization is highly 
and increasingly dependent on non-member 
suppliers of milk. Rules governing fees and 
prices do not favor members over non-members: 
non-members get the same services, at the same 
cost, and without having to take any of the risks 
involved in collective action. 
Low cost systems for 
monitoring 
compliance 
Careful and permanent monitoring of the quality 
of milk supplied by each individual member. 
Monthly meetings in which members discuss 
different technical and administrative topics, 
review incomes and costs, plan new projects, or 
discuss the position of the CAL vis-a-vis 
external agents such as UFOCO or INDAP. 
External accountant keeps records and prepares 
monthly reports that are posted on a bulletin 
board outside the CAL. 
Sporadic meetings ("whenever the 
Administrator needs to, we meet... since he sees 
us each day, he can also inform us of important 
things"). Main meetings are when the buyer 
wants to discuss the price of milk. They monitor 
quality of milk only in response to serious 
complaints from buyers. Detailed information 
about costs, income, quality control is known 
only by the Administrator, who keeps detailed 
records in a notebook. ("The Administrator is 
always here so he knows... since he is also a 
member, we would sink together if anything goes 
wrong ") 
Congruence between 
appropriation and 
provision rules, and 
market conditions 
Clear rules guide payment for services received 
from the CAL (fee per liter of milk processed 
and sold) and for paying the loans that financed 
the investment (fixed fee per member). 
Members and non-members are charged the 
same fee for the services provided by the CAL 
and the technical assistance provided by 
UFOCO, on a per liter basis. Members are 
charged an additional fee to cover the start-up 
loan. The gross price paid to members is slightly 
higher than that paid to non-members. As a 
result, the net price per liter received by 
members is 90% of the gross price, while non-
members receive 85%. 
Rules that establish fees and charges favor non-
members over members. The CAL pays the 
same gross price to members and non-members, 
but charges widely different fees for the services 
provided by the CAL and by UFOCO (technical 
assistance). In addition, members must pay 
extraordinary fees to pay back the loan that 
financed the CAL's building and equipment. As 
a result, both members and non-members end up 
with a net price that is about 86% of the gross 
price. 
Graduated sanctions 
for non-compliance 
with rules 
Fines are levied for not participating in monthly 
meetings. First time offenders get a warning. At 
the second offence a fine ($15) is automatically 
discounted from the milk payments. System of 
fines for diluting milk supplied to the CAL. The 
fine increases with repeated offences ($30 the 
first time, $150 the second time, and the third 
time the person is expelled from the CAL). Only 
once have they had this problem; the fine was 
applied and the subject was intensively 
discussed in several meetings. 
The group as a whole pays the costs when milk 
has become contaminated in the common 
cooling tank due to actions by individual 
members. As a result, they lost their buyer once. 
Some members have not paid the extraordinary 
fees to repay the loans, and no sanctions have 
been enforced. ("This is a small group, and if 
we take measures against one member, they 
would leave, and in the end we could not 
survive "). 
Participation of 
members in defining 
and changing rules 
It took two years for the original group to 
discuss forming a CAL, in particular how to 
finance the CAL, risks of taking out a loan for 
the initial investment and how it would be paid, 
type of building and equipment that would be 
most convenient and most efficient, what to do 
with the afternoon milking controlled by the 
women but needed to make the enterprise 
profitable (the women refused to let go of this 
resource, until the group as a whole was able to 
start other projects controlled by them, like 
flowers and strawberry production). When the 
The bylaws were given to the group by INDAP 
and were never discussed. Several members say 
they have never read them. Rules change 
repeatedly over time. "We do not have rules; we 
solve each problem as they come"; "The only 
rule we have is to pay our loan " (conclusions of 
meeting with members). Decision-making is 
basically done by the President-Administrator, 
who in turn relies on UFOCO staff. "He is one 
of us, he is here all the time, and if we sink we 
sink together". The members explain that this is 
fine since that is why they are paying an 
134 Chapter Eight 
RULES CAT, RANCHTLLO CAL LO OVALLE 
falling price of milk forced them to raise the 
service fee, they opted to start new income-
generating activities (sales of agricultural and 
veterinary supplies). According to their bylaws, 
decisions are taken by majority vote. In practice, 
"all important things are usually defined by 
consensus, but a few times we have had to vote". 
administrator, to make decisions, although they 
do expect him to consult with them "when 
necessary" 
Low cost mechanisms 
for solving conflicts 
Problems are discussed in monthly or, if 
necessary, extraordinary meetings. 
UFOCO managers and staff make all the 
important decisions and even solve many day-to-
day problems, on the request of the 
Administrator. Conflicts have ended with 
dissenting members or suppliers leaving the 
CAL. 
External authorities 
respect the right of 
members to establish 
their own rules 
Members maintain almost complete autonomy 
from UFOCO in their decision-making. In feet, 
they compete against UFOCO in their new 
business venture (agricultural and veterinary 
supplies). This group held prolonged 
negotiations with INDAP before deciding to 
form a CAL. They imposed their will in terms of 
the type of building structure and equipment 
needed, and today the other five CAL in the area 
recognize these as much more appropriate than 
those favored by INDAP. This resulted in lower 
start-up costs and a smaller loan. INDAP 
provided ready-to-use bylaws prepared by an 
external lawyer. Members took some articles, 
but changed many and added some. 
INDAP took all the decisions during the 
formation of the CAL. Almost total dependence 
on UFOCO even for minor day-to-day problems. 
When asked to define their relationship with 
INDAP, the group supports the description 
provided by one of the members: "INDAP is our 
father". 
(2) The average amount of milk supplied by the members has remained constant for four years. This 
is likely to be an indication that the productivity at the farm level has not changed over time. 
(3) The service fee charged to the non-members has always been between two to three times higher 
than the members' fee. 
Thus in the case of CAL Ranchillo, the system of rules protects the interests of those who are most 
important to the survival and performance of the CAL itself: its members, who provide most of the 
milk that the CAL processes and markets. As the system of rules provides clear incentives for the 
members, their contribution over time has increased, and thus the system reinforces itself. 
In the case of CAL Lo Ovalle, the situation is quite the opposite. The rules discriminate against those 
who are most important to the performance and survival of the CAL: the non-member suppliers. This 
has two effects: on the one hand, the members free-ride, and thus have little incentive to improve their 
productivity. On the other, the non-members do not profit to the extent they should, and thus have a 
strong incentive to look elsewhere. 
In 1998 and 1999, these two CALs were threatened by a very pronounced drop in the market price of 
milk. This presented them with a dilemma: if they did not raise their fees for each liter of milk, they 
would not be able to afford to operate the cooling tanks or to offer marketing services. But if they 
raised the fee, they would compound the pressures already facing members due to declining prices. In 
other words, there was a stark contradiction between the interests of the CAL itself, and those of its 
members as individual milk producers. 
CAL Ranchillo tackled this situation through three measures: (a) launching new business ventures 
(sales of agricultural and veterinary supplies); (b) reviewing new technology to help increase 
members' milk productivity, either by increasing yields and/or reducing costs, and; (c) looking for 
new non-member suppliers to increase the amount of milk processed and marketed. All of these 
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decisions made sense given the signals they were receiving from the market. According to the 
manager of CAL Ranchillo, without taking these steps they would have had to increase the service fee 
charged per liter of milk by 50%. 
CAL Lo Ovalle, on the contrary, responded to this challenge by again raising the fees for non-member 
suppliers of milk. In doing so, the members were effectively saying "let the non-members pay the 
cost of the new market trends, and we will free-ride as we have been doing until now". In a meeting 
with CAL Lo Ovalle members, we made the following calculations using records for February 1999: 
non-members contributed 46% of all the milk processed and sold that month, but their service fees 
paid 67% of the CAL's total monthly costs. Whilst CAL Lo Ovalle's non-member suppliers could 
probably absorb this fee when prices were high, they could not continue to do so when the market fell. 
At this point CAL Lo Ovalle's two largest suppliers left the organization and started selling their milk 
to CAL Ranchillo. 
CAL Lo Ovalle's inability to enforce its own rules governing the quality of milk also caused them to 
lose their original buyer. This had a major effect since this person was paying the highest prices in the 
area ($0.23/lt compared with an average of $0.20/lt in 1997). Today CAL Lo Ovalle is left with a 
buyer who is facing serious economic problems himself, and in fact owes the CAL a substantial 
amount of money for past milk purchases. 
The combined effect of these two problems (loss of suppliers and loss of buyer) is the major cause of 
the CAL's poor operational performance. 
Another important example of how institutional performance affects economic performance, is the 
size of each CAL's debt (and the financial costs). During the early design of each CAL's buildings and 
equipment, CAL Lo Ovalle (whose members at that time barely knew each other) accepted INDAP's 
recommendation, influenced by the University of Chile's School of Animal and Veterinary Sciences, 
that they needed a large cooling tank. "This is what Alfa Laval said, and we did as told... it was a 
closed package". Today, at best, CAL Lo Ovalle is only capable of using 25% of the capacity of this 
large tank, but of course they still have to pay back 100% of the financial cost of their investment. 
CAL Ranchillo had the internal strength to resist pressures for two years from INDAP and the 
University of Chile to get the CAL up and running. They observed the design flaws of the older CAL, 
and members argued among themselves about the wisdom of taking out a loan, and how it could be 
repaid through milk fees. As a result, they negotiated a cooling tank that was 20% smaller than the one 
purchased by CAL Lo Ovalle, and also altered the building design to one which was cheaper, more 
functional and efficient. 
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CHAPTER 9. MILK COLLECTION CENTERS IN THE SOUTH 
In this chapter I describe four more EACs which own and operate Milk Collection Centers (CALs). 
These differ from the two analyzed in the previous chapter in that they work directly with the large 
dairy industries, rather than small independent cheese producers. The four CALs discussed in this 
chapter are located in Region X, in the southern part of Chile, about 1000 km from the capital city, 
Santiago. 
9.1 The context 
Region X is Chile's most important dairy region, producing two-thirds of the dairy industry's milk in 
the year 2000. The region's agroecological advantage lies in its climate and pasture; while the national 
average for head of cattle per hectare is 0.7, in Region X dairy farms have an average of 1.2 
heads/hectare. 
Region X has many small dairy farms, with 77% of all farms producing less than 50,000 It per year. 
This contrasts with the Metropolitan Region (where CALs Ranchillo and Lo Ovalle are located), 
where only 14% of the dairy farms produce less than 50,000 lt/year. Region X's small farms support 
an average of around 25 head of cattle, and yields per cow of around 1,000 It, four to six times lower 
than the yields of larger farms with 100 or more cows. 
It is estimated that nationally 38% of the small milk producers (i.e., those that produce less than 
100,000 lt/year) are associated with CALs, and that these organizations produce around 65% of the 
milk supplied by small farmers to the dairy industry, or about 9% of the total national milk production 
(Universidad Austral, 1999). 
The dairy industry is undergoing rapid and deep changes in the following areas3 9: 
• Demand and production: Due to the growth in the population's real per capita income, consumer 
demand for dairy products grew annually by almost 7% between 1986 and 1998. In the 10 years to 
1998, milk production in Chile doubled. Production is increasing in Region X by 55 million 
liters/year, as compared to 12 million liters/year or less in the other regions. Today, demand and 
supply are more or less in balance (IFCN, 2000). 
• Prices: As supply has grown faster than apparent demand, average prices dropped sharply from a 
high of around $ 0.30/lt in 1989, to a low in 1998 of $ 0.20/lt. With these prices, many small 
farmers claim that their production costs are actually higher than the market price of their milk. 
These prices are the 'basic price', supplemented by a number of important bonuses: for higher 
production during the winter months, fat and protein content, total annual volume, cooling milk on 
the farm, and sanitary quality. These bonuses are so important that a large producer who meets the 
highest standards can easily expect a final price 90% higher than the basic price, while the final 
price received by many small farmers can be as low as only 5% to 10% above the basic price. In 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, these bonuses aimed primarily at increasing milk production. 
Many CALs were created precisely to take advantage of the premium price being paid to large 
suppliers: by delivering their milk together and thus appearing before the dairy industry as a single 
supplier, a large number of very small producers could actually capture the higher price paid to 
larger farmers. However, since the mid-1990s the emphasis has clearly shifted to improving milk 
quality and seasonal stability of production. 
This section is based of official statistics provided by the Office of Agricultural Studies and Policies (ODEPA) of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, as well as on information kindly provided by Mr. Victor Esnaola, also of ODEPA. Most of this 
information is available online at http://www.odepa.gob.cl 
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• Yields: Due to the large number of farms producing milk for household use and informal markets, 
average yields in Chile are low. Annual production per cow ranges between 1,200 It for small 
producers, to 6,500 It for large farms. Most observers agree that yields have tended to increase 
significantly over the past decade, due mainly to the growing importance of improved and seeded 
pastures as opposed to natural pastures; the area under the former increased by 20% in the eight 
years leading to 1997. 
• Seasonal fluctuations in production: In order to stabilize production throughout the year, the milk 
industry has paid significant bonuses to farmers who can improve the ratio of winter to spring 
production. The result of these bonuses has been a decrease in production in the peak spring 
month (December, in the southern hemisphere) by 20%, with an increase in the lowest winter 
month (July) of 27%, thus leading to a more stable supply of milk throughout the year. To 
stabilize production, a diary farmer has to make substantial investments to improve feed supply 
during the winter months, and also to improve the genetic quality of his or her herd. Stabilizing 
production is seen by most small farmers as a very difficult objective to achieve. 
• Number of milk producers: There are around 13,500 milk producers in Chile, of which 82% 
produce less than 100,000 It per year. The number of producers who supply milk to the dairy 
industry has decreased significantly over the past five years, in particular among the small 
producer group, which has lost at least 25% of its members (Universidad Austral, 1999). 
• Herd size: Given that many of the bonuses are directly or indirectly linked to scale of production, 
there has been a significant increase in the average size of dairy herds. In 1997, the average herd 
size nationally was 25 head of cattle per farm, and for Region X it was 35. The annual rate of 
growth of herd size between 1990 and 1997 was 5% nationally. With less than 30 head of cattle, a 
small farmer in Region X is likely to produce less than 50,000 It of milk per year. 
• Markets: The medium and large dairy firms buy and process 75% of all milk produced in the 
country, most of the rest going to the informal market. The share of total milk production 
processed by the dairy industry is increasing at a rate of about 1.5% per year. Although Chile is a 
net importer of milk and dairy products, increased production and quality have allowed the 
country to start exporting certain kinds of dairy products (mainly dry milk) to other Latin 
American countries; exports have grown by more than 25% per year. 
• Market concentration: The milk market in Chile is highly and increasingly concentrated. 
According to Vargas and Foster (2000), in 1998 the largest dairy firm controlled 28% of the 
market, while the largest four firms together had a market share of 80%. Six years earlier, the top 
four firms controlled 'only' 62% of the market. 
In summary, CALs in Region X are operating in a rapidly changing and demanding context, where the 
viability of small-scale milk production is being put to the test by the market trends described above. 
Table 9.1 shows the evolution of some key statistics for the CALs in Region X and nationally40. The 
most important trends are: 
• CALs in Region X have always been larger than those in other regions, both in terms of number of 
suppliers and volume of milk processed; 
• there was a period of CAL expansion until 1997, followed by a decrease after the price of milk 
started dropping and the standards of the industry became more stringent; 
• after 1997, many CALs outside Region X were unable to sustain themselves and had to close 
down or merge with other CALs, but CALs in Region X did not decrease in number; 
• after prices started to drop and until 1999, the number of suppliers per CAL dropped significantly 
(by 30% nationally and in Region X), meaning that a large number of small farmers were unable 
Personal communication, Mr. Carlos Cristi and Mr. Juan Burrows, both of INDAP, April, 2001. 
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to continue producing milk for the formal market; 
• as a consequence of the fall in the number of suppliers (and perhaps also in the total production 
per supplier), the volume of milk processed by the CALs also dropped between 1997 and 1999, by 
about 30% nationally and by 40% in Region X; 
• however, after prices improved in the year 2000, the number of suppliers and the total volume of 
milk processed recovered, although the peak levels of 1997 have still not been fully regained. 
Table 9.1 Evolution of CALs, suppliers and output 
Year National Region X 
No. of 
CALs 
No. of 
CAL 
suppliers 
Liters of 
milk 
processed 
xlO6 
Supplier 
per CAL 
Liters of 
milk 
processed 
per CAL 
xlO 3 
No. of 
CALs 
No. of 
CAL 
suppliers 
Liters of 
milk 
processed 
x l 0 d 
Supplier 
per CAL 
Liters of 
milk 
processed 
per CAL 
xlO 3 
2000 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 68 4588 59 67 868 
1999 135 4736 74 35 548 69 3797 48 55 696 
1998 154 5932 104 39 675 70 4440 75 63 1071 
1997 137 6776 106 50 774 69 5278 82 77 1188 
1994 84 5000 98 60 1167 51 3810 42 75 824 
Until 1998 or so, the CALs' main objective was to increase total production, as the industry was 
paying premium prices for volume. By 1997-98 the industry started signaling that this period was 
coming to an end. This was because supply had caught up with demand, and favorable exchange rates 
were making it more and more convenient for the industry to import milk instead of buying it 
domestically. The industry now began to concentrate on improving milk quality and stabilizing year-
round production. Despite having advance warning, most CALs did not react to these signals until the 
industry actually changed its pricing structures to reflect its new priorities.By early 1999, it became 
apparent that most CALs in Region X were not adjusting rapidly enough to the new market conditions, 
and that this was a major threat to their survival. INDAP in Region X launched a special Program to 
Improve the Sanitary Quality of Milk in Milk Collection Centers. The plan included a number of 
measures at the farm and CAL levels, all designed to help small farmers and their organizations adapt 
to the new market conditions. These included on-farm investments to improve milking shed hygiene, 
intensive monitoring of the performance of each CAL, and linking subsidized payments to the private 
advisory firms who work with the CALs to the performance of the organizations they work with. 
According to Jofre and Monje (2001), 4 1 after 18 months this special program had substantially 
improved the quality of milk produced by many of the CALs. In July-August 1999, only 32% of CALs 
were achieving the top standard of the indicator measuring bacterial counts, while by the end of2000, 
56% were doing so. By this time the average bacterial count for all CALs in Region X had decreased 
by 84%. The second key indicator of milk quality is somatic cell counts. In 1999 only 28% of CALs 
achieved the top industry standard for this indicator; this had increased to 73% by the end of the year 
2000. The average somatic cell count for all CALs in Region X decreased by 32% in the 18-month 
period analyzed by Jofre and Monje. These major improvements mean that many more small farmers 
are now capturing the bonuses linked to the top milk quality standards. 
Who based their reports on official information provided by the dairy industry. 
Cooperating to Compete 139 
9.2 The case studies 
9.2.1 Agricola y Comercial Coyam S.A 
Agricola y Comercial Coyam S.A (CAL Coyam) was founded in 1996 by 44 small farmers from 
Maullin municipality, Region X. 
A brief history 
In 1990 20 small farmers got together to form an APPA (Asociaci6n de Pequenos Productores 
Agropecuarios). These APPAs had been promoted in Region X by INDAP as a sort of first-step 
formal organization, since obtaining legal recognition for an APPA was quick and cheap. 
Using their APPA as an organizational platform, the 20 members began to collect their milk and sell it 
to Nestle. This milk was not pre-cooled, and was delivered to a collection point in individual milk 
bins by each farmer. Soon, the farmers started to feel that Nestle was not being fair in its deals: 
according to them, with certain regularity Nestle would acknowledge receiving less milk than the 
amount the farmers claimed, and, more importantly, a significant share of the milk would go off since 
it had not been pre-cooled, the truck was not refrigerated, and the Nestle plant was a long way from 
the farms. An additional complication was that the APPA could not legally engage in for-profit or 
commercial activities. Thus, each farmer had to invoice Nestle individually. 
By 1994, the 20 APPA members recognized that they needed to change the way things were going. 
INDAP had told them about the Milk Collection Centers (CALs), and they thought that this type of 
organization would serve their purposes very well. As they were forming a new CAL, the dairy 
industry's price policies began to favor higher production and supply volumes. The farmers realized 
that to capture these price incentives, and also to justify the investment in a CAL, they needed to invite 
other local farmers to join. Around 20 or so new members joined, many of whom were very small 
farmers with only a handful of cattle each, who produced milk in the spring and summer months but 
not during the winter. As we will see later, although this decision made sense given the market signals 
at the time, it would create major problems for the CAL in the future. 
A key decision by the original APPA members was to invite not only small farmers to join the new 
CAL, but also their 'large' neighbors (actually medium-size traditional dairy farms, but larger than the 
APPA member farms, and large enough to disqualify them from INDAP programs, although far from 
being large-scale or high-tech enterprises). The idea was that joining forces with them would help the 
CAL achieve two goals: (1) increase the amount of milk and, thus, capture the price premium being 
paid by the diary firms, and, (2) spread the fixed costs of the CAL among a larger number of farmers. 
Only one 'large' farmer accepted the invitation, and he almost immediately took effective leadership 
of the organization, largely due to his capacity to interact with INDAP and the milk processing firms. 
As one of the members put it, "before, they would never receive us when we needed to talk to them, 
but this changed.... the family name is important!" This commercial farmer eventually also became the 
President of the Association of Milk Collection Centers, and as such became an important political 
counterpart of INDAP. 
Sourcing clients 
In March 1995 the Milk Collection Center started operating, still under the legal form of the APPA. 
FOSIS subsidized most of the building costs, INDAP paid for the legal services needed to constitute a 
new organization42, and the farmers received agricultural and veterinary advice, also funded by 
INDAP. 
At first, the farmers tried to negotiate a contract with Nestle, but in the end they preferred to reach an 
The new legal status was obtained in 1996. 
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agreement with SOPROLE, the largest dairy agribusiness in Chile . SOPROLE provided - for free -
the cooling tank and the necessary bins to deliver the milk from each farm to the CAL, while also 
offering to pay a better price for milk than Nestle. In 1999, SOPROLE notified the CAL that it was 
interested in selling the cooling tank to the organization; this was interpreted by some of the farmers I 
interviewed as a sign that the firm was probably thinking of dropping CAL Coyam as a milk supplier. 
Other sources explained that this was a new general policy of most of the milk-processing 
agribusinesses, reflecting the shift from a priority in 'capturing' as many suppliers as possible in the 
early1990s, when there was a gap between supply and demand, to the new emphasis on fewer but 
larger suppliers capable of delivering high quality milk throughout the year. 
SOPROLE was initially more open and helpful than Nestle, but with time this began to change. As 
one farmer put it, "before they (SOPROLE) would listen to us, but not anymore. Now they just go 
ahead and change the rules, and they simply inform us one month in advance, and we just have to 
follow whatever they say ". 
Changing buyers brought new challenges. When the CAL started operating, Nestle immediately 
opened two collection centers at both ends of CAL Coyam's area of influence and began paying 
significantly better prices. However, none of the 44 members left the organization because they were 
told by their advisors that Nestle was closing down some of their collection centers, and they felt that 
if they deserted the CAL, they could well end up with neither the Nestle nor the SOPROLE 
contracts.44 
Since 1996, the organization has started other projects with INDAP's support. Through the National 
Contests for the Modernization of Small Scale Agriculture and BOGAN 4 5 , INDAP has funded 
(through loans and grants) two trucks for milk collection, an artificial insemination laboratory, an 
extension to the CAL's premises, a machine to wash the milk delivery bins, and the infrastructure 
required to comply with environmental regulations prohibiting dumping of liquid industrial residues. 
INDAP also supported the investments to start a new line of business: potato seed production, which, 
however, failed after the second year. According to information provided by the local INDAP office, 
between 1995 and 1999, CAL Coyam received 10 loans for a total of $ 35,000. During the same 
period, the organization also received $ 122,000 in grants, of which 72% was linked to a special 
program to support the restoration of degraded soils on members' farms. 
In one of my meetings with the grassroots members, it was acknowledged that INDAP's strong 
support for this CAL was mainly due to the influence and initiative of its commercial farmer leader. 
An interesting fact is that the CAL Administrator - hired by the organization - did not know how 
much money had been invested or how much they owed to INDAP because of the loans involved in all 
these projects. 
Performance analysis 
The CAL's total production increased rapidly from 462,000 liters in 1995 to 1.2 million liters in 1998 
and 1999. However, total income has not shown the same trend, since the price received by farmers 
dropped from $ 0.2/lt in 1996, to about $ 0.13/lt by the end of 1999. This does not include the $ 
0.016/lt fee charged by the CAL for its services and to help pay the outstanding loans from INDAP; 
this fee represented 8% and 13% of the market price in 1996 and 1999, respectively. While the fee 
generates only just enough income to cover the CAL's operational costs, it is not enough to cover its 
debt repayments. For this reason, the CAL has had to reschedule its payments a number of times, and 
at the time of my field research, it had its credit suspended because it had not been able to meet 
payments. 
At the time of revising this chapter, Nestle and SOPROLE announced a strategic alliance that will give them direct control 
over half of the milk market in Chile. 
4 4 Nestle later closed down one of the collection centers, and turned over the second one to another EAC. 
4 5 BOGAN is an INDAP program that combines grants and loans to support fixed capital investments directly related to 
animal production (milk and/or meat). 
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In addition, most of the CAL members have not registered individually as tax payers; this means that 
the CAL must retain the Value Added Tax (18%), which in November 1999 represented an additional 
loss of $ 0.02/lt 4 6. Including all these factors, the final price that an average CAL member received in 
November 1999 was $ 0.09/lt, equivalent to 44% of the price he or she got four years earlier. In my 
interviews, all the members agreed that with the current prices, there is no incentive to increase milk 
production further. 
The low price being paid in 1999 reflects the market trend, but is sharply aggravated by the failure of 
CAL Coyam and its members to stabilize production year-round and to improve the quality of their 
milk. For example, with SOPROLE's pricing policy, in November 1999 CAL Coyam should have 
received $ 0.19/lt, but in fact lost $ 0.06/lt (31% of the basic price) due to the low quality of its milk 
and the very high differences in production between the spring and the winter seasons. 
Why has the organization been unable to improve its performance in all these years? There are two 
clear reasons: 
Welfare versus profits 
Firstly, around half the total membership comprises very small farmers, known as 'temporeros'.47 
These farmers maintain old and low quality cattle, and lack improved pastures for winter feeding. 
They lack the land and other resources to make the investments required to improve their situation. In 
order to improve the overall winter to spring ratio of milk production, the CAL would have to stop 
receiving the milk of these very small members during the spring and summer months. During the 
interviews, many of the members explained to me that this move was strongly opposed by the 
commercial farmer who leads the organization, despite the fact that many of the members were in 
favor. Several of the larger members also said they were unwilling to exclude the temporeros, since 
these were their friends and neighbors; as one of them put it using a Chilean expression: "we have the 
heart of a grandmother ". 
Thus, a membership policy that made sense in one particular market context has now turned against 
the organization as a whole and, in particular, against the many members who could adjust to the new 
market conditions. This is another example of the permanent tension between seeking results at the 
level of the EAC, and prioritizing the welfare of members as individual farmers. The heterogeneous 
nature of the membership reduces the CAL's options for responding to shirting market signals: if the 
CAL adjusts to meet the new market demands, it will hurt its smaller members; if it does not adjust, it 
will hurt the 'larger' fanners. 
What is surprising is that the commercial farmer who holds the key to a change in CAL policy, 
opposes the alternative that would directly favor him, since he is the largest of all the members. When 
confronted with this discrepancy, some of the members lacked an explanation, while others said that 
their leader was a good man willing to make sacrifices for those who are much poorer. While one 
cannot discard this explanation offhand, the obvious contradiction leaves open the possibility that the 
commercial farmer is deriving other benefits from his participation in this organization, ones that I 
could not identify, aside from the fact that he has become a well-known farmer leader in the region. 
Over-riding market signals 
There is a second reason for the CAL's inability to improve its performance over the years. As I 
explained earlier, the dairy industry's pricing policy combines a basic price and a number of direct, 
transparent and explicit price incentives or bonuses linked to milk quality, seasonality, and so on. 
Farmers who meet the grades and standards of the industry receive a significantly higher price than 
those who don't. INDAP's policy, shared by almost all CALs, is that each organization should transfer 
these market signals to the individual members, as an indispensable move if small-scale milk 
Once a year, after the CAL pays its taxes, the farmers recover most of the VAT they paid on each liter of milk. 
Seasonal producers who produce milk only during the spring and summer months. 
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producers are to remain in the market. To transfer these market signals to the individual members, a 
C A L has to monitor each member's performance against the different pricing variables. This is not 
difficult to do: the C A L knows the amount of milk delivered daily by each farmer, and once or twice a 
month each member's milk is sampled and analyzed for quality. With this information, it would be a 
simple matter for the CAL to calculate the price per liter paid monthly to each member. This is the 
way most CALs work, but not CAL Coyam. 
CAL Coyam's agricultural advisory consultant firm is contracted to receive the information from 
SOPROLE as well as from the individual laboratory analyses, and to calculate the price per liter per 
member. With the backing of the commercial farmer, the consultants' policy is to subtract from the 
price that should be paid to the better performing members, to increase the amount due to those who 
are below average. When I interviewed the advisor, he told me that "if we applied the industry rules, 
some of the members would be receiving less than Chilean $ 0.04/lt, and others would be getting close 
to Chilean $ 0.19/lt or more. Those that receive the lower price and have only one or two cows would 
not survive. We prefer to regulate their money." The advisor also explained that instead of relying on 
prices to reward good farming, they analyzed the results of each individual and visited those who were 
not performing well to explain what technical changes they should introduce to improve things. Part of 
the reason for this, they said, was that they felt that the data provided by SOPROLE was fudged and 
did not reflect the real performance of the farmers; in their view, firms such as SOPROLE are out to 
get the small farmers, to drive them out of business, and they saw that it was their duty as advisors to 
counter that policy by assuring "solidarity among the members of the organization". Finally, the 
advisors told me that this policy was supported by the members, a fact that all the members I 
interviewed strongly denied. 
The results of this policy are very clear. According to a report from the INDAP regional office which 
analyzes the quahty of the milk produced by all the CAL in Region X in July-September 1999, CAL 
Coyam had some of the worst results. In fact, its milk was twice as bad as the average quahty of 64 
CALs in Region X, and around four times worse than that of the other three CALs that I have included 
as case studies 4 8. 
I asked the staff of the local INDAP office what they thought of this practice. They were surprised by 
this information, and told me they did not know this was going on. However, they said that it was not 
up to a government agency to intervene in how a CAL runs its affairs. The head of the local office 
stated: "Our task is to define a policy in favor of these technological changes, and to provide the 
services and resources for farmers and their organizations to be able to adjust to market demands. If 
and how they do it is not an area for government intervention ". 
In meetings without the commercial farmer leader I asked the rest of the CAL board members and a 
group of six grassroots members what they thought about this policy. The board members said they 
were conscious that the price differential between the best- and worse-performing members was never 
greater than around $ 0.01/lt. They knew that this was contributing to very poor results both in terms 
of quality and seasonality. Yet, despite the fact that many members complained in private, the issue 
had never been formally raised in one of the monthly meetings because discussing it was more likely 
to lead to open conflict than to reach a satisfactory agreement. They said that it was the advisory firm 
who defined the issues to be discussed at the monthly meetings, and that "they are the referees". In 
short, the board members are aware of the negative implications of the pricing policy but feel 
powerless to change it or even discuss it openly. 
The grassroots members made additional comments. First, they were fully aware of the differential 
performance of the members, since in the monthly meetings the advisory firm informs them of the 
total results, and then details the information for each member. "The problem is that we took the 
decision that if a member delivered low quality milk for a third time, he or she would be suspendedfor 
at least 15 days... but this rule had never been enforced. We all discuss this during the meetings, but 
The indicators for the other three case studies placed them around two times better than the average for the 64 CALs for 
which I have information. 
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no one dares to say 'let's cut this or that person' because we do not want to have a problem with our 
neighbors... besides, if we cut one person, we lose the $0.016/lt fee and we can't afford this." 
The grassroots members also explained that at first there were no individualized laboratory analyses 
provided, so they decided to pay an average price because they did not know who should be rewarded 
or punished. But, "we also decided to start doing the individual lab analyses... this has been going on 
for many months, but nothing changes ". They also claimed that they have never received detailed 
information about how the individual prices are set for each member, they are only told their final 
monthly price. Not one of the grassroots members I interviewed knew if or by how much his or her 
price had been adjusted. But several of them loudly agreed when one said: "we are making an effort in 
vain ". When pressed on the issue of why they did not force an open discussion of this problem if they 
felt they were being hurt, they finally said that the commercial farmer leader is the one who "cuts the 
cake". They went on to give me a number of concrete examples of when the majority had been in 
favor of X decision and the commercial farmer had said that in that case he would resign and leave the 
organization: "we could not survive without him ". 
9.2.2 Cooperativa Campesina El Arrayan Ltda 
The second CAL in this group of case studies is the Cooperativa Campesina El Arrayan Ltda. (El 
Arrayan Peasant Cooperative Ltd.). It was founded in 1995. It has 74 members, of which about 10 are 
inactive and do not deliver milk; however, there are five milk suppliers who are not members of this 
CAL. 
A brief history 
This group of farmers lives 70 km from the nearest milk processing plant. For many years, a truck 
from the dairy firm would pick up their milk but it took so long to deliver it that much of the milk 
would become sour and lose its value. 
The small farmers in the area had been supported by an NGO linked to the Catholic Church, as well as 
receiving advice from one of the private advisory firms contracted by INDAP. In 1990, the NGO 
invited some of them to attend a workshop organized by the Universidad Austral, a regional university 
mat had played a pioneering role in promoting the formation of Milk Collection Centers. At once, they 
became enthusiastic about the idea and began talking with the dairy firm SOPROLE, in a process that 
extended over three years. 
A core group of five or six persons kept the process going throughout this period. This group invited 
all of the 150 or so small farmers in the area to join, 45 of whom responded favorably. When the talks 
with SOPROLE stalled, only nine farmers remained interested. When an agreement was finally 
reached with SOPROLE, the number again grew until the cooperative reached its present membership 
of 74 small farmers. "The doors were left open for two years after we formed the cooperative, but now 
are closed because we now own many things and it would not be fair for others to come and reap the 
benefits ". Today, if a new member wants to join, he or she must pay a fee of $ 420 and remain a non-
member supplier for three months until the quality of his/her milk can be ascertained. 
The legal process to establish a business was started simultaneously with the negotiations with 
SOPROLE. INDAP paid for a lawyer who explained to them the advantages and disadvantages of 
several legal alternatives, until they decided in favor of a cooperative ("because it is easier for a 
person to join or leave, compared to a Limited Liability firm, and it has tax advantages, compared to a 
Corporation"). The cooperative was registered in September 1994, but the Milk Collection Center 
(CAL) began its operations in May 1995. 
The CAL was built with a grant from FOSIS for $ 2,520, plus a loan from INDAP for $ 10,500. 
Although the INDAP loan was scheduled to be paid over four years, they settled it in only half that 
time, with each member contributing $ 158, spread over the two year period. Their cooling tank has 
been lent to them by SOPROLE free of charge. In 1996, after the INDAP loan was paid, they bought 
the land were the CAL was built. 
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Since starting their CAL, the organization has carried out other projects. In 1998, a severe drought 
year, they connected the CAL to the local school's deep water well because the CAL's much smaller 
well had dried up. In 1998 they also built infrastructure to process their liquid residues, so as to 
comply with environmental regulations. That same year they completed the CAL's buildings. The next 
year they built their own deep well, and the organization is now setting up a distribution system to sell 
drinking water to local houses. Also in 1999, they bought a feedmill to process feed for their cattle. 
They also have a small store where they sell veterinary supplies and other goods that are in constant 
demand ( "we have a profit of 6% which is not high, but we do this as a service to the members who 
can save the cost of traveling to town to buy these products "). 
At the start of each season, the members of the cooperative each state the annual loan they will require 
from INDAP. The organization negotiates the loan, but each member is responsible for his or her own 
debt. In the spring of 1999, the organization obtained a loan of $ 42,000 for this purpose. The 
cooperative also negotiates collectively to purchase fertilizers and other agricultural inputs needed by 
the members. While the prices they obtain are not much lower, they do get some important benefits, 
such as free delivery to the CAL and up to three months to pay. 
The organization has also negotiated access to some of LNDAP's programs on behalf of its members. 
For example, in order to improve milk quality the cooperative has obtained grants and loans so that 
76% of the members could have cement floors and clean pressurized water in their milking sheds. 
Another important achievement is that they now exert greater control over the technical advisory 
services provided by a private firm under contract to INDAP. They even fired the old firm due to the 
bad quality of their services. They invited three new firms to present a work plan to the members, who 
voted to select one. At the same meeting, the members elected a commission to supervise and control 
the advisors' work. An annual fee of $ 67 is paid by each member to the advisory firm, the 
proportional amount being discounted monthly from the milk payments. 
These investments have been paid for by cash and in kind contributions from members, as well as 
through additional loans and grants from INDAP and from the municipal government. The 
organization has had a consistent policy of keeping their debts at a low level, and has also ensured that 
members' contributions are set at a level that is acceptable to the poorer households. 
Organizational structure 
The CAL's organizational structure is as defined by law. Since its foundation, the cooperative has held 
three board elections. The original president was replaced at the second election, but was elected again 
the last time. 
Once a year, an external accountant comes to a general meeting to present and explain the 
cooperative's balance sheet and income statement. An elected Accounts Revision Committee liaises 
throughout the year with the external accountant and with the board, and informs the membership 
during their periodic meetings. 
The board meets up to four times per month, and the General Assembly meets every two months, but 
it holds extraordinary meetings to discuss any major decision, such as taking out a loan. Around 45 to 
50 members participate in each membership meeting, and those who do not attend are fined $ 4.2. If a 
board member does not attend the board meetings, the fine is $ 6.3. The fines are always applied and 
paid, with no exceptions. 
The internal bylaws have been adapted over time, according to need and experience. The members I 
interviewed felt the most important rules are those governing the election of the board, the obligation 
to participate in meetings and other activities, and the pricing system that considers the same variables 
as those of the milk industry. The rules are harsh; for example, if a member is caught diluting his/her 
milk, the first time the payment is cut by 50%, and a warning is issued; the second time the member is 
suspended for 10 days (meaning he/she cannot sell milk for that period); the third time the member is 
suspended for life. Most of those who are fined do not come back: "In 1999 two left because of this, 
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but it is better, since they were the ones with the lowest quality." 
Pricing incentives 
When asked about positive and negative price incentives to stabilize production and ensure milk 
quality, the members reply with what has obviously become the organization's slogan: "The 
organization does not reward or punish; each member rewards or punishes him or herself alone". 
The CAL analyses the milk quality for each member, and keeps data on other variables of individual 
performance. Since they do not trust the quality analysis done at SOPROLE's laboratory ("theplant is 
a dictatorship"), they have hired an independent private lab to do a separate test for the cooperative, 
which they use to set the final price each member receives every month. In December 1999, for 
example, the average price was $ 12/lt, but the best-performing member obtained $ 18/lt while some 
got only $ 0.06/lt. The results are printed each month and a copy is delivered to each member, so 
everyone knows who is below or above average in each indicator, and each person has a clear and 
detailed explanation of how his/her monthly prices were calculated. 
This system of individualizing price incentives has allowed the organization to make significant 
progress in overcoming some of the most important technological problems of milk production in 
Chile. In 1996, the CAL had a 6:1 relationship between milk produced in the spring and summer 
months versus winter production, and the ratio had been cut by half in 1999. Milk quality has also 
improved significantly over time, to the point where the different indicators are comparable to those of 
a farmer selected by Nestle as an example to be followed by others (Nestle Chile S.A., 1999). 
Farm level performance constraints 
While progress has been made in adjusting to the industry standards, this has been distributed 
unevenly: in 1999 around 70% of the members had below average performance indicators, judging by 
the average price they received for their milk. The correlation between total production (indicative of 
farm and herd size) and average price is not strong enough 4 9 to conclude that performance is 
predetermined by assets: there is obviously room for improvement for most, if not all, CAL members. 
Despite the progress shown by the CAL as a whole, the low price of milk is hurting this CAL and its 
members, to the point where total milk processed by the CAL has been decreasing steadily since a 
high of 1.23 million liters in 1997, to 916,000 liters in 1999 (the CAL started with 661,460 liters in its 
first full year, 1995). Many farmers stopped selling their afternoon milk production because of the low 
price ("given the price paid by SOPROLE, it is more profitable to use the afternoon milk to raise 
calves and perhaps make a bit of cheese "). 
According to the owner of the advisory firm that works with CAL Arrayan, lower production does not 
only reflect decreasing prices, but also the influence of a severe three-year drought that damaged 
pastures severely, as well as the pressure being put by the organization on members with low quality 
standards to leave the cooperative. 
Due to the lower levels of production, the cooperative had to increase its service fee to its members for 
each liter of milk processed and sold from Chilean $ 0.014/lt in 1995, to Chilean $ 0.021/lt in 
November 1999. Taking into account average milk prices at the time, the fee has increased from 
representing around 7% of the price, to 23%. 
This situation is beginning to create some tension among the members. One of them told me: "This is 
something I don't think is fair. Now that things are not going well, there are many who are not 
delivering the afternoon milk, so there are fewer of us pushing the cart of the cooperative. Once things 
improve, they will come back and continue to benefit. Besides, the organization is also supporting 
those who cut back on the milk delivery, to get loans and subsidies from INDAP... they remain in the 
organization only because it helps them to get loans." 
The correlation coefficient between price and production is 25%. 
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When asked if they have a plan to reverse this situation, the board members readily acknowledge that 
most members have not really tried to increase quality and production, especially during the winter: 
"we made an attempt to introduce artificial insemination to increase winter production, butfew did it, 
in part because they felt they did not have enough feedfor winter feeding". On the other hand, "many 
have not taken the time to register for INDAP's soil fertilization program... if you do not invest in your 
fields, each year you will get less and less". 
Several members I interviewed agreed with the board members that during the good years, when the 
prices were high, most members invested their profits in increasing the size of their herd, but without 
improving their pastures. In fact, an informal survey I conducted of eight members showed that, on 
average, at the start of the year 2000 each of them had 12 head of cattle, compared to only three in 
1990, but the growth in the acreage under improved pastures was much less significant. 
In a meeting with the board they estimated that a comprehensive plan to improve winter milk 
production would require an investment of around $ 126,000, or about $ 1,700 per member. The main 
obstacle is that most members are already in debt to USTDAP, so they do not have more credit. 
I asked local, regional and national INDAP authorities what could be done in this type of situation, 
where an EAC is hampered by constraints at the farm level. They acknowledged that policies which 
support economic organizations emphasized investments at the organizational level. There is a 
disassociation between the instruments which support the EAC and those which support primary 
production. On the other hand, Luis Marambio, former National Director of INDAP, explained that 
this posed a dilemma: "INDAP has a large number of unorganized clients. If we concentrate more 
resources on those who are organized, so that the support to the EAC itself is complemented with 
strong investments in their members 'farms, it would mean that we could attend less farmers." 
The cooperative's private advisor had this to say: "I may preach in favor of specialization, arguing in 
favor of investing in all that which is needed to increase winter production and improving quality. But 
the strategy ofpeasant survival has historically been one of diversification, not of intensification and 
specialization... besides, the dairy industry radically shifted its policy in the past decade, from volume 
to quality, and no one really knows where it will be ten years from now, so I could not promise them 
that the types of investments that I am recommending based on today's signals are the ones that will 
pay off in the future." 
Performance analysis 
Once again we see that in times of difficulty, the ever present tension between the interests of the EAC 
and those of the members, becomes stronger and stronger. Despite the strong commitment and 
discipline of the members and the serious way in which the cooperative runs its affairs, both the 
organization and the individual farmers failed to adopt any of the possible strategies to cope with the 
problem: diversify into new business enterprises or new markets, lower administrative and fixed costs, 
and/or increase primary productivity at the farm level. In the absence of these pro-active changes, the 
organization is now dependent on support from the public sector, as well as on the capacity of its 
members to survive until conditions improve. 
While the members despair about the decreasing prices, all of those I interviewed were unanimous in 
expressing their satisfaction with their organization. The most frequent reason I heard was that "we 
are still selling our milk, while those who are not organized cannot find a buyer." 
9.2.3 Sociedad Agricola y Comercial Chirre Ltda. 
Sociedad Agricola y Comercial Chirre Ltda.(CAL Chirre) was founded in 1997 in the municipality of 
Rio Bueno, although the organization had been operating under a different legal status since 1994. 
This CAL has 46 members, plus an additional eight non-member suppliers. 
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A brief history 
One of INDAP's Technology Transfer Program consultants initially promoted the idea of forming an 
organization of milk producers in this area. CAL Chirre's President of the Board explains: "This 
person knew what was coming, that the diary plants would in the future not receive milk in individual 
bins; besides, this advisor also showed us a big carrot, which was the extra Chilean $ 0.05/lt being 
paid at that time by the dairy firms as an incentive for larger amounts of milk per supplier". Yet, it 
took a lot of work to get the organization going: "we lacked trust in the organizations". Finally, the 
small farmers established an APPA (Association of Small Farmers) with about 30 initial members. 
This operated for three years until they formed the current organization in September 1997. They sell 
their milk to Loncoleche, one of the largest dairy firms in the country. 
The Milk Collection Center was built in 1995, funded by an INDAP loan to be paid off by all the 
members over four years. In 1998 they made several investments to improve and expand their CAL, 
and to add the infrastructure required to comply with the liquid residue disposal regulations. In 1999 
they bought a truck and built a house next to the CAL for the administrator. They have also made a 
considerable investment to buy milk delivery bins, and have improved a road to shorten by 15 km the 
route that the truck has to take to pick up the members' milk. Taking advantage of loans and grants 
made available through INDAP's BOGAN program, they have made improvements to members' 
milking sheds through the acquisition of milking machinery, cement floors, tin roofing and so on. 
Organizational structure 
As with CAL Arrayan, INDAP paid for a legal study to compare the advantages and disadvantages of 
different types of organizations. CAL Chirre chose to be a limited liability firm rather than a 
cooperative because it is too easy for members to leave cooperatives, and since the organization would 
incur debts, they were afraid that a few members would be left to pay the loans: "as a limited liability 
firm, we are all tied together". 
A monthly membership meeting provides members with a detailed report on prices, production, 
quality standards and any other matters of importance. Attendance used to be low until they decided 
that milk payments would be made at the end of these meetings. The board usually meets at least twice 
a month, or more if necessary. All the external stakeholders I interviewed agreed that CAL Chirre's 
board provides excellent leadership. A well-informed INDAP professional, familiar with many CALs, 
explains: "in some CALs, you see that the leadership is provided by the advisor. In other CALs, 
everything rests on one single person. Some CALs do not have any leadership at all and are totally 
dependent on INDAP. But CAL Chirre has a strong team of at least seven members who are deeply 
involved in managing their organization; they are very positive and forward-looking, always with 
clear goals and with good relations with the membership". 
This CAL charges a service fee to members of $ 0.021/lt, including debt repayments: "we started 
charging $ 0.017'/It, but almost immediately saw that this was not enough, so we raised it and have 
kept it constant since then". They have been able to maintain this fee because buying a truck in 1999 
allowed them to lower their fixed monthly costs by 30%. 
However, they have lost their two largest milk suppliers because Loncoleche financed individual 
cooling tanks for them: "one of them we did not mind since he never wanted to accept our rules, but 
the second one has hurt us." 
In 1996 the CAL adopted rules governing milk quality and seasonality of production, but these 
weren't really enforced until 1998 when pressure from the dairy industry increased. In addition to the 
standards required by the industry, they have added their own measures to improve performance more 
quickly. For example, if a member fails to meet the industry sanitary quality standards for two months 
in a row, the CAL doubles the discount in the price of milk on top of the discount applied by their 
buyer Loncoleche. Rules of this sort have been agreed not only for sanitary quality, but also for fat 
content, milk dilution, and so on. A few members have withdrawn from the organization after being 
fined. 
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Performance analysis 
The results of these rules speak for themselves: between 1998 and 1999, the CAL improved the main 
average indicators of milk quality by a factor of two, and improved the fertility and the quality of 188 
hectares of pasture, leading to higher production during the winter months. The board feels that all 
their members have responded very well to this program: "60% are doing very well, and only 10% still 
have quality levels that are not acceptable" (in fact, records kept by the organization show that almost 
one third of the members are below average). 
The board attributes their success to the combination of price incentives and well focused technical 
assistance to those who lag behind. In a meeting with grassroots members, they agreed when one of 
them explained that until the price incentives were enforced, nobody paid much attention to their 
technical advisors' recommendations: "it costs money to do what they say, so unless we stand to lose 
money, it is more comfortable to keep working as we are used to". 
However, the members and the board feel that what they have done is not enough. For example, board 
members say: "We are losing the battle to improve the winter to spring production ratio. So we 
analyzed this and decided several things. First, right now every member has a silo for winter feeding. 
Given that we now have enough feed, we have sent one of our members to receive training in artificial 
insemination at the Universidad Austral ofValdivia. We will shift more cattle to winter production". 
When I asked the grassroots members what they thought of this plan to increase winter production, 
they agreed that it was necessary. However, none of them had any idea of what the change would cost 
them. This lack of detailed knowledge about the economic costs and benefits of different technological 
options was also shared by the private advisors and the INDAP staff whom I interviewed: despite 
being heavily involved in promoting certain practices or discouraging others, none was able to tell me 
the actual costs or expected benefits, for example, of improving milk quality versus seasonal stability 
of production. The head of the local INDAP office explains: "to have access to the market, you need 
quality, that is the key that opens or closes the door. Once you are in, then we should be doing a finely 
detailed analysis of different options, but we are not. We are just reacting to the signals we receive 
from the market, and even that is hard enough, so we do not have a capacity to think ahead." 
In any case, the farmers think that change will be slow: "each of us has only 10 to 12 head of cattle. 
There is no way we can leave half of them for the winter, because we would lose the production of one 
year. So we will go slow, perhaps with two cows per year." 
Despite the achievements of CAL Chirre and its members, the amount of milk received, processed and 
sold by this CAL has decreased by 18% between 1997 and 1999, as the price of milk fell by more than 
20%. The members are disappointed that they have not been able to increase the price of milk as they 
had expected when they started their CAL. But they do not blame the CAL, instead blaming the 
government for signing international trade agreements that let foreign milk into the country: "It is the 
fault of Mercosur", one of them said, "so it is now up to the government to take action to put a stop to 
this situation which is bankrupting all milk producers, not only the small ones". 
However, they still see themselves as doing much better than their non-organized neighbors: "those 
who did not join are really doing bad, they are barely surviving." 
CAL Chirre's members know that their individual monthly income is now lower than before, due to 
the lower price of milk. Yet each month they are informed that the CAL itself is showing a surplus. 
Why don't they lower the fee charged for each liter of milk to increase members' benefits? (I estimate 
that the fee could be lowered by at least 5% without seriously affecting the CAL's finances). When I 
asked this question to the board and grassroots members they unanimously agreed with one person's 
response: "bread for today, hunger for tomorrow!". They clearly see the organization as their main 
support system in a very complex and uncertain environment, and as such they are willing to make 
individual sacrifices to ensure its survival. 
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9.2.4 Agricola Santa Barbara S.A. 
Agricola Santa Barbara S.A. (CAL Santa Barbara) was formed in 1996. It is located in the 
municipality of Puerto Varas, Region X. The organization is the result of a more or less continuous 
process of collective action beginning as early as 1978, when a number of small farmers joined a 
program of on-farm trials and demonstration plots. The first local farmer to join these tests is the 
current President of CAL Santa Barbara. 
A brief history 
In 1984, IN DAP contracted the private consultant firm SERVIAGRO to provide technical assistance 
to farmers in the area under the Technology Transfer Program. The firm, whose work continues today, 
organized the first two groups which included about a third of the current members of CAL Santa 
Barbara. SERVIAGRO and the farmers made rapid progress in improving basic technologies in wheat, 
potato and milk, taking advantage of what they call "the price bonanza of1985-88." The good results 
reinforced the working relationship and the trust between the farmers and their advisors. Today, this 
advisory firm is deeply involved in the organization's strategic planning and decision-making 
processes, to the extent that one of its senior staff members is on the CAL's board (without voting 
rights). 
When in the early 1990s INDAP began to promote the formation of CALs, this group was initially 
reluctant. According to the President of the organization, "we never believed the story that we could 
force the dairy plants to increase prices when all we have are 1 million liters per year... to us that it a 
lot, for them it is nothing." INDAP put pressure on them arguing that a CAL was viable even if they 
only produced 500,000 liters per year. Despite the fact that they were producing 600,000 liters, 
farmers and SERVIAGRO felt this was not enough to sustain a CAL, so for some time they rejected 
INDAP's approaches. 
Their opinion changed when the dairy industry started to tell farmers that unless they could deliver 
pre-cooled milk they would be left out of the market. Towards the end of 1994 they agreed to start a 
CAL and in six months (a record time) they had built the necessary infrastructure, negotiated a 
contract with a dairy firm, and started operations. However, it became obvious that the dairy 
agroindustry's interest in CALs was waning: of the five firms they contacted, only one (Loncoleche) 
was interested in discussing a contract. Also, the dairy firms, included Loncoleche, soon began to raise 
their quahry and seasonality standards, to lower the price of milk, and to transfer the cost of several 
operations to the CALs (e.g., transportation of milk, recording and measurement of individualized 
production and quality levels, emission of a single payment to the CALs as opposed to one check for 
each farmer, and so on). 
To start the CAL, the original group of about 30 farmers realized they would need to expand the 
membership, since the CAL had been projected to work at a 1.5 million liter level. They invited all the 
farmers in the neighborhood, and an additional 40 agreed to join. Loncoleche accepted all 70 
members, on the explicit and formal condition that not a single additional farmer could ever be added 
to the group. Thus, all those who did not join the CAL have been excluded from the formal milk 
market, at least while Loncoleche continues as the dominant buyer in the area. 
Organizational structure 
Since they lacked a legal status, the group initially worked under the umbrella of the local Small 
Farmers' Association. To build the CAL and start operating, INDAP loaned the Association $ 26,300. 
Each of the 70 members had to make a cash contribution of $ 420 to repay that original loan. 
The organization obtained its new legal status in 1996. As a Corporation, Agricola Santa Barbara had 
to issue shares. Each of the 70 members owns four shares which cannot be sold outside the group. 
Given Loncoleche's strict conditions about the number of members, the organization has ruled that if a 
shareholder dies, his or her place has to be taken by only one person; if the surviving family members 
cannot agree among themselves how to manage their four shares, then they have to sell them to the 
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Corporation. 
The members I interviewed agreed with this system of closed membership: "what we have developed 
is a way to understand our work, it has taken us many years to learn, and we have gone through much 
pain... if we start to let in new people, then we will have some speaking in Chinese and others in 
Spanish! Besides, under the old ways of producing milk, we would have welcomed anyone, but today 
we are under strong pressure, and often have to change things from one month to the next... We know 
that in the end only ten percent of the farmers will remain in this business ofproducing milk; what we 
set out to accomplish is that this ten percent includes all of our 70 members., we have already lostfive 
or six, and with the summer prices they are paying this year, some more will leave." 
The corporation is legally required to hold a shareholders meeting only once a year; however, they 
have continued their long tradition of meeting once a month. Failure to attend incurs a fine. The board 
meets as often as necessary, at least once or twice a month, and informally almost every other day or 
so. The board members are elected for a two year period; in the last election, for example, two of them 
where reelected and three were changed. The CAL has a full time manager, who is also a shareholder 
and holds an Agricultural Technician degree. 
From the start, this CAL concentrated on improving milk quality and stabilizing production 
throughout the year. However, their quality levels are still lower than the average of the Loncoleche 
Osorno plant, which is where their milk is delivered. To improve their performance, they have revised 
their internal bylaws each time the dairy industry has adjusted its prices and/or its grades and 
standards. On top of all the discounts applied by Loncoleche when milk does not meet their standards, 
this CAL has voluntarily adopted rules that increase the cost to the farmer of non-compliance (e.g., the 
farmer's price is not only discounted, but he or she is suspended for a number of days from delivering 
his or her milk). Furthermore, the CAL rules that anyone who breaks the same rule three times is 
suspended for life. Already one shareholder has been suspended {"he still is a shareholder and we 
cannot take that away, but the law does not say that we have to buy his milk"). 
This CAL charges one of the lowest milk-processing fees in Region X, only $ 0.011/lt, half of what 
the other CALs included in my study are charging. Farmers see this fee as an indicator of the 
organization's achievements, but in fact it is artificially low, since the manager and the advisors 
recognize that it is not sufficient to cover the costs of running the organization. For example, "the 
salary of the manager is subsidized by INDAP through the FODEMprogram". 
To cover this gap between costs and income the other organizations I studied increased their 
membership fees. However, CAL Santa Barbara has instead started new business enterprises in order 
to make a profit to subsidize the CAL's running costs. One of these initiatives failed (a potato 
marketing scheme), but two yield handsome profits: a 'mini market' and a gasoline station. The mini 
market, for example, has annual sales of around $100,000. As a board member explains, "ideally we 
would like these other businesses to cover the full cost of the CAL, so that the farmer could receive the 
full price paid by the dairy plant". However, this strategy has risks; the potato marketing project left 
them with a debt that, with interest rates, has climbed to $ 42,000: if INDAP does not agree to forego 
this debt, it will bankrupt the CAL 5 0 . The gas station, a good source of income for a number of years, 
had to close down when a competitor opened another one in the area. They agreed with the owner of 
the new station that he would charged them lower prices for gasoline, in exchange for their closing 
down their own pump ("it was a good business for a time, and we got out before we started losing 
money"). 
CAL Santa Barbara's low service fee is also possible because of the contract between the CAL and the 
advisory firm This establishes that one of the senior SERVIAGRO staff members will spend half time 
The farmers feel that INDAP should not ask them to repay that loan, because the whole potato marketing project was 
designed, managed and strongly promoted by INDAP. It failed after only one year, leaving a number of organizations with 
high debts! At the time of writing this note (June 2001), I have been told mat INDAP is likely to cancel the debt. 
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supervising the overall operations of the CAL, supporting the hired manager, and especially focusing 
on assuring the quality of milk. Since INDAP subsidized most of the payment to the advisory firm, 
this results in lower administrative costs for the CAL. For example, in 1999 this CAL had gross sales 
of about $ 467,000; the cost to the farmers of the technical advisory services that year was equivalent 
to 2% of that value, while the INDAP subsidies represented an amount equivalent to 8% of the CAL's 
gross income. If the farmers had had to pay the full cost, it would have represented almost $ 0.02/lt, an 
amount that would be almost impossible for the farmers alone to pay. 
This relationship between the advisory firm and the CAL is largely built on the trust of the farmers, 
itself a product of 16 years of continuous work with a good and proven track record of success. In 
turn, the advisory firm has proved adept at improving its knowledge and skills as required by the 
changing circumstances of its small farmer clients. For example, the two senior staff members have 
recently obtained MBAs in order to be able to operate better in the business- and market-oriented 
environment that their clients are facing. 
Despite the fact that this fruitful relationship is grounded in very concrete achievements, one must 
remember that financially it is only possible through government subsidies to small farmers for private 
advisory service. Both the small farmers and the advisors readily acknowledge that it would not be 
possible to sustain these sorts of arrangements if subsidized technical assistance for small farmers was 
ended. 
The very deep involvement of the advisors in the running of the CAL has created a high degree of 
dependence on the part of the farmers. For example, when due to some bureaucratic adjustments 
INDAP temporarily suspended the functioning of the advisory services, it only took five months for 
the old manager of the CAL and some of his cronies to run up a debt of $ 36,000 with Loncoleche, of 
which $ 21,000 disappeared! To this day, the CAL is facing the financial consequences of this 
mismanagement. 
While the advisory firm has designed a very good training program for the farmers, the curriculum is 
strongly focused on production and technological issues, such as operation and maintenance of 
milking equipment, animal feeding, forage conservation, and so on, with much less attention to farm 
and business management topics. The opinion of the advisors is that "in the short run, small farmers 
cannot operate alone in the very competitive market environment that characterizes the dairy 
industry; it will take many years of work before they can achieve a stage of complete independence." 
Performance analysis 
The evolution of production in this CAL is similar to the other CAL I have described. In 1995, the 
CAL received, processed and sold only 650,000 liters, and this grew very rapidly until peaking in 
1997 at close to 3 million liters. Since then, with the fall in milk prices (31% between 1995 and 1999), 
production has begun to decrease, reaching 2.2 million liters in 1999. 
Of course, this drop in total production hurts the CAL's finances. In 1999, the organization generated 
a total income of $ 139,000: 62% from the mini market, 24% from CAL service fees, and 14% from 
the FODEM subsidy. Its total operational expenses were $ 118,000. The balance is destined to pay 
outstanding INDAP loans. The drop in milk production has meant that this amount is almost 10% 
lower than its 1997 income. 
As in some of the other case studies, CAL Santa Barbara uses the industry's system of price incentives 
to stimulate its members to improve quality and stabilize annual production. In November 1999, the 
farmer with the best price received $0.17/lt, while the lowest price was only $ 0.09/lt, with an average 
for the CAL of $ 0.15/lt. This system of incentives, together with the intense and open monthly 
discussion of the quality results ("we discuss the five best and the five worst, why they got those 
results"), plus the good technical advice these farmers receive, have resulted in quality standards that 
are twice as good as the average for the 64 CAL in Region X, and the best among the four CAJ. that I 
studied. 
Yet nearly 60% of the members still achieve quality indicators below the CAL's own average. I asked 
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a group of six grassroots members to explain why new, harsher rules were approved unanimously in 
August 1999. After some discussion, they agreed that this was for two reasons: first and foremost, 
improving quality is the key to continued market access {"and we have seen that those who left are 
really doing very, very bad"), and if the Loncoleche contract is lost, they see absolutely no chance of 
gaining a new contract with another firm; second, I quote one of them, "we have a business vision, 
which has to be a long term vision, the old vision is one of having bread today and being hungry 
tomorrow". 
However, the members are not satisfied with the results so far in terms of milk quality and seasonal 
stability of production. Milk quality could be further improved by cooling milk between milking and 
reaching the CAL's cooling tank. The board is assessing the option of installing individual storage 
tanks for their largest producers, plus "sector cooling tanks' distributed around the area so that each 
farmer could cut down the time it takes him/her to get the milk into cold storage. Getting these 
individual or sector cooling tanks is seen as a critical step by the manager: "if we do it, we could get an 
additional $ 0.02/lt, and if we don't do it, in the end the larger members will do it by themselves... and 
ciao to the organization!" The problem is that this plan would cost between $ 158,000 and $ 210,000 
to implement, and would only be viable if the loans could be paid in a 10-year period, "but no one 
wants to take the risk since we don't want to even think about how low the price of milk will be in ten 
years!". 
9.3 The southern CALs' performance and impacts 
This section discusses the performance of these four organizations at two different levels: (a) their 
economic and financial performance as businesses, and (b) the effects of CAL participation on 
members' households and farms. 
9.3.1 Economic and financial performance 
Table 9.2 shows the economic and financial performance of the four CALs for 1999 (1998 in the case 
of CAL Coyam). It is important to remember that 1999 was a year of very low prices, when 
production reached its lowest level. Hence, these results probably show these organizations at their 
weakest economic and financial levels since their inception. 
All of the CALs, except CAL Coyam, had a positive net income. Relative to the value of their assets, 
CAL Santa Barbara and CAL Arrayan show the best results, while relative to annual income, CAL 
Arrayan performs best. 
Financially speaking, CAL Santa Barbara is very exposed, since its debts are worth almost 80% of its 
assets (the result of the failed potato marketing project), although most of the debt is long-term and 
thus more manageable than if it was short-term. The remaining three CALs have their debts well under 
control. 
All the CALs are receiving substantial grants from the public sector, but this mostly reflects the 
importance of the BOGAN program through which INDAP is supporting on-farm investments. Based 
on complementary information I was able to collect, 1 estimate that in none of the cases do 
government subsidies represent more than 5% or so of the operational or fixed costs of the CALs 
themselves. 
In conclusion and with the possible exception of CAL Coyam these EACs' economic and financial 
performances have been acceptable, even during years characterized by low prices and decreasing 
production. 
Table 9.2 Economic and financial performance of four Milk Collection Centers in the south of Chile 
Item Coyam 1998 Arrayan 1999 Chirre 1999 Santa Barbara 1999 
Total revenue ($) 196,760 158,071 191,612 572,401 
Total expenses ($) 198,198 138,225 184,502 551,171 
Net result ($) - 1,159 19,845 7,110 21,231 
Total assets ($) 14,499 71,994 44,168 248,686 
Current assets ($) 14,499 43,466 13,749 80,825 
Noncurrent assets ($) 0 28,528 30,420 167,861 
Total liabilities ($) 3,670 21,800 13,633 198,425 
Current liabilities ($) 3,670 19,204 2,264 14,287 
Noncurrent liabilities ($) 0 2,596 11,370 184,138 
Net assets ($) 11,127 50,193 30,535 50,261 
Grants from government ($) 33,342 51,974 33,066 74,725 
Net result/total revenue -0.01 0.13 0.04 0.04 
Total liabilities/total assets 0.23 0.30 0.31 0.80 
Operational capital (current assets - current liabilities) ($) 11,127 24,262 11,485 66,538 
Liquidity (current assets/current liabilities) 4.30 2.26 6.07 5.66 
Dependency (grants/total revenue) 0.17 0.33 0.17 0.12 
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9.3.2 Impacts on members' farms and households 
I will now analyze the impact of these four CALs on their members' farms and households. 
Household income 
In all four cases the CALs' members are doing substantially better than their non-organized neighbors 
in terms of net annual household income (Table 9.3). The differences are particularly striking for CAL 
Santa Barbara and Chirre. 
In all cases, farm income is the main component of total household income. The members, however, 
generate more non-farm income than their non-organized counterparts, except for CAL Arrayan, 
where this figure is the same for both groups. Unearned income is much less important, with the only 
exception being CAL Chirre members. 
Table 9.3 Income and income composition, CAL Santa Barbara, Coyam, Arrayan, and Chirre (1999-
2000 agricultural season, $) 
INDICATORS SANTA BARBARA COYAM ARRAYAN CHIRRE 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Net hh income 27,046 4,399 7,190 4,256 28,532 22,936 12,621 7,297 
Earned net hh income 27,015 4,273 6,720 4,459 27,693 21,415 10,225 6,763 
Unearned net hh income 31 127 469 67 839 1,522 2,396 534 
Non agricultural net 
income 
3,247 228 1,955 526 3,322 3,122 8,146 3,368 
Farm net income 25,067 4,227 6,134 4,354 26,364 19,853 8,415 4,926 
Farm profits, production and sales 
When comparing farm net income between the members and the non-members of the four CALs, the 
differences are 6 to 1 in the case of CAL Santa Barbara, and between 1.3 and 1.7 to 1 in the other three 
cases. This evidence supports members' opinions that their non-organized neighbors are getting much 
poorer farm results. 
For crop and pasture production, these figures reflect the fact that members produce more by value 
than non-members. The gross value of production closely mirrors the results already described for 
farm net income, meaning that members are not necessarily producing better, but are producing more 
(in the area of crops and pastures). I suspect this result is probably due to members having more access 
to cash, both from the greater household income, but also because by being organized they have better 
access to loans and grants from INDAP. Just as non-members have reduced milk production to a 
greater extent than members, they are likely to have also been forced to decrease the area under crops 
and improved pastures. 
An extremely interesting result in shown in Table 9.4: in all cases, except for CAL Chirre, the non-
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participants have better economic results for milk production than the EAC members. This is because, 
compared to non-participants, participants: 
• produce much more milk (between 41% and 142% more), 
• obtain better prices per liter of milk (around 3% to 13% higher, with the exception of CAL 
Coyam, where the price paid to the participants is 3% lower than that received by the non-
participants), 
• generate a much higher gross income (between 37% and 149% higher), 
• but also incur much higher costs per liter (between 0.5% and 80% higher), with the exception of 
CAL Chirre where participants' costs per liter are 7% lower, 
• with the final result that the non-participants end up with a lower gross margin per liter of milk, 
with the exception of CAL Chirre where the participants are ahead. 
Table 9.4 Average per farmer economic results of milk production, CALs Santa Barbara, Coyam, 
Arrayân, and Chirre (1999-2000 agricultural season) 
INDICATORS SANTA BARBARA COYAM CAL ARRAYÂN CAL CHIRRE 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Production (Its) 34,96.0 16,225 14,559 10,347 16,965 10,335 29,983 12,390 
Price per liter ($/lt) 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.13 
Gross income ($) 5,033 2,065 1,947 1,427 2,326 1,370 4,103 1,644 
Direct costs ($) 6,981 1,798 2,218 1,573 2,308 928 2,609 1,158 
Direct costs per liter 
($/lt) 
0.20 0.11 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.09 0.09 0.09 
Gross margin ($) -1,948 267 -272 -146 18 442 1,494 485 
Gross margin per liter 
($/lt) 
-0.06 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0 0.04 0.05 0.04 
This result is consistent with the information gathered in the interviews and meetings with the farmers 
and their advisors. CAL members stated that nmmtaining market access was the primary objective; in 
economic terms this means they are using practices and technologies (both at the farm and EAC levels) 
which are not profitable given the current price of milk. In fact, these farmers are supporting the CALs 
financially at the expense of their own individual income. This is not surprising if we remember that, 
because of the drop in prices, their service fees have grown in relative terms to represent up to 20% of 
the price paid by the dairy plants. 
The non-member farmers who mainly trade in the informal markets are freer to cut down on more 
expensive practices. But the members cannot afford to cut down quality or seasonal stability, as this 
would surely mean losing their contracts with the dairy firms. 
Ultimately, the explanation for the magnitude of the effect of decreasing milk prices on farm income, 
lies in the low productivity achieved by most of these farmers. This is demonstrated by the direct 
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production costs per liter shown in Table 9.4; these are way too high when compared to those of many 
medium and larger farmers. These small farmers can sustain these high production costs because 
family labor plays a major role. However, sustaining production on the basis of cheap family labor 
certainly results in lower total household income. This is because in Chile the opportunity cost of labor 
is so high, with more than 40% of total rural income coming from off-farm employment, with real 
wages in the agricultural sector having grown continuously for more than 10 years due to the 
expansion of the for-export sector and with low unemployment rates both in the countryside and in the 
economy at large. 
I feel it is important to distinguish between the enterprise (e.g., the CAL itself), and the associative 
project, which must include actions both at the EAC level and at the level of members' farms. 
Ultimately, the EACs' performance and sustainability will depend to a large extent on productivity 
improvements made at the farm level. Besides, increased productivity at the farm level is the only way 
to deal with the permanent tension between prioritizing the results and survival of the organization, 
against those of the members. Table 9.4 shows that, given the low productivities of the members of 
these CALs, when the prices fell, the conflict between firm and members was resolved in favor of the 
former and at the expense of the latter. If, as many of the farmers told me during our interviews, they 
had invested part of the profits made during the 'good years' in, for example, increasing winter 
production by improving pastures, then the results in Table 9.4 would have been different, and the 
inevitable adjustment during the 'bad years' would have been less detrimental to the individual farmers 
(for example, because if average prices had increased due to higher winter production, it could have 
been possible to drop the service charges, instead of having to increase them, as most CALs had to do). 
Of course, organized farmers will not be able to sustain their organizations at the expense of their farm 
incomes indefinitely if prices continue their downward trend. Fortunately, I can report that in the years 
after I collected my data, the trend was reversed and prices improved substantially, to an average level 
in Region X of about Chilean $ 103/lt in the year 2000, an improvement that would again give these 
farmers a significant profit (ODEPA, 2001). 
Yet, in the long run the lesson is clear: the members of the CALs and the CALs themselves are 
operating with productivities and costs that leave them very vulnerable to sustained low prices. It 
would seem very important for them to take advantage of the new cycle of high prices to: (a) accelerate 
their plans to further improve yields, milk quality and seasonal stability of production, (b) capitalize 
their CALs and strengthen their complementary income-generating activities. 
Dealing with member heterogeneity 
The above results are averages for the CALs, and as such mask a very important factor that has a major 
influence on their performance: the heterogeneity of their members. The reader will remember that the 
CALs were formed when the dairy industry's major objective was to increase total production to meet 
the growing demand for dairy products. The pricing system was such that a CAL would gain most if it 
increased membership so as to be able to sell more milk, regardless (to a certain extent) of the quality 
or seasonal stability of production. This resulted in very heterogeneous organizations in terms of the 
production capacities of their members. When the priorities of the dairy industry changed in favor of 
milk quality and seasonal stability of production, this heterogeneity became a major liability for the 
EACs, because many members lacked the resources to respond rapidly to the new market demands. 
I can illustrate this issue and its effects with data from CAL Chirre for the 1999 season. The number of 
cows per member ranged from 5 to 19, with a coefficient of variation (standard deviation divided by 
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the mean) of 100%. Average milk yields ranged from 750 to 2,143 lt/cow/year, with about half the 
members below 1,500 lt/cow/year and with a coefficient of variation of 38% Spring-summer 
production per member was 2,474 It to 41,468 It, with a coefficient of variation of 74%. Production 
during the critical winter months ranged from 0 to 19,700 It. The ratio between spring-summer and 
winter production ranged from an almost ideal 1.19 to 12, with an average of 3.6 and a coefficient of 
variation of almost 60%. Bacterial counts (a major indicator of quality) range from 2,000/ml to almost 
800,000/ml, with a coefficient of variation of 216%. Considering the wide heterogeneity in all these 
performance indicators, it is no surprise that the prices per liter received by each farmer also differ 
sharply: the minimum price received by each farmer ranged between $ 0.10/lt and $ 0.16/lt, while 
maximum prices varied between $ 0.11/lt and $ 0.22/lt. 
The first implication of this heterogeneity is that CAL Chirre's farmers will have widely different 
capacities for improving their performance indicators. To a CAL member with five cows producing 
less than 5,000 It of milk per year, it is hardly worth investing in improving the sanitary conditions of 
his or her milking shed, as the cost would be much higher than the total value of one year's worth of 
milk. On the other hand, to a farmer who has 19 cows and produces 200,000 It of milk, such 
investments would represent less than 10% of the value of his or her milk. These differences in 
capacity to adjust to market conditions become even greater when talking about the investments 
needed to improve winter production, as the basic means to achieve better seasonal stability. 
On the other hand, the pricing rules imposed by the market and followed by the CAL also have 
different meanings for different members. To a farmer receiving an average price of $ 0.11/lt, the CAL 
service fee represents 20% of the price, while for a farmer who had the capacity to invest and improve 
his or her performance, the fee may represent as little as 9% of the price paid by the dairy plant. 
The point is that when the members of the CALs are as heterogeneous as in CAL Chirre (and the 
situation is much worse, for example, in CAL Coyam), it becomes almost impossible to establish costs 
and benefit rules that have more or less equal impact on all members. A rule that for some members 
promotes improved performance, to others can represent an absolute barrier to further action. 
Member heterogeneity is a major threat to these CALs under current market conditions. And it will not 
be a simple task for these organizations to solve this problem. Any attempt to expel a large fraction of 
the members would be a major disruption to the internal life of the organization and to the surrounding 
rural community. Furthermore, even the least productive members make an indispensable contribution 
to the CALs. In the case of CAL Chirre, for example, the milk production of the smallest members 
makes up between 12 and 15% of total production. If the CALs lost this production, it would result in 
increased fees for those who remain, and probably in lower average prices due to the loss of incentives 
that the dairy firms still pay to suppliers of larger volumes. 
Regardless of what the CALs decide, the market is making its own adjustments, with CALs' 
membership falling significantly between 1997 and 1999. However, this market-driven adjustment 
does not automatically affect the smallest members. Firstly, there are no statistically significant 
correlations between farm size or number of heads of cattle, and the performance indicators I describe 
above. Secondly, almost none of these farmers produce milk exclusively; like most small farmers 
throughout the world, they maintain diversified farming systems, and, as small farmers do, will use 
other crops and enterprises to mitigate the shocks such as those resulting from the decreasing price of 
milk. Hence, some of the smallest farmers have and will continue to raise the productivity of their milk 
operation. Those who have diversified their farm activities may well draw on their other resources to 
remain with the CAL as this represents the only option to maintain access to the formal dairy market, 
and, not least, to the many non-market benefits that result from being an EAC member. 
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Technology adoption and yields 
One of the most striking differences between CAL members and non-members is in the adoption of 
new production and marketing technologies (Table 9.5). In particular, members are better than non-
members at using animal production technologies, such as health, artificial insemination and genetic 
improvements. However, they are also ahead of non-members in crop diversification, use of fertilizers, 
access to machinery and equipment, and use of improved seeds and new varieties. 
Table 9.5 Technological changes implemented in the past five years, CALs Santa Barbara, Coyam, 
Arrayan, and Chirre 
INDICATORS SANTA 
BARBARA 
COYAM CAL ARRAYAN CALCB3RRE 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% % % % % % % % 
Crop diversification 50 40 60 50 50 60 44.4 27.3 
Marketing of inputs of products 80 40 50 30 40 10 22.2 9.1 
Machinery and equipment 70 60 50 10 20 30 66.7 9.1 
Constructions and installations 50 50 90 50 50 40 44.4 45.4 
Crop varieties and seed quality 70 33.3 80 60 30 70 55.6 36.4 
Use of fertilizers 100 40 80 70 80 70 77.8 36.4 
Weed control 50 50 50 60 50 40 66.7 36.4 
Insect and disease control 80 50 20 40 70 30 55.6 36.4 
Cattle breeds 60 20 40 30 0 50 22.2 27.3 
Reproduction of cattle 80 40 70 70 40 20 77.8 18.2 
Sanitary management of cattle 100 70 70 100 70 50 100 90.9 
Table 9.6 Average yields, CAL Santa Barbara, Coyam, Arrayan, and Chirre (1999-2000 agricultural 
season) 
I N D I C A T O R S S A N T A 
B A R B A R A 
C O Y A M A R R A Y Â N C H I R R E 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Potatoes (kg/ha) 28,090 19,651 23,914 19,500 16,203 17,688 23,083 10,845 
Milk (Lt/cow/yr) 1,825 1,629 1,933 1,509 1,500 1,195 2,214 1,452 
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Because of this, members are obtaining higher yields than non-members (Table 9.6). Members' annual 
milk yields per cow are between 12% and 53% higher than those of the non-members. In potato yields 
(perhaps the main crop of small farmers in Region X), most of the members come out ahead of non-
members by 23% to more than 100%. 
Access to agricultural services 
Virtually all the small farmers included in the survey (members and non-members) have access to 
some form of technical assistance, from the CAL advisors, other INDAP consultants, NGOs, or private 
advisors. However, in all four cases CAL participants spend more on these services. Members also 
tend to pay for a wider variety of technical assistance providers, including the CALs, the advisors hired 
with the INDAP subsidy, and private advisors working independently, while the non-members only 
pay for the services of firms linked to INDAP. 
However, there are important differences in access to credit (Table 9.7). Compared to the non-
members, a much higher proportion (75% to 200% higher) of the members have access to at least one 
type of agricultural loan. Also, the members obtain loans that are 20% to 50% larger than the non-
members, with the exception of CAL Arrayan. Yet, the total average debt of these farmers is usually 
below $ 2,000, an amount which is very reasonable and even low considering the value of their assets 
and their production. 
Table 9.7 Access to credit, CAL Santa Barbara, Coyam, Arrayan, and Chirre (1999-2000 agricultural 
season) 
INDICATOR SANTA BARBARA COYAM CAL ARRAYAN CAL CHIRRE 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
N° $ N° $ N° $ N° $ N° $ N° $ N° $ N° $ 
Total loans 7 1,602 4 1343 9 1,743 5 1,272 8 1,182 4 1,992 7 1,457 2 973 
Short term 
loans 
5 1,465 3 1,117 9 115 5 91 8 1,182 3 554 4 1,272 2 973 
Long term 
loans 
2 1,945 1 2,023 7 694 5 1,083 0 0 1 631 3 1,703 0 0 
INDAP loans 6 179 4 1343 1 1,547 1 946 8 1,182 3 554 7 1,457 2 973 
State bank 
loans 
0 0 0 0 9 1,229 5 1,272 0 0 1 631 0 0 0 0 
Private banks 
loans 
0 0 0 0 1 4,625 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
9.4 Explaining the performance differences 
In previous sections we saw that CAL Coyam was not performing as well as the other three. We also 
saw significant differences between members and non-members in terms of household and farm 
income, production, technology adoption, yields and access to certain agricultural services. In this 
section I will explain these differences. 
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Table 9.8 Household composition, CALs Santa Barbara, Coyam, Arrayan, and Chirre 
INDICATORS SANTA BARBARA COYAM CAL ARRAYAN CAL CHIRRE 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Members of household 3.6 4.1 4.2 3.9 4.4 3.7 3.4 3.2 
Female members 1.7 2.4 2 1.8 2.4 1.5 1.6 1.8 
Male members 1.9 1.7 2.2 2.1 2 2.2 1.9 1.5 
Members 0-12 yrs. 0.5 1 0.8 0.3 1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Members 13-18 yrs. 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 
Members 19-30 yrs. 0.3 0.9 0.8 0.6 1 0.7 0.8 0.6 
Members 31 -45 yrs. 1 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.5 
Members 46-65 yrs. 0.9 1 1.3 0.9 1 1.2 1.3 1 
Members 66+ yrs. 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.4 0.6 
Schooling members 7 yrs or 
+ 
7.2 6.8 5.7 6.9 7.1 5 6.8 5.2 
Schooling members 15 yrs 
or + 
7.5 6.8 6.1 7 7.6 5 6.8 5.2 
Schooling members 19-30 
yrs or + 
6.4 6.5 4.2 4.2 6.7 5 6.8 3.8 
Schooling members 31-45 
yrs or+ 
6.3 3.3 3.4 4.5 2.4 3.5 1.8 3.5 
Schooling members 46-65 
yrs or + 
4.5 3.6 5.2 4.6 5.4 3.4 5.2 2.1 
Schooling members 66 yrs 
or + 
2.3 1 0.4 1.3 1.3 1.1 2.5 1 
Schooling of head of hh 7.1 5.1 5 5.1 6.1 3.5 6 4.1 
Schooling of spouse 5.3 4.4 4.2 5.1 7.4 3 4.9 3.2 
Schooling of sons/daughters 5.3 5.6 6.6 8.1 4 6 4.8 5.9 
Schooling of other members 
hh 
1.6 1.3 1.3 2 1.9 2.4 3.4 1.1 
Schooling female members 
hh 
6.8 5.8 5.1 5.7 7.2 4.1 6.5 4.8 
Schooling male members hh 7.2 4.5 5.1 6 6 5.5 6.7 4.5 
Age of head of hh 54.5 53 57 60 52.9 64.4 54.7 57.2 
Age of spouse 42 34 37 51 51.5 50.3 35 48.1 
Age of sons/daughters 16.8 14.7 20 18.6 13.7 23.1 10.1 17.9 
Dependency ratio 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.6 07 0.6 0.5 0.6 
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9.4.1 Farmers' assets 
The performance differences between the CALs and between members and non-members cannot 
be explained by differences in the specific types of assets available to these households, as I shall 
explain. 
Household characteristics (human capital) 
There are almost no significant differences between the four CALs and between members and non-
members in terms of household composition and their sex, age, and educational characteristics 
(Table 9.8). 
Physical and financial assets 
Only in the case of CAL Chirre do members have access to more land than non-members (Table 
9.9). The average size of the farms (between 20 and 40 ha) clearly places these farmers in the 
category of commercial small producers, although, as we have seen, each CAL has a significant 
share of members with smaller farms (the coefficient of variation of the total farm size variable is 
in all cases larger than 50%). 
Table 9.9 Land assets, CAL Santa Barbara, Coyam, Arrayân, and Chirre 
INDICATORS SANTA 
BARBARA 
COYAM CAL ARRAYAN CAL CHIRRE 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Land owned by hh (ha) 35.16 38.60 19.76 22.05 26.43 24.25 41.37 23.83 
Land taken by hh, shareholding (ha) 0.45 0 0 0 0 0 0 4.54 
Land taken by hh, rental (ha) 0 0 0.35 0 1 0 0 0 
Land taken by hh, other contracts 3.50 0 0 0 4.70 0 0 0 
Land let by hh, shareholding (ha) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Land let by hh, rental (ha) 0 1.90 0 0.10 0 0 0 0 
Land let by hh, other contracts (ha) 0 0 0 2.50 0 0 0 0 
Land under management by hh (ha) 39.56 36.70 20.11 19.45 32.13 24.25 41.37 28.38 
In all cases, land rental and sharecropping arrangements are not very common, and over 80% of the 
total land is owned by the household, both for members and non-members. None of these small 
farmers has access to irrigation, a resource which is very uncommon in Region X. 
There are no important differences in the distance between the farms and main roads with public 
transportation, which are around 1 to 4 km. The nearest town or city is about 10 to 20 km away and in 
all cases the roads are paved or gravel. These are not isolated farms. 
The total value of members' physical assets (buildings, machinery, cattle and land) tends to be 
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somewhat greater than that of the control groups, although the differences are not large, with the 
exception of CAL Chirre, where members are 50% wealthier than their non-organized neighbors 
(Table 9.10). The total value of these farmers' assets (members and non-members alike) ranges 
between $ 60,000 and $ 120,000. 
Table 9.10 Fixed and quasi-fixed assets, CALs Santa Barbara, Coyam, Arrayân, and Chirre ($) 
INDICATORS SANTA 
BARBARA 
COYAM CAL ARRAYAN CAL CHIRRE 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Value of buildings and mfrastracture 41,610 24,443 18,033 14,789 17,335 18,895 25,725 12,584 
Value of machinery and equipment 13,238 4,646 650 3,269 2,037 6,962 4,606 2,081 
Value of land owned by hh 78,305 80,680 33,010 28,370 59,178 76,400 105,292 75,538 
Value of livestock 10,822 5,127 4,810 4,829 6,345 5,584 7,398 4,195 
Total value of physical assets 138,492 111,989 56,309 48,800 84,895 105,033 142,814 94,934 
9.4.2 Social capital 
I will discuss the influence of social capital on the comparative performance of these farmers and CAL 
from four points of view: participation in organizations, social conditions for cooperation, systems of 
rules that govern the relationships among fanners, and participation of the organization in larger 
networks. 
Participation in community and economic organizations 
Aside from CAL membership, there are no large differences between members and non-members in 
terms of their participation in either economic or community organizations, although the differences 
are somewhat greater in the cases of CAL Santa Barbara and, in particular, of CAL Coyam, whose 
members are significantly more involved than the non-members in other economic organizations 
(Table 9.11). 
However, there are very important differences in the way members and non-members perceive the 
benefits and costs of participating in an EAC (Table 9.12). Significantly, in the three cases with better 
economic and financial performance and with a richer and more intensive degree of participation and 
organizational commitment on the part of the members (Santa Barbara, Arrayan and Chirre), 
participants were less positive than non-participants about the benefits of membership, and also much 
Table 9.11 Participation in development projects and organizations, CALs Santa Barbara, Coyam, Arrayân, and Chirre 
I N D I C A T O R S C A L S A N T A 
B A R B A R A 
C A L C O Y A M C A L A R R A Y A N C A L C H I R R E 
Parts . Non-part s . Parts . Non-part s . Parts . Non-part s . Parts . Non-par t s . 
Y e s Y e s Yes Y e s Yes Y e s Y e s Yes 
% % % % % % % % 
Organizat ions o r projects w i t h economic object ives 
Marketing of products or purchasing of inputs (other than CALs) 60 - 60 0 0 0 0 
Soil conservation and pasture improvement 30 0 30 20 0 0 0 0 
Storage of products 40 0 60 0 10 0 0 0 
Youth 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Women's 0 0 40 10 0 0 0 0 
Trade Association 10 10 50 10 0 0 n . i 0 
Cooperative 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 
Organizations or projects with social development objectives 
Neighborhood committee 40 30 100 80 80 90 44.4 27.3 
Sports, culture and recreation 20 10 30 20 40 20 22.2 18.2 
Housing or local improvement 10 20 40 30 30 30 33.3 27.3 
Table 9.12 Perception of costs and benefits of participating in BACs, CALs Santa Barbara, Coyam, Arrayan, and Chirre 
I N D I C A T O R S S A N T A B A R B A R A C O Y A M C A L A R R A Y Â N C A L C H I R R E 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Not True Not True Not True Not True Not True Not True Not True Not True 
True % True % True % True % True % True % True % True % 
% % % "„ % % % % 
Benefits 
Improved household income 30 50 33.3 66.7 20 60 66.7 0 60 0 0 0 0 88.9 0 0 
Improved yield and production 20 70 33.3 66.7 10 80 25 75 40 40 0 0 22.2 77.8 100 0 
New crops and livestock 40 60 33.3 66.7 10 80 33.3 66.7 40 40 40 40 22.2 77.8 100 0 
Improved marketing 40 20 0 100 50 30 100 0 70 20 0 0 33.3 44.4 100 0 
Improved prices of products 77.8 11.1 66.7 33.3 80 10 100 0 100 0 0 0 77.8 22.2 100 0 
Lowered production costs 30 30 33.3 33.3 40 50 66.7 33.3 30 50 0 0 11.1 88.9 0 100 
Farm improvements 30 70 0 100 0 100 0 66.7 40 50 0 0 0 88.9 100 0 
Improved quality of life for family 40 40 0 100 20 70 33.3 66.7 55.6 11.1 0 0 22.2 66.7 100 0 
Improved quality of life for women 57.1 42.9 0 100 11.1 66.7 50 50 77.8 11.1 0 0 33.3 66.7 0 100 
Improved quality of life for youth 50 50 0 50 42.9 57.1 50 50 77.8 0 0 0 44.4 44.4 0 0 
Optimistic view of the future 37.5 62.5 33.3 0 0 50 33.3 66.7 55.6 22.2 0 0 33.3 55.6 100 0 
Improved relations with government agencies 50 50 33.3 0 11.1 55.6 33.3 66.7 33.3 33.3 0 0 12.5 87.5 100 0 
Improved relations with municipal government 62.5 25 66.7 0 0 70 33.3 66.7 20 60 0 0 42.9 57.1 0 100 
Improved relations with neighbors 30 70 33.3 66.7 0 80 0 50 33.3 66.7 0 0 11.1 77.8 0 100 
Doing better as small farmers 20 70 0 33.3 0 80 0 100 50 30 0 0 11.1 77.8 0 100 
Costs 
Incurring debts 10 60.2 66.7 33.3 10 80 33.3 66.7 30 50 0 0 22.2 77.8 0 100 
Membership fees 0 100 66.7 33.3 20 80 0 100 20 80 0 0 11.1 88.9 0 100 
I N D I C A T O R S S A N T A B A R B A R A C O Y A M C A L A R R A Y A N C A L C H I R R E 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Not True Not True Not True Not True Not True Not True Not True Not True 
True % True % True % True % True % True % True % True % 
% % % % % % % % 
Greater risks in agriculture 50 50 66.7 33.3 40 50 50 50 40 50 0 0 44.4 44.4 100 0 
Loss of time in meetings 60 40 33.3 33.3 40 60 33.3 66.7 60 10 0 0 66.7 33.3 0 0 
Share of product prices taken by org. 11.1 88.9 66.7 33.7 10 80 33.3 66.7 10 90 0 0 II.1 88.9 0 100 
Worsened relationships with neighbors 70 10 100 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 0 0 77.8 11.1 100 0 
Some take advantage of the rest 37.5 62.5 66.7 33.3 66.7 33.3 50 50 77.8 22.2 0 0 44.4 55.6 100 0 
Less trust in the future 44.4 55.6 66.7 0 55.6 11.1 100 0 57.1 42.9 0 0 33.3 55.6 100 0 
Difference of 100% is due to those who did not answer or said they did not know. 
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more aware of the actual costs of participation. In the low-performing CAL Coyam the opposite is 
true: the members are more positive about the benefits and less aware of the actual costs of 
participation. This result is similar to the case studies of CAL Ranchillo and Lo Ovalle, where 
members of the better performing EACs seem much more critical about costs and benefits of 
participation in these organizations. 
The members of CALs Santa Barbara, Arrayan and Chirre are especially downbeat about the 
economic benefits of participation, in terms of product prices, marketing, household income and so on. 
But they are more optimistic than the non-members about their future in general and as small farmers, 
as well as with respect to improved relations with their neighbors and with the central and municipal 
governments. 
Members of the three better-perforrning CALs are also much more aware than non-members of the 
actual costs of participation, such as increased indebtedness or the need to pay membership and 
service fees to the organization. 
The results for CAL Coyam are almost the opposite. Here, the members feel that the organization has 
allowed them to improve prices, marketing and household income, despite the fact that the quantitative 
evidence from the survey tends contradict this. There are no differences among members and non-
members when it comes to appreciating the costs of participating in an EAC. 
One possible explanation for the notable difference in points of view between members of CALs Santa 
Barbara, Arrayan and Chirre, on the one hand, and CAL Coyam on the other, is that for the former 
members have much more access to detailed information and real debate about their organizations' 
actual results, achievements and problems. In the interviews with CAL Coyam members, I always 
ended up feeling that they tended to rely more on the 'official' discourse promoted by the leadership 
and by their advisors, but that they were much less aware of the actual details of their results, 
achievements and constraints. For example, none of them was fully aware of how prices were set for 
each member, or what use was made of the organization's income. I do not mean to say that grassroots 
members of CAL Coyam were totally unaware of what was happening, but they clearly moved more 
in the area of 'suspicions' than of clear and detailed information. 
Norms which foster cooperation 
Trust and reciprocity are two important social norms attributed by the literature as important 
foundations for cooperative behavior. 
When compared to non-members, the members of the four CALs trust other people more and are more 
open to thinking that other individuals will in general try to be fair and to help others instead of taking 
advantage of them. They also feel that it is easier to become organized now than in the past, that they 
participate more than their neighbors in community and farmers' organizations, and that these 
organizations are almost always useful for them and for the majority of the participants (Table 9.13). 
Networks 
In many respects, there are no major differences among the four CALs in terms of the networks in 
which they participate as organizations and through which they engage with other market and non-
market agents. 
With respect to the rural communities to which these organizations belong, the four CALs grew out of 
Table 9.13 Trust, cooperation, reciprocity and view of the future, CAL Santa Barbara, Coyam, Arrayan, and Chirre 
QUESTION SANTA BARBARA COYAM ARRAYAN CHIRRE 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Ease of organizing with 
neighbors, compared to 10 
years ago 
More 
Difficult 
% 
Easter 
% 
More 
Difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
More 
Difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
More 
Difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
More 
Difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
More 
Difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
More 
Difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
More 
Difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
40 20 20 40 0 80 0 50 10 70 40 40 22.2 77.8 18.2 36.4 
Household's degree of 
participation in organization 
compared to neighbors 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
10 30 60 10 10 30 40 0 20 0 40 0 0 66.7 36.4 9.1 
Community and farmers' 
organizations are useful 
Never or 
Almost 
never 
% 
Always 
or 
Almost 
Always 
% 
Never or 
Almost 
never 
% 
Always 
or 
Almost 
Always 
% 
Never or 
Almost 
never 
% 
Always 
or 
Almost 
Always 
% 
Never or 
Almost 
never 
% 
Always 
or 
Almost 
Always 
% 
Never or 
Almost 
never 
% 
Always 
or 
Almost 
Always 
% 
Never or 
Almost 
never 
% 
Always 
or 
Almost 
Always 
% 
Never or 
Almost 
never 
% 
Always 
or 
Almost 
Always 
% 
Never or 
Almost 
never 
% 
Always 
or 
Almost 
Always 
% 
20 80 30 50 10 80 20 70 0 90 20 80 0 100 18.2 72.7 
For you and your family, 
participation in an organization 
is... 
Waste 
of time 
Beneficial Waste 
of time 
Beneficial Waste 
of time 
Beneficial Waste 
of time 
Beneficial Waste 
of time 
Beneficial Waste 
of time 
Beneficial Waste 
of time 
Beneficial Waste 
of time 
Beneficial 
20 70 50 40 10 90 0 60 20 70 0 50 0 77.8 36.4 27.3 
Farmers' and community 
organizations benefit... 
Only a 
few or 
none 
The 
majority 
Only a 
few or 
none 
The 
majority 
Only a 
few or 
none 
The 
majority 
Only a 
few or 
none 
The 
majority 
% 
Only a 
few or 
none 
% 
The 
majority 
% 
Only a 
few or 
none 
% 
The 
majority 
% 
Only a 
few or 
none 
% 
The 
majority 
% 
Only a 
few or 
none 
% 
The 
majority 
% 
10 90 60 20 0 100 20 50 30 70 50 20 33.3 66.7 36.4 63.6 
Can you trust most people? No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
80 10 80 10 50 50 50 20 60 40 70 30 44.4 44.4 63.6 9.1 
Most people... Only 
care for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
Only 
care for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
Only 
care for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
Only 
care for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
Only 
care for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
Only 
care for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
Only 
care for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
Only 
care for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
50 40 100 0 30 60 50 20 60 30 70 30 55.6 22.2 81.8 0 
Most people... Take 
advantage 
of the 
rest 
% 
Try to 
be fair 
% 
Take 
advantage 
of the 
rest 
% 
Try to 
be fair 
% 
Take 
advantage 
of the 
rest 
% 
Try to 
be fair 
% 
Take 
advantage 
of the 
rest 
% 
Try to 
be fair 
% 
Take 
advantage 
of the 
rest 
% 
Try to 
be fair 
% 
Take 
advantage 
of the 
rest 
% 
Try to 
be fair 
% 
Take 
advantage 
of the 
rest 
% 
Try to 
be fair 
% 
Take 
advantage 
of the 
rest 
% 
Try to 
be fair 
% 
50 20 60 10 30 50 20 60 30 40 70 20 33.3 55.6 72.7 9.1 
Has your situation as small 
farmers compared to 10 years 
ago... 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
Worsened 
•/. 
Improved 
% 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
70 30 80 10 0 80 60 20 50 50 40 50 45.5 55.5 11.1 88.9 
In the next 10 years, will your 
situation as small farmers... 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
20 60 0 10 20 10 10 20 10 50 20 70 11.1 66.7 18.2 63.6 
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pre-existing informal community groups. These groups gradually became formal organizations as the 
political environment in the country changed from one in which collective action was discouraged and 
repressed, to one that promoted organized civic participation in different spheres of social life. In the 
specific case of CAL Coyam, the small farmers have forged a strong link with at least one large and 
dynamic farmer who is also a regional leader of milk producers. 
The four CALs are intimately connected with HMDAP, a government agency. I often heard the farmers say 
things like "we are a product of INDAP" or "without INDAP we would have disappeared as small 
farmers". UMDAP's policies and programs created the political climate for these organizations to form, and 
supplied the financial and technical resources and expertise to turn that incentive into fruitful action. There 
is very little doubt that the survival of these CALs at least in the short-term, is extremely dependent on 
INDAP's support. 
The four CALs and the community groups from which they grew, have a long history of interaction with 
intermediate agents, such as NGOs, extension agents, or church organizations. Through them they can 
reach out to other public or private agencies, have access to information and expertise, capture public or 
non-governmental resources, and interact with other farmers' groups in the region or elsewhere. In fact, 
none of the four CALs would have been possible without the cooperation and active work of these 
intermediate agents. 
Yet, there are important differences in the way these CALs interact today with these intermediate agents. 
In the case of CAL Santa Barbara, the private consultant firm working with them continues to play an 
essential leadership role. Its involvement in the organization's daily life and operations goes way beyond a 
nominal advisory role. CAL Chirre and CAL Arrayan rely on their external advisors for technical and 
managerial support, but are significantly more autonomous in their decision-making; their relationship 
conforms more to the idea of a contractual arrangement, with well-specified and limited roles. In the case 
of CAL Coyan, the advisory firm - apparently in agreement with the commercial farmer who is the leader 
of the organization - plays a very traditional paternalistic role. It decides by itself what is best for the 
farmers, with little or no discussion or consultation, to the extreme point of handing money belonging to 
some members to others, as it does each month when it 'redistributes' the milk payments that are due to 
each! 
By definition, the four CALs are strongly and formally linked to the dairy market through their contracts 
with specific firms, all of which are major industry players in Chile. The signals sent by these market 
agents through their pricing and standards policies are major determinants of the specific objectives, 
priorities and lines of activities of the Santa Barbara, Arrayan and Chirre CALs. In the case of CAL 
Coyam, these market signals are 'blurred' by the direct intervention of the advisory firm and the 
commercial farmer who leads the organization. His ad hoc 'price and income redistribution system' works 
against the trends favored by the market by artificially creating a strong disincentive to all types of 
members to improve the productivity of their farms, the quality of their milk, and the seasonal stability of 
production. By redistributing income from the better- to the worse-performing members, this top-down set 
of rules discourages those farmers who have made an effort to improve their performance and who cannot 
capture the benefits of their work, and it also discourages those who are behind because they can free ride 
on the efforts of their fellow members. 
Systems of rules 
Table 9.14, adapted from the work of Ostrom (1990), summarizes the information collected during the 
field work relative to the system of rules that govern these four organizations. 
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To summarize Table 9.14 there are three different rale systems: 
(a) CAL Coyam: the de facto system of rules encourages free riding by around half the members of the 
organization, who reap important benefits without having to incur the costs of improving their milk 
production. According to some respondents, this peculiar system of rules means that these free riders 
get as much as 50% more income per liter than they would otherwise. 
This money is being taken from those members who have invested in improving their milk quality and 
stabilizing their annual production. Under normal circumstances, one would expect these members to 
change the rules (actually, to enforce their written rules and bylaws), or else leave the organization. 
Why has this not occurred? Most farmers do not have the option of leaving the CAL, as the industry 
has in fact closed itself to new suppliers; those who leave risk losing their access to the formal dairy 
market. This illustrates a point I heard expressed by many small farmers during the interviews: "we 
are stuck together in this ship... either it floats and we all win, or else we sink together'". 
Table 9.14 Rules of CALs Santa Barbara, Coyam, Arrayan and Chirre (based on Ostrom, 1990; see 
Chapter 2, Section 2.5) 
RULES Santa Barbara Coyam Arrayän Chirre 
Clearly defined 
boundaries 
Membership is clearly 
defined and its bylaws 
in effect close it for 
the indefinite future. 
Policies actively 
discourage new 
members. 
Membership is clearly 
defined. 
Membership is clearly 
defined. While 
nominally open to 
new members, joining 
requires the payment 
of a large sum of 
money. 
Membership is clearly 
defined. Legal 
structure makes it 
very difficult for new 
people to join. 
Low cost systems for 
monitoring compliance 
Well-defined and 
efficient monitoring 
system of compliance 
with key rules is in 
place. Rules are well 
enforced. 
Members lack 
effective monitoring 
system. Key detailed 
information is 
available only to a few 
members and to 
external advisors. 
Rules are defined on 
paper but seldom if 
ever applied. 
Well-defined and 
efficient monitoring 
system of compliance 
with key rules is in 
place. Rules are well 
enforced. 
Well-defined and 
efficient monitoring 
system of compliance 
with key rules is in 
place. Rules are well 
enforced. 
Congruence between 
appropriation and 
provision rules, and 
market conditions 
Two different areas: 
rules governing 
pricing system are 
directly and formally 
based on market 
signals. Rules 
governing fixed 
investments, 
participation in the 
internal life and 
decision-making 
process, are based on 
a criterion of equality 
of contributions and 
benefits. 
De facto system of 
pricing rules whereby 
those who contribute 
more, receive less and 
subsidize those that 
contribute less and 
end up receiving more 
than their fair share. 
System discourages 
innovation and 
encourages free 
riding. 
Two different areas: 
rules governing 
pricing system are 
directly and formally 
based on market 
signals. Rules 
governing fixed 
investments, 
participation in the 
internal life and 
decision-making 
process, are based on 
a criterion of equality 
of contributions and 
benefits. 
Two different areas: 
rules governing 
pricing system are 
directly and formally 
based on market 
signals. Rules 
governing fixed 
investments, 
participation in the 
internal life and 
decision-making 
process, are based on 
a criterion of equality 
of contributions and 
benefits. 
Graduated sanctions for 
non-compliance with 
rules 
With respect to prices 
received by each 
member, sanctions are 
proportional, 
graduated, automatic 
and self-enforcing. 
Sanctions are almost 
never applied. 
With respect to prices 
received by each 
member, sanctions are 
proportional, 
graduated, automatic 
and self-enforcing. 
With respect to prices 
received by each 
member, sanctions are 
proportional, 
graduated, automatic 
and self-enforcing. 
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RULES Santa Barbara Coyam Arrayân Chirre 
With respect to 
participation and other 
commitments, 
graduated sanctions 
are indeed decided 
and applied by the 
membership whenever 
necessary. 
With respect to 
participation and other 
commitments, 
graduated sanctions 
are indeed decided 
and applied by the 
membership whenever 
necessary. 
With respect to 
participation and other 
commitments, 
graduated sanctions 
are indeed decided 
and applied by the 
membership whenever 
necessary. 
Participation of members 
in defining and changing 
rules 
Although external 
advisors have a major 
influence in 
suggesting 
adjustments, the 
process is transparent 
and considered 
legitimate by 
members. Rules are 
approved with the 
active participation of 
all members. Rules 
are well-tuned to 
allow the organization 
to respond to key 
market signals. 
Members are formally 
consulted, but in feet 
key decisions are 
made by one leader. 
Formal rules about 
pricing systems are 
superseded by de 
facto rules designed 
and managed by main 
leader and external 
advisors. De facto 
system of rules runs 
counter to what the 
market is demanding. 
Rules are defined with 
the active 
participation of all 
members. Rules are 
well-tuned to allow 
the organization to 
respond to key market 
signals. 
Rules are defined with 
the active 
participation of all 
members. Rules are 
well-tuned to allow 
the organization to 
respond to key market 
signals. 
Low cost mechanisms for 
solving conflicts 
External advisors are 
'referees' of last 
resort, although most 
conflicts are managed 
and solved by the 
organization. The 
CAL has gone 
through at least one 
major internal conflict 
and managed it very 
effectively. 
Conflicts are not 
discussed or brought 
into the open. Leader 
imposes his will 
whenever he feels it is 
necessary, by 
threatening to resign, 
an action that would 
have a severe effect 
on the organization. 
Conflicts are solved 
by consensus or 
majority vote through 
open discussion in 
periodic meetings. 
Conflicts are solved 
by consensus or 
majority vote through 
open discussion in 
periodic meetings. 
External authorities 
respect the right of 
members to establish 
their own rules 
External advisors have 
a very strong 
influence on the 
organization. 
However, on many 
specific occasions 
when the majority of 
members have held an 
opinion against them 
on large or small 
issues, such opinions 
have been accepted. 
External advisors and 
one leader largely 
decide all key issues. 
Opinion of members 
counts for little. 
External authorities do 
not intervene in the 
internal affairs of the 
organization. 
External authorities do 
not intervene in the 
internal affairs of the 
organization. 
The better milk producers could also 'take over' the organization and expel the free riders, as in fact is 
happening in the other three case study CALs. However, there are too many poor-performing farmers 
in CAL Coyam and there is no way the remaining good-performers could finance the CAL without 
them. Its members are way too heterogeneous in terms of their assets and their productive capacities, 
the product of an early decision in the formation of this organization. Fully half of them lack the 
minimum farm size or resources to finance or justify economically the investments required to 
improve milk quality or the seasonal stability of production. Thus, CAL Coyam is caught in a Catch-
22 situation: if only the best-performing members remain in the organization, they will lack the 
volume of production required to sustain the CAL, and if all the members remain, the organization 
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will not be capable of adjusting to meet the industry requirements. 
On the other hand, this CAL has not been capable of making a gradual adjustment because of the 
power of one single member: the commercial farmer who is the leader not only of the CAL, but of all 
the CALs in Region X. He has the internal power to impose his personal views on many of his fellow 
CAL members. And he also has the contacts and political influence to block any externally-induced 
efforts to change the internal conditions of the organization, as well as to increase the risk that would 
be run by any members who attempted to gain control of their organization or to leave to form or join 
another CAL. On the other hand, this commercial farmer, because of his political influence, can 
reward the acceptance of the status quo by his fellow CAL members through his ability to capture 
important resources from INDAP and other public agencies. According to some sources, even the 
dairy firm to which this CAL sells its milk is unlikely to want to start a public political problem by 
terminating its contract with CAL Coyam. 
Hence, one likely future scenario for CAL Coyam is that it will linger on for some time, but that it 
gradually loses presence and importance as its members' milk production continues to decline. How 
long this decline will last depends on the evolution of milk prices and on the capacity of the CAL 
leader to continue to capture public subsidies. 
(b) CAL Santa Bdrbara: a solid, highly motivated and innovative group of farmers, reinforced by the 
influence and support of an equally capable external agent - the private advisory firm. 
Thanks to the work of the public advisors, this organization is probably ahead of many CALs in terms 
of its information and knowledge about future trends in the industry and its capacity to implement the 
necessary technological and management changes. Decisions are made and implemented rapidly51 not 
only because the group is solidly constituted, but also because of the great trust placed in then-
advisors' recommendations. When an EAC is working in a dynamic and unpredictable market, this is 
an invaluable resource. For example, this was the only group already thinking beyond the current 
issues of quality and seasonal stability of production, and beginning to look at alternatives such as the 
investment in individual and sector collecting tanks in order to ensure further progress once the current 
industry standards were met. 
However, the support of this external agency is only possible thanks to INDAP funding. We saw that 
when the advisors had to suspend their work even for a few months, the organization rapidly ran into 
major problems as it tried to keep up the pace to which it was accustomed, without the benefit of the 
technical and managerial expertise and the contacts and networks supplied by the agency. 
This is a major gap in INDAP's policies and instruments: the emphasis and investment in training and 
learning processes is extremely low. LNDAP is pouring millions of dollars into pastures, buildings, 
equipment, technical support, and so on, but very little into training farmers and farmer leaders and 
developing learning systems to improve the decision-making capacity of these EACs. 
In June 2001,1 interviewed Mr. Luis Marambio, who had been National Director of INDAP between 
1994 and 2000. Looking back, he rapidly acknowledged that perhaps the most important failure of 
INDAP during his administration had been its inability to improve what he calls the human capital 
within the organizations. He stated: "We assumed that we could buy the necessary professional 
services. We were wrong. Not only are those top-quality professionals not widely available to work 
with small farmers, often in remote areas, but even if they were, that would only solve certain needs, 
but would still leave the organizations highly dependent. We erred in our diagnosis and in our 
strategy to address this problem. An improved policy in support to small farmers has to place a much 
stronger emphasis on creating human capital and supporting learning processes inside the economic 
organizations." 
(c) CAL Array&n and Chirre: these organizations function with a much greater degree of autonomy 
5 1 Consider, for example the six months that it took this group to set up and start operating their CAL, with the close to three 
years that it took the farmers of CAL Arrayan to do the same. 
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from external agents. Of course, they rely on their technical advisors to inform and support many 
decisions and lines of action, but the lines between the EACs and the advisors are much more clearly 
drawn. 
The drawback is.that, compared to CAL Santa Barbara, these CALs are probably less aware of future 
opportunities and threats, and are in this sense more vulnerable to sudden market changes. They react 
well to what is going oh around them today, but their vision is shorter. 
On the plus side, these two EACs are less dependent than CAL Santa Barbara on the flow of pubUc 
funds to sustain their irdbrmation-gathering and decision-making processes. Some of their members 
have acquired knowledge and skills that in Santa Barbara still reside with the external advisors. 
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CHAPTER 10. POTATO MARKETING EACs 
In this chapter I present three case studies of EACs engaged in marketing their members' potato crops, 
one in Region X and two in Region LX. These case studies allow me to explore the theory presented in 
Chapter 2 that economic collective action only makes sense if the participants are being hurt or 
constrained by market failures. The wholesale potato market in Chile is considered to come closest to 
the concept of a 'perfectly competitive market'. Thus, I would expect to see that EACs involved in 
wholesale potato marketing would fail to deliver any significant economic benefits to their members, 
who would end up deserting their organization. 
10.1 The context 
Vargas and Foster (2000) studied the markets of the most important crop and animal products in Chile, 
and concluded that "of the 15 products considered, only the market for potatoes corresponds to the 
textbook model characterized by many market participants whose activities are determined by spot 
prices generated by open markets." The bulk of potato production is concentrated in a few distinct 
areas of the country; thus, competition is intense and there is ample information at harvest time about 
market and price conditions. 
The 1997 Agricultural Census identified over 90,000 potato producers in Chile, the vast majority of 
them small farmers with an average crop size of less than 1 ha. Although there is no information on 
the number of buyers, it certainly runs into the hundreds. Industrial contracts with potato growers are 
still not very important (7% to 12% of total production), and supermarket chains command less than 
10% to 15% of the total retail sales of potatoes. 
A typical small farmer sells his or her production on-farm to a middleman, who only needs to collect 
the production from one or two hectares to fill a truck and be ready to go to the major markets in 
Santiago or elsewhere. If the farmer is a bit larger, he or she can hire a truck and send the production 
to Santiago or other large cities directly. 
Most potatoes pass along a large chain of intermediaries until they reach the two main retail outlets. 
The largest by far are the neighborhood vegetable fairs set up weekly in all small and large cities in 
Chile, where thousands of small merchants may each sell between 200 to 800 kg of unbranded and 
ungraded potatoes. The second most important retail outlet is the supermarket, where potatoes are sold 
in two, five or 10 kg bags of graded potatoes; three brands dominate this outlet. 
Industrial processors (of which Nestle and Pepsico are the largest) and those who supply the fast food 
and restaurants chains, usually buy their produce from a handful of medium and large producers or 
import it directly when they need special types of potatoes. 
The price paid by the final consumer at the end of the marketing chain is two to four times greater than 
the price paid to the farmer by the initial intermediary. This price differential has been an important 
incentive for many small farmers to think about engaging in collective action to market their potatoes. 
Potato prices vary significantly between and within years, due to changes in the area under this crop 
and, thus, in total supply. In the past 26 years, average annual prices (adjusted for inflation) have 
varied between $ 0.23/kg and $ 0.62/kg. However, with 90,000 producers in the market, there is 
nothing an EAC could do to regulate supply and thus affect market prices. But an EAC may be able to 
capture better prices if it could store its potatoes and regulate the timing of sales, as there are also large 
differences in the monthly prices of potatoes (an average for the past decade of 53% or more between 
the prices at the best and worse month of the year). 
INDAP has promoted the formation of potato grower EACs with two objectives in mind. The most 
common one has been to allow small farmers to capture a larger share of the final price paid by end 
consumers, by selling their potatoes at some point further down the marketing chain, and by regulating 
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the timing of sales through investments in storage capacity. 
The second option has been to reach the supermarket with a processed (cleaned, graded and branded) 
product. An EAC that can sell its product through this outlet can expect to increase its gross income by 
no less than 75%, although there are processing and marketing costs involved. 
Although INDAP has commissioned several studies to analyze the option of setting up EACs engaged 
in industrial processing of potatoes, the conclusion has always been that this is not a viable option as 
the resources required are huge, the competition fierce from very large agroindustrial conglomerates 
such as Nestle or Pepsico, and the marketing opportunities scarce and dominated by a few firms who 
have the financial resources and the expertise to easily out-compete any new entrant. 
10.2 The case studies 
The three case study EACs are the Sociedad Agroindustrial y Comercial Agrocamp S.A., in Region X, 
and Cooperativa Pullallan Ltda and Agricola y Comercial Carahue Ltda., both in Region DC. 
10.2.1 Sociedad Agroindustrial y Comercial Agrocamp S.A. 
The Sociedad Agroindustrial y Comercial Agrocamp S.A. (Agrocamp S.A) was legally founded in late 
1996 (but had been operating under that name for at least a year before), by 16 grassroots 
organizations, themselves legally constituted, who are the shareholders of Agrocamp S.A. These 16 
organizations have around 530 members. Agrocamp works mainly in Los Muermos, an area well 
known as an important potato-producing region. 
A brief history 
In 1990, INDAP contracted the Federation of Cooperatives of the South (FECOSUR) to provide 
technical assistance to small farmers in the Los Muermos area. From the start, the head extensionist 
and the staff of INDAP-Los Muermos, put a strong emphasis on supporting the formation of 
grassroots organizations for those farmers receiving technical assistance. Local Associations of Small 
Farmers (APPA) and cooperatives began to form; by 1993 these local EACs were already buying the 
fertilizer their members would need for the season, and in some cases they had started to negotiate 
collectively with potato buyers. 
As these local experiences were generally successful, the farmers reacted favorably when some of the 
leaders, with the encouragement and support of INDAP, began to promote the idea of establishing a 
second-tier organization. The key argument for this move was that by bringing together all the local 
organizations in Los Muermos, they would control a large enough volume of potatoes to justify 
establishing their own outlet in the Conception 5 2 and Santiago wholesale markets, thus avoiding a 
number of intermediaries and obtaining better prices for their members. 
Organizational structure 
Agrocamp has a staff of 22 paid employees, including a General Manager, three people who work in 
the Administration and Finances department, nine people who make up the Technical Assistance unit, 
and the rest who are in the Commercial department. There is also an elected Accounts Inspection 
Commission, actually comprising a single farmer who works on his own without support from any 
internal or external accountant. Agrocamp's General Manager is also Chairman of the National Potato 
Network, an umbrella organization for all the potato marketing EACs. 
The 16 shareholders (the grassroots EACs) elect a five-member board every three years, although the 
Chile's second largest city, more or less half way between Los Muermos and Santiago. 
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board members have not changed since the organization was formed. The board members claim that 
they keep being reelected because "we have received training, have gained knowledge and experience, 
and besides, it takes a lot of time to do this job, so there are few volunteers". Every year there is a 
general meeting with all the shareholders, which can be attended by any individual member. The local 
grassroots organizations meet every month. Board members visit each grassroots organization every 
year. However, some of the farmers I interviewed mentioned that in these meetings they usually talk 
about new Agrocamp projects and future plans, but the outcome of past Agrocamp activities or its 
economic or financial situation are never explained. 
The General Manager and the board meet at least once a month in a formal session, but if necessary 
they can get together on an almost daily basis. There appears to be great trust and a good working 
relationship between the board and the Manager. 
Agrocamp is a contractor of INDAP's technical assistance programs, and provides this service to 
almost all of its members 5 3. 
As mentioned above, the organization was launched with the primary purpose of marketing potatoes, 
but early on it decided to diversify operations, as the board and management very rapidly realized that 
potato marketing would not yield sufficient income to justify the organization. Agrocamp now has five 
Business Units: potato marketing (in Los Muermos and in an outlet at the wholesale market of 
Conception), sales of agricultural and construction supplies (starting in 1997), a supermarket 
(launched in 1998, the first one to be set up in the town of Los Muermos), a veterinary pharmacy 
(1998), and milk marketing. Agrocamp also owns a small local hotel and some real estate in the town 
of Los Muermos. 
To launch all these ventures and acquire these assets, the EAC has had to incur a substantial debt with 
INDAP, and at the time of my field work had defaulted on the payments. Even the supermarket was 
financed by an INDAP loan. 
Performance analysis 
Agrocamp's annual gross sales have grown by a factor of 30, starting from $ 40,000 in 1996. 
Although potato marketing was the organization's original intention, gross income from potato sales in 
1999 represented less than 7% of total sales. The largest source of income was the sale of agricultural 
and construction supplies, representing around 70% of total income. The next largest source was from 
providing technical assistance (about 12% of total income), followed by supermarket sales (8%). 
Why do potatoes represent such a low share of the EAC's total annual income? According to a survey 
of a sample of Agrocamp's farmer members, the members only sell around 9% of their total marketed 
potato production through the EAC (although according to sales figures provided by the General 
Manager, it is around 14%). However, some of the members who live in more remote areas sell as 
much as 50% or more of their harvest to the EAC, because in these locations the middlemen pay a 
lower price. These data are confirmed by the interviews I held with a number of grassroots members in 
December 1999: the previous season, some of them had not sold even one sack of potatoes through 
Agrocamp. 
Why don't EAC members sell their potatoes through their organization? Some of the board members 
claimed that this was due to the ingrained individualistic and selfish behavior of small farmers. The 
General Manager's theory is that they are speculating against future market prices ("although they 
usually end up losing money when they do this"). Most of the grassroots members I interviewed have a 
different opinion: they say they do not sell to Agrocamp because it is more convenient to work with 
the traditional middlemen. I agree with this explanation and will now explain why. 
In the first year, Agrocamp hired a trader to visit members' farms and offer to buy their produce. The 
results were disappointing even from the start, with members preferring to sell their produce to the 
Although INDAP funds the costs of attending only 330 farmers. 
176 Chapter Ten 
hated conchenchos (middlemen). This was ironic, as the whole point of the EAC was to circumvent 
this middleman system which farmers blame for the low prices they often get for their products. The 
EAC leaders decided the prices they were offering were not competitive enough. 
Hence, the EAC board decided to offer a better price, which ended up being higher than the average 
market price for the season. Consequently, Agrocamp lost a substantial amount of money. As the 
President of the Board put it, "we learned right there that one cannot go against the market price." 
To avoid repeating this mistake, the organization decided to pay farmers only once the potatoes had 
been sold; that is, between 15 and 30 days after delivery. According to the General Manager, this has 
solved the potato-marketing operation's cash flow problems, but he failed to mention that it has also 
resulted in members returning to the old middlemen, who pay cash on delivery, and often pay better 
prices (in part because they are avoiding paying the 18% Value Added Tax). 
Agrocamp briefly sold potatoes to a supermarket in the regional capital city of Puerto Montt. The 
Manager explains: "they would pay 60 to 70 days after delivery, return unsold produce, and sold less 
than 3200 kg per weelc4". The board members debated a few other ideas, the most sensible of which 
was the production and marketing of seed potato. Middlemen are far less active in this market and this 
strategy would allow the EAC to broker deals with other small farmers in the north of the country, 
where seed potato cannot be produced due to phytosanitary restrictions. This idea has already been put 
into practice, and they would like to expand it at a faster rate, but lack the necessary financing having 
defaulted on their INDAP loan repayments. 
Despite the actual figures, board members and the Manager do not think they have failed in what they 
still feel is their essential mission: to improve marketing of their members' potato harvest. They insist 
that the other businesses are only part of a necessary diversification strategy to support the potato 
marketing operations. The manager explains: "our agriculture-related businesses only leave a 2 to 5% 
profit rate, while those not related to agriculture, like the supermarket, yield 12 to 20%... we create 
new business units to subsidize agriculture." 
In a meeting I held with the board, they unanimously claimed that even if they did not sell their 
members' potato harvest directly, they still had an indirect positive effect. Their theory was that they 
were acting as a price regulator in the region by establishing a price at which potatoes would be 
bought by Agrocamp. I doubt that this is in fact happening. First of all, if Agrocamp paid prices above 
the going market price paid by the middlemen, it would incur heavy losses, as happened before. 
Second, Agrocamp lacks the financial clout to deliver on its promise to buy, at a given price, the 
production not bought by the middlemen. Third, Agrocamp is certainly buying less than half a percent 
of the total potato crop in its area of influence, and hence it is a minor player even in the local market. 
Fourth, even if Agrocamp could influence prices in the area, buyers would still be free to move just a 
few kilometers away, and buy the production from the region's remaining 20,000 hectares of potatoes. 
Not one of the grassroots members I interviewed mentioned potato marketing when asked about the 
three main benefits of being a member of Agrocamp. The most frequently mentioned benefits were: 
commercial credit for the purchase of fertilizers, technical assistance at a reasonable cost, and 
commercial credit for supermarket purchases. Some of the farmers I interviewed claimed that the price 
of fertilizers and other agricultural supplies in Los Muermos decreased noticeably after Agrocamp 
started operating in this line of business and began competing against other commercial firms. Several 
members also mentioned the added convenience of working with technical advisors. Technical 
advisors can give farmers a purchase order so that they can immediately obtain the necessary 
agricultural inputs from the EAC itself. These are delivered by Agrocamp to the farmers' fields, 
saving travel time and red tape, while keeping prices competitive. 
The conclusion is that Agrocamp's marketing program is not having any major effect, directly or 
indirectly, on the prices members are paid for their potatoes. Yet, as I will explain below, Agrocamp is 
5 4 The yield of perhaps less than one-quarter of a hectare, and thus, not a very significant amount if the purpose is to find an 
outlet for the majority of the EAC members. 
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having a major influence on its members' net farm and household income, because of its work as a 
technical assistance consultant and as a supplier of fertilizers and other agricultural inputs. 
10.2.2 Cooperativa Pullallan Ltda. 
The Cooperativa Pullallan Ltda. is located in the Puerto Saavedra, on Region DCs coast. There is 
much poverty in this area, with many small farmers being Mapuche people 5 5, the original inhabitants 
of Central and Southern Chile (about 90% of the members of Pullalan are Mapuche). Still, according 
to INDAP sources Cooperativa Pullallan's members tend to have larger farms and be better-off than 
most of the very poor peasants in the Puerto Saavedra area. 
A brief history 
The cooperative acquired its current legal status in 1996. But as all the members belong to the same 
Mapuche local community (comunidad), there are family ties among many of them. For many years 
this community has engaged in collective action through a Small Farmers' Committee, an informal 
organization frequently found in Mapuche communities. The cooperative was formed because the 
Committee could not legally engage in formal market transactions of any kind. 
The cooperative has 32 members, most of whom used to belong to the Committee (the rest are 
younger farmers who joined the formal organization when it was established). Although all the 
members of the Pullallan community were invited to join, not all did. Old rivalries were partly to 
blame, while not all wanted - or were able - to pay the initial fee of $ 147. Membership is now closed, 
because as some of the current members explain "we have made many investments and worked hard to 
get what we own, so now it would not be fair to let others come and enjoy all of this". 
The organization has been led since its informal inception by a small group of members, one of whom 
is very influential in the cooperative, despite not being from the local Lonko's household (the head of 
the Mapuche local community). 
Organizational structure 
The members meet once a month at a general meeting, with attendance usually between 50 and 60%; 
however, everyone makes sure not to miss three meetings in a row, because this leads to suspension of 
his or her membership. All the current board members were selected from among the younger farmers 
(aged between 21 and 35), a decision that had the unanimous backing of the membership. The board 
meets every week. 
The first President and key leader of the EAC is now the cooperative's administrator, and participates 
in the weekly board meetings. The members wanted him as administrator so he would be free to travel 
and work with INDAP, potential buyers, and other farmers' organizations: "there is no one here with 
more experience and know-how than him". Although the administrator was once paid by the 
cooperative as a full time employee, the position is now an honorary one because the cooperative can 
no longer afford the salary. The administrator therefore no longer devotes all his time to EAC 
business. It is interesting to note that at least one of the younger board members accompanies the 
aaxninistrator to every meeting, be it with INDAP, a client, another organization, and so on. "We now 
have contacts with the buyers in Osorno and Santiago, as well as with the firm that sells us the 
fertilizer, and we know who to talk to in INDAP for the different issues", says one of these young 
board members. 
External observers familiar with the history of this group explain they have always been active in 
5 5 Due to centuries of injustice, exclusion and discrimination, poverty is rampant among the Mapuche and other indigenous 
Chilean populations. 
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starting new projects, thanks in large part to the strong leadership of one highly motivated and 
energetic individual. They see the group as solid and well constituted, rights and duties are clear, and 
the members are always being driven to achieve new goals. In fact several farmers have left the group, 
unable to cope with the strong peer pressure to achieve. 
Pullallan has received loans and grants from INDAP, and other public sources support potato 
production and marketing. They have designed and implemented small-scale sprinkler irrigation 
systems on most members' farms, complete with a network of 20 small dams. They own one pump 
and the full set of pipes and sprinklers, which they move from field to field according to a schedule 
defined in weekly meetings with the technical advisor. 
Early on they built a good, medium-size warehouse to store their harvest, as well as a meeting house 
which is used by them and the other five community organizations that are active in Pullallan. This 
building also houses the cooperative's office, and is equipped with two desktop computers; the 
younger members are being trained to use these PCs. 
For two years in a row Pullallan has run a project to collectively produce seed potato for selling to 
farmers in the north of the country. This operation is run as a sharecropping arrangement between the 
farmers (who provide the land and labor) and the cooperative (who supplies the certified seed). When 
I visited Pullallan, the cooperative was also considering buying a truck and a potato harvester to help 
reduce costs. 
Between 1996 and 1999, the cooperative bought into INDAP's technical assistance programs, and was 
able to hire its own advisors. Every two years, with the aid of the advisors, they run soil fertility tests, 
a practice they feel has allowed them to make substantial savings on the use of fertilizers. 
The members have made significant contributions in cash and in kind to all these projects. Sometimes, 
some members put up the initial capital, and the cooperative pays them back over a set period and at a 
prearranged interest rate. 
The farmers in Puerto Saavedra are poor and their farms small. Access is also difficult compared with 
many other potato-growing regions, so there are few middlemen willing to travel to the region to buy 
their potato harvest. Most of the traders who do go there are small operators who find it hard to 
compete in more prosperous areas and lack the resources to buy the crop of medium and large farmers. 
It is likely, therefore, that the farmers of Puerto Saavedra receive some of the lowest prices in the 
country for their potatoes. When I visited the area in January and February 2000, most farmers were 
talking of "the crisis of potato production" in Puerto Saavedra (due to low prices and a major three-
year drought), and the local INDAP office had a record 65% default rate on loans given to potato 
producers. 
Each year since it was formed, the cooperative has sold part of its members' potato harvest at the 
wholesale markets in Osomo (a medium-sized city in the south) and in Santiago. The contacts with the 
buyers were established by their leader, whose travel to these cities was funded by INDAP. The board 
members explained potato prices were between Chilean $ 0.03/kg to $ 0.07/kg higher in these cities 
than those paid locally by the middlemen; these differences are very substantial. Moreover, they have 
learned to exploit a window of opportunity in the Osomo market, which they can reach in November 
before the harvest has started in most areas to the south. 5 6 
The cooperative also buys potatoes from local farmers who are not members. A board member told me 
"we pay them a bit more than what the conchencho (middleman) would, but less than the price we pay 
to our members." Members also receive preferential prices, though not exclusive access, to the 
fertilizers the cooperative buys in bulk. 
The cooperative ensures that members sell their potatoes through it by linking sales with the supply of 
its other services, such as the use of the irrigation system or delivery of fertilizers to the farm. If a 
Due to phytosanitary restrictions, potatoes from the north cannot be sold in the disease-free areas south of the country. 
Hence, by harvesting early these farmers are enjoying a regional non-market trade barrier. 
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member does not sell his or her potatoes through the organization, he or she will not have access to 
these other services, or will be charged the full non-member fee. 
Performance analysis 
How effective has this strategy been? Not very, according to the information, opinions and complaints 
of the board and grassroots members. Based on data from the local survey of members and non-
members and the income statements of the cooperative, I estimate that the cooperative is not 
marketing more than 15% to 20% of its members' total potato harvest. Although low, this share is 
higher than for most other EACs, according to several well-informed sources and my own case study 
results. 
During a meeting I held with several grassroots members of the Pullallan cooperative, they listed the 
main problems they face in marketing their potatoes: low quality ("we use the same seed year after 
year., buying new seed is too expensive"), small volumes, and the "lack of loyalty of us, the members... 
the cooperative cannot buy all of our harvest in cash, so we sell part of it to the conchencho... also, we 
have to transport our harvest to the warehouse by cart, while the conchencho takes it from the farm; 
this is why we now want to buy our own truck." 
To raise working capital so as to afford to buy a larger share of the local harvest, the General Meeting 
approved an extraordinary contribution of $ 315 per member. Those who do not make this 
contribution will become 'passive members' and will be charged the full commercial fee for all the 
services provided by the cooperative. A time frame has been established so that all the members, 
including the poorest ones, can fulfill this obligation. 
In 1997 the cooperative was awarded a special grant to train 20 of their members in 'accessing and 
competing in the potato market'. As a result of this training workshop, they were able to secure a 
contract with a regional supermarket chain. However, according to one well-informed source, the 
cooperative could not fulfil its obligation to deliver clean, graded and bagged potatoes, so they 
eventually lost the contract. This failure was due to three linked factors: 
(a) The cooperative was of course tied to its members, that is, a specific group of farmers who are its 
suppliers. The per kilo production costs for poor farmers are high, because their yields are very 
low. Quality is uneven, in part because their fields are also uneven and because they use old and 
degraded seed. Hence, the cooperative was trying to reach a high-end market, more demanding in 
quality than the wholesale market, from a very weak and unfavorable production base. 
(b) The cooperative lacked the financial strength to pay its members cash on delivery, and the 
supermarkets typically pay only after 60 or more days. Moreover, the supermarket charges them -
according to the law - the 18% Value Added Tax, which they cannot claim as a financial credit 
since most of them are not registered as tax payers. Poor farmers are financially unable to engage 
in this sort of transaction, so they end up selling a large share of their harvest to the traditional 
middlemen, who not only pay cash on delivery, but also can pay a slightly higher net price since 
they operate illegally by avoiding paying VAT. 
(c) Because of the small scale of its operations, the cooperative cannot afford to buy the machinery 
necessary to clean, grade and bag the potatoes they intend to sell to the supermarket. They must 
hire this service elsewhere, and they end up working with old, inefficient and expensive 
equipment. 
This experience motivated Pullallan to join forces with other organizations to give them a scale of 
operations necessary for more ambitious projects, such as selling to supermarkets. They joined with 
other six potato-marketing EACs from Puerto Saavedra and three other neighboring municipalities, to 
form SOPROPAR S.A., a second-tier EAC that will be their common trader and technical assistance 
provider. 
The farmer who leads the Pullallan cooperative was a major force behind the decision to set up 
SOPROPAR, and was elected as its first Chairman. One of the organizations that is a member of 
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SOPROPAR S.A. provided a warehouse in Santiago to be used to wholesale or retail potatoes. In 
addition, MDAP has lent the new organization a large potato-storage warehouse, built during the 
agrarian reform in the 1960s. Finally, all the member organizations have renounced their own 
technical assistance contracts, and the new organization is now hired by INDAP as their common 
provider of agricultural advisory services. 
Some questions that neither INDAP nor the SOPROPAR leadership could answer are why they think 
that they can build a robust second-tier organization on the basis of seven very weak EACs, and, in 
particular, why they think they can command the loyalty of their members in marketing potatoes, 
when the member organizations have failed to do so. 
10.2.3 Agricola y Comercial Carahue Ltda. 
Agricola y Comercial Carahue Ltda. is better known to its members and to external agents as Santa 
Celia, the name of the sector in the municipality of Carahue, Region DC, where this EAC is based. 
Although the organization started with about 50 or so members, it now has only 10, of which only 
eight are still active. All come from the same small sector, and there are close family ties between 
several of the members. There is no single leader running this organization, but there is a core group of 
three or four members who appear to have the greatest influence. A distinctive characteristic of Santa 
Celia is that most of the members are young and have completed at least their high school education, 
and a few of them even have technical or incomplete university studies. 
A brief history 
Santa Celia was formally established in 1997, although the group had been working for over 30 years 
as a Committee of Small Farmers, then as a local group of INDAP's Technology Transfer Program, 
and since the early 90s as one of the local branches of the Cooperativa El Alma, a large potato-
marketing EAC that went bankrupt in the mid-90s. 
Since 1991 Cooperativa El Alma had received grants from a major poverty alleviation program funded 
by the Dutch government; some of these funds were used to build a large number of small warehouses 
scattered in different sectors of the coastal provinces of Region DC. The idea was that local 
organizations would collect the potato harvest, to be sold later by Cooperativa El Alma. That EAC 
faced the same problem of lack of membership loyalty seen today in the cases of Agrocamp and 
Pullallan. It took only one year of trying to overcome this problem by buying the harvest in cash on 
delivery, as the traditional middlemen do, for the cooperative to go bankrupt: it is difficult to outsmart 
and outcompete the traditional traders! 
After the failure of El Alma, INDAP started putting pressure on several of the best local groups to 
formalize their own EACs. The members of San Celia did not see much need for this change in status, 
since the activities they were interested in carrying out could be done using their informal local 
Committee of Small Farmers. When INDAP started conditioning the continuity of its support on EAC 
formation, 10 of the 50 Committee members decided to take the step. However, the Committee of 
Small Farmers continues to exist, and the members of Santa Celia are also active in that organization. 
The group from the Santa Celia sector decided to take advantage of the existing infrastructure, and to 
try to continue marketing their potatoes together. They were highly motivated by the fact that two of 
the members had inherited a warehouse in Santiago, located in the middle of a wholesale market 
neighborhood. Since they now had the capacity to store and regulate the flow of potatoes thanks to the 
local warehouse, plus the option of retailing their production at the market end because they also had 
storage facilities in Santiago, they felt they had all the necessary elements to bypass the middlemen 
and sell directly to final or almost final consumers. As one of the members put it "for 30 years the 
Committee had been dreaming about bypassing the conchenchos, and we now saw a light at the end of 
the tunnel". 
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First, they had to take out a loan with INDAP in order to repair the Santiago warehouse and to have 
some working capital to start their marketing operation. Then, INDAP gave them a grant for a 
delegation to visit Santiago to learn how the wholesale and retail potato markets worked (as one 
member of the Board of Santa Celia put it, "we learned all the theory, but we were left alone to learn 
how things really work."). 
Part of the loan has been paid with the profits from two small collectively-managed seed potato crops 
(0.75 ha the first year and 1.75 ha the second year). Once they pay their debts, they plan to continue 
with this project and to split the profits between the members. 
After several months of work they took their 1997 harvest to Santiago, where they immediately found 
that they could not compete given the market prices and their cost structure. It took them over one 
month to sell about three truckloads of potatoes, less than 20% of their total harvest. 
Performance analysis 
According to information from INDAP and Santa Celia members, and the data I gathered in the 
survey, I estimate that the direct production, transportation and marketing costs of Santa Celia are 
around $ 0.14/kg. With these costs and compared with official price statistics for the past decade in the 
Santiago market, I estimate that, with luck, Santa Celia could have competed in only five of the past 
10 years, even when bypassing many middlemen by selling their potatoes in Santiago. 
As a comparison, the costs of a sample of five nearby commercial potato farmers were never greater 
then $ 0.10/kg. Why the difference in costs per kilo? This is because of the commercial farmers' much 
higher yields, which more than compensate for the differences in direct production, transportation and 
marketing costs. 
Santa Celia's small farmers, with their very low productivity levels due to their late adoption of 
outdated technologies, cannot expect to compete in a market of undifferentiated commodities, because 
of Cochrane's treadmill effect (Cochrane, 1958) discussed in Chapter 2. Bypassing one or even several 
links in the marketing chain is simply not enough, as the market price includes the costs of liaising 
between the producers and the final consumers. 
Although these farmers have had the support of different extension programs for many years, they 
have a very poor opinion of their quality: "Nobody here believes the technical assistants... there have 
been so many mistakes and so many failures, and then nobody becomes responsible for them... the 
technicians come once every so often and they expect us to do as they say." 
After their failed venture in the retail market, the farmers of Santa Celia were more or less forced by 
INDAP to join SOPROPAR, the second-tier organization to which Cooperative Pullallan also belongs. 
The Santiago warehouse was turned over to the new organization, and SOPROPAR will hire a trader 
to run the marketing operation in Santiago. According to INDAP sources, SOPROPAR will be able to 
do better because it will have a larger stock of potatoes to sell. According to the members of Santa 
Celia, if SOPROPAR does better it will be due in large part to the fact that the grassroots 
organizations are shouldering many of the costs; for example, each of the seven member organizations 
has agreed to lend SOPROPAR one large truckload of potatoes, so that the new EAC can start its 
operations. 
In the face of these results and dim perspectives, I asked the Santa Celia members why they had 
agreed to join SOPROPAR, and they gave me two reasons. First, INDAP put pressure on them by 
making it clear that all future loans and grants would be channeled through the new organization; "we 
are used to having a Patron [the large landowners before the agrarian reform], and our Patron today 
is INDAP." Secondly, one of them says, "it is the hope we have left... what are we going to do? We 
know that if we sell to the conchenchos we will lose, so we might as well lose on our own. If we stop 
trying, we might as well sell the land." 
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10.3 Performance and impacts of potato-marketing EACs 
As with the previous case studies, I will now explain the economic and financial performance of these 
three EACs, and will then analyze their impacts on their members' household and farm incomes. 
10.3.1 Economic and financial performance of the potato-marketing EACs 
In this section I will show that these three EACs are not viable economic organizations. 
I have two different sources of information for Agrocamp; one an external audit mandated by INDAP 
in 1999, and the other the unaudited balance sheet and income statements given to me by their own 
internal accountant. For the other two EACs, I only had access to the information from their 
accountants. Table 10.1 shows the main results. 
According to the external auditors, Agrocamp is broke, while according to its own books, it is in very 
bad financial shape and close to going broke. According to the external auditors, in 1998 Agrocamp 
had a modest but positive net income of $ 42,000, while according to their own internal accounts, they 
lost $ 6,300 that year, despite government grants for close to $ 63,000. The potato-marketing operation 
is the source of Agrocamp's losses. The external audit makes it clear that Agrocamp's situation has 
deteriorated sharply since 1997. 
On the other hand, Cooperativa Pullallan nominally shows very positive economic and financial 
results, but this is only due to the fact that 66% of its income comes from government grants. These 
grants were supposed to be used to pay for the technical advisory services that the organization should 
give to its members under contract to INDAP, but in fact only 60% or so was spent on this or other 
purposes, the rest appearing as the organization's profit. The organization did manage to obtain a 
small profit on its potato-marketing operation, helped in part by the fact that most of its fixed costs and 
part of its marketing expenses were covered by INDAP grants. 
In 1999, Santa Celia experienced a small loss. Although this organization shows a healthy financial 
status, this is only due to the fact that the board members pledged their own assets in favor of the 
EAC; otherwise, Santa Celia would also show negative financial results. 
What we see then is that the three organizations are losing money and are only sustained thanks to the 
largesse of INDAP, through its subsidies and loans. In the absence of this substantial support, the three 
organizations would rapidly collapse. 
The common reason for this failure is the inability of these EACs to market their members' potato 
harvest, who prefer to sell most of their production through the traditional middlemen. The EACs' 
claim that this failure is largely due to their lack of working capital is only partly true. While they do 
lack enough financial resources to buy their members' full potato harvest, their accounts clearly show 
that they could be marketing a much larger share than what is actually being sold through them. This 
reinforces the members' own arguments that they sell their produce to the middlemen because it is 
more convenient and profitable than marketing it through their own organizations. 
10.3.2 Impact on members' farms and households 
Household income 
Table 10.2 shows that the member households of these three EACs have a net income of between 40 
and 160% higher than non-members. As in the case of the CALs, the members of these EAC tend to 
generate more non-farm income than the non-members. Farm income is the main source of total 
income, but non-farm income is also very important, as its contribution can be as high as 25 to 40% of 
total income. 
Table 10.1 Economic and financial performance of three potato-marketing EACs 
Item Agrocamp 1998 
External audit 
Agrocamp 1998 
Own accounts 
Pullallan 1998 Santa Celia 1999 
Total revenue ($) 1,266,932 1,321,468 51,854 8,235 
Total expenses ($) 1,224,694 1,314,955 34,855 8,926 
Net result ($) 42,238 -6,515 16,999 -690 
Total assets ($) 533,769 682,832 45,387 40,384 
Current assets ($) 339,174 511,919 29,589 20,413 
Noncurrent assets ($) 194,595 170,913 15,798 19,971 
Total liabilities ($) 564,430 613,710 9,973 8,977 
Current liabilities ($) 429,522 428,895 817 568 
Noncurrent liabilities ($) 134,878 184,815 9,155 8,409 
Net assets ($) -30,661 69,122 35,414 -2,102 
Grants from government ($) 59,193 n.a. 34,074 0 
Net result/total revenue 0.03 -0.05 0.33 -0.08 
Total liabilities/total assets 1.06 0.90 0.22 0.22 
Operational capital (current assets - current liabilities) ($) - 90,377 83,024 28,771 19,845 
Liquidity (current assets/current liabilities) 0.79 1.19 36.21 35.96 
Dependency (grants/total revenue) 0.05 n.a. 0.66 0 
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Table 10.2 Income and income composition, Agrocamp, Santa Celia and Coop. Pullallân ($) (1999-
2000 agricultural season) 
I N D I C A T O R S A G R O C A M P S A N T A C E L I A C O O P . 
P U L L A L L Â N 
Participants Non-parts. Participants Non-parts. Participants Non-parts. 
Net hh income 7,495 5,696 7,919 2,955 2,536 1,471 
Earned net hh income 7,479 5,314 6,604 1,299 1,380 960 
Unearned net hh income 466 382 895 1,656 1,156 511 
Non agricultural net income 2,001 235 3,322 1,036 n.a. n.a. 
Farm net income 6,411 2,650 5,917 885 304 -6 
In the Santa Celia and Pullallan areas, unearned income (transfers and government subsidies) 
represents a very large component of total income, possibly reflecting the impact of the multiple 
poverty alleviation public subsidies, as well as remittances from migrant family members, which are 
known to be particularly high in the case of Mapuche households. 
Farm profits, production and sales 
Since I have already shown that these EACs are only marketing a small fraction of the potato harvest, 
these operations are not likely to be having much impact on members' farm or household income. 
However, Table 10.3 shows that all member farmers have higher gross margins per hectare for their 
potato crop than non-members. This is basically due to their significantly higher yields, more than 
compensating for their higher direct production expenses5 7. As we saw in the three case studies, the 
farmers who decided to join these organizations have a long tradition of participation in different 
technical assistance and extension programs. 
Did the best potato farmers join these organizations, or does participation in the organization lead to 
better results? Probably both. There is no doubt that these three EACs have continued a long process 
of technology transfer and agricultural advice promoted by INDAP since at least the early 1990s, and 
in some cases going back even longer. It is likely that the farmers who joined these EACs were more 
inclined to innovate and were already performing better in terms of yields, costs and quality. But the 
majority of the farmers I interviewed (with the exception of those from Santa Celia), highly valued the 
access to technical assistance that the EACs are giving them. Has EAC membership added to the 
initial technical advantage of their members? I don't know. But INDAP and the farmers need to 
explain whether it is necessary to go through the whole process of setting up an EAC to have this 
technical assistance service. 
There may be an effect of lower costs of fertilizers and other inputs, since the organizations also offer these supplies at a lower 
cost to their members. However, I did not measure that variable in the survey, although I did find that the total expenditure per 
hectare on fertilizers and other inputs was much higher for members than non-members, thus explaining the higher yields. 
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Table 10.3 Participation in potato-marketing EACs and economic results of potato production (1999-
2000 agricultural season) 
VARIABLE THREE EACS AGROCAMP SANTA CELIA COOP. PULLALLAN 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Gross income ($) 5,968 1,699 5,173 1,356 10,231 3,095 4,516 1,333 
Direct expenses 
($) 
3,931 1,767 3,465 1,576 5,293 2,654 4,058 1,452 
Gross margin ($) 2,037 -68 1,708 -220 4,938 441 458 - 119 
Gross margin per 
hectare ($/ha) 
679 -56 657 -245 667 147 120 -85 
Price (J/kg) 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
Yield (kg/ha) 20,952 15,502 25,808 19,253 14,612 10,049 12,095 9,700 
Crop area (ha) 3 1.2 2.6 0.9 7.4 3 3.8 1.4 
Production sold 
(%) 
63 47 71 44 60 53 41 42 
Production sold 
through 
middlemen (%) 
57 43 68 44 50 44 23 42 
Comparing the farm income item in Table 10.2 with the potato gross margin line in Table 10.3, we can 
see that for Agrocamp and Santa Celia members, potatoes make a rather small contribution to total 
farm and household income, while in the case of Pullallan all of the net income comes from potatoes 
(in fact, the other farm activities are losing money, as net farm income is less than the potato gross 
margin). A question that should be explored in depth and for which I do not have an answer, is 
whether there is a relationship between the relative importance of the crop to a household, and the 
'loyalty' of the individual member to the organization when it comes to marketing that crop. On the 
one hand, one could argue that the more important the crop, the more incentive a household would 
have to become involved in the organization. On the other hand, the more important the crop, the less 
willing the household would be to market its potatoes through a channel that, as we have seen, offers 
few benefits compared to the traditional approach. 
Table 10.3 also shows that EAC members are more market-oriented than non-members, as a higher 
percentage of their harvest is sold in the marketplace, with the exception of Pullallan. 
The results also confirm that on average (for these three EACs), 94% of the production sold by EAC 
members is marketed through the traditional middlemen. The Pullallan cooperative sells less than 18% 
of the total marketed potatoes of its members, and the shares for Santa Celia and Agrocamp are even 
lower, 10% and 3%, respectively. In fact, EAC members on average receive a slightly lower price for 
their potatoes than non-members, although the difference is not statistically significant. 
A very important finding is that on average the member farmers' on-farm production costs are around 
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$ 0.09/kg, to which one should add an additional $ 0.03/kg to $ 0.04/kg for transportation costs. These 
figures leave these farmers in a very uncompetitive position, compared to 'normal' market prices, by 
at least $ 0.02/kg to $ 0.03/kg, or around 15 to 20% of their current production plus transportation 
cost. It is impossible even for a very efficient EAC to yield good results when it is starting from such a 
low point! 
This illustrates the need for policies and programs to focus on actions at both the farm and the EAC 
levels. In the long run, an EAC cannot survive if the primary productivity of its members is so low 
that, no matter what, it will never be able to buy their products or sell them a service at a price which 
is realistic both to them and to the members. When many or all of the members have productivity 
levels that are far below most competitors, there is a strong incentive for the EAC to disengage from 
them and start acting as "just another firm, buying and selling from and to whomever it is most 
convenient", as I have heard said by many managers, advisors, policy-makers, and even small farmers 
on EAC boards. 
However, one should remember how difficult and improbable it is for most small farmers, especially 
the poorest ones, to keep ahead of the mean productivity level in a commodity crop such as potatoes. 
Cochrane (1958) has already explained the consequences of being trapped on the agricultural treadmill 
while at the same time being late-adopters of productivity-enhancing technologies. While EACs may 
improve their chances under certain conditions, they do not seem to offer a definitive means of 
escaping this fate. Instead, these small potato producers remain in the market only because up to 80% 
of their direct costs are represented by the opportunity cost of family labor; self-exploitation is what 
lets these households continue producing potatoes, a strategy that allows them to survive as production 
and consumption units, but that spells poverty. 
Technical assistance, technology adoption and yields 
All the EAC members have had access to technical assistance and extension services for at least a 
decade. In some cases, they are receiving these services from more than one source. Non-members do 
not have access to direct support, but they benefit indirectly from the local diffusion of many of the 
innovations introduced by the organized farmers, in particular in Pullallan and Santa Celia where the 
EACs are so embedded in their local communities. A significant number of EAC members are paying 
part of the cost of these services, with an average contribution of between $ 32 to $ 53 a year. The 
result is that most members have adopted more innovations over the past five years than non-
members. In the case of Agrocamp, this is true mainly for fertilizer, insecticide and fungicide use, and 
to a lesser extent crop diversification, new infrastructure, crop varieties, seed quality and artificial 
insemination of cattle. Santa Celia members are ahead of their control group in terms of use of 
machinery, equipment fertilizers and insect and disease control. Pullallan members show better results 
in terms of crop diversification, use of irrigation systems and access to mechanized equipment (Table 
10.4). The effect of the greater use of these production technologies is that EAC members have higher 
yields not only in potatoes, but also in other locally important enterprises such as oats and milk (Table 
10.5). 
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Table 10.4 Technological changes implemented in the past five years, Agrocamp, Santa Celia and 
Coop. Pullallan 
INDICATORS AGROCAMP SANTA CELIA COOP. PULLALLAN 
Participants Non-parts. Participants Non-parts. Participants Non-parts. 
Yes % Yes % Yes % Yes % Yes % Yes% 
Crop diversification 53.3 40 22.2 40 50 20 
Contract agriculture 3.3 0 0 0 0 0 
Marketing of inputs of products 33.3 26.7 55.6 0 70 20 
Irrigation and drainage 0 11.8 0 0 25 0 
Machinery and equipment 13.3 16.7 66.7 20 50 20 
Constructions and infrastructure 53.3 33.3 33.3 40 50 30 
Crop varieties and seed quality 63.3 56.7 77.8 70 80 80 
Use of fertilizers 86.7 53.3 66.7 30 80 70 
Weed control 46.7 33.3 77.8 70 90 90 
Insect and disease control 26.7 6.7 77.8 40 80 70 
Cattle breeds 17.2 20 0 10 22.2 20 
Reproduction of cattle 51.7 33.3 11.1 22.2 22.2 10 
Sanitary management of cattle 75.9 63.3 88.9 60 60 60 
Table 10.5 Average yields, Agrocamp, Santa Celia and Coop. Pullallan (1999-2000 agricultural 
season) 
INDICATORS AGROCAMP SANTA CELIA COOP. PULLALLAN 
Participants Non-
participants 
Participants Non-
participants 
Participants Non-
participants 
Oats (Kg/ha) 4,605 3,188 2,236 996 3,520 2,301 
Potatoes (Kg/ha) 20,952 15,502 25,808 19,253 14,612 10,049 
Milk cow (Lt/cow/yr) 2,143 1,774 311 216 257 192 
BAC members are also ahead of non-members in terms of the incorporation of some new farm 
management practices, notably costs and income records: 17%, 22% and 70% of the Agrocamp, Santa 
Celia and Pullallan members keep records, while none of the farmers in the control groups do so. 
However, there are no differences in terms of other management practices, such as VAT accounting 
and filing, being legally registered as farmers for fiscal purposes or holding bank accounts (Table 
10.6). 
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Table 10.6. Farm management practices, Agrocamp, Santa Celia and Coop. Pullallân 
INDICATORS AGROCAMP SANTA CELIA COOP. PULLALLAN 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% % % % % % 
Farmers legally registered for fiscal 
purposes 
13.3 6.7 22.2 30 20 0 
VAT accounting and filing 6.7 6.7 22.2 30 20 0 
Costs and income records 16.7 0 22.2 0 70 0 
Holds a bank account 3.3 0 11.1 0 10 0 
Legalized land titles 64.3 86.2 100 88.9 100 62.5 
Legalized water titles 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Access to credit 
In the case of Agrocamp and Santa Celia, over 60% of the members and a slightly smaller proportion 
of the non-members have access to agricultural credit from INDAP. These are basically short term 
loans. The amount lent by INDAP to the members is significantly larger than to non-members, by as 
much as 94% in the case of Agrocamp, and by 13% in the case of Santa Celia. In the case of Pullallan, 
less than one-third of the members had access to INDAP loans last season, but this is most likely due 
to many of them having defaulted on previous payments. Only a handful o f farmers, members or non-
members, have access to credit from other sources, such as the State Bank, private banks, or 
commercial credit from agricultural supply firms (Table 10.7). 
Table 10.7. Access to credit, Agrocamp, Santa Celia and Coop. Pullallân 
I N D I C A T O R S A G R O C A M P S A N T A C E L I A C O O P . P U L L A L L A N 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
N° $ N° $ N" $ N" $ N° $ N° $ 
Total loans 23 1,455 16 731 6 1,710 6 2,554 3 610 1 526 
Short term loans 23 1,109 14 625 6 1,710 6 2,186 3 610 1 526 
Long term loans 5 1,608 2 1,472 0 0 1 2,207 0 0 0 0 
INDAP loans 21 1,413 16 731 6 1,710 4 1,519 3 610 1 526 
State bank loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 4,625 0 0 0 0 
EAC loans 3 1,261 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
All EAC members valued the simplification of loan paperwork for members. The common practice is 
for the technical advisors to fill in the loan applications in the field, and then take care of the 
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paperwork at the INDAP office. Although not as frequently mentioned by the farmers, but emphasized 
by LNDAP sources, an additional advantage is that those who are organized have more leverage to ask 
INDAP to reschedule debts, although, as seen in the case of Pullallan, there is a limit to how far 
INDAP is will ing to go, and eventually those who do not pay will end up without access to this 
service. 
10.4 Explaining the performance differences 
In the previous section w e saw that members of these three EACs tend to have higher household and 
farm incomes. In this section I will explore the probable reasons for that finding. 
10.4.1 Farmers' assets 
The members of the potato-marketing EACs are less poor and better educated than non-members. 
Household characteristics (human capital) 
In the case of Agrocamp, members have significantly larger households and, in particular, more male 
members of ages 19 to 45, suggesting that there is greater seasonal or permanent out-migration from 
non-member households. However, this does not seem to be the case for the other two case studies 
(Table 10.8). 
There are important differences between members and non-members in educational levels. In Santa 
Celia, heads of household, males, females, and all age groups are distinctly better educated than non-
members. In Agrocamp, members are doing better in terms of the education o f women and the 
younger generations. In Pullallan, only the head of the members' households are ahead of their 
counterparts in educational attainment (Table 10.8). 
Physical and financial assets 
In all cases, EAC members have more land, owned and managed, than non-members. The differences 
in land owned are of 64%, 30%, and 200% in favor of the members of Agrocamp, Santa Celia and 
Pullallan, respectively (Table 10.9). Members also tend to own more buildings and infrastructure, 
machinery and equipment, and livestock (Table 10.10). On the other hand, there are no differences 
between members and non-members in terms of distance to a road with public transportation or to 
nearest town or city. 
I did not find any quantitative or qualitative evidence whatsoever to suggest that EAC participation 
has allowed members to acquire these valuable assets; one must conclude that the poorest farmers 
have been left out of these organizations. There are two probable explanations: first, all these EACs 
require new members to contribute cash to constitute the organization's initial capital, and the poorest 
farmers may be incapable of paying this fee. Second, the poorest farmers consume most of their potato 
crop within the household, and therefore have less reason to join a potato-marketing EAC. 
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Table 10.8 Household composition, Agrocamp, Santa Celia and Coop. Pullallan 
INDICATORS AGROCAMP SANTA CELIA COOP. PULLALLAN 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Members of household 4.9 4 4.6 5.1 3.7 4.2 
Female members 2.2 1.8 2.2 2.2 1.7 2.2 
Male members 2.7 2.2 2.3 2.9 2 2 
Members 0-12 yrs. 1.1 0.7 1.4 0.8 1.1 1.2 
Members 13-18 yrs. 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 
Members 19-30 yrs. 0.9 0.6 0.4 1.1 0.4 0.5 
Members 31-45 yrs. 1.2 0.9 1.2 0.9 0.8 1 
Members 46-65 yrs. 0.8 1.1 0.8 1.3 0.4 0.5 
Members 66+ yrs. 0.4 0.3 0 0.3 0.4 0.3 
Schooling members 7 yrs or + 5.5 6.6 8.3 5.6 7 5.7 
Schooling members 15 yrs or + 5.7 6.8 10 5.8 7.7 5.5 
Schooling members 19-30 yrs or + 3.9 5.4 3.7 5.1 3 2.8 
Schooling members 31 -45 yrs or + 4.3 4.6 9.5 3.1 5 4.7 
Schooling members 46-65 yrs or + 2.6 3.5 5.6 3 0.8 1.8 
Schooling members 66 yrs or + 1 0.9 0 0.3 0.7 0.3 
Schooling of head of hh 5.1 5.5 10.3 4.4 *8.4 5.2 
Schooling of spouse 4 5.9 8.1 5.1 4.2 4.9 
Schooling of sons/daughters 5.7 5.7 5.1 4.3 3.2 3 
Schooling of other members of hh 0.8 1.1 0.4 1.2 0 0.4 
Schooling female members of hh 4.3 6.6 7.2 5.1 3.8 3.8 
Schooling male members of hh 5.6 5.5 9.1 4.9 7.2 5.3 
Age of head of hh 53.2 53 46 52.9 47.4 44.6 
Age of spouse 40 43 37.8 43.6 39.7 32.5 
Age of sons/daughters 19.2 14.5 11.8 13.8 6.7 6.9 
Dependency ratio 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.4 1 0.8 
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Table 10.9 Land assets, Agrocamp, Santa Celia and Coop. Pullallân 
INDICATORS AGROCAMP SANTA CELIA COOP. PULLALLÂN 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Land owned by hh (ha) 29.06 17.71 38.44 29.65 15.40 4.77 
Land taken by hh, shareholding (ha) 0 0 6.77 2.90 0.40 1.12 
Land taken by hh, rental (ha) 2.68 0.10 0 1.40 1.87 0.3 
Land taken by hh, other contracts (ha) 0.46 0.16 0 0 0 0 
Land let by hh, shareholding (ha) 0 0 0 1.50 0 0.30 
Land let by hh, rental (ha) 0.10 0 0.66 3 0 0 
Land let by hh, other contracts (ha) 0.66 0 0 0 0 0 
Land under management by hh (ha) 31.45 17.98 44.55 29.45 17.67 5.90 
Table 10.10 Fixed and quasi-fixed assets, Agrocamp, Santa Celia and Coop. Pullallân ($) 
INDICATORS AGROCAMP SANTA CELIA COOP. PULLALLAN 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Value of buildings and infrastructure 13,766 15,191 28,599 14,873 14,157 4,202 
Value of rrrachinery and equipment 1,236 673 4,886 2,846 1,791 299 
Value of land owned by hh 31,340 18,679 60,650 71,802 30,478 6,269 
Value of livestock 4,144 2,876 3,998 3,162 1,791 978 
Total value of physical assets 50,078 37,330 93,931 92,707 48,219 11,749 
So, while it makes sense for a poor farmer to stay away from such an EAC, it is troubling that INDAP 
channels a higher share of all its loans and subsidies to the organizations and to those who are 
organized. In this way the poorest farmers are excluded from services they do need and are likely to 
want, such as technical advice and credit. Why does INDAP do this? The first incentive is political: an 
organization has more political visibility and power than one isolated poor farmer. The second 
incentive is that of increased government efficiency: working through the organizations allows INDAP 
to reach many more farmers at a significantly lower cost, and thus enhances its capacity to reach more 
households with the same budget. 
10.4.2 Social capital 
As with the previous sets of case studies, I will discuss the role of social capital in the performance of 
these three EACs from four points of view: participation in organizations, social norms that foster 
cooperation, systems of rules, and involvement of these EACs in larger networks. 
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Participation in community and economic organizations 
The members of these three EACs show a significantly higher degree of participation in other 
economic organizations and collective action projects, compared to non-members. The differences are 
important in most of the types of organizations and projects included in the case study surveys, except 
for those exclusively made up of youth and women. Moreover, the members of these three EACs are 
five or six times more likely to hold leadership positions in these other economic organizations or 
projects (Table 10.11). However, participation in non-economic community groups tends to be more 
even, and in some specific cases the non-members show a greater degree of involvement. 
Table 10.11 Participation in development projects and organizations, Agrocamp, Santa Celia and 
Coop. Pullallan 
INDICATORS AGROCAMP SANTA CELIA COOP. PULLALLAN 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% % % % % % 
Organizations or projects with 
economic objectives 
Irrigation or drainage 0 0 0 0 10 0 
Marketing of products or purchasing of 
inputs 
23.3 0 0 0 10 0 
Soil conservation and pasture 
improvement 
16.7 13.3 0 0 0 0 
Storage of products 13.3 6.7 11.1 0 10 0 
Youth organizations 0 0 0 0 10 0 
Women's organizations 0 0 11.1 0 0 0 
Trade organizations 20 26.7 II.1 0 10 0 
Cooperatives 30 3.3 0 0 10 0 
Held leadership position in any of the 
above 
33.3 6.7 44.4 10 60 0 
Organizations or projects with social 
development objectives 
Neighborhood committee 73.3 53.3 33.3 30 70 30 
Sports, culture and recreation 56.7 43.3 33.3 60 50 60 
Housing or local improvement 26.7 20 55.6 30 10 30 
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Table 10.12 Perceptions of costs and benefits of EAC participation, Agrocamp, Santa Celia and Coop. 
Pullallân 
INDICATORS AGROCAMP SANTA CELIA COOP. PULLALLAN 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Not 
True 
% 
True Not 
True 
% 
True Not 
True 
% 
True Not 
True 
% 
True Not 
True 
% 
True Not 
True 
% 
True 
Benefits 
Improved household income 16.7 56.7 28.6 71.4 44.4 11.1 83.3 16.7 30 60 0 0 
Improved yields and production 10 76.7 7.1 85.7 44.4 22.2 50 50 33.3 44.4 0 0 
New crops and livestock 56.7 43.3 35.7 57.1 88.9 11.1 100 0 50 40 0 0 
Improved marketing 50 20 50 42.9 44.4 11.1 66.7 16.7 11.1 44.4 0 0 
Improved prices of products 66.7 23.3 100 0 77.8 11.1 83.3 0 40 50 0 0 
Lowered production costs 33.3 43.3 35.7 57.1 55.6 33.3 50 50 30 60 0 0 
Farm improvements 16.7 80 7.1 92.9 88.9 11.1 100 0 50 40 0 0 
Improved quality of life for 
family 
30 60 0 100 77.8 22.2 80 0 20 50 0 0 
improved quality of life for 
women 
48.1 40.7 0 100 55.6 33.3 100 0 30 50 0 0 
Improved quality of life for youth 35.7 39.3 0 100 55.6 22.2 100 0 40 50 0 0 
Optimistic view of the future 25 50 21.4 57.1 11.1 55.6 40 40 30 70 0 0 
Improved relations with govt, 
agencies 
41.7 33.3 21.4 71.4 44.4 44.4 83.3 16.7 20 60 0 0 
Improved relations with 
municipal govt. 
40 40 28.6 64.3 22.2 77.8 20 80 90 0 0 0 
Improved relations with 
neighbors 
10.3 75.9 0 85.7 11.1 66.7 0 83.3 20 50 0 0 
Doing better as small farmers 14.8 66.7 0 100 44.4 22.2 50 16.7 10 70 0 0 
Costs Willi 
Incurring debts 10 80 50 50 22.2 77.8 0 100 50 40 0 0 
Membership fees 0 100 42.9 57.1 11.1 88.9 0 100 40 60 0 0 
Greater risks in agriculture 33.3 51.9 83.3 16.7 33.3 66.7 33.3 66.7 20 70 0 0 
Loss of time in meetings 36.7 33.3 50 42.9 0 55.6 50 33.3 40 30 0 0 
Share of product prices taken by 
org. 
80 20 28.6 71.4 66.7 33.3 100 0 50 50 0 0 
Worsened relationships with 
neighbors 
86.7 0 85.7 0 88.9 0 83.3 0 100 0 0 0 
Some take advantage of others 44.4 44.4 15.4 84.6 33.3 55.6 33.3 66.7 50 40 0 0 
Less trust in the future 44.8 34.5 69.2 15.4 22.2 33.3 0 100 70 20 0 0 
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In terms of their perception of the costs and benefits of participating in an EAC, a solid majority (60% 
or more of the responses) of Agrocamp's members think that participation leads to higher yields and 
production, farm improvements, improved quality of life for the family, better relations with their 
neighbors, and to doing better in the future as small fanners. A clear majority also does not think that 
EAC participation results in receiving higher prices for their products. With respect to costs, most 
Agrocamp members think that EAC participation leads to greater debts and to having to pay 
membership fees, while they clearly disagree with the idea that participation means that the EAC will 
take a fraction of the price received for their products or that it will result in conflicts with then-
neighbors (Table 10.12). 
A clear majority of the members of Santa Celia agree only about two benefits: improved relations with 
the municipal government, and with their neighbors. A majority also agrees that the following are not 
benefits of EAC participation: diversification into new crops or animal production enterprises, 
improved prices for their products, farm improvements, or achieving a better quality of life for their 
families. In terms of costs, a significant majority of the members agree that these include higher debts, 
paying membership fees, and having to take greater risks as a farmer. However, they also agree that 
conflicts with the neighbors are not a cost of participation, or that the EAC will charge them a 
commission on the price its products (Table 10.12). 
In the case of Pullallan, a clear majority of the members identify the following as benefits of 
participation: higher household income, lower production costs, better relationships with national 
government agencies (but not with the municipal government), and doing better in the future as small 
farmers. Most members agree that participation led to taking greater risks in agriculture and to having 
to pay membership fees (Table 10.12). 
In summary, while members of these three EACs have a tendency to participate more in other 
economic organizations and projects, their reasons for doing so vary. The only clear benefit they 
perceive is that participation leads to better relations with their neighbors. They clearly do not join to 
receive better product prices (despite the fact that this was the major reason for forming the EAC in 
the first place). They agree strongly that the main costs are paying membership fees, incurring debts, 
and raising the risk of agriculture. In other words, the costs perceived by the majority are of an 
economic nature, while the perceived gains are all social. 
Norms that foster cooperation 
Non-member farmers in Pullallan and Santa Celia have less trust in their neighbors and in the benefits 
of collective action than the EAC members. Whilst most feel that community or economic 
organizations are always or almost always beneficial, they also think that they benefit only a few of 
the members. The non-members in these two localities also agree that most people try to take 
advantage of others, and that they only care for themselves. A large majority of the Pullallan non-
members add that you cannot trust most people (Table 10.13). 
On the other hand, the members of the Pullallan and Santa Celia EACs only agree with the statement 
that most people only care for themselves, but not with any of the other options that would suggest a 
lack of trust in their neighbors or in collective organizations. In fact, the majority of the members of 
these two EACs think that economic and community organizations are always or almost always 
beneficial, and that their benefits reach the majority of the members. The Santa Celia members mink 
that today it is easier to form a community or economic organization (Table 10.13). 
Table 10.13 Trust, cooperation, reciprocity and view of the future, Agrocamp, Santa Celia and Coop. Pullallan 
QUESTION AGROCAMP SANTA CELIA COOP. PULLALLAN 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
Ease of organizing with neighbors, compared to 10 More Easier More Easier More Easier More Easier More Easier More Easier 
years ago Difficult % Difficult % Difficult % Difficult % Difficult % Difficult % 
% % % % % % 
13.3 53.3 26.7 43.3 22.2 66.7 50 50 10 40 30 30 
Household's degree of participation in Less More Less More Less More Less More Less More Less More 
organizations compared to neighbors' % % % % % % % % % % % % 
23.3 33.3 10 36.7 22.2 66.7 10 30 0 50 50 0 
Community and farmers' organizations are useful Never or Always or Never or Always or Never or Always or Never or Always or Never or Always or Never or Always or 
Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost 
never Always never Always never Always never Always never Always never Always 
% % % % % % % % % % % % 
0 83.3 13.3 76.7 0 88.9 40 60 0 100 30 70 
For you and your family, participation in Waste of Beneficial Waste of Beneficial Waste of Beneficial Waste of Beneficial Waste of Beneficial Waste of Beneficial 
organizations is: time % time % time % time % time % time % 
% % % % % % 
6.7 70 20 56.7 11.1 44.4 20 50 0 70 50 20 
Farmers' and community organizations benefit... Only a few The Only a few The Only a few The Only a few The Only a few The Only a few The 
or none majority or none majority or none majority or none majority or none majority or none majority 
% % % % % % % % % % % % 
33.3 56.7 46.7 53.3 33.3 66.7 60 40 20 70 80 20 
Can you trust mosl people? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
% % % % % % % % % % % % 
73.3 20 63.3 16.7 55.6 44.4 40 50 40 50 80 20 
Most people... Only care Tiy to help Only care Try to help Only care Try to help Only care Try to help Only care Try to help Only care Try to help 
for others for others for others for othere for others for others 
themselves % themselves % themselves % themselves % themselves % themselves % 
% % % % % % 
76.7 6.7 63.3 23.3 77.8 22.2 50 40 60 40 90 10 
Most people... Take Try to be Take Try to be Take Try to be Take Try to be Take Try to be Take Try to be 
advantage fair advantage fair advantage fair advantage fair advantage fair advantage fair 
of the rest % of the rest % of the rest % of the rest % of the rest % of the rest % 
% % % % % % 
36.7 33.3 63.3 13.3 55.6 44.4 80 20 60 30 80 20 
Your situation as small fanners compared to 10 Worsened Improved Worsened Improved Worsened Improved Worsened Improved Worsened Improved Worsened Improved 
years ago has... % % % % % % % % % % % % 
16.7 73.3 26.7 40 33.3 44.4 60 40 30 20 40 30 
In the next 10 years, will your situation as small Worsen Improve Worsen Improve Worsen improve Worsen Improve Worsen Improve Worsen Improve 
farmers... % % % % % % % % % % % % 
10 36.6 10 43 22.2 55.6 30 40 10 90 20 50 
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In the case of Agrocamp, there are no major differences of opinion between members and non-
members. Both groups feel that community and economic organizations are always or almost always 
useful, but they also think that you can't trust most people and that most people only care for 
themselves (Table 10.13). 
Networks 
Cooperative Pullallan and Santa Celia are very strongly embedded in their communities. They are the 
product of long histories of community-based collective action, and both grew directly out of Small 
Farmers Committees - for decades the predominant form of organization for agricultural production. 
However, the step to become formal, legally constituted business-oriented organizations, has clearly 
divided both communities: while the Small Farmers Committees included most people, the new EACs 
represent only those who are wealthier or less poor, and thus more market-oriented. Nevertheless, 
community relations have not been strained. The many non-members whom I interviewed do not seem 
to feel excluded from membership; instead, they say that it was they who decided not to join. They 
also feel that the EACs have given them some direct and indirect benefits, such as having access to 
new technologies, being able to join with the EAC members to buy fertilizer and other agricultural 
supplies, or having access to the EACs' warehouses or Meeting Houses. Although the non-members 
continue to work with the traditional middlemen - as do the members - the EAC is an additional option 
to consider each time they need to sell their potatoes. The EAC members continue to work with and, in 
many instances, lead the different community organizations that coexist alongside the EACs. 
Agrocamp is a different matter. In this case the organization is almost completely separated from the 
local communities to which their members belong. The links with the grassroots organizations that are 
Agrocamp's shareholders are largely formal, and one has no significant influence on the daily life and 
work of the other. Agrocamp is basically seen by the individual grassroots members as just another 
business firm, although they do recognize that being owned by a group of farmers' organizations gives 
them certain benefits that they could not expect from a typical business firm. The grassroots members 
whom I interviewed have no interest or intention of getting more involved in the management or daily 
work of Agrocamp. As in the case of Santa Celia and Pullallan, the individual farmers who belong to 
the grassroots organizations which make up Agrocamp also tend to be among the wealthier or less 
poor households in their communities. 
In contrast with the Milk Collection Centers I described earlier, these EACs do not maintain 
permanent relations with a specific market agent. In fact, their main problem is that they have little 
connection with their target market; the exception being Agrocamp with its supermarket and fertilizer 
operations. These organizations were formed because of a false image of how the market is organized 
and functions. For decades, as one of the farmers I interviewed said, they had thought that local prices 
were the result of some sort of conspiracy by the conchenchos, and that all would be well if they could 
just get together and take their potatoes to Santiago or Concepci6n directly. This misconception has 
meant that members continue to deal with the same middlemen, in the same old way that for decades 
they have considered unfair. By not conforming to the real ways in which markets work, these 
organizations have ended up being largely irrelevant as potato-marketing EACs. 
As their links with the markets have failed, these EACs have become more and more dependent on 
INDAP. This is a lesson: if an economic organization cannot link to a market-demand engine, it will 
either disappear or run into the arms of some public or non-governmental agency willing to protect it 
and sustain it. As one of the members said; "INDAP is our Patron", and until now it has been a nice 
Patron, pumping millions of pesos into keeping these EACs alive. Why has INDAP been willing to do 
this? There are a few reasons, including: 
• lack of information and analysis about the future prospects of the EACs and the belief that the 
problem has been one of implementation and not a fundamental flaw in design; 
• an unwillingness to pay the political cost of letting these organizations fail; 
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• an institutional culture in INDAP that thinks that letting these EACs go would be tantamount to 
betraying the peasantry, to whose cause and survival most of the LMDAP staff are deeply and 
sincerely committed. 
As part of their survival strategies Agrocamp and Pullallan have totally dismissed the intermediate 
external technical agencies that helped them in their initial years. Basically, they needed the resources 
that used to be channeled by INDAP to those agencies in order to cover the growing gaps in then-
annual net results. Besides, the advisory services that are now being provided by their own staff are 
reasonably well evaluated by the farmers. The question is whether the large share of resources that is 
being deviated from its intended use - technical advice - could not be better used to find new options 
to improve farming systems and the well-being of these farmers. The fact that the three organizations 
continue to insist on the same failed approach to doing business suggests that there is a lack of 
strategic thinking about fresh new courses. 
Systems of rules 
Table 10.14 (adapted from Ostrom, 1990 - see Chapter 2, Section 2.5) summarizes the systems of rules 
that govern these EACs. What we see are three completely different situations: 
• Agrocamp. The relationship between Agrocamp and its members increasingly resembles the type 
of interaction that any commercial business firm has with its clients. Just like a regular firm has 
certain preferential clients, so Agrocamp gives some additional benefits to its members (such as 
30-day credit in supermarket purchases). The shareholders do not act in their capacity as owners 
of Agrocamp, and they have left the organization to be run by the small group of farmers who are 
board members and by the General Manager. The grassroots individual members could not care 
less about being actively involved in Agrocamp's decision-making process. Strictly speaking, 
Agrocamp should probably not be considered an EAC at all, at least by my definition which 
requires that the members control the decision-making process of their organization. 
• Santa Celia. This EAC has reverted to the system of rules that characterizes the traditional Small 
Farmers Committees, despite maintaining the decision-making structures and authorities required 
by law. This system of rules has evolved over at least 30 or 40 years, and is very appropriate to the 
needs of this organization. 
• Pullall&n. Pullallan's rule system is a mixture between a cooperative and a Small Farmers 
Committee. As in a cooperative, the elected board is in place and functions as an effective 
decision-making unit, but the general meeting of members is also very active, as in the traditional 
Committees. Two interesting innovations deserve attention: first, members can decide whether or 
not to participate in the organization's projects and activities, and thereby decide which 
obligations they want to assume and which rewards they expect to obtain. The second is an 
exception to the first rule, and is the decision to link the cost of some key services to the degree of 
members' participation in the potato-marketing operation. Also of importance in this case is the 
good balance achieved between the role of their major leader, and the democratic and participatory 
functioning of the organization. The leader exerts his influence because of his greater knowledge 
and experience, and not by imposing his will against that of the majority of the members. The 
leader has also made persistent and fruitful efforts to bring young members into leadership 
positions, and to help them acquire experience and expertise by insisting that they actively 
participate in the meetings and activities that are his responsibility. 
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Table 10.14 Rules of Agrocamp, Santa Celia and Pullallân (based on Ostrom, 1990) 
RULES Agrocamp Santa Celia Pullallân 
Clearly defined boundaries Ownership is formally 
defined, but in fact the 
governance of the 
organization is out of the 
hands of the members. 
Access to its services is fully 
open, although the members 
do obtain limited preferential 
treatment. The EAC 
resembles a conventional 
commercial firm, with the 
members being treated more 
or less equally to other 
clients. 
Membership is clearly defined. 
Low cost systems for 
monitoring compliance 
There is no monitoring 
system in place that allows 
the members to be informed 
and take action. In fact, the 
grassroots members show no 
interest in being informed or 
in becoming involved in 
running the EAC. In practice, 
there are no rules to be 
enforced, other than the 
commercial obligations that 
the members acquire when 
they purchase agricultural 
inputs or consumer goods on 
credit. 
Well-defined and efficient 
monitoring system of 
compliance with key rules is 
in place. The fundamental 
rule that members should 
market their potatoes through 
the organization, is not and 
cannot be enforced, as it 
would surely lead to the 
breakup of the organization. 
Other rules guiding 
participation in meetings and 
other activities, are enforced 
on a regular basis 
Well-defined and efficient 
monitoring system of 
compliance with key rules is 
in place. Compliance with 
the fundamental rule that 
members should market their 
potatoes through the 
organization is partially 
encouraged by linking it to 
preferential access to other 
services provided by the 
organization. 
Congruence between 
appropriation and provision 
rules, and market conditions 
Currently the members make 
no contributions. Although 
each of the 16 shareholders 
was supposed to have 
contributed $ 2,100 to the 
assets of the organization, 
many have not done so. All 
individual members and all 
the shareholders have access 
to the same services, 
regardless of their 
contribution. The nominal 
operational rule that members 
should market their potatoes 
through the EAC, is not 
coherent with market 
conditions. 
Not for potato marketing. For other services and activities, 
those who have contributed receive greater benefits than those 
who haven't. The nominal operational rale that members 
should market their potatoes through the EAC, is not coherent 
with market conditions. 
Graduated sanctions for non-
compliance with rules 
No sanctions are enforced, as 
members in fact are not 
expected to make any 
contributions or perform any 
duty. The EAC itself lacks 
any real authority to impose 
any type of sanction on a 
member. 
The EAC expelled one 
member when he committed 
a major offense. 
For potato marketing, the 
EAC lacks the means and 
authority to apply sanctions 
to those who do not comply 
with the rule of selling the 
crop through the 
organization, although it does 
link the access to and cost of 
other services to their 
contribution to the marketing 
operation. For other aspects, 
the EAC has devised a system 
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RULES Agrocamp Santa Celia Pullallau 
where a member can decide 
whether to participate in 
projects. Once a member is 
'in', then sanctions are 
applied if necessary. 
Participation of members in 
defining and changing rules 
None. The EAC is run by the 
General Manager and the 
board (same board members 
since the EAC was formed). 
Although there is a board in 
order to comply with legal 
requirements, the 
organization is in feet run by 
the group as a whole, who 
make all decisions together in 
periodic meetings. 
Members are regularly 
consulted in frequent 
meetings. The board also 
functions as a decision-
making unit, meeting weekly 
to decide on all aspects of the 
organization. One member 
has a strong influence on the 
decision-making process, but 
not to the extent of 
undermining the role or 
authority of the general 
meetings or of the board. 
Low cost mechanisms for 
solving conflicts 
Conflict management and 
resolution takes place behind 
closed doors in board 
meetings. According to the 
board members, "there are 
never any conflicts". 
The monthly meetings are the forum where problems or 
conflicts are discussed and solved. Most conflicts are solved 
by consensus. However, in both cases the members recognize 
the authority of the general meeting to make decisions by 
majority vote if necessary. 
External authorities respect 
the right of members to 
establish their own rules 
INDAP is on a crash course 
to exerting greater control 
over the organization and its 
management, as it needs to 
control Agrocamp's financial 
crisis. 
INDAP has imposed 
decisions that were formally 
and openly opposed by the 
EAC, by threatening to 
withhold its support. 
INDAP has a great respect for 
the main leader of the 
organization, and thus more 
or less allows this EAC to run 
its own affairs. 
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CHAPTER 11. VEGETABLE MARKETING EACs 
This chapter describes two EACs, Cooperativa We Tukucan Ltda. and Cooperativa El Renacer del 
Cajôn Ltda, dedicated to the production and marketing of vegetables for the fresh market. 
11.1 The context 
There are nearly 60 different species in the Chilean vegetable sector. In the 1997 Agricultural Census, 
about 45% of the farms in Chile declared they cultivated one or more vegetable crops, covering 9% of 
the total cultivated area (excluding pastures and forest plantations). Over the past decade, the annual 
area under vegetable crops has fluctuated up and down between 105,000 ha and 115,000 ha per year. 
The main vegetable crops by area are tomato (15% of the area), fresh com (11%), onion (5%), lettuce 
(5%), and green peas (4%). Beet, an important crop in one of my case studies, represents only 1% of 
the vegetable crops' area. 
Two-thirds of the vegetable growing area is concentrated in the more temperate and irrigated areas of 
Regions V and VT, as well as in the Metropolitan Region (the central part of the country around the 
major population center of Santiago) with its well developed network of roads and small and medium 
sized towns. 
Region V, were the El Renacer del Caj6n cooperative is located, supports 13% of the area under 
vegetables. Its greatest advantage lies in its high yields and, in particular, its climate which allows it to 
produce an early crop of many of the fall and winter vegetables (primores). This comparative 
advantage has been enhanced by the massive introduction of greenhouses (about 1,200 ha) for early 
vegetable production. Much of the acreage under greenhouses belongs to medium and large 
commercial farmers. 
Region IX in the south of the country, where the We Tukucan cooperative operates, is not known as a 
vegetable producing area. However, for decades there has been a vegetable production subsector 
around the regional capital city of Temuco, with an area that fluctuates around 4% of the national 
total. At least half of the area under vegetables in Region EX comprises small gardens kept by the 
many Mapuche5 8 households, most of whose production does not reach the market. 
Vegetable production in Chile is largely dominated by small farmers. The average area under 
vegetables per farm is less than one hectare. Average areas per farm per crop do not exceed 1.5 ha per 
farm, even for the most important vegetable crops. This is true for my case study crops and regions: 
tomatoes in Region V (1.2 ha per farm), and lettuce and beet in Region IX (around one-tenth of a 
hectare per farm). 
The city of Santiago is easily the biggest market for fresh vegetables in Chile. The main retail outlets, 
accounting for over 85% of total sales, are the Ferias Libres ('free fairs'), comprising hundreds of 
small traders with pickup trucks who move around different neighborhoods daily. These mobile 
shopkeepers buy most of their produce at Santiago's three wholesale markets, although some of them 
also travel to nearby farms to buy directly from the producers. Many of the farmers in the central 
provinces transport their produce to these wholesale markets, but there is also a large group of 
wholesale middlemen. Some farmers have 'commission agreements' with traders, whereby they send 
their produce to the wholesale market to be sold for either a fixed fee per unit or for a pre-established 
share of the final price. 
In this very competitive and open market, the key variables determining the success or failure of a 
The main native people in Chile. 
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vegetable farmer are location, yields, production costs and quality. However, transaction costs are also 
important, especially if a farmer intends to reach the wholesale market directly, without going through 
a middleman. Prices can fluctuate by as much as 10 to 20% in a day; access to timely information 
about daily supply and prices and the capacity to enforce agreements with wholesale buyers and 
traders can make the difference between success or failure. Small farmers in particular, must weigh up 
the costs of leaving the farm to take their crop to the wholesale market and directly supervise its sale, 
versus selling on the farm or relying on a trader. 
11.2 The case studies 
11.2.1 Cooperativa El Renacer del Cajon Ltda. 
This cooperative was established in 1991. It is located in Region V, in the municipality of Quillota in 
the central part of the country. It started with 10 members, five of whom are relatives (three brothers, 
one sister and one cousin), all young, and all close friends who together have been active in different 
community activities and organizations for a long time. One more member joined in 1998. Of the 11 
formal members, six are active (three brothers, one cousin and two non-relatives). The brothers and 
sister make up the core group of the cooperative; she is a young, intelligent, hard driven and hard 
working woman who is the undisputed leader and President of the cooperative. The father of the core 
group was one of the more important local leaders in the agrarian reform of the 1960s and 70s, and 
remains a leading community activist ("but he has an awful business sense and always has had bad 
results., we did not allow him to become a member of the Coop because he would have wanted to lead, 
and we would have gone under for sure"). 
They started working together in the late 1980s as a politically-motivated youth group linked to the 
Catholic Church. As a way of expressing their opposition to the military dictatorship, they started 
forming pre-cooperative organizations for Region V's Regional Federation of Cooperatives. Their first 
economic project was honey production, funded by a Dutch NGO through the Regional Federation of 
Cooperatives. However, it failed when they could not control a new disease that had a major impact on 
Chile's honey industry. 
Nevertheless, part of the group remained highly motivated and decided to try their luck with a crop 
they were more familiar with. Although none of them had produced greenhouse tomatoes before, there 
were large commercial farmers in the area who had established greenhouses. "We would look at those 
greenhouses and spend our time asking ourselves 'How can we do the same?'... we learned that they 
had computerized irrigation systems, and to us that seemed incredible... we later learned that the 
irrigation timer only costs $ 200 and we laughed ... we were the first small farmers to set up 
greenhouses with automatic drip irrigation." 
Six of the members put up their homes as collateral for an ENDAP loan, as well as their personal 
savings, to set up the first 15 greenhouses (around 3,000 m 2). This was the final outcome of their 
participation in GARIM, a special program launched jointly by INDAP and SENCE (the National 
Labor Training and Employment Service) which provided training, technical assistance and start up 
capital to young rural people willing to launch a career as self-employed entrepreneurs. 
Their failed honey project taught them the importance of technical knowledge; they immediately hired 
one of the top regional advisors on tomato production. "He was extremely expensive, but we worked 
with him for two years and we learned a lot... we then had two other very good advisors, also 
expensive, but they really knew what they were talking about and we learned... the first advisor saved 
us so much money and he made us bring down the initial greenhouses because he said that they were 
trash; he would not let us go on until we got it right... this is why many of other groups failed, because 
they started doing things wrong." 
Their current advisor is a specialist on management and marketing: "we are now good producers, but 
we still have a long way to go in learning how to manage our business and how to penetrate new 
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markets." 
Initially they worked on the project collectively, with little division of labor. However, they rapidly 
learned that they needed to specialize, so one of the women (the current president) took over the 
finances and administration (she had worked as a commercial assistant in a medical laboratory firm), 
one of the brothers became the trader, and the rest remained in charge of production. 
At the beginning, none of the members owned any land, so the tomato production project was started 
on one hectare rented from other farmers (not relatives, since they did not want to mix family and 
business matters). One of the members then obtained another hectare of land from her father, took out 
a loan and put up her own greenhouses. Finally, another member inherited about half a hectare, and 
installed his own greenhouses there. Thus, at the time of my field work, the cooperative had three 
family-based production units, each run privately by the direct owners. 
Through the cooperative they collectively buy their agricultural inputs and supplies, negotiate then-
loans with ENDAP, sell their produce, contract their agricultural advisors, and produce the seedlings in 
order to manage the production schedule throughout the year and to ensure uniform varieties and 
quality. In 1994 they bought a truck to improve their marketing options, and in 1996 they took out a 
loan that allowed them to more than double the number of greenhouses. 
They pride themselves on their ability to change varieties very rapidly as consumer preferences change 
"most other farmers, even the big ones, don't change until they lose money one year... we don't want to 
lose money so we change ahead of time." 
They have also installed a fax machine so as to keep in touch daily with prices and market conditions: 
"good information is essential, otherwise you harvest and take the truck to the market only to find that 
it is full of tomatoes..." 
Three of the brothers and the sister, together with their father, have also launched a separate EAC 
based on about 10 ha of avocadoes, all using drip irrigation. 
Thanks to their early emphasis on doing things right during production, and to their willingness to 
invest in hiring the best advice possible, the group's yields are extremely high (around 135 ton/ha), 
almost twice the national average. The very best commercial producers in Region V manage to get 
140 ton/ha, so this cooperative is among the top producers in the country. "We aim for top yields with 
the best quality, because we know that's where the profits are". 
The quality of their production is so high and their prices so competitive, that they easily sell all the 
tomatoes and other vegetables they can produce 5 9. This has allowed them to expand the area of 
greenhouses to a total of almost one hectare in less than three years. 
The group faced a serious crisis between 1997 and 1999. A very severe drought and lower than normal 
winter temperatures affected yields and quality severely, and lowered prices.' "We faced this crisis 
head on, by investing heavily in wells and to improve our irrigation systems... we put all the money we 
had, and we also took out a loan to recapitalize the cooperative." 
A couple of years ago the group became interested in moving towards organic production, after one 
member went to Germany and saw that organic tomatoes in supermarkets were more expensive than 
conventional ones. The cooperative has an agreement with the national Agricultural Research Institute 
(INIA) to acquire integrated pest management (IPM) and drip irrigation technology through a local 
demonstration plot installed in one of the cooperative member's fields. 
Most small vegetable farmers in the area sell their produce on the farm to middlemen, but the 
cooperative has acquired its own track and a permanent post at the Valparaiso wholesale market, 
where one of the members sells their produce. The cooperative also buys and sells other small 
farmers' produce. 
According to the management and marketing advisor, the break-even point of the cooperative's tomato production is of 
around $ 0.10/kg, while market prices normally are above $ 0.42/kg. 
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The members readily acknowledge that they have had no impact whatsoever on the market price: 
"when we started, we thought that by being together we could negotiate better prices... this is an 
illusion." They explain that the only way to get better prices is by producing better quality. Being 
known as producers of top quality tomatoes is particularly important when the prices are low: "when 
there are good prices, anyone can make it... but when there is a bad year, then it makes a big 
difference if the buyers know that your tomatoes are all well graded and packaged and so on." 
They also sell a small fraction of their produce to a supermarket in Valparaiso; they wish they could 
sell more through this outlet because prices are higher, but the problem is that the demand from one or 
two supermarkets is quite limited. To target a large number of supermarkets or whole supermarket 
chains, they would need much larger volumes, as well as packing and grading equipment and storage 
facilities. 
They could expand the volume to the needed levels to justify a packing house and the use of their own 
label by letting other farmers join the cooperative, or through supply agreements with other farmers. 
However, they fear that if they go this route they would lose control over quality and would almost 
certainly need to abandon their idea to some day specialize as organic producers. "Everybody will 
some day produce tomatoes under greenhouses, so this will become a crowded market... organic 
production offers a very concrete way to differentiate ourselves from the rest and continue obtaining 
prime prices." 
Hence, the cooperative needs to decide between two different development pathways. On the one 
hand, they could take the large-scale option and become an important supermarket supplier of 
tomatoes. Alternatively, they could target the niche market of organic tomatoes and aim for a higher 
priced differentiated product. 
The group is keen on improving their business and management skills, and so they have joined with 
several other EACs from Region V to establish a Centro de Gestion (Management Center), an 
organization that can provide business, management, accounting and marketing advice to small 
farmers' organizations in the area. 
The staff of the local INDAP office feel that this cooperative is by far the best among the seven local 
EACs. The local head of ENDAP told me that "they are very responsible... other groups are always 
trying to have everything financed by INDAP, while they tend to reinvest a major share of their profits 
and ask only for the smallest possible loans." Most of the people I interviewed who are familiar with 
the Cooperative agree that this EAC could survive even without support from INDAP or other public 
agencies. 
While the organization maintains legally-required formal structures, decision-making is based on 
group meetings and a clear assignment of tasks and responsibilities to individual members. The group 
meets as frequently as necessary: "before we would have a formal meeting once a month... now, each 
of us has a concrete assignment, so we only meet when necessary... while we waste little time in 
useless meetings, it is also true that we share less information; for example, I am in charge of the 
administration, and I do not have any obligation to inform the others on a regular basis." 
This system of decision-making is based on very deep trust among the members, perhaps the strongest 
among all the EACs that I studied. Such deep trust is made possible by the close family and friendship 
ties, by their long experience of working together and by the fact that the group is closed and very 
homogeneous. Often, when one of the members needs to take out a loan but has no collateral, the rest 
will vouch for him or her. At times, when one member is facing difficulties in meeting the payments 
on his or her loans, the rest help until the situation is brought under control: "we all know that none of 
us will ever let the rest down. Therefore, if today I help one of my colleagues, tomorrow I will also be 
able to receive the support of the rest." 
11.2.2 Cooperativa We Tukucan Ltda. 
This Cooperative was established in 1994 by 28 small farmers, 75% of whom are Mapuche. About 
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seven of the members are significantly larger than the rest, providing the bulk of the produce sold by 
the cooperative. The cooperative also buys from non-members to fill in specific demands that cannot 
be covered by the members. Its members reside in several different small towns and villages around 
the city of Temuco, the capital of Region IX, in the south of Chile. 
All of the members have been vegetable producers for a long time. Before the formation of the 
cooperative, these farmers used to compete with each other in Temuco's wholesale markets. None of 
the members produced enough to have their own permanent post at the wholesale market. "None of us 
had a permanent post at the market, and the big traders always had the best location because they 
were there all the time." Each was forced to rely on middlemen, or to undertake the cost of taking their 
produce to the market and staying there one or two days. "We all used to have the same problems, and 
for years we tried to solve them fighting against each other, with the only result that the middlemen 
were the only winners... this was so absurd that we were brother against brother and friends against 
friends, and all of that to put more money in the pockets of the middlemen." 
The first meetings were promoted by a small group of the current members of the cooperative, without 
any external support or stimulus. The talks went on for almost six years, and they carried on 
inconclusively until ENDAP's policies to support EACs began to show a clear way of putting then-
plans and ideas into practice. INDAP rapidly became a strong supporter of this EAC. A member of 
INDAP who is familiar with We Tukucan told me: "This was an emblematic EAC in this region. They 
were involved in the types of crops we would like to see more in small-scale agriculture, were strongly 
organized, and moved aggressively to create new business opportunities. We gave them all the support 
we could." 
When the time came, of the 90 or so initial participants, only 28 finally joined the EAC. As one of the 
grassroots members explained, "when it was time to stop talking and put up $ 63 each, then most of 
them just never showed up again". 
According to the board members, their initial expectations were to increase the volume they could sell 
together, and thus to be able to share the costs of the marketing process: "we could not be good traders 
and good producers at the same time; if you are small, it is too expensive to spend all that time trying 
to sell your products, especially if you don't have a permanent post at the marketplace." 
From the end of 1994, the group began implementing a large number of projects: building their 
warehouse and packing facilities; setting up a refrigerated storage unit; buying three delivery trucks; 
installing sprinkler and drip irrigation systems on all members' farms; hiring their own General 
Manager, sales agent, accountants, and technical advisors; buying computers to improve the efficiency 
of their administration; and carrying out, as a member put it, "an infinite number of training courses" 
on production, management, quality control and marketing issues. 
Each member runs his or her own farm as an independent production unit. The main products are 
lettuce, carrots, beet, leeks, and cabbage. The cooperative coordinates production schedules to avoid 
too much or too little production of any one crop at a given time. It does this by asking members what 
they intend to produce that season, and then negotiating production levels with each farmer. The 
cooperative also tries to standardize the varieties of each crop in order to be able to offer a larger 
volume of the same product, and to differentiate themselves from other sellers. 
Each farmer is responsible for taking his or her produce to the cooperative's central warehouse. The 
amount of produce they should bring in each day is determined by the management, and 
communicated to each member using two-way radios (now being replaced by mobile phones). At the 
warehouse, the produce is graded, packaged, labeled, and delivered to the buyers. The members are 
paid 15 days later, at the produce's average price over the previous two weeks, minus the value of the 
produce returned unsold by the supermarkets. The cooperative charges a flat 25% fee on the price 
paid by its clients for its services (transport, grading, packing and marketing, plus the support services 
such as technical assistance, accounting and so on). 
What the members like most about this arrangement is, as one put it, that "as individuals we can now 
forget about the marketing side, since this is taken care of by the organization. We can concentrate on 
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producing more, and each of us has at least doubled his production levels. Besides, our clients receive 
a better service, because we have staff that are dedicatedfull time to working with them. If one of us at 
one time has only a small amount of produce, it can be still taken to the market in Temuco instead of 
having to sell it on the farm." 
The members have to sell all their harvest through the cooperative. If this rule is violated, the member 
will be fined " an amount similar to the damage caused to the organization". It is up to the technical 
advisors to determine the amount sold privately by the individual. The rule has been enforced in the 
past, and some of the members paid the fine, while others left the organization. The capacity to 
enforce this key rule was weakened when the cooperative started rurming into liquidity problems and 
was unable to buy all its members' harvest. Nowadays, "there are some cases of members who 
routinely purchase their inputs through the cooperative on credit, get all the services, and then go off 
and sell on their own." This example underlines the two-way relationship between rules and economic 
performance. 
By 1998 over three-quarters of We Tukucan's sales were to three supermarket chains, of which one, 
Santa Isabel6 0, generated 51% of the total sales that year. That same year, the income from sales at the 
wholesale market represented 23% of total sales. The gross value of these sales reached more than half 
a million dollars that year, and the organization was one of, if not the largest, regional suppliers of 
fresh vegetables. Anyone familiar with the We Tukucan Cooperative pointed to this EAC as one of the 
most impressive success stories, emphasizing that it was particularly notable for 27 small farmers to 
have achieved such results in only four years! 
And yet, as one friend has put it, at the same time "the volcano was getting hotter "\ In December 
1998 the cooperative defaulted on its loan payments. This crisis was the result of two factors, the most 
important being that the cooperative had become top-heavy, and that its operational and non-
operational expenses had grown to the point where they could not be covered by the EAC's revenue. 
The second factor was that the cooperative could not adjust to the supermarket chains' payment 
methods. Not only did they pay 60 or 70 days after delivery, but they also returned any unsold 
produce to the cooperative6 1. The cooperative could not transfer this payment method to its members, 
as they would be likely to desert the EAC and continue marketing their vegetables on their own. 
It was only a matter of time before this two-pronged attack on the cooperative's finances would reach 
a point of no return. A key point is that the cooperative members did not know what was coming until 
the problem had become a crisis. 
The organization reached this point through a process of successive investments justified more by the 
results of past experiences than by a clear and cold-headed analysis of the merits of the new projects. 
In 1994 and before, the group had impressed INDAP as it showed a capacity to organize a relatively 
large number of small farmers with very little or no external support. The group had a strong 
leadership, a clear diagnosis of their marketing constraints, and a well defined vision of how they 
could overcome them. INDAP provided the initial grants and loans, and the results were clearly 
positive, one could even say almost spectacular. The EAC expanded rapidly, supported by larger loans 
and more grants. INDAP was happy because it could use this EAC as a public showcase of its policies 
and their effects. The farmers were not only producing and selling more, but were also proud of their 
new status as one of the best EACs in the region. The results of previous investments were considered 
sufficient proof that this EAC could make it, and the analysis of future prospects as well as their 
monitoring practices, became more and more relaxed6 2. INDAP seemed to restrict its monitoring to the 
A subsidiary of Royal Ahold of Netherlands, the largest food retailer in the world. 
6 1 About 20% to 30% of the produce 'bought' by the supermarket is returned unsold to the farmers, who not only lose the 
income but must also incur the costs of disposing of it. 
6 2 Weak monitoring practices were shown by the Cooperative Board and members, and also by INDAP. After the crisis, an 
analysis conducted by INDAP showed that the Cooperative had been showing a negative net revenue for at least two years, 
and yet INDAP continued to lend it money during that period, unaware of its poor financial position. 
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physical outputs of the projects: a larger warehouse, irrigation systems installed on members' farms, 
more trucks, more production, and so on. As far as ENDAP was concerned, the members seemed 
happy, no one was complaining, and that was that. 
Little or no attention was given to the economic and financial results of these investments, much less 
to the sustainability of the whole process. "We never had a method for monitoring this process, we 
were following the wrong indicators, we did not ask the correct questions, and we were far too short-
sighted, " says an ENDAP member, adding that "in my opinion, the same happened at the cooperative." 
Another external advisor familiar with the process, puts it bluntly: "there were two blind persons 
[INDAP and the cooperative] driving a very fast car." 
Those who asked questions about the wisdom of this accelerated growth were viewed suspiciously as 
'technocrats' who did not trust the capacity of small farmers. One ENDAP employee told me: "they 
were gold nuggets that we wanted to support, and our analysis became more and more emotional; a 
closer look would have told us to slow down and to restrain at least the more recent loans and 
investments until they consolidated their previous gains." 
The almost continuous flow of fresh cash supplied by ENDAP through new grants and loans financed 
the growing deficit. Between 1996 and 1998, ENDAP loaned the cooperative $235,000, an amount 
equivalent to more than two-thirds of annual sales, to which one should add $84,000 in different 
subsides in 1998 alone. 
Paradoxically, the cooperative's cash flow problem was aggravated as a direct consequence of its 
success in penetrating the supermarket chains. To the members and to ENDAP this penetration was 
clear proof of the EAC's great success; no-one seemed to pay attention to the fact that these outlets 
pay their suppliers only after 60 days or more. Eventually, the deficit became so large that not even the 
largesse of ENDAP could sustain it, and the bubble burst. 
The Board knew about the problem immediately, but the leadership did not inform the rest of the 
members until four months later. However, the members soon knew something was wrong when the 
frequency of the payments for their produce began to extend rapidly from 15 to 60 days, and when the 
service fee was increased from 20% to 25%. Finally the Board could not hide the information any 
longer and the crisis exploded in the open. 
After intense recrimination and debate, the members grew calmer when it became evident that 
although there were severe administrative deficiencies and mistakes, no-one had stolen one cent from 
the organization. The members then focused together on identifying the precise problems and 
diagnosing the causes. One member explained that at that point "we realized that we had made 
numerous mistakes in the administration of our business... none of us really knew how to manage 
something like this, so we left it in the hands of the managers and we did not control them ". 
Afterwards, in a series of fully attended meetings, the members defined a course of action: they cut 
their staff by 40%; brought their administration costs under control by lowering the fixed salaries of 
the hired staff and establishing payments according to results; they fired the manager and hired a new 
one; took a number of steps to reduce the share of the produce that was left unsold; and made an 
extraordinary cash contribution to increase the working capital of the cooperative. The president of the 
board, the prime promoter of the formation and growth of the cooperative, also resigned his position to 
let a new leadership guide the restructuring process, but has remained an active member with a very 
supportive attitude towards the new board and management. 
The new manager has taken a number of measures to put the administration in order, and launched a 
special campaign to market the production of new non-member farmers. Through this plan, the 
cooperative was able to double gross sales in less than one year by bringing in about 25 new non-
member suppliers. 
However, the cooperative has had to stop working with the supermarkets because it could not sustain 
the financial cost of being paid 60 or more days after delivery. This was especially problematic given 
the growing importance of non-member suppliers who would not work with the EAC under those 
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conditions. Also, members acknowledge that they are delivering a lower share of their total harvest to 
the cooperative, and selling more on their own. This is because the cash flow constraints mean that the 
EAC often lags behind in its payments; in fact, several of the members who left the organization did 
so because of this problem. 
According to the members, the cooperative is now being managed more tightly; they are stricter about 
demanding high quality and timely products from the member and non-member suppliers alike; and 
they are also doing better in demanding payment for the credit given by the EAC to its members when 
they buy agricultural inputs through the organization. 
However, when I asked several of the members if they now had better and more frequent information 
about the organization's performance, they acknowledged they did not. While they say that it is true 
they should be more involved in monitoring the day to day operations of the cooperative, they still rely 
on a small core group of leaders because they prefer to spend their time working on their farms rather 
than attending meetings. 
Things began to brighten a bit when the cooperative signed a contract with a British firm to export 
beet to the United Kingdom. After an initial test with one container, the cooperative was asked to ship 
six more, and there were good prospects for continuing this business in future years. 
All of these measures have resulted in a substantial improvement in the EAC's operational results. 
After a negative net revenue of about $80,000 in 1998, the losses in 1999 were 10 times lower. 
However, the debt (principal plus interest) has grown to such a magnitude that it is virtually 
impossible for the EAC to ever pay it back. The future of the organization depends on INDAP's 
decision to condone a very large part of the debt. 
One of the cooperative members told me that "during this time we often talked about throwing in the 
towel, handing in our assets to INDAP and forgetting about the whole thing. What kept us going was 
the knowledge that if we don't correct this problem, we will end up back where we started, at the 
hands of the middlemen. We know that there is no chance of making it as small vegetable producers if 
we go it alone." Of course, this argument is particularly valid for the majority of the EAC's members, 
who are very small farmers. The larger farmers are also tied to the EAC because they put up their own 
private assets as collateral for some of the INDAP loans. Finally, a very powerful argument that 
underlies the whole process was made explicit during a meeting I held with nine members: "we know 
that if worse comes to worse, INDAP will not foreclose on us." In the end, only seven of the members 
left the organization as a result of the crisis. 
11.3 Performance and impacts of vegetable marketing EACs 
I now turn to describing and explaining the economic and financial performance of these two EACs, 
as well as their impacts on members' household and farm income. 
11.3.1 Economic and financial performance of the vegetable marketing EACs 
The available information shows that Cooperativa El Renacer del Cajôn has achieved reasonably good 
economic and financial results, while We Tukucan is basically bankrupt (Table 11.1). 
El Renacer del Cajôn has managed to obtain substantial profits (37%) on its total revenue. This is 
mainly because of its low aaxninistration and marketing costs, as well as being able to keep its 
financial costs very low by financing members' expansion and its own assets primarily through the 
reinvestment of profits. However, the ratio between total assets and liabilities is close to becoming 
dangerous, although 85% of the liabilities are long term and thus the cooperative should be able to 
meet its financial commitments as long as it continues to sustain its high profits. Only 6% of the 
cooperative's total revenue comes from government grants, and this is used to pay part of the technical 
and management advisors' costs. 
208 Chapter Eleven 
We Tukucan, on the other hand, had important losses because its operational expenses were 
significantly higher than its revenue, even after receiving a substantial amount of money from 
government grants. Its liabilities are significantly larger than its assets, and given the annual losses it is 
impossible to expect that the cooperative will be able to pay its debts. More important, the cooperative 
has lost all of its operational capital, and thus will face severe difficulties in buying produce from its 
members or other farmers unless they agree to be paid many days after delivery. Since We Tukucan 
has defaulted on its loan repayments, legally all of its debts have become due and are now short term 
liabilities. Clearly this aggravates the EAC's financial position. Unless INDAP agrees to cancel a 
substantial share of the debt, We Tukucan will not be able to survive. 
Table 11.1 Economic and financial performance of two vegetable marketing EACs 
Item El Renacer del Caj6n 
1998 
We Tukucan 
1998 
Total revenue ($) 79,701 535,669 
Total expenses ($) 50,574 611,930 
Net result ($) 29,127 -70,261 
Total assets ($) 57,720 207,899 
Current assets ($) 8,367 82,562 
Non-current assets ($) 49,352 125,337 
Total liabilities ($) 38,352 260,436 
Current liabilities ($) 9,225 260,436 
Non-current liabilities ($) 29,127 0 
Net assets ($) 19,368 - 52,537 
Grants from government ($) 4,919 83,891 
Net result/total revenue 0.37 -0.14 
Total liabilities/total assets 0.67 1.25 
Operational capital (current assets - current liabilities) ($) -858 -177,874 
Liquidity (current assets/current liabilities) 0.91 0.32 
Dependency (grants/total revenue) 0.06 0.16 
11.3.2 Impact on members' farms and households 
Household and farm income 
As shown in Table 11.2, El Renacer del Cajon cooperative members have a significantly lower 
average net household income than their neighbors. The opposite is true for We Tukucan. I will 
explain these differences later on, but note that especially in the case of El Renacer del Cajon the 
comparison group comprises landowners, while members own very little or no land. 
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Non-agricultural household income is particularly high for El Renacer del Cajon members, as each 
family has at least one person who is employed off-farm. The members of El Renacer del Cajon 
agreed that their decision to reinvest a large share of their profits in the EAC was made possible by 
this non-farm income. Actually, several of this cooperative's members used to be employed in the 
nearby cities, before going back to being farmers as a result of their project. The interviews I held with 
all the members of this organization confirm that most of them have seen their annual income grow as 
a result of EAC participation, even those who renounced permanent jobs in the services sector. 
In the case of We Tukucan, the households clearly derive all their income from agriculture. While all 
informed observers agree that most of these small farmers were not poor at the time the cooperative 
was launched, the average annual income they have achieved is clearly impressive, in particular if one 
remembers that most of them are very small farmers belonging to the Mapuche people, who generally 
are amongst the poorest and more marginalized in Chile. All the members I interviewed were 
convinced that, despite the crisis, their income had increased substantially as a result of EAC 
participation. 
Table 11.2 Income and income composition, El Renacer del Caj6n and We Tukucan ($, 1999-2000 
agricultural season) 
INDICATORS EL RENACER DEL CAJON WE TUKUCAN 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Net h i income 10,003 16,107 29,021 11,679 
Earned net hh income 9,059 9,169 23,844 10,760 
Unearned net hh income 945 6,937 5,177 919 
Non agricultural net income 6,302 1,693 6,606 4,457 
Farm net income 4,017 8,202 21,201 9,769 
Gross income for vegetables / Gross farm income (%) 96 100 90 77 
Table 11.3 allows us to explore any possible causal links between EAC participation and farm and 
household income. These two cooperatives illustrate two different strategies: one (We Tukucan) has 
strived to break into a new, dynamic and seemingly more profitable market, while the other has tried 
to become the best and most efficient participant in a traditional market. 
Compared with non-members, members of El Renacer del Cajon earn a 10 times larger gross margin 
per hectare for their tomatoes. I confirmed this impressive result in the field. The difference in 
performance is due to three facts: (a) cooperative members grow all their tomatoes in greenhouses and 
hence their yields are four times larger than the average for open-field tomatoes; (b) greenhouses 
allow them to harvest earlier and attain better prices; and (c) since they are marketing almost all of 
their production directly, rather than depending on middlemen, they receive almost double the price 
compared with their control group. Ultimately, cooperative members get about the same total gross 
margins as non-members on an average of 1,800 m 2 of land per member. Non-members need 10 times 
more land to get the same result. 
The story is different for We Tukucan. The cooperative's main impact has been to allow its members 
to increase their income from vegetables by expanding the area under those crops. In fact, on a per 
hectare basis non-members do better than members. While members' yields are significantly higher 
than non-members, they cannot capture the full effect of this advantage because they end up getting 
about the same net price for their products. 
Why is this so? Remember that the members of We Tukucan are selling about three quarters of their 
produce to different supermarket chains, and that these outlets force them to 'buy back' unsold 
produce; usually around 20% to 30% of the produce sold. On top of that, the cooperative charges 
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members a 25% fee for their services. 6 3 That is, the net price paid to the farmer per kilo delivered to 
the supermarket is around 50% lower than the gross price paid by the supermarket per kilo effectively 
sold. 
Table 11.3 Average economic results of vegetable production, El Renacer del Cajôn and We Tukucan 
(1999-2000 agricultural season) 
EL RENACER DEL CAJÔN WETUKUCAN 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Gross income ($) 10,406 14,138 28,181 110,351 
Direct expenses ($) 2,544 6,802 8,230 1,783 
Gross margin (S) 7,862 7,336 19,951 9,252 
Gross margin per hectare ($/ha) 42,885 4,009 3,772 6,294 
Price tomato ($/kg) 0,42 0,22 n.a. n.a. 
Price beet (S/kg) n.a. n.a. 0.13 0.10 
Price lettuce ($/kg) n.a. n.a. 0.17 0.17 
Price carrot ($/kg) n.a. n.a. 0.02 0.02 
Yield tomato (ton/ha) 135 35 n.a. n.a. 
Yield beets (ton/ha) n.a. n.a. 71 12 
Yield lettuce (ton/ha) n.a. n.a. 54 47 
Yield carrot (ton/ha) n.a. n.a. 20 13 
Crop area (ha) 0.18 1.83 5.29 1.47 
Production sold (%) 100 100 77 72 
Production sold on farm (%) 19 100 3 5 
Experts interviewed agreed that farmers are usually paid around 30% to 50% higher prices per kilo 
effectively sold by the supermarket, than the wholesale market. If we assume that the 20% to 30% 
return rate of unsold produce is more or less standard for high quality fresh vegetables such as lettuce, 
leeks or cabbage, then the service fee charged by the cooperative to its members would have to be 
below 10% for there to be any net gain from selling to the supermarkets. Anything above that means 
that a farmer is probably better off selling in the old way. 
And to this we should add the financial costs of the supermarkets' payments 60 or 70 days after 
delivery6 4, which is an extremely long period if we consider that many of these vegetable crops have a 
75 to 100 day cycle. Therefore, the supermarket's method of payment increases the required working 
capital of a farmer by two-thirds. We Tukucan absorbed this huge cost by paying its members after 15 
The supermarket chains also discount other costs, or force their suppliers to absorb them directly, such as the cost of 
promotions, shelf space, staff salaries, and so on. In the case of We Tukucan, several of these costs are included in the 25% 
service fee charged by the EAC. 
6 4 At the time of writing this chapter, several major supermarket chains announced that they would extend this period to 150 
days in case the government enacted a proposed law to make them pay Value Added Tax on time. That is, they would make 
the suppliers shoulder the cost of paying their taxes on time. 
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days, even if the supermarket paid after 60 or 70. The alternative, transferring this cost to the 
members, was not an option as it would have meant that most, if not all, would have started selling 
their produce elsewhere. The EAC's attempt to absorb these costs was one of the main causes of its 
financial collapse, as it meant keeping a supply of working capital at least four times larger than if it 
paid its members once the supermarket had paid. 
The lesson seems to be that small vegetable farmers should be extremely careful when trying to access 
the supermarket chains. Unless they have deep enough pockets to withstand the predatory payment 
methods of supermarkets, and unless their volumes are so high that they can keep the per unit costs of 
marketing and administration very low, then they are probably better off sticking to the wholesale 
markets. The ways in which supermarkets operate create very large barriers for small farmers, even if 
they are well organized as in the We Tukucan case. 
Access to technical assistance and credit 
Virtually all vegetable farmers, organized or not, have access to one or more forms of technical 
assistance. All EAC members have access to their own advisors hired with the aid of DSfDAP's grants 
(Table 11.4). Moreover, most of these farmers also receive support from private advisors usually 
employed by the commercial agricultural inputs and supply firms. 
Table 11.4. Access to technical assistance services, El Renacer del Cajon and We Tukucan 
INDICATORS EL RENACER DEL CAJON WETUKUCAN 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% % % % 
Tech. assistance from EAC 75 0 100 0 
Tech. assistance from government 100 57 100 100 
Tech. assistance from local gov't 0 0 100 100 
Tech. assistance from university 0 0 0 0 
Tech. assistance from NGO 0 0 0 0 
Tech. assistance from private firm 0 0 0 0 
Tech. assistance from other org. 0 0 0 0 
Tech. assistance from private advisor 67 71 100 100 
All these farmers also have access to loans from different sources. Notably, in the case of the EAC 
members, almost all the loans come from INDAP, whilst non-members work with ENDAP and other 
providers of financial services, such as the State Bank and private banks (Table 11.5). Non-members 
presumably use these other sources because the amounts they can get from ENDAP are four to five 
times lower than the amounts lent to the EAC members. 
An interesting finding is that the average debt of El Renacer del Cajon's members is three times 
smaller than We Tukucan members, despite the fact that greenhouse vegetable production is more 
capital intensive than traditional cropping systems. This may be because El Renacer del Cajon's policy 
of financing growth largely through the reinvestment of profits is also followed by individual members 
on their own farms; in turn, this practice is made possible by their significant access to non-farm 
income. 
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Table 11.5. Access to credit, El Renacer del Caj6n and We Tukucan ($, 1999-2000 agricultural 
season) 
INDICATORS EL RENACER DEL CAJÖN WE TUKUCAN 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
N° $ N° $ N° $ N" $ 
Total loans 2 2,031 6 460 8 5,991 4 1,713 
Short term loans 1 908 1 631 8 3,337 4 1,188 
Long term loans 1 3,153 6 4,499 5 4,247 1 2,102 
INDAP loans 2 2,031 6 450 5 6,139 4 1,713 
State bank loans 0 0 0 0 2 3,153 0 0 
Private banks loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4,265 
EAC loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 210 
Commercial loans 0 0 1 631 0 0 0 0 
Personal loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4,205 
Technology adoption 
As in most of the other case studies, the members of these two EACs are more advanced than their 
non-organized neighbors in their adoption of certain production practices and technologies. 
Table 11.6. Technological changes implemented in past five years, El Renacer del Cajon and We 
Tukucan 
INDICATORS EL RENACER DEL CAJÖN WETUKUCAN 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% % % % 
Crop diversification 100 71 70 44 
Contract agriculture 50 14 70 11 
Marketing of inputs and products 50 29 80 33 
Irrigation and drainage 100 86 90 56 
Machinery and equipment 100 100 100 78 
Buildings and infrastructure 75 71 60 33 
Crop varieties and seed quality 75 86 100 100 
Use of fertilizers 75 86 90 78 
Weed control 75 71 100 89 
Insect and disease control 75 86 80 89 
In the case of El Renacer del Cajon, the differences are particularly striking for market-oriented 
technologies or practices, such as crop diversification (all the members had begun producing bell 
peppers, cucumbers and other vegetables, as opposed to the neighbors who only produce tomatoes), 
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experimenting with contract agriculture, and changing the marketing of products or inputs. Members 
told me they had hired an expert on farm management and marketing, as they felt this was where they 
needed to focus their energy, having solved all the main technical problems of production (Table 
11.6). 
The same is true of We Tukucan members, who have been quicker than their neighbors to adopt 
various farm improvements such as sprinkler and drip irrigation, machinery and equipment, and 
buildings and infrastructure (Table 11.6). 
These differences between members and non-members also extend to farm management. We Tukucan 
members are clearly ahead of the non-members in having legally registered themselves as farmers, 
maintaining accounting systems and filing for Value Added Tax payments and credits, keeping farm 
costs and income records, or holding bank accounts (Table 11.7). The differences are less striking in 
the case of El Renacer del Cajon, because in the Quillota area farmers have worked in a more 
'entrepreneurial environment' for many years (Table 11.7). 
Table 11.7 Farm management practices, El Renacer del Cajôn and We Tukucan 
INDICATORS EL RENACER DEL CAJÔN WETUKUCAN 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% % % % 
Legally registered farmers for fiscal purposes 100 100 100 33 
VAT accounting and filing 100 100 100 33 
Costs and income records 100 43 70 22 
Holds a bank account 20 0 30 0 
Legalized land titles 100 100 44 57 
Legalized water titles 100 100 13 0 
11.4 Explaining the performance differences 
In this section I explore the relationship between the performance of these two EACs and of the 
members versus the non-members, and the different characteristics of the individuals, households, and 
organizations. 
11.4.1 Farmers'assets 
Household characteristics 
In both cases, EAC members are younger and better educated than non-members. In the case of El 
Renacer del Cajon, members' households are also significantly smaller than those of the non-
members. 
The better education levels among members are true for most categories; younger children and older 
persons, as well as males and females. The differences are very important; for example, members aged 
31 to 45, the heads of households and their spouses, on average have twice or more years of education 
than non-members (Table 11.8). 
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Table 11.8 Household composition, El Renacer del Cajon and We Tukucan 
INDICATORS EL RENACER DEL CAJÔN WE TUKUCAN 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Members of household 3 4.3 4.6 4.6 
Female members 1.4 1.9 2.2 2.2 
Male members 1.6 2.4 2.4 2.3 
Members 0-12 yrs. 0.4 0.9 1.9 0.6 
Members 13-18 yrs. 0 0.4 0.4 0.8 
Members 19-30 yrs. 0.2 1.3 0.4 0.9 
Members 31-45 yrs. 1.6 0.7 1.2 1.1 
Members 46-65 yrs. 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.9 
Members 66+ yrs. 0.4 0.1 0 0.3 
Schooling members 7 yrs or + 9.1 6.8 8.6 7.8 
Schooling members 15 yrs or + 9.1 6.8 11 8.1 
Schooling members 19-30 yrs or + 1.4 5.5 2.6 7.1 
Schooling members 31 -45 yrs or + 10.2 3.6 9.3 5.7 
Schooling members 46-65 yrs or + 2.8 2.1 4.9 2.8 
Schooling members 66 yrs or + 0 0.9 0 1.3 
Schooling of head of hh 8.8 4.4 10.4 5.2 
Schooling of spouse 9.4 5 10.1 5 
Schooling of sons/daughters 3 5.4 4.3 8.8 
Schooling of other members hh 0.8 2.7 0.5 3.4 
Schooling female members hh 8.6 6.5 8.6 6.8 
Schooling male members hh 8.4 4.7 7.7 6.7 
Age of head of hh 44.2 50.3 42.9 56.3 
Age of spouse 37.4 41.4 36.7 43.1 
Age of sons/daughters 9.6 11.4 9.2 23 
Dependency ratio 0.3 0.3 0.9 0.4 
Physical and financial assets 
On average EAC members own less land than non-members. However, We Tukucan members 
addressed this situation by renting as much land as they own, so that they end up managing more land 
than non-members. Of great importance is the fact that We Tukucan members have a significantly 
larger area under irrigation compared to non-members; this is a great advantage in Region LX, were 
irrigation is not widespread. El Renacer del Caj6n members also have access to additional land 
through different contractual arrangements, although they still end up with an average of less than two 
hectares of land per member, of which less than 50% is irrigated65 (Table 11.9). 
Only irrigated land is suitable for vegetable production in Region V, but not in Region DC with its much higher rainfall and 
lower évapotranspiration levels. 
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Table 11.9 Land assets, El Renacer del Cajon and We Tukucan 
INDICATORS EL RENACER DEL CAJÖN WE TUKUCAN 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Land owned by hh (ha) 0.38 2.22 5.34 6.68 
Land taken by hh, shareholding (ha) 0 0 0.50 0.88 
Land taken by hh, rental (ha) 0.03 0.78 5.25 1.33 
Land taken by hh, other contracts 1.37 0 1 1.27 
Land let by hh, shareholding (ha) 0 0 0.02 0.22 
Land let by hh, rental (ha) 0 0 0 0 
Land let by hh, other contracts (ha) 0 0 0 0.11 
Land under management by hh (ha) 1.79 3 12.07 9.84 
Irrigated land under mngt by hh (ha) 0.74 1.81 5.97 1.72 
Irrigated land owned by hh (ha) 0.67 2.07 4 4.57 
The total value of We Tukucan members' capital assets is twice as high as their control group. The 
members are wealthier in all the categories included in the survey: buildings and infrastructure, land, 
machinery and equipment and livestock. The interviews and workshops revealed that, with the 
exception of land, many of these assets were acquired as a direct result of the EAC's skill in capturing 
different grants, subsidies and loans for their members. In fact, several We Tukucan board members 
told me that one of their main roles was to make sure that their members could benefit from the many 
different programs made available by INDAP, CORFO, FOSIS and other public agencies (Table 
11.10). 
Table 11.10 Fixed and quasi-fixed assets, El Renacer del Cajon and We Tukucan ($) 
INDICATORS EL RENACER DEL CAJON WETUKUCAN 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Value of buildings and infrastructure 13,866 21,763 14,733 11,249 
Value of machinery and equipment 76,295 10,312 20,411 3,813 
Value of land owned by hh 18,794 103,168 82,795 40,862 
Value of livestock 3,771 910 2,649 1,568 
Total value of physical assets 112,727 136,155 120,060 57,322 
El Renacer del Caj6n members are wealthier than non-members in machinery, equipment (mainly 
irrigation), and livestock, but lag behind in the value of land, buildings and infrastructure, as well as in 
the total value of all these different assets. Machinery and equipment make up two thirds of the total 
value of members' assets, and there is no doubt that their acquisition has been possible through the 
EAC's activities and projects (Table 11.10). 
In short, these two EACs have been very effective in helping their members acquire significant 
amounts of capital, through their organized participation in different development projects and 
programs. Their perception by public agents as successful and dynamic EACs has given them 
privileged access to many different kinds of public support. 
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11.4.2 Social capital 
As in the previous case studies, I will discuss the role of social capital in terms of participation in rural 
organizations, social norms that foster cooperation, systems of rules within the EACs, and the EACs' 
participation in wider networks. 
Participation in community and economic organizations 
These EAC members tend to participate more than non-members in other rural organizations. This is 
true for both economic and community organizations. Moreover, a significant proportion of the EAC 
members hold leadership positions in these rural organizations (Table 11.11). 
Table 11.11 Participation in development projects and organizations, El Renacer del Cajôn and We 
Tukucan 
INDICATORS EL RENACER DEL CAJÔN WE TUKUCAN 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Yes 
% 
Yes 
% 
Yes 
% 
Yes 
% 
Organizations or projects with economic objectives 
Irrigation or drainage 100 & 100 
Marketing of products or purchasing of inputs 60 14 90 22 
Soil conservation and pasture improvement 0 0 0 11 
Storage of products 20 0 60 11 
Youth 0 0 0 0 
Women 0 0 30 22 
Trade Association 0 0 30 22 
Cooperative 100 0 100 11 
Held leadership position in any of the above 20 14 50 33 
Organizations or projects with social development 
objectives 
Neighborhood committee 40 100 40 11 
Sports, culture and recreation 40 29 40 22 
Housing or local improvement 40 14 30 11 
El Renacer del Cajôn members are extremely positive about the costs and benefits of participating in 
EACs. Most, if not all, members agreed that participation had brought many specific benefits. 
Perceived economic benefits included improved household income, higher production, agricultural 
diversification, and improved marketing, whilst social benefits comprised better quality of life for the 
family as a whole and for women and youth in particular, better relations with their neighbors and with 
government agencies, etc. Few, if any, members cited reduced production costs as a benefit of 
membership. Nearly all agreed that the main costs were indebtedness, exposing their farms to greater 
risks, and having to pay membership fees (Table 11.12). 
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Table 11.12 Perception of costs and benefits of EAC participation, El Renacer del Cajôn and We 
Tukucan 
INDICATORS EL RENACER DEL CAJON WE TUKUCAN 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
Not 
True 
% 
True Not 
True 
% 
True Not 
True 
% 
True Not 
True 
% 
True 
Benefits 
Improved household income 0 100 20 80 10 0 0 50 
Improved yield and production 0 100 20 80 20 80 0 50 
New crops and livestock 0 100 20 80 20 70 50 50 
Improved marketing of inputs and 
products 
20 60 40 60 200 60 25 75 
Improved prices of products 20 40 40 40 70. 0 25 50 
Lowered production costs 80 20 50 25 30 40 50 25 
Farm improvements 20 80 20 80 20 80 50 50 
Improved quality of life for family 0 100 20 80 30 50 0 25 
Improved quality of life for women 0 100 20 80 30 50 0 100 
Improved quality of life for youth 0 80 20 80 25 62.5 0 100 
Optimistic view of the future 0 100 20 80 10 80 25 75 
Improved relations with government 
agencies 
0 60 40 60 20 70 25 50 
Improved relations with municipal 
government 
40 40 40 60 40 40 0 75 
Improved relations with neighbors 0 40 25 75 10 80 0 100 
Doing better as small farmers 0 100 20 80 20 60 0 50 
Costs 
Incurring debts 0 100 0 ô 1 0 100 0 100 
Membership fees 0 100 0 100 10 90 0 100 
Greater risks in agriculture 40 60 40 20 20 70 0 100 
Loss of time in meetings 40 40 60 20 20 80 25 50 
Share of product prices taken by org. 100 0 66.7 33.3 0 100 25 50 
Worsened relationships with 
neighbors 
100 0 100 0 90 10 75 25 
Some taking advantage of others 40 40 40 40 22.2 77.8 25 50 
Less trust in the future 100 0 80 20 80 10 75 25 
A very interesting finding is that the El Cajon control group has an equally positive view of 
membership benefits. Perhaps this is why many said they would like to become members of the 
cooperative, but accused the old members of being "selfish" by keeping membership closed. 
We Tukucan members are also positive about the benefits of membership. Most agree that the 
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economic benefits are higher incomes, improved yields and production, diversification into new crops, 
improved marketing and farm improvements. Hardly anyone cited improved prices as a benefit of 
EAC participation, confirming the results given in the section above on household and farm impacts. 
In terms of the costs of participation, We Tukucan members cite costs famiUar in all the other case 
studies: higher debts, higher risks and having to pay membership fees. However, they also include 
time lost to meetings, net prices being reduced because of the share taken by the EAC, and "some 
members take advantage of the rest" (Table 11.12). 
The We Tukucan control group identified fewer benefits of participation, and discarded most of the 
economic benefits apart from improved marketing. The benefits they recognize are social: better 
quality of Ufe for women and the youth and better relations with their neighbors and with the 
municipal government. On the side of the costs, they agree with members about debts, risks and 
membership fees, but do not realize (as the members do) that EAC participation can lead to the 
organization taking a share of the product prices, losing time in meetings or to some members taking 
advantage of others. In short, they appear to be less aware of certain benefits but also of some of the 
costs identified by the members (Table 11.12). 
Worms that foster cooperation 
Compared with non-members, El Renacer del Caj6n members are more trusting of other people. 
Nearly all non-members interviewed felt that you cannot trust most people, that most individuals only 
care about themselves, and that given the opportunity, most people would take advantage of others. 
EAC members disagree with this view, tending to think that you can trust most people and that 
organizations benefit the majority of their members. Cooperative members also think that rural 
organizations are always or almost always beneficial, that participating in these organizations has been 
good for them and their families, that they are doing better as small farmers than 10 years ago, and that 
10 years from now they will be doing even better (Table 11.13). 
In the case of We Tukucan, the control group was also more negative when it comes to trusting others: 
they think that you cannot trust most people, that individuals only care about themselves, and that rural 
organizations only benefit a few of the members. The members are split almost 50/50 on these 
questions, with about half answering along the same lines as the non-members. This split is probably 
the result of We Tukucan's ongoing crisis. I perceived during meetings with members that there were 
clearly two groups: (a) those who were active in the EAC until the crisis were still optimistic and 
committed to finding a solution, while (b) those who were less active before were more negative about 
the events leading to the crisis, blaming the leadership and the other members, and thinking that things 
were unlikely to change (Table 11.13). 
Networks 
The El Renacer del Caj6n cooperative is clearly embedded in one rural community. The parents of the 
current members lived through the agrarian reform together, fought against the lattfundistas, and 
together suffered repression and persecution during the mibtary regime. They all belong to the same 
community organizations. Before forming their cooperative, the members had obtained much 
experience of collective action together, having carried out many common economic, social, cultural 
and political activities and projects. The cooperative is one more step in a longer social process at the 
local level. 
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Table 11.13 Trust, cooperation, reciprocity and view of the future, El Renacer del Cajon and We 
Tukucan 
QUESTION EL RENACER DEL CAJON WETUKUCAN 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
Ease of organizing 
with neighbors, 
compared to 10 years 
ago 
More 
difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
More 
difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
More 
difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
More 
difficult 
% 
Easier 
% 
0 100 57.1 28.6 0 80 33.3 66.7 
Household's degree of 
participation in org. 
compared to 
neighbors 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
Less 
% 
More 
% 
20 60 28.6 14.3 20 50 44.4 22.2 
Community and 
farmers' organizations 
are useful 
Never or 
almost 
never 
% 
Always or 
almost 
always 
% 
Never or 
almost 
never 
% 
Always or 
almost 
always 
% 
Never or 
almost 
never 
% 
Always or 
almost 
always 
% 
Never or 
almost 
never 
% 
Always or 
almost 
always 
% 
0 100 0 100 10 80 22.2 55.6 
For you and your 
family, participation 
in org. is... 
Waste of 
time 
% 
Beneficial 
% 
Waste of 
time 
% 
Beneficial 
% 
Waste of 
time 
% 
Beneficial 
% 
Waste of 
time 
% 
Beneficial 
% 
0 100 0 71.4 0 80 0 66.7 
Farmers' and 
community 
organizations 
benefit... 
Only a 
few or 
none 
% 
The 
majority 
% 
Only a 
few or 
none 
% 
The 
majority 
% 
Only a 
few or 
none 
% 
The 
majority 
% 
Only a 
few or 
none 
% 
The 
majority 
% 
40 60 42.9 42.9 50 50 55.6 33.3 
Can you trust most 
people? 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
No 
% 
Yes 
% 
40 60 71.4 28.6 50 50 66.7 22.2 
Most people... Only care 
for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
Only care 
for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
Only care 
for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
Only care 
for 
themselves 
% 
Try to 
help 
others 
% 
60 40 85.7 14.3 50 50 77.8 22.2 
Most people... Take 
advantage 
of the rest 
% 
Try to be 
fair 
% 
Take 
advantage 
of the rest 
% 
Try to be 
fair 
% 
Take 
advantage 
of the rest 
% 
Try to be 
fair 
% 
Take 
advantage 
of the rest 
% 
Try to be 
fair 
% 
40 20 57.1 28.6 40 40 33.3 44.4 
Has your situation as 
small farmers 
compared to 10 years 
ago... 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
Worsened 
% 
Improved 
% 
0 100 42.9 57.1 20 70 22.2 33.3 
In the next 10 years, 
will your situation as 
small farmers... 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
Worsen 
% 
Improve 
% 
20 .80 14.3 57.1 0 70 0 88.9 
In the case of We Tukucan, the members belong to a number of different communities dispersed over 
a relatively large area around the city of Temuco; their social interaction is largely limited to this EAC. 
Because of this, cooperative members had no prior experience whatsoever of working together, either 
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for economic or non-economic objectives. The cooperative is the result, not of a previous history of 
collective action, but of the inspirational leadership of a few individuals. This origin is reflected in the 
cooperative's management style whereby a small number of founder members took charge with little 
active participation by the majority. 
We Tukucan decided to make supermarkets their main market. This relationship gives little bargaining 
power to members; the EAC can basically 'take it or leave it' when it comes to the supermarkets' 
imposed demands and requirements. As the supermarkets themselves are engaged in fierce 
competition with each other, their rules and conditions are extremely difficult for small farmers to 
meet, and leave the EAC very little room for maneuver. While perhaps five or six of the members of 
We Tukucan could have survived under these conditions, most of the rest, being very small farmers, 
could not; thus, heterogeneity of the EAC introduced further degrees of rigidity into their decision-
making process. What is perhaps more important is that the EAC engaged in this difficult and 
demanding relationship without sufficient preparation. 
In contrast, El Renacer del Cajon has remained in the much more flexible and impersonal traditional 
fresh vegetable market. They can shift clients at will and from one day to the next, based on results of 
previous engagements or on the conditions offered by the many potential buyers. While they often 
think about accessing the supermarkets, they have always felt that before they get there they have to be 
on much more solid economic, financial and technological ground. They do not want just to sell 
tomatoes to the supermarkets; they want to enter that market when they can offer organic tomatoes, 
when they have control over the necessary volume of produce with uniform quality, and when they 
have accumulated enough working capital to be able to survive the supermarkets' financial conditions. 
When I asked the members of El Renacer del Caj6n to explain why they are so cautious, their answer 
surprised me: "because of the honey bees!". They explained how they had tried to rapidly increase the 
number of hives, and that when faced with the first serious threat (a new disease), they just did not 
have enough knowledge and experience to know how to react ("we were completely dependent on 
others, and it turned out they out they did not know either what has happening"), nor the financial 
strength to sustain the losses. The project collapsed overnight. As the woman who heads this EAC told 
me, "we produce tomatoes, but always keep thinking about the bees when sometimes we feel the urge 
to move ahead more rapidly... if we want to be pequenos empresarios [small business entrepreneurs], 
we have to think long term, and this means to be willing to sacrifice short term benefits in order to 
make sure that you are building on very firm foundations." 
Both organizations base their relationship with FNDAP and other public agencies on the fact that they 
are widely seen as successful EACs (until 1998 in the case of We Tukucan). As such, they had greater 
leverage than most economic organizations to extract greater benefits from the many public programs 
designed for small-scale agricultural development and the promotion of EACs. We Tukucan played 
this card to the full, launching on a very rapid expansion process fuelled by public funds, and paying 
very little attention to the need to consolidate previous gains before moving ahead again. El Renacer 
del Caj6n was much more careful; although they clearly had the option to take out more and larger 
loans (for example, to buy and sell produce from other farmers), they have based their expansion 
largely on the reinvestment of their own profits. 
System of rules 
Table 11.14 (adapted from Ostrom, 1990 - see Chapter 2, Section 2.5) summarizes the system of rules 
governing these EACs. These EACs have two completely different systems of rules. 
El Renacer del Caj6n relies on a system based on: 
• the very active and detailed involvement of all members in all important decisions affecting the 
EAC, so that all rules have a very high degree of consensus and legitimacy; 
• every member having almost daily access to extremely detailed information concerning not only 
the activities of the EAC itself, but also of each member, with the result that there are few if any 
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opportunities for anyone to free ride or take advantage of the rest; 
• the very close relationship of trust, friendship and reciprocity among all the members, imposing 
great peer pressure on each person to conform to the agreements and commitments. 
The result of such legitimate rules, close monitoring, and strong norms fostering cooperation, is that 
this organization is ran on the basis of what Ostrom (1999), following Levi (1988), calls "quasi 
voluntary compliance"; while the members could in theory cheat and free ride, they do not because 
they would certainly be caught almost immediately, and the cost of such action could be extremely 
high both in economic, social and personal terms. From the point of view of its internal institutional 
performance, this cooperative is by far the most robust of all those I studied. 
We Tukucan is a different story. It is run by a very small group of members and hired managers, while 
most members remain passive. This system worked well while things were going smoothly; the 
leadership enjoyed the legitimacy afforded by good results and concrete and frequent achievements 
that clearly benefited most members. However, it also meant that the EAC was completely unable to 
monitor and learn about those results that were not immediately obvious, and to take corrective action 
in time. The consequence was a crisis threatening the organization's survival. The EAC lacked what 
could be called 'institutional know-how', i.e., a set of internalized or embedded organizational 
practices, traditions, rules and norms to guide decision-making when the going got rough. 
Consequently, the organization has been incapable of taking full control of its problems, and has been 
forced to rely on short term decisions imposed by external agents. It does not have the institutional 
strength to devise and put into action any sort of long term plan to correct its fundamental problems. 
Table 11.14 El Renacer del Cajon and We Tukucan's rules (based on Ostrom, 1990) 
RULES El Renacer del Cajon We Tukucan 
Clearly defined boundaries Membership is clearly defined. The 
EAC deals with non-member small 
farmers from whom it buys produce, 
strictly on a client basis. All benefits are 
completely restricted to the members. 
Membership is clearly defined. 
However, with the financial crisis the 
EAC has been forced to blur its 
boundaries by offering non-member 
suppliers a number of benefits which are 
identical to those received by the 
members. 
Low cost systems for monitoring 
compliance 
Given the very close contact between all 
the members, they are almost fully 
aware on a daily basis of what is 
happening in the production and 
marketing side. All the members are 
informed in detail of all the 
organization's debts and other 
commitments, as well as of each 
individual member. Given this intimate 
knowledge of what is happening in all 
the relevant areas, it is highly unlikely 
that any one member could free ride. All 
the members comply with the rules 
required to achieve the EAC's main 
objectives (e.g., assuring uniform 
quality and a well thought-out 
production schedule) 
Before and after the crisis, most 
members had little or no information 
about the EAC's performance or future 
plans. They trusted that the board 
members knew what they were doing 
and would inform them if necessary. In 
turn, most of the board members lacked 
the technical know-how to effectively 
monitor the performance of their EAC 
on the basis of the information that 
should be made available by 
management. Although the EAC has 
written bylaws that define a number of 
benefits and obligations, after the 
financial crisis the EAC has less power 
to enforce many of the most important 
ones, such as the obligation to sell 
produce through the EAC. This has 
resulted in many of the farmers selling a 
larger share of their harvest on their 
own. 
Congruence between appropriation and 
provision rules, and market conditions 
The relationship between provision and 
appropriation is regulated by a careful 
Given the heterogeneity in size, 
production capacity and socioeconomic 
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RULES El Renacer del Cajon We Tukucan 
separation of activities and 
responsibilities between the individuals 
and the EAC itself. Each individual is 
responsible for his or her own 
production units and must meet the 
quality standards agreed upon by all. 
Each individual has well defined 
responsibilities in the EAC (marketing, 
administration, production technologies, 
relations with clients, and so on). 
status among the members, the smaller 
and poorer members end up making a 
relatively larger effort to meet certain 
expenses of the EAC. Also, the system 
of payment used by the EAC (average 
net price received in a 15-day period, 
after discounting the cost of unsold 
produce) punishes those who can deliver 
higher quality produce. The 
appropriation rules followed by the EAC 
until the crisis (paying the members 
after 15 days), was not congruent with 
the conditions of their major client 
(supermarkets who pay after 60 or more 
days), and the EAC lacked the resources 
to fill in the gap on a sustainable basis. 
Graduated sanctions for non-compliance 
with rules 
Given the extremely detailed 
information available to all members 
about the different aspects of the EAC, 
the members can usually react almost 
immediately to any sign of non-
compliance. Until now peer pressure has 
been sufficient to force members to 
correct their behavior when they have 
not complied with their obligations or 
commitments. 
While the members are fully aware of 
who is or is not complying with some of 
the most important rules, the EAC does 
not impose sanctions until the 
infractions are very serious. In those 
cases, some members have preferred to 
leave the EAC. The weakened financial 
position of the EAC has affected its 
capacity to enforce sanctions as it 
cannot afford more members leaving the 
organization. 
Participation of members in defining 
and changing rules 
All the members are intimately involved 
in all significant decisions. Rules are 
changed routinely to meet changing 
conditions. 
A small group of members shoulders 
most of the work involved in running 
the EAC. The majority of members are 
very passive in the decision-making 
process. The members formally 
approved the EAC's bylaws, but the de 
facto rules are decided by management 
or by those few members who are most 
involved in management. 
Low cost mechanisms for solving 
conflicts 
Given the detailed information that all 
members have concerning all aspects of 
the EAC and of each of the members' 
work, this organization is characterized 
by what Ostrom (1999) following Levi 
(1988) calls "quasi-voluntary 
compliance". 
The 1998 crisis shows that this EAC 
lacked low cost mechanisms for solving 
conflicts, since nothing was done until 
the problem exploded with all the 
consequences that have been described 
above. 
External authorities respect the right of 
the members to establish their own rules 
The members take a very strong position 
of not allowing INDAP or any other 
authority to become involved in their 
decision-making. On many occasions 
they have rejected offers of external 
support when they feel they could 
undermine their independence. 
Before the financial crisis of 1998, 
INDAP usually respected the right of 
the EAC to ran its own affairs. After the 
crisis, INDAP has taken a much more 
active role in many of the fundamental 
decisions of the organization. 
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CHAPTER 12. EACs FOR PROCESSING AND MARKETING 
RASPBERRIES 
In this chapter I describe three EACs dedicated to the processing and marketing of raspberries for 
international markets: Golden Berries S.A., Frutas de Guaico S.A. (or Guaicofrut), and Frutas de 
Romeral S.A. (or Romefrut). As discussed in Chapter 4, raspberries do not figure prominently among 
the EACs' main crops and enterprises. Only 41 of the 424 EACs that I surveyed were involved in 
raspberry processing and/or marketing. However, these cases are interesting because raspberries are an 
almost totally new crop in Chile. In less than 10 years, production and exports have grown to the point 
where Chile is now the largest producer in the southern hemisphere, agroprocessing facilities have 
been set up, export firms have been established, technologies have been developed and disseminated, 
production areas with comparative advantages have been consolidated, etc. We can thus use these 
case studies to analyze how EACs adapt and function in a climate of very rapid innovation along the 
whole chain from the field to consumers in the North. 
12.1 The context 
World production of raspberries increased by about 60% between 1992 and 2000. Total world 
production is around 400,000 tons, of which Chile contributes about 8%. However, Chile is the only 
large producer in the southern hemisphere, allowing it to supply the markets in Europe and North 
America off-season. 
Chile's aggressive incursion into raspberry production was motivated by the sharp increase in 
international prices when civil war disrupted production in the former Yugoslavia, until then the 
world's most important producer. Chile, a major exporter of fresh fruit for a long time, had the right 
climate, the expertise and the infrastructure necessary to respond rapidly to this window of 
opportunity. 
Chile exports its production to the European Union (frozen) and to the USA (fresh). Chile's exports 
represent about 40% of the European Union's imported raspberries, and about 16% of the USA's. 
Chile's market share grew steadily during the 1990s. There are about 36 industrial firms which process 
and export raspberries in Chile, two of which control about 61% of the market. 
As a result of this market opportunity, Chile's production and area increased from nearly zero in the 
early 1980s to about 30,000 tons on 7000 ha in the late '90s. As the farmers involved in this crop 
learned how to manage it, average national yields increased by about 50% in the last decade, and by 
close to 300% in the most productive regions. 
There are around 3,200 farmers involved in raspberry production in Chile. The average size of 
raspberry plantations per farm is around 2 ha. About 70% of all the producers are concentrated in 
Regions VII and VTH.. Several agroindustries are also present in these zones. Almost all the production 
is destined for the international market, where prices can be up to $ 6 per kg higher than on the 
national market. Small farmers play an important role in raspberry production, thanks in part to an 
early and aggressive support program headed by the regional offices of INDAP in Regions VII and 
VIII. For example, over one-third of the raspberry production in Region VII, the most important 
region for this crop in Chile, is controlled by small farmers who are INDAP clients. 
From year to year raspberry prices can fluctuate by as much as 300% on the international and national 
markets, making this a very profitable but very risky product. Growing international competition has 
imposed high quality standards that producers must meet to remain in the market. Those farmers who 
can meet these standards can access the fresh or frozen product markets, while those who fail must sell 
their produce to juice and marmalade factories. The price difference between the fresh, frozen, and 
juice and marmalade markets, can be as high as 400% and 800%, respectively. 
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The average cost of establishing one hectare of raspberries is around $ 5,600, while annual production 
costs run at about $ 7,000. Small farmers can compete basically because they rely on household labor. 
This is a very important advantage in such a labor-intensive crop, where harvest costs can represent up 
to 60% of total production costs. In addition, small farmers can supervise the harvest process closely, 
often allowing them to maintain a high quality product, compared to a medium or large farmer who 
can easily have hundreds of workers in the fields during harvest. 
Another advantage for small farmers is that they can count on subsidies from INDAP to establish 
irrigation systems; in a commercial farm this makes up about 20% of the initial investment. 
12.2 The case studies 
12.2.1 Golden Berries S.A. 
Golden Berries S.A is a corporation owned by 10 shareholders, themselves EACs with a total 
membership of 339 small farmers. Each of the 10 EACs which owns Golden Berries is organized 
around a cold storage warehouse. Golden Berries markets its members' raspberry production as well 
as that of an additional 247 small farmers who are not members of the shareholding EAC. Its main 
offices are in the city of Parral, Region VTJ, about 400km south of Santiago. 
A brief history 
Golden Berries grew out of a Microregional Development Project, formulated and approved by 
INDAP in 1995. In the microregion of Bullileo, two private consultant firms were working with 540 
small farmers under contract to the Technology Transfer Program. Over 150 of these farmers went 
into raspberry production with technical support from these advisors and with loans and grants from 
INDAP. In 1995 the area under raspberries controlled by these farmers represented about 3% of the 
national total. 
I interviewed many of the small farmers who were among the first to start producing raspberries. They 
told me that until the early 1990s, wheat had been their main crop. However, as Chile began to open 
its markets to international competition, they found that they could not compete with Argentinean 
wheat. One of these farmers told me that "a large farmer with 100 ha or more of wheat, can still make 
enough money to make a living, even if he only obtains a profit of $ 420 per hectare. But a small 
farmer, with a maximum of 5 or 10 ha of wheat, cannot expect to survive based on wheat production... 
we had to find new alternatives, or we would end up having to sell the land so that our children could 
go to school and have a future." 
By the mid-'90s average raspberry prices had reached a peak of between $ 6/kilo to $ 17/kilo 
(depending on quahty), meaning that a small farmer could generate a gross income of up to $ 70,000 
per hectare, close to one hundred times more than what one hectare of wheat could produce. 
The idea of planting raspberries had been taken from several large farms who had brought the crop 
into the region "One day we would find out that a few raspberry plants had somehow crossed the 
fences during the night from the large farms and had appeared in our backyard.... this is how we 
began to learn how to propagate the plants, what diseases affected them, and so on... but we were only 
learning, because we lacked the money to start growing them on a larger scale." At the same time, the 
staff of the private consultant firms working with the small farmers began to learn about the new crop 
and to start small-scale demonstration and experimentation plots. 
In 1993-94 INDAP opened up a credit line to finance small farmers' raspberry plantations. One of 
them told me that "as soon as we had the funding available, this spread like a wildfire", and in only 
one year there were dozens of small farmers with a quarter to half a hectare of raspberries. 
Several farmers told me that with the support of their advisors and by observing the large farms, they 
soon learned how to produce raspberries, achieving moderately high yields and good quality, but that 
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marketing remained an important problem. "We could not sell directly to the exporters, because we 
lacked the volume they demanded, so we had to sell through middlemen." Their bargaining position 
was very weak, because the produce must be sold the same day it is harvested as it is highly 
perishable. 
The high prices of raspberries in the mid-'90s provided an extremely strong incentive for small 
farmers to expand their production as fast as possible, but this could not happen without the producers 
solving their marketing constraints and especially without ready access to cold storage during harvest. 
Under the Microregjonal Development Project, the first five cold storage warehouses were built in 
1995, and another five were added the next year. The groups of farmers that made up the EACs 
controlling each warehouse had formed several years before to participate in the Technology Transfer 
Program. According to the General Manager of Golden Berries, the second group of warehouses was 
"a big mistake", since it led to excess cold storage capacity. A better plan would have been to add 
greater volume to the initial five units. Around half of the warehouses have perennial problems 
meeting their own costs, given the low amount of raspberries processed and sold by them, relative to 
the size of the investment and the cost of running the cold storage unit. 
Several sources confirmed that the decision to have 10 warehouses was made because each local 
group of farmers wanted their own unit, and because INDAP did not have the long-term vision to 
convince farmers that the prevailing high prices would eventually have to fall and that to be profitable 
each unit would need to work at close to full capacity. 
During 1995 and 1996 the Microregional Development Project was coordinated directly by INDAP, 
who hired a small team of consultants to manage it. These were more accountable to INDAP than to 
the farmers. INDAP's management of the project soon led to a growing tension between the 
productive and technological aspects (coordinated by the private advisory firms) and the commercial 
side of the project (managed by the INDAP consultants). It was unclear who was accountable to 
whom, and there were frictions between planning, management and implementation. In other words, 
INDAP had started the project with an organizational design typical of an agricultural development 
project, and this soon became incompatible with the needs of a business endeavor. 
With reference to INDAP's organizational design, one of the Golden Berries board members 
explained that "the concept was correct, but it was badly applied. Because of the mistakes in the 
implementation, several of the warehouses were on the brink of bankruptcy... the optimistic production 
goals were not achieved, and the quality was also not very good.... the original advisors would come 
to our farm two or three times per year, and they would spend most of the time in meetings when what 
we needed was to have them on the farm as frequently as possible... when we had a problem that we 
did not know how to solve, we would have to wait for them or go to their office, and by the time we 
had a solution it was too late... they kept working with raspberries the same way they used to do with 
wheat, but with wheat we knew what to do since we had been planting it since always... with 
raspberries we were learning and we needed more support, and they [the advisors] just were not up to 
it." 
One of the Golden Berries board members told me that when they realized the project was not 
achieving its intended results, "we began to see that to make it work we needed to take direct 
control."66 
In 1996 INDAP hired a new Coordinator of the Microregional Development Project, who led the 
transition from the development project organization to the formation of Golden Berries. When the 
EAC formed in 1996, the Coordinator of the project was hired by the farmers as the General Manager 
of the firm. Finally, in 1997 the new EAC convinced INDAP to transfer to Golden Berries the funds 
used to pay the private consultant firms that were providing technical assistance to the farmers. With 
Despite these early failures, prices were so high that farmers still ended up with a much higher income than they used to 
with wheat. Besides, as many told me, the very labor-intensive raspberries meant there was plenty of well-paid work for 
hundreds of farmers and their families. 
226 Chapter Twelve 
these funds, the EAC was able to hire its own technical and adnoinistrative staff and establish its own 
offices. 
Organizational set-up 
The board of Golden Berries has 10 members, one from each of the shareholding EACs. Golden 
Berries has 16 paid employees: a General Manager, an Operations Manager, a manager for 
administration and finances, six administrative staff, and five speciabsts in charge of providing 
technical assistance to the farmers. 
The main service that Golden Berries provides to its members is to market their raspberries. Golden 
Berries sells the product to several exporters, although the trend has been to concentrate on fewer 
clients. The individual farmer is responsible for producing, harvesting and delivering his or her 
raspberries to the cold storage warehouse, where they are graded according to industry standards, 
packaged and stored. Golden Berries is informed daily of the amount of product available in each 
warehouse for the different quality grades, and with this information it negotiates directly quantities, 
prices and payment and delivery conditions with the buyers. 
In each step in this process (farmer to warehouse, warehouse to Golden Berries, Golden Berries to 
processing and export firm) there is a sales operation. That is, the farmer sells to his or her warehouse, 
who sells to Golden Berries, who sells to the final client. The EAC has chosen this system because it 
feels that it stimulates greater efficiency at each link in the chain, and specifically because it avoids 
having the more efficient (farmer or warehouse) subsidize the less efficient (farmer or warehouse). 
The farmers also told me that with this system it is much easier to clarify and render accounts: Golden 
Berries is accountable to each warehouse individually, and each warehouse to each of its individual 
members. As one of the warehouse managers told me, "some organizations only know about averages, 
average costs, average prices... so they end up not knowing if someone is a cat or a rabbit!" 
The second most important service provided by Golden Berries, and one that is highly valued by the 
farmers, is technical assistance. As with many other EACs, Golden Berries also sells the most 
important agricultural inputs that its members need, not only for raspberry production but also for then-
other crops. The EAC also takes care of the accounting of the individual warehouses, who thus share 
this cost. 
Performance analysis 
The formation of Golden Berries has solved many of the original problems: technical assistance 
improved substantially, a fact confirmed by all the farmers that I interviewed: "the technicians now 
respond to the General Manager and to the board, and not to somebody sitting in an INDAP office... 
the technicians have clear goals that they must meet, and these are the same goals that we need to 
achieve in order to turn out a profit, so production and the economic side are like two sides of the 
same coin, not like before... when the advisors are hired by the farmers, things go much better, 
because if we lose money, they don't get paid or they are fired." 
Under the new arrangement, yields and quality improved substantially, and the farmers were able to 
work with several buyers, so selling their production has never been a problem. However, Golden 
Berries itself never managed to balance its accounts, as its owners (i.e., the small farmers) always 
demanded very high prices for their raspberries, leaving the EAC Utile or no margin to cover its own 
costs. To many farmers, Golden Berries was a 'service organization' that should continue behaving as 
before: an organization subsidized by INDAP to provide an almost free service to small farmers. This 
pressure was strongest from the four or five warehouses that were having difficulties meeting then-
own costs due to their relative low volumes of operations. A simple analysis showed that at best 
Golden Berries could expect to generate an annual income of around $ 78,000, but its costs in 1998-99 
were around $ 282,000. The gap was financed by INDAP through a series of grants, which by 1999 
added up to $ 177,000 per year. 
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Why did ENDAP and the farmers get involved in an investment project that had such a faulty design? 
One of Chile's top raspberry experts explained to me that "in 1993-94, few people in Chile and much 
less in INDAP knew much about raspberries. When they launched these raspberry projects with the 
small farmers, they were probably afraid of getting involved in the processing and export side of the 
business because they lacked the technical and managerial know-how. They wanted the small farmers 
to take advantage of the new opportunity, but they just did not know how to do it right." 
Towards the end of 1999 the board became aware of their EAC's tenuous financial position. However, 
many board members insisted that it was the duty of the government to supply the necessary funding 
to sustain the organization, as it was indispensable for small raspberry growers to have this marketing 
service to avoid falling prey to the middlemen. Other board members and the managers explained to 
me that the only alternative was to diversify into different income-generating activities, and, in 
particular, to move several steps ahead in the value-adding chain to become not only a trader but also a 
processor and, eventually, an exporter of raspberries. 
At the same time, by 1998-99, it was becoming quite obvious to many stakeholders and observers that 
decision-making power was mainly concentrated in the hands of the General Manager of Golden 
Berries, despite the fact that the board appeared to be quite active and involved in management. On the 
surface, the board carried out all of its duties, but in fact the General Manager was directing the 
decision-making process. Several well informed sources (including four members of the board) told 
me that the board was limited by the small farmers' restricted capacity as corporation directors. The 
result was an EAC owned by a group of shareholders incapable of controlling and directing a strong 
external manager. 
Over time, the information to the board and to external stakeholders such as INDAP, became less 
specific and less regular. In May 1999, INDAP requested an external audit of the EAC because the 
General Manager had not been able to provide sufficient information to justify the use of certain 
grants. The audit established that a substantial amount of money was missing. The board fired the top 
three executives of the EAC, and immediately informed the shareholders. 
The initial reaction of the members was to put an end to the EAC. Eventually, however, the EACs that 
make up Golden Berries decided to try to rescue their organization. Since INDAP had stopped the 
flow of funds to the organization, they approached a commercial bank for a short-term loan to help 
process the 1999 harvest, and they also obtained an advance payment from one of their main clients, a 
large exporter. When the EAC secured this fresh funding, INDAP partly resumed its financial support. 
They hired a new manager and imposed a severe cut in the fixed costs of Golden Berries. They also 
hired an independent external auditor to help the board supervise the new management. 
With this effort, Golden Berries managed to survive for one additional harvest. However, by the end 
of the season it had become obvious to all that the EAC was no longer viable, and the farmers decided 
to close it down. Seven of the warehouses have decided to continue working together to market their 
raspberries. One of the warehouses closed down its own operations and the farmers have either 
stopped producing raspberries or are back to selling to middlemen. The retraining two warehouses 
have decided to continue their own operations independently. 
12.2.2 Frutas de Romeral S.A. 
Frutas de Romeral S.A. (also known as Romefrut) is an EAC with 48 members. It was founded in 
1995 by a group of small farmers who the previous year had successfully sold their raspberries 
together. Romefrut is based in the municipality of Romeral, in Region VII. The great majority of 
Romefrut's members are beneficiaries of the agrarian reform with a socioeconomic level that is 
probably above average for Chilean small farmers. 
A brief history 
The original idea of collective marketing was promoted by one small farmer who had been a technical 
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advisor for IANSA, a large agroindustrial complex working with small farmers in sugarbeet 
production. As a technical advisor, this local leader had worked with many of the small farmers who 
would become involved in this project. Since his establishment as a farmer in the area, he had become 
a highly respected leader in many local development projects. 
Many small farmers in the area started planting raspberries in 1990 and 1991. With the boom in 
raspberry production, this leader began convincing his neighbors of the need to work together to 
negotiate with the middlemen. The talks went on inconclusively until 1994, when he and a partner 
rented a small cold storage warehouse and bought around 300 tons of raspberries from 80 small 
farmers at a higher price than that paid by the traditional middlemen. This convinced the group that it 
was feasible to sell their produce together. 
The group asked INDAP for support to consolidate their experience. As INDAP was promoting the 
participation of small farmers in the booming raspberry industry, it very rapidly processed this request 
and in only a few months the project was approved. Of the 80 initial participants, only 48 decided in 
the end to join the EAC, while the rest declined to make the contribution to the initial capitalization of 
the firm (the total cost of the shares per farmer was around $ 4,200, payable over a two year period). 
Organizational set-up 
Romefrut was conceived as a processing and marketing EAC. Using its own infrastructure, it can 
participate in all the steps in raspberry processing: it buys the raspberries from its members and any 
other farmer, large or small, willing to sell; it grades, freezes, packages, labels, stores and sells the 
raspberries through exporting firms. Almost all the produce is sold frozen (IQF, or Individually Quick 
Frozen, and block-frozen, depending on the quality of the raspberries), in line with the main trend of 
Chilean raspberry exports, destined for the European market. Less than 5% is of such poor quality that 
it has to be sold to the juice and marmalade industry. 
The EAC buys the raspberries from its members "because that is how the market operates... the 
middlemen pay cash on delivery, and if we want the members to sell their raspberries through us, we 
have to do the same." 
The EAC also buys berries from other small and medium farmers in the area. Members and non-
members receive exactly the same treatment in terms of prices and quality control, but the members 
receive additional benefits, such as technical assistance and greater access to different public programs 
which support small-scale agriculture. These include the subsidized installation of irrigation systems. 
In addition, many of the members I interviewed told me that by the time their children grow up and 
take over the farms, they will have paid the cost of setting up Romefrut; they think they will be able to 
pass this EAC on to their children, who, as one of the farmers told me, "will not have to deal with the 
conchenchos [middlemen] as we used to do." 
In 1999 Romefrut had about 10 main clients to whom it sold its processed product. However, the EAC 
is gradually reducing its portfolio of clients, as it wants to concentrate on no more than four or five to 
be able to negotiate better and more stable contracts. The EAC has been very successful in using the 
'carrot' of its 60 tons of top-quality berries destined for the very profitable fresh market, to negotiate 
better prices and payment conditions for its frozen product. The manager of one of the two largest 
exporters in Chile, who buys from Romefrut, said that "60 tons of fresh-quality raspberries is an 
extremely interesting proposition, placing Romefruit amongst our most valuable clients." hi the 2000-
2001 season, Romefrut, in association with six other EACs, managed for the first time to export a 
fraction of its production directly to Europe; this trial was successful and the EACs plan to gradually 
expand this operation. 
In its first three years, this EAC experimented with different management approaches. It was led by 
two people who had played a catalytic role in the formation of the organization. One was the chairman 
of the board, and the other acted as general manager of the EAC. Like many other EACs, Romefrut 
had received a direct grant from INDAP to be used to hire and pay its own management, 
administrative and technical staff. In addition, the EAC received several long-term loans to buy the 
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land, build and equip its processing plant. Between 1995 and 1997, the EAC implemented several 
consecutive investment projects to finish and expand the processing plant, until it was able to process 
over 1000 tons of raspberries per season. 
Performance assessment 
Most of the informants I talked to agreed that during the first two or three years the management and 
administration of the EAC and its investment projects was very deficient. The technical and 
administrative staff had been selected and hired by the leaders of the EAC, and apparently they lacked 
the expertise to adequately manage a complex business operation that was moving close to $ 1 million 
per year. Gradually, the EAC began to lose much of its working capital. This was because it was 
diverting a growing proportion of its income to finance expansion projects, and also because of a 
policy of granting generous credit to many members for buying agricultural inputs, which would be 
paid back after harvest. In addition, in 1996-97 farmers experienced significant difficulties with their 
raspberries, due to declining prices and unfavorable weather; many of them had expanded the area 
under raspberries very rapidly, only to discover that they lacked the necessary labor, technical and 
managerial capacity to maintain the same high yields and quality standards. 
During these early years, the grassroots members neither demanded nor received adequate information 
about the EAC's operations and performance. This was due to their great trust in the capacity of then-
leaders who had managed to bring them together and to successfully negotiate the necessary support to 
start the organization and build the processing plant. The leadership gave the members general 
information, stating that the EAC was doing well, and the members felt confident as they saw the new 
buildings and equipment growing day by day. 
In 1997, INDAP requested an external assessment of the project, with an emphasis on management 
issues. This study reported severe deficiencies in the management of the EAC: lack of control and 
weak accounting practices, extremely large amounts of money owed by the members to the EAC for 
agricultural inputs, large investments in equipment and infrastructure that had never been used, 
payments with inadequate documentation, and so on. Based on this report, INDAP requested that the 
EAC find a new manager with the technical expertise required to put the administration in order. The 
board, with the support of the shareholders' General Meeting, refused. A few months later at the next 
board elections, several members were replaced by new ones, but the core of the leadership remained 
in place. The members felt this was a triumph against DSfDAP's imposition as an external authority: 
they felt they had the full control of their EAC and they intended it to stay that way. 
One year later, during the 1998-99 harvest, the EAC ran out of money and was unable to pay its 
members for most of the raspberries that had already been delivered, processed and sold. INDAP this 
time demanded an in-depth audit, which revealed that the EAC had been steadily losing money for 
several years in a row and, in particular, that it had lost all of its working capital. Within four months 
of the crisis being brought out into the open, the members made a number of decisions that eventually 
saved the EAC. 
The members' analysis, conducted in a series of meetings, clearly showed that the problem was the 
result of bad management and not of any inappropriate or dishonest action on the part of the board or 
the management. Information provided by the external accountants and auditors was key in allowing 
the EAC members to regain their trust and to decide on a clear course of action. When it became clear 
that there had been no foul play, the farmers reacted by electing a new board and hiring a new 
manager. The new board was expanded to seven members so that each geographic sector could 
directly elect one board member from their local neighborhood. The original leader, who had been the 
main promoter of the EAC, was also removed. Because of the shortage of funds, they were unable to 
hire a professional manager, so instead they hired the most highly educated EAC member. However, 
the members did agree to hire an external consultancy firm which supports the board and the farmers 
in several aspects of management, adniinistration, accounting and production and quality control. 
INDAP supported the emergency plan by agreeing to reschedule the loans it had made to the EAC, but 
it would not agree to throw in any fresh funding. 
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In addition to these organizational and administrative steps, the 48 members unanimously made an 
extraordinary contribution of capital by each donating one ton of raspberries. In addition, for the first 
time they signed individual contracts with the EAC in which each member established a formal 
commitment to sell a specified amount of raspberries to the EAC during the next season. 
Several of the farmers I interviewed explained that the donation and commitment were more than 
justified by the benefits they derive from Romefrut. In particular, they see the EAC as providing the 
basic security they require to continue expanding the farm area under berries. "Each of us has around 
1 ha of raspberries, but we all want to get to at least 2 or 3 ha," one of the members told me, adding 
that "with Romefrut here, we know we can sell all of our production at a fair price... if we had lost the 
EAC, we would have ended back with the middlemen and under those conditions it would have been 
much riskier to expand production." 
Several of the members I interviewed told me that after the crisis it was possible to regain members' 
trust and support, thanks to a policy of clear, detailed, and frequent information from the external 
advisors and accountants. Before the crisis, the members would meet three or four times a year, but 
the information they received was very general. Today, the members meet once a month, and most 
members attend regularly. The external accountant provides detailed information to members at each 
meeting. A written accounting report is distributed to all the members every three months. All the 
major decisions, especially those that pass judgment on a fellow member, are now taken by secret 
ballot. 
These measures began to yield results as the EAC made a profit on its operation the following year. 
However, the EAC does not have enough capital to buy all of its members' harvest. Its contract with 
each member covers about two-thirds of a farmer's harvest, and the member is free to sell the rest to 
the middleman. This way, the EAC has a bit more room to delay payment for a few days, as the 
members receive cash from the middlemen to meet their immediate expenses. 
While this system is an innovative and smart solution to a difficult problem it still leaves the EAC 
short of the tonnage it must process to start turning a large and stable profit. In 1999 the members had 
about 76 ha of berries (mostly raspberries, but some had begun chversifying into boysenberries and 
strawberries) in full production, plus an additional 25 ha that would go into production one or two 
years later; an area that is more than enough to sustain the EAC. In addition, all of the members I 
interviewed made it clear that they intended to continue expanding the area under berries through the 
partial reinvestment of profits6 7. Thus, the EAC has clear potential to become financially stable if it 
can increase its working capital enough to purchase a higher proportion of its members' harvest. This 
is a central goal of the current board, management and external advisors. 
12.2.3 Frutas de Guaico S.A. 
Frutas de Gauico S.A. (also known as Guaicofrut) was established in 1997, after having operated for 
some time informally. The EAC was formed by 44 small farmers who had been previously working as 
non-member suppliers of Romefrut. 
A brief history 
Many of the farmers in the new group had been involved in Romefrut's formation. Several of them 
told me they had not joined Romefrut because they distrusted economic organizations, mainly because 
of bad experiences in the early '70s. According to different sources, the farmers who did not join 
Romefrut tended to have smaller farms and fewer raspberries than those who did agree to form the 
organization. To the former, the initial capital contribution of more than $ 4,000 was too much. 
Even after prices dropped in the mid-90s, most of the farmers I interviewed agreed that in a 'normal year' they could gross 
at least $ 3,000/ha, which is at least three times more than the next best local alternative. In addition, they explained that with 
raspberries they could provide almost full time employment for all the family members throughout the year. Finally, since 
they can now produce their own plants, the initial investment is considerably lower than when they started. 
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When Romefrut built its processing plant and began its operations, many of those who had not joined 
changed their mind. However, the owners would not let them in, although the EAC did buy their 
raspberries. However, the 1997 raspberry harvest in the area was so large that Romefrut did not have 
the capacity to buy the produce of close to 100 small non-shareholder farmers; as a result, they lost a 
high percentage of that year's production. 
Motivated by Romefrut's example and being aware that they lacked security in marketing their 
raspberries, part of this group of farmers secured INDAP grants and loans to launch their own EAC. 
Each of them had to make an initial capital contribution of $ 200 in cash, plus one ton of berries 
(about half of the farmers who had been involved in the initiative declined to join when they had to 
commit themselves to this payment). By the next harvest the EAC was organized and had the basic 
infrastructure and equipment necessary to begin operating. 
The new EAC had the advantage of learning from Romefrut's experience, and, as one member of the 
board of Guaicofrut told me, "since we are all neighbors we knew well how Romefrut was working, 
and when we started our project we were able to take those things that we liked and change those that 
we did not like." 
In particular, the Guaicofrut group, being made up of smaller farmers with fewer raspberries, could 
exert a more careful control over their crop, and from the start they decided to compete based on 
producing top quality fruit. "The members of Romefrut are larger and they have more volume, but they 
cannot match our quality. Romefrut has had several of its shipments rejected because of poor quality 
control, and this has never happened to us." 
Guaicofrut was also able to see how much of Romefrut's infrastructure remained underused, so their 
investment and expansion strategies were much more careful, thus keeping their fixed and financial 
costs lower. 
Romefrut and Guaicofrut have engaged in several activities together. For example, they have financed 
joint marketing campaigns; have traveled together to other regions and countries to visit raspberry 
traders, plantations and processing plants; have organized joint training workshops for their members; 
and have commissioned joint market studies. However, all the Guaicofrut members that I interviewed 
agreed they would not join with Romefrut in commercial operations because of the differences in 
quality. 
According to several grassroots members that I interviewed, the most important services they receive 
from the EAC are: 
• the security of knowing that the EAC will buy their fruit at a fair price; 
• loans to buy agricultural inputs 
• the ability to recuperate the Value Added Tax they pay on their inputs (18% of the gross price) 
• cash loans to pay labor costs (up to $ 500/ha), and 
• access to good quality and specialized technical assistance services. 
Guaicofrut also organizes its members' individual INDAP loan applications, thus saving them time 
and the cost of traveling to the INDAP local office. Finally, Guaicofrut has an active program of social 
and community activities for members' families. 
Organizational set-up 
Guaicofrut's board is very well organized; each member has a specific area of responsibility: assessing 
the applications for credit on agricultural inputs, supervision of accounts, maintenance of the 
processing plant and equipment, social and community affairs, and so on. The board meets every 
week, with the General Manager in attendance. Since 1997, there have been two board elections; the 
last time a new Chairman was elected, together with several younger EAC members, part of an 
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explicit policy of encouraging the younger members to take on greater responsibilities. The board has 
the authority to decide on each and every contract with potential clients, and the General Membership 
meeting decides on any significant investment, as well as on the general conditions of all the 
commercial and financial transactions between the EAC and the members. 
There are two General Membership meetings per year; one meeting is dedicated to an in-depth 
analysis of the results of the previous season, and the other to issues such as defining the price, quality, 
delivery and payment rules for the next season, or defining criteria for auxiliary services like technical 
on-farm support, or the credit program for agricultural inputs. External informants who are familiar 
with Guaicofrut told me that there is always a frank debate in the General Membership meetings, and 
that open but respectful criticism of the board, management or individual members is frequent and 
well accepted. One of the members of Guaicofrut, who has a technical degree, is the EAC's paid 
General Manager. 
After several years of work, the General Assembly mandated the board to revise the EAC's internal 
bylaws. One board member explained to me that "the initial bylaws were written by a lawyer, and we 
just accepted them... over time we have devised our own rules, and this time the bylaws will be 
tailored to our own specific needs." 
The EAC has always been careful to keep all its aorninistration and finances in order. In our 
conversations, the board members emphasized the importance of their decision to hire an expensive 
external accounting and auditing firm: "if you want to go into a project like this, you have to be willing 
to invest in having good information and good accounting services, otherwise you are blind." The 
EAC has always paid its loans promptly, and is very careful in assessing each member's application 
for loans for agricultural supplies, charging a reasonable interest rate: "there is no use being generous 
today if we cannot have the results that will let us continue providing the same support tomorrow." 
During the first years, the EAC insisted that all members sell all or most of their harvest through the 
EAC. In a meeting with the board, I was told that thanks to on-farm visits by the technical advisors 
(twice weekly), they always have a very good idea of how much fruit each member is likely to harvest, 
and, in addition, "we are all neighbors and ourfarms are next to each other, so it is impossible for one 
member to sell to the middleman without the rest knowing about it." To prevent members from selling 
too much of their production to the middlemen, they established a number of rules, such as linking the 
credit for agricultural inputs to the delivery of the fruit. But, as the EAC developed, they now think 
that these rules are less important: "the members sell to us most of their production because we are 
doing well and we pay good prices on time., if we were having problems, we could have all the rules 
in the world and it would not make any difference." 
The manager adds that the EAC's price policy is to pay the highest possible price that will let the EAC 
meet its own costs, pays its loans, and finance its new investments: "the members know perfectly well 
that until we finish paying our loans, we cannot transfer all of our profits to the members via the price 
we pay for their product. We know that this will come in time, but first we must lay firm foundations." 
The overall price policy for each season is set at the General Assembly before the harvest starts. The 
external accountant and the manager first inform the members of the EAC's financial needs for 
covering its loans and costs. Then the members decide on a profit target for the EAC. This information 
is then translated into a reference price, based on the available information on international prices at 
that time. The manager uses the Internet daily to monitor the international prices of raspberries during 
the harvest season, to help calculate the actual price it will pay to member and non-member suppliers. 
The grassroots members told me that the actual prices they receive are similar to those paid by the 
middlemen, but they feel this is because they are still paying off the large investments needed to set up 
the EAC. During the harvest and marketing season, each member receives a written statement twice a 
month with a detailed explanation of the amount delivered, results of the quality controls of his or her 
production, gross price, discounts to pay back any outstanding personal loans, and net total price. 
Cooperating to Compete 233 
Performance analysis 
Small price increments have been possible over time as the EAC has managed to raise the volume of 
operations while maintaining costs, and, in particular, because the EAC has always placed a great 
emphasis on making investments that allow it to add more value to the product before selling it. In 
1996-97, the EAC was only capable of collecting 200 tons in cold storage chambers and negotiating 
the sale collectively; in 1997-98 it was able to freeze a small share of the produce, and it made its first 
direct export to England (45 tons or about 15% of production). One year later it processed all the 
produce and directly exported 150 tons (40% of the total production) to Canada, the USA and different 
European countries. In 1999-2000, its plans included increasing production by about 60%, processing 
all of it before selling it, and exporting at least 80% of the stock directly. In the year 2000, the EAC 
took out a loan with a private bank for equipment for processing vegetables. 
12.3 The raspberry EACs" performance and impacts 
In this section I will describe and analyze the economic and financial performance of these three 
EACs, as well as examming their impacts on their members' farms and households. 
12.3.1 Economic and financial performance 
Table 12.1 shows that in 1998 all three EACs were in a delicate economic and financial position. 
Table 12.1 Economic and financial performance of three raspberry processing and marketing EACs 
Item Golden Berries 
1998 
Romefrut 
1998 
Guaicofrut 
1998 
Total revenue ($) 1,589,916 1,161,844 609,654 
Total expenses ($) 1,589541 1,238,892 586,529 
Net result (S) -176 -77,048 23,125 
Total assets ($) 552,300 930,321 610,555 
Current assets ($) 543,266 296,546 336,542 
Noncurrent assets ($) 9,034 633,775 274,013 
Total liabilities ($) 516,040 823,957 585,953 
Current liabilities ($) 489,748 145,791 130,349 
Noncurrent liabilities ($) 26,293 678,167 455,603 
Net assets ($) 36,260 106,364 24,603 
Grants from government ($) 293,846 31,534 31,534 
Net result/total revenue -0.001 -0.07 0.04 
Total liabilities/total assets 0.94 0.89 0.96 
Operational capital (current assets - current liabilities) ($) 53,518 150,756 206,193 
Liquidity (current assets/current liabilities) 1.11 2.03 2.58 
Dependency (grants/total revenue) 0.19 0.03 0.05 
In the case of Romefrut, 1998 was the year when it incubated the financial crisis that exploded a few 
months later, in April-May 1999. We can see that the EAC was losing a substantial amount of money, 
at a rate that was rapidly depleting its working capital. The EAC reached this point because of its 
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policy of very rapidly expanding its processing facilities, while at the same time working with 
volumes of raspberries that were 50% below its full processing capacity. This policy was, in turn, the 
result of very flawed management decisions, taken by a board and management controlled by small 
farmers who simply lacked the expertise to plan and implement a more sensible development strategy. 
Guaicofrut is the only one of the three EACs that had positive results in 1998, although it was facing a 
very high level of indebtedness. However, most of the debt was long-term and the organization was 
able to meet its financial obligations on time and in full. Again, this EAC's fragile position was partly 
due to its low levels of operations relative to its processing capacity, as well as to the maintenance of a 
number of expensive technical assistance and credit services that put a heavy strain on its finances. In 
contrast with the other two EACs, Guaicofrut's board and management were always more 
conservative when it came to deciding on new investments and new lines of work. In particular, its 
tradition of setting up a raspberry pricing policy that gave priority to meeting its own obligations, 
meant that value-adding was the only way it could balance its own economic and financial obligations 
with the need to pay competitive market prices for its members' raspberries. 
One common negative element is the high debts of these three organizations, ranging between $ 
500,000 and $ 825,000. Golden Berries' situation is particularly vulnerable as almost all of its 
liabilities are short-term, while Romefrut and Guaicofrut have to deal with mostly long-term loans 
taken to build and equip their processing plants. 
Romefrut and Guaicofrut have low dependency on government grants, while Golden Berries 
essentially was still alive thanks to the very high rate of support from INDAP, allowing it to meet a 
fifth of its total expenses. 
12.3.2 Impact on members' farms and households 
Household and farm income 
Table 12.2 shows that there are no significant differences between the income and income 
composition of the members and non-members of Romefrut and Guaicofrut. 
In the case of Golden Berries, however, the differences are important, as members have significantly 
higher total household and farm income than non-members. The Golden Berries data in Table 12.2, 
combined with those in Table 12.3, show how an EAC can improve its members' well-being and the 
profitability of their farms, and at the same time go bankrupt in part because of the unreasonable or 
unsustainable magnitude of that impact. 
Table 12.3 shows that in all cases EAC members have a much greater area under raspberries than non-
members. From my interviews and meetings, I think there are two reasons for this. Firstly, members 
have privileged access to credit; necessary for expansion in such an expensive crop. Secondly, as 
members told me time and again, they feel that being part of the EAC lowers the risks involved in 
marketing this highly perishable crop, and thus they can risk producing a higher volume. In other 
words, EAC participation creates both an incentive to grow more raspberries, and delivers the 
resources required to respond to that incentive. In addition, EAC members repeatedly told me how 
much they valued the fact that with a larger area under raspberries, they could provide more on-farm 
work for family members. This is confirmed by the data in Table 12.2, which show that between one-
fifth and one-third of the direct costs of raspberry production are represented by family labor and 
should thus be added to the annual household income. 
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Table 12.2 Average income and income composition, Golden Berries, Guaicofrut and Romefrut 
(1999-2000 agricultural season, $) 
INDICATORS GOLDEN BERRU5S ROMEFRUT GUAICOFRUT 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Net hh income 13,230 8,709 11,178 12,552 12,035 12,546 
Earned net hh income 10,578 4,651 9,632 11,917 11,338 11,911 
Unearned net hh income 2,652 4,059 1,547 635 697 635 
Non agricultural net income 681 1,551 1,932 4,759 2,690 4,759 
Farm net income 9,898 3,100 7,700 7,158 8,873 7,152 
Table 12.3 Average economic results of raspberry production, Golden Berries, Romefrut and 
Guaicofrut ( 1999-2000 agricultural season) 
Variable GOLDEN BERRIES ROMEFRUT GUAICOFRUT 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Gross income ($) 4,697 1,001 14,402 7,390 10,993 7,385 
Direct costs ($) 3.945 770 9,080 3,926 5,011 3,935 
Cost of family labor ($) 1,366 392 1,655 738 931 740 
Gross margin ($) 751 231 5,322 3,464 5,982 3,450 
Gross margin per hectare ($/ha) 951 1,050 2,801 3,981 4,097 3,966 
Total production (kg) 4,987 1,230 13,868 7,794 11,173 7,789 
Percentage fresh quality 5.1 10 6.2 3.2 3.3 3.2 
Percentage IQF quality 0 0 79.7 77.1 70.4 77.1 
Percentage block 5 2 12.4 14.7 24.7 14.7 
Percentage pulp 3.2 9.9 0.1 0 1.2 0 
Percentage ungraded harvest 88.1 79 1.2 5 0.5 5 
Yield total (kg/ha) 6,313 5,595 7,299 8,959 7,653 8,953 
Average price ($/kg) 0.94 0.81 1.04 0.95 0.98 0.95 
Crop area (ha) 0.79 0.22 1.90 0.87 1.46 0.87 
Production sold through EAC (%) 97 0 71 0 82 0 
Apparently there is a cost to be paid for this expansion, as members tend to have significantly lower 
yields than non-members. As anyone familiar with raspberries knows, managing 1.5 or 2 ha well is a 
difficult undertaking, especially if one considers that these farmers have only been involved with this 
crop for around five or six years. 
However, in terms of quality - an extremely important variable in this crop - there are no large 
differences between members and non-members. Both the members and non-members in the Golden 
Berries area sell most of their crop "all barrer", that is, as an ungraded lot. This is because they lack 
the processing and value-adding facilities that would allow them to meet all the quality grades 
recognized by the industry. As a result the prices received by the Golden Berries members are between 
5% and 19% lower than those obtained by the members of the other two EACs. 
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An extremely interesting finding is revealed by analyzing the price differentials between members and 
non-members across the three EACs: they are 16%, 10% and 4% for Golden Berries, Romefrut and 
Guaicofrut, respectively. 
For Golden Berries, there is little doubt that this huge bonus over the market price is mainly 
responsible for the EAC's bankruptcy, as no business in a market as competitive as raspberries, can 
afford to pay prices that are so much higher than the market price. This is especially true when Golden 
Berries is not adding much value through processing or directly exporting its raspberries. The same 
can be said, more or less, for Romefrut, although with an important difference of magnitude; the 
external audits of this EAC make it clear that the firm was paying prices that it could not sustain 
financially. 
Only in the case of Guaicofrut do the price differentials begin to make sense, as this EAC was not only 
processing all of its fruit, but was also exporting most of its produce directly, and was thus more 
capable of capturing a higher share of the final consumer price and transferring it to the members. 
Access to technical assistance and credit 
All of the farmers (members and non-members) sampled as part of these three case studies have access 
to technical assistance services. In fact, most of them receive this type of support from more than one 
source, and the only difference is that EAC members get advice from more sources than non-members 
(Table 12.4). One important difference is that members tend to pay for some of the technical advice 
they receive, while most of the non-members only get free advice. 
Table 12.4 Access to technical assistance services, Golden Berries, Romefrut and Guaicofrut 
INDICATORS GOLDEN BERRIES ROMEFRUT GUAICOFRUT 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% % % % % % 
Tech. assistance from EAC 96.7 0 100 0 100 0 
Tech. assistance from government 16.7 0 80 100 100 100 
Tech. assistance from university 0 0 33.3 0 0 0 
Tech. assistance from NGO 3.3 0 0 0 0 0 
Tech. assistance from private firm 56.7 53.3 50 100 100 100 
Tech. assistance from other org. 3.3 0 33.3 0 0 0 
Tech. assistance from private advisor 6.7 0 0 0 0 0 
One very important difference between members and non-members in the three case studies is that the 
former have more access to short and long-term loans, from INDAP and other commercial sources, 
and the amounts they receive are also significantly higher. Only a small minority of the non-members 
has access to short-term loans, and none of the non-members included in my samples received long-
term financing; this is obviously a very serious constraint to participation in a perennial and expensive 
crop like raspberries (Table 12.5). 
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Table 12.5. Access to credit, Golden Berries, Romefrut and Guaicofrut 
INDICATORS GOLDEN BERRIES ROMEFRUT GUAICOFRUT 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
N° $ N° $ N" $ N° $ N° $ N° $ 
Total loans 16 1,384 4 972 11 4,908 2 652 7 2,970 2 652 
Short term loans 11 1,069 4 972 4 1,493 2 652 5 2,813 2 652 
Long term loans 9 1,154 0 0 9 4,868 0 0 2 3,364 0 0 
INDAP loans 15 939 4 972 10 3,456 1 1,051 3 1,787 1 1,051 
State bank loans 1 631 0 0 1 1,682 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Private bank loans 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4,205 0 0 
EAC loans 0 0 0 0 1 2,102 0 0 2 631 0 0 
Agroindustry loans 1 694 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 9,460 0 0 
Commercial loans 0 0 0 0 1 505 1 252 1 505 1 252 
Other sources of 
loans 
1 1,051 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Technology adoption 
The differences between members and non-members in the adoption rates of a set of different 
technologies are not as large in these three cases as in those analyzed in the previous case studies 
chapters. This is true both for production, marketing and farm management technologies and methods. 
We have seen that almost all these farmers have access to technical assistance services, and all of them 
have been involved in commercial agriculture for at least 20 or 30 years. The fact that they have 
chosen to diversify into a new and risky crop such as raspberries, is in itself a sign of the disposition of 
these farmers to innovate (Tables 12.6 and 12.7). 
12.4 Explaining the performance differences 
In this section I explore the relationship between the performances of these three EACs and of the 
members versus the non-members, and the different characteristics of the individuals, households, and 
organizations. 
12.4.1 Farmers' assets 
There are no large differences between these groups of farmers in terms of their human capital, access 
to land, or the value of other physical assets, although the members of Guaicofrut and Romefrut tend 
to be slightly better off than their control groups. 
Household characteristics 
There are no significant differences between members and non-members, or between the three case 
studies, in terms of the characteristics of the individuals and their households: age, education, 
household size and so on (Table 12.8). 
One interesting observation is that these households tend to be larger than those of the potato and milk 
producers in the south. Because of their location in a dynamic region that offers more off-farm 
employment opportunities, and also because of the higher labor intensity and profitability of their own 
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Table 12.6 Technological changes implemented in past five years, Golden Berries, Romeftut and 
Guaicofrut 
INDICATORS GOLDEN BERRTES ROMEFRUT GUAICOFRUT 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Yes% Yes% Yes% Yes% Yes% Yes% 
Crop diversification 73.3 33.3 83.3 62.5 58.3 62.5 
Contract agriculture 36.7 6.7 53.8 25 50 25 
Marketing of inputs of products 70 13.3 66.7 37.5 66.7 37.5 
Irrigation and drainage 50 40 58.3 62.5 33.3 62.5 
Machinery and equipment 43.3 13.3 66.7 50 58.3 50 
Buildings and infrastructure 30 33.3 75 37.5 33.3 37.5 
Crop varieties and seed quality 83.3 33.3 81.8 50 45.5 50 
Use of fertilizers 53.3 35.7 66.7 50 66.7 50 
Weed control 70 53.3 66.7 75 75 75 
Insect and disease control 70 60 66.7 85.7 63.6 85.7 
Cattle breeds 29.2 15.4 44.4 60 28.6 60 
Reproduction of cattle 25 7.7 42.9 0 28.6 0 
Sanitary management of cattle 45.8 30.8 57.1 40 42.9 40 
Table 12.7 Farm management practices, Golden Berries, Romefrut and Guaicofrut 
INDICATORS GOLDEN BERRIES ROMEFRUT GUAICOFRUT 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
% % % % % % 
Legally registered farmers for fiscal 
purposes 
96.7 73.3 75 62.5 90.9 62.5 
VAT accounting and filing 100 73.3 100 83.3 100 83.3 
Costs and income records 30 6.7 41.7 37.5 58.3 37.5 
Holds a bank account 30 6.7 8.3 12.5 8.3 12.5 
Legalized land titles 63.3 40 100 100 100 100 
Legalized water titles 80 96.7 87.5 100 88.9 100 
farming systems, these households apparently are more capable of retaining their younger members, as 
seen, for example, in the higher number of household members who are between 19 and 30 years of 
age. 
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Table 12.8 Household composition, Golden Berries, Guaicofrut and Romefrut 
INDICATORS GOLDEN BERRDSS ROMEFRUT GUAICOFRUT 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Members of household 5.6 5.1 5.8 6 5.2 6 
Female members 2.3 2.4 2.3 3 2.8 3 
Male members 3.3 2.7 3.6 3 2.3 3 
Members 0-12 yrs. 1.1 0.9 1.2 1 0.9 1 
Members 13-18 yrs. 0.3 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.5 
Members 19-30 yrs. 1.7 1.3 1.3 2.5 1.3 2.5 
Members 31-45 yrs. 1 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.8 0.6 
Members 46-65 yrs. 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.1 
Members 66+ yrs. 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Schooling members 7 yrs or + 6.4 5.6 6.3 7.7 6.7 7.7 
Schooling members 15 yrs or + 6.5 5.7 6.8 7.7 7 7.7 
Schooling members 19-30 yrs or + 8.7 8.5 6.4 10.3 7 10.3 
Schooling members 31-45 yrs or + 6.1 6.1 3.7 1.1 3.6 1.1 
Schooling members 46-65 yrs or + 5.4 3.9 4 1.9 2.7 1.2 
Schooling members 66 yrs or + 2.4 1 0.4 0 0.3 0 
Schooling of head of hh 4.3 3.3 5.8 4.6 3.8 4.6 
Schooling of spouse 4.8 3.7 4.8 1.5 4.1 1.5 
Schooling of sons/daughters 6.9 6.1 7 7.5 8 7.5 
Schooling of other members of hh 1.5 2 1.3 3.1 1.2 3.1 
Schooling female members of hh 6.4 5.1 5.5 5 2.7 3.5 
Schooling male members of hh 5.7 4.9 6.3 7.4 3.3 4.2 
Age of head of hh 56.3 56.7 53.8 53.8 51.5 56.7 
Age of spouse 42.8 44 48 44.8 40 42.3 
Age of sons/daughters 27.9 25.1 16.5 18.4 19.8 20.1 
Dependency ratio 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.6 
Physical and financial assets 
The members of Golden Berries and Guaicofrut have larger farms than non-members, although the 
differences are not very important. As is common in this region, all the farms are almost fully irrigated 
(Table 12.9). 
The total value of the capital assets of members of Romefrut and Guaicofrut tends to be slightly higher 
than non-members; these differences reflect the greater value of the land, buildings and infrastructure, 
and machinery and equipment. However, the differences are not that large (Table 12.10). 
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Table 12.9 Land assets, Golden Berries, Romefrut and Guaicofrut 
INDICATORS GOLDEN BERRIES ROMEFRUT GUAICOFRUT 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Land owned by hh (ha) 17.34 12.77 7.54 9.22 13.88 9.22 
Land taken by hh, shareholding (ha) 0 0 0.65 0.06 0.08 0.06 
Land taken by hh, rental (ha) 1.64 0 0.33 0.19 0.45 0.18 
Land taken by hh, other contracts 0.19 0 0.89 1.93 0.14 1.93 
Land let by hh, shareholding (ha) 0.38 10 0.12 0.37 0.45 0.37 
Land let by hh, rental (ha) 0.28 0.73 0 0.12 0.02 0.12 
Land let by hh, other contracts (ha) 0.28 0.13 0.06 0.04 1.41 0.06 
Land under management by hh (ha) 18.32 11.04 9.25 10.85 12.67 10.85 
Irrigated land under management by hh 
(ha) 
3.34 1.46 4.99 3.75 6.05 3.75 
Irrigated land owned by hh (ha) 9.55 10.53 7.33 8.66 10.87 8.66 
Table 12.10 Fixed and quasi-fixed assets, Golden Berries, Romefrut, Guaicofrut ($) 
INDICATORS GOLDEN UKRUIFS ROMEFRUT GUAICOFRUT 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Value of buildings and infrastructure 15,018 12,071 19,929 15,401 13,784 15,626 
Value of machinery and equipment 14,188 4,785 12,578 4,572 9,464 4,572 
Value of land owned by hh 91,709 84,082 85,028 74,268 111,016 73,861 
Value of livestock 3,771 910 1,980 1,882 2,691 1,856 
Total value of physical assets 112,727 115,132 118,138 93,967 133,560 93,731 
Almost all the households are located within one or two kilometers of a main road, which in the three 
cases are paved highways to the towns of Parral (Golden Berries) or Romeral (the other two EACs), or 
to the major cities of Talca (Golden Berries) or Curico. These farmers definitely do not have 
transportation or communication problems. 
12.4.2 Social capital 
As in the previous case studies, I will discuss the role of social capital in terms of participation in rural 
organizations, social norms that foster cooperation, systems of rules within the EAC, and participation 
of the EAC in larger networks. 
Participation in community and economic organizations 
Overall, the members of these EACs participate more than non-members in other economic and 
community organizations. In addition, they tend to hold leadership positions in these other 
organizations to a greater extent than the non-members (Table 12.11). 
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Table 12.11 Participation in development projects and organizations, Golden Berries, Romefrut and 
Guaicofrut 
INDICATORS GOLDEN BERRIES ROMEFRUT GUAICOFRUT 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Parts. Non-
parts. 
Yes 
% 
Yes Yes 
"/,. 
Yes Yes Yes 
% 
Organizations or projects with 
economic objectives 
Irrigation or drainage 36.7 33.3 8.3 0 8.3 0 
Marketing products or purchasing inputs 63.3 6.7 33.3 12.5 50 12.5 
Soil conservation and pasture 
improvement 
10 6.7 33.3 12.5 16.7 12.5 
Storage of products 20 0 0 0 25 0 
Youth 10 13.3 0 0 16.7 0 
Women's 6.7 20 0 0 0 0 
Trade Association 17.2 0 8.3 12.5 8.3 12.5 
Cooperative 43.3 20 0 0 0 0 
Held leadership position in any of the 
above 
43.3 13.3 50 12.5 16.7 12.5 
Organizations or projects with social 
development objectives 
Neighborhood committee 6.7 20 66.7 37.5 50 . _ 
Sports, culture and recreation 43.3 33.3 41.7 25 43.3 25 
Housing or local improvement 13.3 6.7 50 25 58.3 25 
In the case of Golden Berries, there are very striking differences of opinion between the members and 
non-members about the perceived costs and benefits of participating in economic organizations. The 
non-members almost unanimously agree that an economic organization cannot have any sort of 
economic or social benefit. A large majority of the members, on the other hand, agree that a number of 
benefits are likely, although more in the social (e.g., improved relations with neighbors, better quality 
of life for women), rather than the economic, sphere (e.g., improved marketing and better prices). The 
members of Golden Berries identify the same costs already highlighted in most of the other case 
studies: higher debts, having to pay membership fees, and the EAC taking a share of the price paid by 
the buyers of their product (Table 12.12). 
In the cases of Romefrut and Guaicofrut, most members and non-members have a very positive 
opinion of the benefits, both social and economic, that can be derived from participating in an 
economic organization. Their opinion is particularly strong - compared to many of the other case 
studies, including Golden Berries - when it comes to the benefits of participation on prices, marketing, 
lower production costs, crop diversification, etc. The members and non-members of these two EACs 
identify the same costs already noted by the members of many of the other case studies: higher debts, 
higher risks, and membership fees (Table 12.12). 
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Table 12.12 Perception of costs and benefits of participating in EAC, Golden Berries, Romeftut and 
Guaicofrut 
INDICATORS 
Benefits 
GOLDEN BERRIES ROMEFRUT GUAICOFRUT 
Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. Parts. Non-parts. 
Not 
True 
% 
True 
% 
Not 
True 
% 
True 
% 
Not 
True 
"'il 
True 
% 
Not 
True 
True 
% 
Not 
True 
% 
True 
% 
Not 
True 
It/ 
•1 
True 
% 
Improved household income 43.3 43.3 60 20 60 20 60 10 80 10 80 
Improved yield and production 16.7 56.7 73.3 6.7 20 60 0 0 0 90 0 0 
New crops and livestock 33.3 60 93.3 6.7 20 80 0 100 50 50 0 100 
Improved marketing and products 33.3 46.7 93.3 0 0 80 0 100 0 100 0 100 
Improved prices of products 40 43.3 80 6.7 0 70 0 100 0 50 0 100 
Lowered production costs 43.3 36.7 86.7 0 50 10 100 0 60 40 100 0 
Farm improvements 46.7 53.3 73.3 20 50 40 0 100 44.4 55.6 0 100 
Improved quality of life for 
family 
23.3 60 80 13.3 10 90 0 100 0 90 0 100 
Improved quality of life for 
women 
26.7 66.7 66.7 20 10 90 0 100 0 100 0 100 
Improved quality of life for youth 43.3 46.7 80 13.3 20 70 0 100 0 77.8 0 100 
Optimistic view of the future 33.3 60. 60 20 0 60 0 100 10 60 0 100 
Improved relations with govt, 
agencies 
40 43.3 93.3 6.7 0 50 0 0 11.1 55.6 0 0 
Improved relations with 
municipal govt. 
43.3 36.7 86.7 6.7 40 30 100 0 20 50 100 0 
Improved relations with 
neighbors 
10 73.3 53.3 26.7 10 70 0 100 0 100 0 100 
Doing better as small farmers 20 53.3 73.3 6. so 1) 100 0 88.9 0 100 
Costs 
Incurring debts 26.7 70 80 20 0 100 0 0 20 70 II 0 
Membership fees 13.3 86.7 86.7 13.3 20 80 100 0 20 70 100 0 
Greater risks in agriculture 23.3 53.3 53.3 20 10 60 0 100 20 40 0 100 
Loss of time in meetings 33.3 56.7 73.3 26.7 0 80 0 100 40 50 0 100 
Share of product prices taken by 
org. 
26.7 66.7 73.3 13.3 60 40 0 100 40 50 0 100 
Worsened relationships with 
neighbors 
76.7 10 100 0 60 10 0 100 80 10 0 100 
Some take advantage of others 46.7 46.7 66.7 26.7 10 80 0 100 33.3 55.6 0 100 
Less trust in the future 40 43.3 73.3 13.3 60 20 0 100 55.6 22.2 0 100 
The turbulence that Romefrut went through one year before this survey is revealed by both the 
members and non-members agreeing, almost unanimously, that two of the costs of participation are 
having to spend time in a lot of meetings (Romefrut was having two or three meetings per week for 
three or four months during the crisis), and that some of the members take advantage of others 
(presumably related to the fact that the external audit revealed that around 15 or so of the members, 
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those with closest ties to the original Chairman of the board and the first manager, had accumulated 
unpaid loans from the EAC for almost $ 105,000) (Table 12.12). 
In summary, there are important differences of opinion between the three case studies about the costs 
and benefits of participation. The members of Guaicofrut and Romefrut are very positive about the 
economic and social benefits of participation, while Golden Berries' members underline only the 
social aspects. Romefrut members identify several unusual costs related to the crisis their EAC went 
through, while the members of Graicofrut and Golden Berries identify those costs already seen in 
most of the other case studies: debts, risks and fees. 
Norms that foster cooperation 
There are no large differences between members and non-members, or between the case studies, in 
terms of how the farmers view issues such as trust and reciprocity (Table 12.13). 
In the three cases, large majorities of both members and non-members tend to think that nowadays it is 
easier to work collectively than 10 years ago, that economic and social organizations are always or 
almost always beneficial, and that their families have benefited from participating in economic and 
social organizations. 
However, large majorities in all groups also think that most people only care for themselves and that 
they will try to take advantage of the rest. The only area in which there is some difference between the 
members and non-members in the Guaicofrut and Golden Berries case studies, is that a majority of the 
non-members plainly say that you cannot trust most people. 
In my long talks with leaders and grassroots members, as well as with many unorganized farmers in 
these three areas, I always got the impression that these farmers approached the EAC from a very 
utilitarian point of view. Time and again, many of them would talk about the need to be vigilant about 
the behavior of others, including the leadership, the other members and the management staff. Unlike 
some of the potato and milk case studies, I never had the sense that I was in the presence of a trustful 
community, and, on the contrary, it appeared that the members of these three EACs worry that it is 
likely that others will try to take advantage of them if they can. 
In short, there is no evidence whatsoever that the members of these organizations have more or less 
trust in their neighbors and their partners in the EAC than the non-members. 
Networks 
There are very significant differences in the networks which surround these three EACs. I will argue 
that Golden Berries is an example of an EAC with very weak, often non-existent, links with many of 
the agents crucial to the development of a robust economic organization. Guaicofrut represents the 
other pole, having invested in building strong and effective links with other agents. Romefrut is in 
some ways similar to Golden Berries, and in others it is closer to Guaicofrut, although one can see a 
difference before and after its financial crisis in 1998-99. 
First of all, Guaicofrut and Romefrut are embedded in a specific rural community, so that the members 
interact with each other not only in the EAC but in a large number of social and community 
organizations, and in many cases belong to the same extended families. This facilitates a more 
intimate knowledge of the behavior of each individual in areas that have a direct effect on the EAC, 
such as their complying with the rule of not selling a large proportion of their harvest through 
middlemen, or their capacity as leaders. Similarly, these two EACs dedicate important resources to 
local social activities. Finally, the political leverage and the human resources of these EACs are used 
to negotiate with local authorities for community benefits, such as improving the local roads, schools 
or health centers. 
This embeddedness of an EAC in a local community can bring benefits to both, but it can also have 
negative effects. For example, the internal conflicts that Romefrut has gone through have affected 
Table 12.13 Trust, cooperation, reciprocity and view of the future, Golden Berries, Romefrut and Guaicofrut 
QUESTION GOLDEN BERRIES ROMEFRUT GUAICOFRUT 
Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants Participants Non-participants 
Ease of organizing with neighbors, More Easier More Easier More Easier More Easier More Easier More Easier 
compared to 10 years ago Difficult % Difficult % Difficult % Difficult % Difficult % Difficult % 
% % % % % % 
23.3 50 20 60 8.3 83.3 0 62.5 8.3 91.7 0 62.5 
Household's degree of participation in Less More Less More Less More Less More Less More Less More 
organizations compared to neighbors % % % % % % % % % % % % 
16.7 30 46.7 20 41.7 25 37.5 0 8.3 33.3 37.5 0 
Community and farmers' organizations are Never or Always or Never or Always or Never or Always or Never or Always or Never or Always or Never or Always or 
useful Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost Almost 
never Always never Always never Always never Always never Always never Always 
% % % % % % % % % % % % 
13.3 76.7 13.3 80 0 100 25 75 0 91.7 25 75 
For you and your family, participation in Waste of Beneficial Waste of Beneficial Waste of Beneficial Waste of Beneficial Waste of Beneficial Waste of Beneficial 
organizations is: time % time % time % time % time % time % 
% % % % % % 
6.7 70 13.3 53.3 0 75 25 50 0 91.7 25 50 
Farmers' and community organizations Only a The Only a The Only a The Only a The Only a The Only a The 
benefit... few or majority few or majority few or majority few or majority few or majority few or majority 
none % none % none % none % none % none % 
% % % % % % 
40 56.7 33.3 40 53.8 41.7 50 50 50 50 50 50 
Can you trust most people? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
% % % % % % % % % % % % 
50 40 73.3 13.3 58.3 33.3 62.5 12.5 41.7 50 62.5 12.5 
Most people... Only care Try to Only care Try to Only care Try to Only care Try to Only care Try to Only care Try to 
for help for help for help for help for help for help 
themselve others themselve others themselve others themselve others themselve others themselve others 
s % s % s % s % s % s % 
% % % % % % 
76.7 13.3 86.7 13.3 75 25 75 25 91.7 8.3 75 12.5 
Most people... Take Try to be Take Try to be Take Try to be Take Try to be Take Try to be Take Try to be 
advantage fair advantage fair advantage fair advantage fair advantage feir advantage fair 
of others % of others % of others % of others % of others % of others % 
% % % % % % 
60 26.7 53.3 26.7 66.7 16.7 62.5 25 66.7 25 62.5 25 
Has your situation as small farmers Worsened Improved Worsened Improved Worsened Improved Worsened Improved Worsened Improved Worsened Improved 
compared to 10 years ago. . . % % % % % % % % % % % % 
23.3 60 26.6 46.7 0 100 0 87.5 8.3 91.7 0 87.5 
In the next 10 years, will your situation as Worsen Improve Worsen Improve Worsen Improve Worsen Improve Worsen Improve Worsen Improve 
small farmers... % % % % % % % % % % % % 
20 43.3 13 46.7 0 66.6 0 75 0 74 0 75 
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local community cohesion; many farmers explained that since Romefrut's financial crisis there are 
now two camps within the community and the EAC, one of them aligned with the original leadership 
displaced after the crisis, and the other with the new leaders. 
Golden Berries is a different story. Here the 10 warehouses that make up the EAC are spread over a 
relatively large area. Moreover, since Golden Berries is a second-tier organization, the grassroots 
members of the 10 warehouses rarely interact directly, since even in the General Shareholder meetings 
they are represented by only one or two members. Each of the 10 first-tier organizations which make 
up Golden Berries, however, is part of a single rural community, and at that level there are similar 
social interactions as in Guaicofrut and Romefrut. However, there are only very weak links between 
Golden Berries itself and the rural communities from which the individual grassroots members come. 
Perhaps this is why the leadership and management of Golden Berries was left to the professional 
staff. The top managers were widely admired by both the farmers and INDAP for being the type of 
modem, well-trained managers that supposedly could lead an EAC trying to work in a complex market 
environment. However, the distance between the members and management was so large that there 
was no way in which the latter could be monitored, controlled or directed. The farmers of Golden 
Berries - and INDAP - paid dearly for this decision to rely so much on their well-trained and ambitious 
managers! 
Golden Berries was not only a weak social organization, but it also functioned in a way that distanced 
its grassroots members from market agents and market signals. It used ENDAP's generous subsidies 
and grants to try to alter the market trends and signals, for example, by strongly subsidizing the net 
prices received by the farmers. The EAC could sustain this strategy for about three or four years, and 
there is no doubt that in the short-run the grassroots members profited tremendously. But the distortion 
was so large that Golden Berries was unable to survive the crisis. 
In my talks during and after the crisis with many grassroots members and leaders, I often heard 
arguments that revealed that, ultimately, they did not feel that Golden Berries was indispensable to 
them as raspberry producers. Since they still had the 10 local cold-storage warehouses, each group felt 
that they could still organize and manage the marketing of their raspberries. Moreover, leaders and 
many of the members of the five or six warehouses that were showing good results, actually felt that 
they would gain by getting rid of the other local groups. Some even told me that they would actually 
profit from the fall of Golden Berries, as the members of the weaker warehouses in the long run would 
end up selling their raspberries to them. 
In short, both from the point of view of the social interactions among the members and of the 
relationship with market agents, Golden Berries proved to be an artificial organization, making little 
sense either from an institutional, economic or financial point of view. The members of Guaicofrut 
have strongly supported a policy of increasing integration in the value-adding chain of the raspberry 
national and international markets. Guaicofrut's interaction with market agents and market trends has 
been based on trying to build and exploit a competitive advantage that can be sustained without 
external support. Whilst they have not fully managed to achieve this goal, and the EAC no doubt has 
been dependent on public programs for funding its projects, the basic logic of their decision-making is 
clearly in this direction. To this end, they have been willing to explicitly sacrifice short-term gains, as 
for example when setting their price policy prior to each harvest. They have put considerable energy 
into building close ties with specific market agents, as they understand that they cannot proceed with 
their strategy without these relationships, especially if they are going to consolidate their capacity to 
export directly, thus bypassing the large commercial firms that dominate this market. 
Guaicofrut has also built close links with other EACs in order to reach the international markets. It is 
loosely associated with other economic organizations in Region VII that are also engaged in raspberry 
processing and export. It has been very careful in selecting its partners, choosing only those that it 
feels can fulfill their obligations in terms of top quality, volume and timeliness of delivery. For this 
reason, it has avoided working with Romefrut. 
Guaicofrut has also established working relationships with a wide range of individuals and 
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organizations that can provide specialized technical expertise. In contrast with Romefrut, from the 
start it contracted an external firm to help it with their accounting systems, in order to have permanent 
access to detailed information about their adniinistration and finances. It has taken care to set up a 
strong technical department to give on-farm advice and support to the members, as they understand 
that the results of their collective activity are largely determined by what happens before the 
raspberries arrive at the processing plant. Finally, it has contracted, on a long-term basis, the services 
of some of the top Chilean experts on the raspberry international market, since members know that 
exporting directly requires making use of highly specialized skills. As they say, they have always been 
willing to "pay expensive advisors" and they make no pretence of thinking that they can ride these 
rough waters alone, as Romefrut tried to do during its first years. 
However, these advisors and experts clearly do not dominate Guaicoffut's decision-making process. 
They explain the standards that the EAC and the farmers have to meet, based on the requirements of 
the international markets. With that information, the members of the EAC can decide how fast they 
want to approach specific goals (e.g., exporting directly or indirectly through other firms; diversifying 
into new berry crops to counterbalance the declining prices of raspberries; starting to process 
vegetables to reach totally new markets and make better use of their installed processing capacity; or 
setting minimum acceptable shares of the harvest that each member must sell through the EAC). That 
is, the technical advisors are precisely that, technical advisors. 
These interactions with markets, with external intermediate agents and specialists, and with rural 
communities, determine the nature of the relationship with INDAP and other public organizations. 
Simply put, the stronger the interaction with market and technical agents and with rural communities, 
the less dependent the EAC is on government support. Thus, Golden Berries was always almost totally 
dependent on INDAP's good will, Romefrut became increasingly dependent as their financial 
problems grew, and Guaicoffut has always managed to have the highest independence from INDAP. 
This does not mean that Guaicofrut or any of the others could have managed to get anywhere, or even 
be formed, without decisive support from INDAP and public funding. Very simply, no private bank in 
Chile would ever have dreamed of lending a group of peasants half a million dollars to start a 
raspberry processing plant and export firm! The relevant question is not if these EACs can make it in 
the absence of any external support and subsidized public funding, but whether they can manage to 
achieve a degree of autonomy in their decision-making, given their financial dependency. Being part 
of a strong network with other market agents and intermediate organizations and specialists gives an 
EAC greater power to negotiate the terms of their relationship with the government agencies. 
Rules 
In discussing these EACs' systems of rules, it is important to remember that raspberry production, 
processing and marketing is a rather new activity in Chile, and one in which these small farmers had 
not previously been involved. Together with cut flower production and marketing, raspberries 
exemplify the boldest attempts by small farmers in Chile to become involved in the new farming 
enterprises that have come about through the liberalization and globalization of Chilean agriculture. 
The small farmers' organizational traditions, including systems of rules for decision-making in 
economic collective action, were developed in the '60s and early '70s in a very different context. 
These three case studies illustrate the extent to which small farmers have been capable of adapting that 
institutional tradition to the challenges and demands imposed by global markets. 
It can be argued that Golden Berries was incapable of adapting its systems of rales beyond the context 
of traditional, government-led agricultural development programs, while Guaicofrut has successfully 
created rules appropriate to the new context of international markets. Romefrut is somewhere in 
between, with a break before and after the crisis. 
Simply put, Golden Berries' members wanted their EAC to operate in the same way as INDAP had: 
the design and implementation of the service was left largely in the hands of professional staff, and it 
was assumed that the cost was to be financed by the government. The managers of the EAC were the 
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key players, in the same way that the ENDAP consultants had coordinated the Microregional 
Development Project, or, previously, the private consultants who had introduced them to raspberry 
production. In this arrangement, the role of the farmers' leaders was essentially one of liaison between 
the grassroots and 'the authorities', even if they were now staff and specialists hired by the EAC. This 
arrangement was very convenient for the farmers, who were able to capture the full benefits of 
collective action (technical assistance, higher prices, greater security in marketing, and so on), without 
having to take responsibility for designing, implementing, monitoring, adjusting or paying for those 
services. 
Guaicofrut is a very different story. From the start, the members and leaders understood that to 
penetrate and survive in the international raspberry market, they had to proceed gradually, build each 
successive step on firm foundations, interact with well qualified specialists who could provide the 
management and technical expertise they lacked, and be willing to sacrifice short-term gains in favor 
of securing their position in the market. 
The best example of this attitude is the way they define their price policies before each harvest. They 
ensure they have secured the funds necessary to fulfill their commercial obligations and to launch new 
investment projects, always with the aim of adding value to their product before selling it. The priority 
given to seeking knowledge from specialists on production business management, agroindustrial 
processing, and marketing, and the willingness to invest important sums of money to receive this 
support, also demonstrates Guaicofrut's philosophy of sacrificing short-term benefits in order to build 
the foundations of a stronger long-term position in the raspberry market. 
Most of Guaicofrut's members have always actively participated in the key decisions that affect their 
organization. Every person I interviewed agreed that debates have always been lively and that 
respectful criticism is allowed and even encouraged. While there are important leaders who play a 
distinct role, they have never had an overwhelming position in the organization. The external 
specialists play a technical role in outlining options, helping the members understand the markets in 
which they operate and identifying threats, opportunities and goals, but there is no doubt that decision-
making remains in the hands of the farmers. 
Why is it that two groups of relatively similar small farmers - those of Guaicofrut and Golden Berries 
- using the same set of policies, programs and instruments, arrived at such different organizational and 
institutional designs? I do not have a definitive answer to this question, but I believe that Guaicofrut's 
emergence from a serious crisis may have played a role. When, in 1997, they lost a large part of their 
production, they realized two things: first, how fragile their position was in the raspberry market; and, 
second, that once they had made a substantial investment in their raspberry orchards, they were 
involved in a high-stakes game in which the losses could be extremely high. Guaicofrut is the child of 
an event that threatened the best opportunity these farmers had of surviving as independent producers, 
once the macroeconomic and trade reforms ended their expectations of improving their life through 
traditional farming systems. 
Golden Berries, on the other hand, developed along a very different pathway, led mainly by external 
agents. When the critical step was taken - changing from a development program into an economic 
organization - there was no break in the fundamental logic with which both the external agents and the 
farmers themselves had acted. It was a change of form, but not of substance. The old rules of the 
development program could not resist the test of the new circumstances that the farmers and the EAC 
were facing. 
In the case of Romefrut we observe a change in the system of rules before and after their crisis of 
1998-99. In the initial years, the rules of development programs dominated, although in this case the 
key role was played by a small core group of leaders, in contrast with Golden Berries where external 
agents were in charge. The rest of the members had great trust in this core group and in particular in a 
couple of its members, who had been the key players in getting the EAC started. Because they felt 
they were in good hands, the majority of the Romefrut members were happy not to worry about what 
was going on in the EAC. The leaders and the managers, who had been very effective in the past when 
dealing with relatively small projects, made a tremendous number of errors now that they had to 
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handle a much larger and complex project. They mistrusted external specialists and felt confident that 
they knew enough to guide the organization and its development. There was little debate among the 
members and few questions were asked, as the continuous growth of their processing plant, the good 
prices the members were receiving, and the generous credit program for agricultural inputs, were 
definitive proof that the leaders knew what they were doing. When ENDAP pressed the EAC to hire an 
external firm to support management and administration, the members rallied in support of the leaders, 
and rejected this attempt as an unnecessary and unwelcome intrusion. 
Finally, reality caught up with Romeffut. Yet, the EAC survived the crisis because of the strong bonds 
between the members. A new team of leaders took over, and the membership agreed to drink the bitter 
medicine of cutting their benefits, and even more telling, of donating a very large amount of 
raspberries to keep the EAC alive. This was possible in part because the farmers who make up 
Romefrut are not poor, and while these investments did hurt, they did not threaten their survival as 
independent small farmers. In addition, even the watered-down benefits provided to them by the EAC 
are important enough to justify the costs involved in rescuing their operation; what they value most, as 
many told me, is that having the EAC greatly reduces their risk as individual farmers working in a 
very competitive market. 
However, having discussed this crisis at length with many of the members and leaders, I am convinced 
that Romefrut was able to sort out its problems largely because of the underlying social relationships 
that bind the members together. Their initial assessment of the crisis focused firstly on determining if 
there had been foul play by the leaders, or if they were due to 'technical' mistakes. When they were 
convinced that their leaders had not behaved inappropriately, their attitude immediately changed: this 
was a mistake, perhaps a large one, but only a mistake, not something that could split the group. It is 
difficult to convey the emphasis all the farmers I interviewed put on this point, stressing the great 
difference between 'technical' errors and simply unforgivable social behavior. One farmer's comment 
illustrates this point: "when we learned that this was only a problem of money, right then we knew that 
we could deal with it. If the auditors had said something eke, it would have been the end." Also, by 
being part of a tight rural community, the members of Romefrut were also able to rapidly generate a 
new leadership team made up of individuals they knew and trusted to guide them through a difficult 
period. There is little doubt that although the crisis weakened Romefrut financially, it also 
strengthened the organization institationally. 
The system of rules designed by each of these EACs is summarized in Table 12.14, following Ostrom 
(1990; see Chapter 2, Section 2.5). 
Golden Berries has almost none of the rules that Ostrom sees as important for robust organizations. 
There is a reason for this: for all practical purposes, the grassroots members did not see their 
organization as an EAC, they continued to relate to it in the same way they had approached the 
1NDAP support programs. 
In the case of Guaicofrut, all of the Ostrom rules are more or less in place. There are two rules that I 
would like to highlight, for they are important in giving an EAC a comparative advantage in the 
market place: 
(a) The EAC explicitly differentiates between members and non-members in the provision of a 
number of support services, but not in the rules that govern its core business. All suppliers, whether 
they belong to the EAC or not, get the same treatment when it comes to receiving and paying for their 
raspberries. In this essential aspect, the EAC simply transfers to the individuals the prevailing market 
signals governing quality and prices. The EAC has internalized these market signals as part of its 
internal system of rules. In doing so, the EAC avoids the short-term costs that would result from trying 
to act against market trends, and it also gains long-term benefits by forcing farmers to adjust to what 
the market demands, or else pay the consequences. Thus, having a set of important support services, 
valued by the members, allows the EAC to give additional benefits to those who contribute most to the 
EAC (for example, by selling a larger proportion of their harvest through the organization), and to 
impose sanctions on those who violate their commitments and obhgations, without having to distort 
market signals. In other words, if the EAC did not have these support services, it could only reward or 
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sanction a given individual by manipulating market variables, and, as we know well from the case of 
Golden Berries, this is an extremely dangerous game. 
(b) Guaicofrut is able to monitor the behavior of each of its members in detail. On the one hand, it 
relies on the very close geographical and social proximity of its members to learn about such key 
issues as a farmer's decision to sell some of his or her crop through middlemen. Golden Berries, being 
dispersed over a relatively large area and not having any links with a particular rural community, 
could never obtain this extremely valuable information without setting up an expensive ad hoc 
monitoring system. In addition, Guaicofrut uses the information from modem accounting and 
information systems, such as external auditors and the Internet, to monitor daily international prices 
and to allow its members to monitor the organization's performance (which in practice means the 
performance of the board and the management). A typical commercial firm can of course have access 
to such monitoring systems, but it must pay a high cost to have field supervisors, lawyers and 
managers to monitor the decisions of its individual suppliers and to enforce their contractual 
commitments. 
The case of Romeffut is more complex, since we have to deal with two somewhat different sets of 
rules, before and after the crisis of 1998-99. Beforehand, the EAC had a set of rules modeled on a 
typical development project. After the crisis, the EAC began to move the same way as Guaicofrut. 
What I would like to emphasize, though, is that this transition remains incomplete, as if there was 
some force preventing the EAC from learning the full lessons of the crisis, and making a clear 
adjustment in its system of rules, even though the members are clearly aware of this shortcoming. This 
issue deserves more research, but I would like to venture two hypotheses: 
Firstly, based on Romefrut's experience, it appears to me that a collective action process generates an 
'institutional know-how'; that is, a body of traditions, knowledge, rules, and methods that guide the 
individuals and the organization in their daily decision-making. When something happens that forces 
the EAC to change track, it still carries with it many elements of that institutional know-how, 
developed under different circumstances, and which cannot be discarded from one day to the next. 
People cannot 'reformat' their minds and the way in which they relate to each other as if they were a 
hard disk on a computer. If you wish, there is a path dependency in institutions and organizations, 
where patterns of the past continue to affect present decisions. 
Secondly, when an EAC undergoes a crisis that weakens it substantially, it loses power and autonomy 
vis-a-vis external agents who become critical to its survival (INDAP in the case of Romefrut). These 
external agents attain the power to impose decisions by conditioning their continued support on the 
adoption of certain rules. As the external agents themselves have a stake in solving the crisis (because 
it would affect their own performance and expose them to the public or to other, more powerful 
decision-makers), there is a strong incentive for them to make decisions in their own favor. This 
constrains the options open to an EAC and its members. External authority becomes decisive, and it is 
no longer possible to say to what extent the system of rules is the EAC's or the external agents'. 
Table 12.14 Rules of Golden Berries, Romefrut, and Guaicofrut (based on Ostrom, 1990) 
RULES Golden Berries Romefrut Guaicofrut 
Clearly defined boundaries The members of the EAC are 
clearly defined. The members 
receive exclusive benefits in 
terms of preferential prices and 
of access to different support 
services. 
The members of the EAC are clearly defined. The 
members receive exclusive benefits in terms of access to 
different support services, but they and the non-member 
suppliers receive the same treatment in terms of price, 
delivery and quality conditions for their raspberries. 
Low cost systems for 
monitoring compliance 
The EAC totally lacked a 
system to monitor the 
performance of the different 
members and of management. 
Until this EAC's 
financial crisis, members 
lacked an effective 
monitoring system and 
The EAC always had a strong 
and effective monitoring 
system, based both on 
participatory mechanisms and 
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RULES Golden Berries Romefrut Guaicofrut 
members and of management. thus they could not 
enforce compliance with 
their own rules. The 
system has improved 
somewhat after the crisis 
but it is still relatively 
weak. 
on the use of specialized 
information services provided 
by external advisors. 
Congruence between 
appropriation and provision 
rules, and market conditions 
Each member received more or 
less equal benefits, regardless 
of his or her individual 
contribution to the EAC. This 
not only affected the support 
services, but also those related 
to the core business as the EAC 
averaged its costs and 
distributed them uniformly 
across all the members. 
In terms of the core 
business of the EAC, the 
members do receive 
differential benefits 
according to their 
performance and 
contribution. However, 
this does not occur in 
terms of the different 
support services, where 
all have more or less 
equal access to benefits. 
Each member receives benefits 
carefully tailored to his or her 
individual contribution to the 
EAC, both in terms of the core 
business and of the different 
support services (e.g. cash 
advances for labor costs or 
credit for agricultural inputs). 
Graduated sanctions for non-
compliance with rules 
No sanctions were ever applied 
for non-compliance. 
No sanctions are applied 
for non-compliance with 
the rules. 
A system of sanctions is in 
place and is applied when 
necessary, mainly by restricting 
access to support services. 
Participation of members in 
defining and changing rules 
There was little, if any, 
participation of members in 
defining and changing the 
rales. This process was in the 
hands of the hired managers 
and, to some extent, a few 
leaders. 
Most decisions were 
originally left to a small 
core group of leaders. 
During the crisis, 
TNDAP imposed a 
number of key rules. 
The members definitely play 
the decisive role in defining all 
important rules. The rules have 
been changed frequently to 
meet new conditions. 
Low cost mechanisms for 
solving conflicts 
Due to the lack of any 
significant degree of 
participation, there was no 
mechanism to deal with 
problems and conflicts. The 
EAC broke up as a result of 
this. 
The EAC lacked a 
system for dealing with 
problems and conflicts 
gradually. 
Conflicts and problems are 
approached rapidly before they 
grow out of proportion, and are 
solved through dialogue and 
discussions in membership 
meetings. The board and 
management have a clearly 
delineated authority to deal 
with many day-to-day problems 
and conflicts. 
External authorities respect the 
right of members to establish 
their own rales 
INDAP always had a great 
influence on the decisions of 
the EAC, given its extreme 
dependency on public funding. 
During the EAC's crisis, 
INDAP intervened and 
forced a number of key 
decisions. 
The EAC has always had a 
large degree of autonomy in 
managing all of its affairs, 
including the definition of 
rales. 
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CHAPTER 13. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
13.1 The context: a reminder 
This study analyzed the emergence and development of Empresas Asociativas Campesinas (EACs), or 
Associative Peasant Business Firms in Chile. Since the early 1990s, these EACs have been a key part 
of Chile's new small-scale agricultural development strategy; a strategy launched in response to the 
opportunities and threats stemming from the liberalization and globalization of the Chilean economy, 
and of the agricultural sector in particular. 
This new strategy arose from the realization that focusing on increased productivity in the commodity 
sector was achieving little. The Chilean economy was already committed to a process of liberalization, 
and agriculture was inevitably going to be exposed to intense international competition. Commodity 
prices were likely to continue their downward trend, pushed by the global processes of technology 
innovation and diffusion. Small farmers in Chile would be continually trying to catch up with those 
leading the technological innovation process, always behind the going price while lacking the 
capacities of the most competitive in the global market, only surviving by self-exploiting family labor. 
The previous years had shown the limitations of public policies aimed at halting this treadmill, such as 
the price stabilization programs for the main commodities launched in the early 1980s. For about five 
or six years, those policies brought good prices and favorable marketing conditions for the key 
commodity crops grown by small-scale farmers. But by the early '90s this impact was eroded by 
declining international prices and the appreciation of the Chilean peso against the US dollar. 
Small farmers were painfully aware of the futility of the strategy to increase yields for commodity 
crops. How often did we hear them complain that they were sick and tired of seeing extensionists 
demonstrate the advantages of yet another improved wheat variety! They would explain that they had 
done as they were told; thousands of small producers over the past 10 years had increased their yields 
to levels as high as 4 or 5 tons/ha for wheat, 12 tons/ha for maize, or 60 tons/ha for sugarbeet, and yet 
they were often worse off than before in terms of their income and welfare, as the real prices of these 
products dropped by 25% to 50%. As one peasant asked in despair: "When is this progress going to 
end? Before progress came, we used to live very well..." 
The only alternative for small-scale farming was to diversify into new, higher-value, non-traditional 
products, linked to more dynamic markets, in which small farmers could capture a larger share of the 
final price paid by consumers by engaging directly in marketing and value-adding activities. 
This new approach began to take shape in the early '90s, based on three explicit policy statements, 
which implied a break with the conventional thinking about peasant agriculture and its options for 
development: 
(1) The market-driven nature of small-scale farming in Chile means moving away from traditional 
commodities destined for the domestic market, into diversified non-traditional products linked to 
agroindustrial, export and niche markets. 
(2) The arena for public policy support to such an approach is no longer the linear research-extension-
farmer arrangement, but complex and diverse private-public networks and alliances, within well 
defined rural territories and geared towards gaining access by peasant farmers to clearly identified 
market opportunities. 
(3) The primary social agents for the development of small-scale agriculture are to be business-
oriented farmers' organizations (EACs). 
The new policy orientation was strongly influenced by a context of high and sustained economic 
growth, liberalization of the economy, and opening up of agriculture to international competition; 
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democratic governments, and strong, proactive and relatively efficient social policies. 
This context had four major impacts on small-scale agriculture. First, the liberalization of the economy 
and the opening up of agriculture to international competition resulted in both 'push' and 'pull' 
incentives that caused small farmers to diversify away from traditional commodities and into new and 
more profitable enterprises and more dynamic markets. As Rafael Castro, the farmer quoted at the 
start of Chapter 1 said, small farmers in Chile were and still are faced with a clear-cut option: "change 
or sell the land." 
Second, the development options available to small farmers are shaped by the broader transformation 
of the Chilean countryside. Rapid urbanization; the improvement and spread of infrastructure and 
public services; the emergence of a dynamic for-export agricultural and agroindustrial sector and the 
concomitant expansion of all sorts of agricultural support services; and the doubling of the area under 
irrigation not only provided some of the material conditions for transformation in small-scale farming, 
but also led to a mentality, or a culture, of change and innovation. One would have had to work with 
small farmers in Chile over the past 15 or 20 years to understand the enormous importance of the 
changes in outlook and attitudes among so many small farmers. 
Third, the high and sustained growth of the economy allowed the government to fund a proactive and 
expanding social policy and to make a concerted effort to support social and economic sectors that 
otherwise would have lacked the opportunity to capture some of the potential rewards of liberalization 
and globalization. 
Finally, on a less positive note but not without consequences for our analysis, one cannot forget that 
the market-oriented small farmers who make up the bulk of EAC membership are the hardened 
veterans of the intense social and political reforms of the 1960s and early 70s, and the survivors of the 
extreme neoliberal experiment launched by the miUtary dictatorship in 1973. They have come a long 
way from their situation only 30 years ago, when they were illiterate, extremely poor and socially and 
politically marginalized landless peons under the Hacienda system. 
13.2 Research questions and answers 
The study addressed the following questions: 
(1) Have EACs achieved their aim of improving the performance of peasant agriculture in the context 
of a market economy open to international competition? 
(2) Are EACs sustainable as economic organizations, or, as has occurred many times in many Latin 
American countries, are they simply dependent appendices of the public programs that created 
them? 
(3) What changes or adjustments in public policies and their instruments are needed to improve the 
performance, impacts and sustainability of EACs? 
The answers to the first two questions are straightforward and have been presented in detail in 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. In summary: 
• Public policies coupled with market incentives have stimulated the emergence of around 750 
EACs, involving a fifth of all small farmers in Chile. The poorest peasants participate much less in 
these organizations than the better-off. 
• Most new EACs are involved in non-traditional production systems, services and markets. 
• The economic impact of EACs on their members' farms depends on the products and markets 
involved. EACs focused on marketing commodities in the wholesale or spot markets have little 
economic impact. Those involved in non-traditional products and in markets with high transaction 
costs can have more of an impact. 
• EAC membership does not appear to affect annual household income, regardless of the E A C s 
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product and market orientation. Gains in on-farm income will generally be compensated for by 
losses in off-farm employment. 
• Around one-third of EACs are economically and financially strong enough to operate as 
sustainable business-oriented organizations. About a fifth are in good financial shape, and would 
have a good chance of surviving if public program support suddenly withdrew today. I estimate 
(without direct hard evidence) that a severe economic and financial crisis is facing most of the 
EACs whose core business is marketing commodities such as wheat, grain legumes, and potatoes, 
and up to one-third of the EACs engaged in non-traditional products, services and markets. 
I answer the third question in the rest of this chapter. 
13.3 Improving the performance, impact and sustainability of EACs 
Many lessons and recommendations have emerged from this research, and in particular from the case 
studies. However, my personal conclusion is that of the many factors that affect an EACs 
performance, impact and sustainability, three deserve special attention:68 
(1) Market, service and product orientation. EACs can be effective vehicles for fanners changing then-
practices, but not for improving the performance of small-scale agriculture within the traditional 
realm of commodity production. 
(2) Networking. Effective EACs are embedded in effective multi-agent networks. 
(3) Rules and incentives. EACs' systems of rules must provide incentives for an adequate allocation 
of costs and benefits among the members, and between them and the EAC. 
I will now discuss each of these in mm. 
13.3.1 EACs as vehicles for change 
In this study I analyzed - using quantitative methods and through qualitative case studies - a large 
number of EACs. Both approaches have revealed the following key finding: 
EACs formed to improve their members' bargaining position within traditional commodity markets 
have not been able to improve the performance of their members as small farmers, and also have not 
achieved the economic and financial viability that would ensure their sustainability as business-
oriented organizations in the absence of government loans and subsidies. I estimate that about 36% of 
Chile's EACs are in this position. 
On the other hand, EACs formed to support their members as they diversify into non-traditional 
products, new marketing arrangements, and/or new value-adding activities, can (although not always) 
improve the performance of their members' farming systems, and can become viable business-
oriented organizations. I estimate that about two-thirds of EACs fall into this category. 
Commodity-based EACs 
In a market economy open to international competition, EACs cannot improve on regular market 
exchanges when it comes to trading undifferentiated commodities in spot or wholesale markets. At 
any given time, prices will correspond to the interplay of supply and demand. The number of buyers 
and sellers is large enough in these markets to preclude any one of them from having any significant 
effect on prices. A group of 50 or 100 or 200 small farmers certainly will have more produce to offer 
6 8 1 do not include such obvious factors as honest and competent managers, sound investment projects, business plans which 
meet at least the minimum standards of professional quality, etc. These business management topics were outside the scope 
of this study, but I do not want to imply that they are not of great importance in determining the performance, impact and 
sustainability of EACs. 
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than a single peasant, but the total amount will continue to be insignificant compared with the total 
market size. If such a group attempts to negotiate a higher price than the going market price, buyers 
will simply look elsewhere. Only producers at the cutting edge of technological innovation and whose 
productivity is higher than average will be able to make a higher profit, but always based on the 
prevailing price. In an economy open to international competition, those farmers leading the pack may 
well be in another country. 
Furthermore, in this context EACs will certainly incur higher costs than an individual farmer selling 
his or her crop directly to a trader or middleman. Such costs include: (a) direct and fixed 
organizational/adrninistrative costs; (b) taxes, especially the Value Added Tax that middlemen usually 
evade; (c) costs resulting from free riders within the EAC, which we know to be very high. Thus there 
are no additional rewards to offset the increased costs: this explains why this type of EAC will tend to 
fail. 
There are two 'smoking gun' pieces of evidence that confirm this finding. The first is that farmers who 
produce commodity crops such as wheat or potatoes have a significantly lower rate of EAC 
membership. Secondly, those farmers who actually join an EAC to market these products tend to 
default on their commitment and continue marketing most of their harvest through the traditional 
channels, despite these channels being universally despised as 'unfair'. 
Of course, these organizations can still make a contribution to their members, as long as they engage 
in services other than marketing undifferentiated commodities. They can provide technical support 
under contract to DSTDAP, they can run agricultural machinery services, they can sell agricultural 
supplies, and, above all, they can use their greater social and political influence to capture a greater 
share of government loans and subsidies for their members. In short, they could actually succeed if 
they stopped doing the things they were set up to do (marketing of commodities), or, at the very least, 
reduce the relative importance of those activities. 
EACs as instruments for changes in practice 
A number of EACs have been set up to support changes in practice, i.e., to help their members 
diversify into new products, new marketing arrangements, and/or new value-adding activities. The 
markets in which these EACs operate are characterized by: 
• Products differentiated by quality or other grades or standards. This implies transaction costs 
involved in the identification of the produce to be exchanged, negotiating prices, delivery and 
payment conditions, and in enforcing agreements with clients. In my study, the raspberries cases 
are a good example. 
• Costly price and market information: accessing such information is expensive, and the lack of 
such information can have significant repercussions on the actual price obtained. For example, 
prices for fresh vegetables fluctuate widely even over the space of a few days. 
• High market access barriers: due, for example, to the high cost of the equipment, infrastructure or 
technologies required to participate in the specific market (such as processed goods that require 
expensive facilities for grading, processing, packaging, storage, and so on); or because of the 
volume, seasonal supply and delivery conditions imposed by potential clients (such as 
supermarket chains or the large dairy industries); or because the marketing costs are very high and 
a high total volume of marketable produce is required to offset them (as for certain fresh 
vegetables). One should note that what is relevant here is that these are barriers to market access 
from the point of view of individual small farmers. 
• Perishable products: the risk of not selling one's product on a given day is high, so having access 
to a larger portfolio of clients is key. This is of importance, for example, to fresh vegetable 
producers, especially when prices are low due to over-supply. 
In markets characterized by high transaction costs, EAC membership can lead to a significant 
improvement in market access, risk exposure, and price obtained. Furthermore, markets with high 
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transaction costs are no place for a small farmer to be walking alone! 
Again, the actual behavior of farmers revealed in my research confirms the theory. In markets with 
high transaction costs, the rate of EAC membership is significantly higher than the national average, 
and opportunistic behavior by free riders is much less prevalent. 
However, it is important to clarify that engagement in a market with high transaction costs is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for the success of an EAC. I estimate that about one-third of the 
EACs in these markets have failed. 
13.3.2 EACs as part of multi-agent networks 
Effective EACs are embedded in effective multi-agent networks. This is because linkages to a broader 
set of actors than those found within rural communities provide vital support for EACs operating in 
new, more dynamic and competitive markets. These networks include rural communities, markets, 
government agencies and programs, and intermediate support organizations. 
Rural communities 
In almost all the cases studied, EAC members participate more in other rural organizations than non-
members, and tend to hold leadership positions in these organizations. EACs thus bring together many 
farmers who are part of "el active- social", or the socially-active members of local communities. These 
individuals are positive about the potential costs and benefits of collective action, making them more 
likely to join an EAC, and with less hesitation, than others. Their past experience of collective action 
helps the formation of EACs. 
Such experience of collective action among rural communities also leads to the formation of catalytic 
community groups. These are groups comprising more or less the same individuals within a 
community, which persist over time and 'switch on' or become active when a new collective initiative 
is needed. When one examines the history of collective action in a community, this same group of 
people, more or less, pops up time and again. These groups catalyze and organize other community 
members to participate in new collective efforts. 
Such groups give the emerging EACs a broad knowledge base. This might include the norms, 
attitudes, behefs, information about the likely behavior of the other participants, organizational 
principles such as leadership roles, initial sets of rules, and experience in dealing with external agents. 
Rural communities, through the individuals who make them up and through these catalytic community 
groups, can accumulate and store such organizational knowledge, even drawing on it years later if 
necessary. 
The existence of these catalytic community groups greatly enhances the emerging E A C s chances of 
succeeding. Without them, initial leadership is likely to be taken on either by a strong individual or by 
external agents. These people tend to have a disproportionate influence in an E A C s important 
formative period when rules are established, roles defined, technologies chosen, staff hired, 
negotiations occur and agreements are reached with clients, suppliers, and external agencies, and so 
on. 
The case studies illustrate other ways an EAC can benefit from being embedded in its rural 
community: 
• A reduction in the costs of monitoring whether members fulfil their organizational obligations. 
Social and geographic proximity provide valuable information at low cost to the EAC. 
• A reduction in the material heterogeneity of its members, at least according to certain 
characteristics associated to location. As I will discuss below, greater homogeneity in terms of 
different variables associated to location makes it easier to enforce rules about the benefits 
members receive and the costs for which they are liable. 
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• Social costs which deter members from behaving opportunistically. Relationships between 
members outside the EAC can be important in deterring people from breaking rules and failing to 
meet obligations. 
• Community knowledge can ensure that fines or sanctions are appropriate and fair. Knowledge of 
the community helps an EAC to distinguish, for example, unintentional mistakes, behavior 
resulting from major problems or emergencies within a household, or serious, intentional 
violations. 
• Better member participation in EAC discussions and decision-making processes. When the 
members are all neighbors, it is easier for them to meet as often as necessary. Discussion and 
dialogue can take place not only in the formal instances designed for such purpose, but also 
informally. 
For all the case study EACs which were not embedded in a rural community, there were no formal 
mechanisms which effectively replaced the social exchanges Usted above. In these cases there was a 
very clear communication gap that impeded interaction between the EAC and its members. The 
members participated less, they were definitely less informed about what was going on in their EAC, 
there was more room for undetected opportunistic behavior, and it was clearly more difficult to impose 
sanctions when necessary. This suggests that formal management or organizational procedures and 
mechanisms (board meetings, hired managers, accounting systems, etc.) can never fully replace the 
quality of interactions based on social and geographic proximity. 
On the other hand, the case studies also yielded some examples of how EACs embedded in a rural 
community can undermine operational rules. For example, the social and economic power of a single 
individual within the community led them to dominate an E A C s decision-making process. Also, I 
often observed how close social relations prevented the EAC from enforcing its rules of sanctions, 
because of fear of affecting good relations between friends, neighbors or members of the same 
families. In at least one of the case studies, this sort of 'perverse social capital' largely explains the 
failure of the EAC. 
EACs not only benefit from the rural communities in which they are embedded, but in almost all cases 
they also contribute to them. A rural community that contains an EAC has acquired a political asset, 
often enabling investments in drinking water distribution systems, rural electrification projects, 
repairing and improving roads and small bridges, building meeting houses that are open to many other 
community organizations and groups, providing access to valuable information obtained through the 
contact established with government agencies, and so on. Furthermore, EACs very often give non-
members access to some of their services, such as marketing their produce. 
Markets 
An EAC which lacks effective links to specific markets will either collapse from lack of purpose, or 
will become something other than an EAC, such as a channel for government or intermediate agency 
funds, taking advantage of the greater political leverage enjoyed by almost any organized group of 
farmers. Thus "effective links to specific markets" implies real exchange of goods and services, and not 
simple declarations of intent. 
An E A C s meaning and purpose is defined by the conditions of a specific market. This shapes 
members' expectations about EAC membership. Where EACs focus on marketing commodities, 
members' expectations and objectives cannot be fulfilled. They will rapidly conclude that they will not 
get the benefits they originally expected. The lack of correspondence between market conditions and 
the domain of action of the EAC becomes a disincentive, and the members default on their 
commitments. 
When this happens, the organization will usually change its role, but may still keep up the pretence to 
maintain access to the resources provided by other actors in the network. Examples from the case 
studies include EACs that become extension firms working under contract to INDAP, a supermarket 
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owner and operator, or simply an apparatus for improving members' access to various subsidies. 
When, on the contrary, there is congruence between the EAC's domain of action and market conditions 
(as when the organization helps its members access a new market from which they were previously 
barred), then market signals are an incentive for continued collective action. In a successful EAC, the 
members will continuously try to improve the congruence between their practice and market 
conditions. To do so, they adjust and refine their systems of rules. I will return to this later when I 
discuss the relationship between systems of rules and the economic performance of the EAC. 
Government agencies 
All of the case studies clearly illustrate the key role of government agencies, especially INDAP. This 
confirms my hypothesis in Chapter 2 that the 'political opportunity' provided by government through 
its public policy signals is a prime incentive for EAC formation. 
The case studies demonstrate three levels of government involvement in EAC formation: 
(1) At one end of the spectrum, a few EACs are basically creatures of government intervention. There 
is no history of collective action among the individuals involved. The whole process is put in 
motion only after government agents (or intermediate agencies) make a deliberate effort to set up 
an EAC. Clearly such an origin leads to quite an artificial organization, largely dependent on the 
continuous flow of government funds for its survival. 
(2) Some of the EACs emerged out of pre-existing local groups or organizations, with a previous 
history of working within government programs, notably INDAP's extension services. In these 
cases, the government program transformed the existing group into an EAC. However, in at least 
three cases, whilst the EAC ended up being ineffective, the original groups (lost or weakened in 
the process) managed quite well before their government-induced transformation. 
(3) Finally, there are five case studies where pre-existing local groups or organizations took the 
initiative to set up an EAC. Some of them had some contact with government programs in the 
past, but some had not. In most of these cases, the pre-existing groups had been trying for years to 
form some sort of formal organization to engage in marketing or value-adding activities. In all 
cases, the fanners did not know exactly what type of organization they needed, or how to form it, 
but they did have a more or less well identified problem, and they certainly knew what they 
wanted to achieve. Eventually, one way or another they managed to 'connect' with sympathetic 
government officials, usually through an intermediate agent (such as an NGO, an extension agent, 
a parish priest, or a regional federation of cooperatives), and the EAC was formalized with the 
support of both government and intermediate agencies. 
It is unlikely to be coincidence that the latter five EACs were most successful in extracting precisely 
what they wanted from public programs, or in defining with greater autonomy how they would run 
their organizations. This does not mean that all have been successful, for we have seen at least two of 
them (We Tukucan and Romefrut) run into great difficulties precisely because their notorious 'drive', 
fuelled by their own accomplishments, encouraged an unsustainable rate of growth. Neither does it 
mean that the second type of EAC cannot manage to become rather successful business-oriented 
organizations. 
In my cases there was no correlation between the autonomy of the original groups and their success as 
sustainable EACs, except for the extreme case of those that were artificial creatures of government 
programs. 
After the organization forms, its relationship with government agencies is conditioned by how 
successful the EAC appears to be. Those case study EACs which did not quickly show clear signs of 
success, soon fell into the protective embrace of the government agency and lost much of then-
autonomy. The reason is clear: once a government agency and its officials have invested in an EAC, 
they will do anything to prevent it from going under, for they are not willing to pay the political cost of 
failure. This occurs even when the EAC's failure cannot reasonably be attributed to a mistake or 
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omission by the government agency. 
This is a major problem for two important reasons: 
(1) At the first visible sign of trouble government agencies will react by, in effect, externalizing at 
least some of the costs out of the EAC. They do so by providing implicit or explicit subsidies, 
either to the EAC itself or to the members at the farm level, or to both. Inevitably, this decouples 
the EAC from its market context, and eventually distorts incentives and rules and disguises market 
signals. This sort of 'salvage' operation leads to a vicious cycle: the externalization of costs and 
risk decouples the EAC from market signals and trends, incentives and rules are altered 
accordingly, the negative results are enhanced, more subsidies are poured into the EAC, its 
disconnection from market realities increases, and so on. The dozens of EACs facing financial 
crises in the past two years were the ultimate outcome of this distortion in the nature of the 
relationship between these organizations and government programs. 
(2) The government's response to EACs in trouble means that it is impossible to bring problems out 
into the open for analysis and discussion. Such analysis would help negotiate more lasting 
solutions than simply pumping millions into keeping them alive, and would also allow people to 
learn from the mistakes that may have been made. 
The gradual development of each EAC, as well as the progressive improvement of public policies and 
support programs, requires concerted social learning. This 'reflex reaction' by government agencies is 
a very serious stumbling block for processes of social learning and the adaptive management of these 
kinds of soft systems. 
Intermediate agencies 
In my conceptual framework (Chapter 2) I highUghted the role of intermediate agencies (NGOs, 
extension firms, etc.) in building linkages between the actors who form part of the EACs' networks. I 
also explained that these agencies provide organizational models and expertise to give shape and 
content to emerging EACs. These roles reduce the actual and perceived costs and risks to farmers 
when starting up an EAC, and increase their chances of success. 
In all the case studies, intermediate agencies were important facilitators of EAC formation. This is true 
even of those pre-existing local groups or organizations who took the initiative to set up an EAC. 
While these proactive local groups had developed their own notion of why they wanted to change the 
status quo, and despite having some idea of the type of activities in which they would like to engage 
and their objectives, it was not until they linked to an intermediate agency that they were able to get 
going. This was because of the models, expertise and contacts provided by the external facilitators. 
While being good catalysts of EAC formation, these intermediate agencies are often less capable of 
supporting the actual implementation and consolidation of the organizations and their business-
oriented project. Why is this? 
In June 2001, I interviewed Mr. Luis Marambio, National Director of INDAP from 1994 to 2000. 
Looking back, he acknowledged that one important limitation of this government agency had been its 
inability to improve the human capital surrounding the organizations. He stated: "We assumed that we 
could hire the necessary professional services. We were wrong. Those top-quality professionals very 
often were simply not available to work with small farmers, often in remote areas." 
The existing intermediate agencies and facilitators are basically the same ones that had been 
accustomed to working within the linear transfer of technology paradigm. Their outlook was one of 
delivering ready-made options and solutions to well defined problems and constraints, mainly in the 
domain of production technology. 
But the courses of action for the new EACs can no longer be defined in terms of standardized 
pathways towards pre-conceived 'optimum' outcomes. The new strategy requires a new set of skills, 
information and knowledge to facilitate communication between different stakeholders operating from 
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different perspectives, and to negotiate agreements for concerted action, almost always within very 
dynamic and uncertain contexts. 
The technical problems which need to be solved are also fundamentally different from the old focus on 
raising traditional commodity crop yields. Many intermediate agents and advisors simply lack 
sufficient expertise and experience in producing high-value products, marketing, management and 
processing for value-adding. 
These problems were sometimes compounded by some EACs insisting on taking over the delivery of 
technical assistance, thereby displacing the intermediate agencies. Sometimes this resulted in more 
pertinent and more focused support and advice, and in better coordination between support to the 
production, marketing and value-adding parts of the process. But very often it weakened the technical 
quality of the support services, in particular when some EACs diverted part of the funds available for 
technical support to help cover their other costs and investments. 
Some of the EACs have made much progress in learning how to relate to the world of technology and 
professional advice. They avoid contracts which do not have very clear objectives, time frames, and 
indicators of progress and results. They talk and negotiate with a larger number of potential advisors 
before choosing the most appropriate, often visiting other communities where they have worked to 
obtain information on their performance. They prefer to sign specific contracts with a diverse number 
of specialists, as opposed to hiring one single agency to provide all the forms of advice they need. 
13.3.3 EACs with coherent systems of rules 
As discussed in Chapter 2, collective organizations require systems of rules to constrain the types of 
opportunistic behavior described by the "tragedy of the commons" and the Prisoner's Dilemma 
metaphors. These theories of collective action are focused primarily on the question of how costs and 
benefits are allocated between the individual participants in the collective action effort. 
The case studies underline that the presence of such systems of rules dictates effective collective 
action within EACs. These rules permit EAC members to construct agreements for concerted action 
that they deem fair and legitimate; to create incentives for the members to comply with their rules; and 
to adjust their rules and agreements according to circumstances. Without such systems, opportunistic 
behavior prevails and collective action is undermined. 
However, one aspect is particularly important for EACs. Effective systems of rules need not only to 
address the allocation of costs and benefits between the individual members, but also and 
simultaneously, the allocation of contributions and appropriations between the members as 
independent farmers, and the EAC as a business-oriented organization. The balance between the 
E A C s economic and financial performance and sustainability on the one hand, and the impacts of the 
collective effort on individual farms and households, on the other, depends on how this allocation 
problem is solved. 
In each transaction between the EAC and its members, there is a trade-off between the interests of 
individuals as independent farmers, and those of the EAC itself. In each transaction the EAC could 
enhance its own performance by limiting the returns to individual members or by transferring a larger 
share of the costs incurred to them. Similarly, members could profit more by making the EAC 
shoulder more of the costs, or by privately extracting a greater proportion of the benefits. 
As discussed earlier, if an E A C s activities are not dictated by market conditions, most members will 
turn their backs on collective action, or else the organization will become, in practice, something other 
than an EAC. This is the case for EACs marketing undifferentiated commodities in the spot and 
wholesale markets. They fail to achieve either one of their declared goals: becoming a viable business-
oriented organization, or improving the conditions of their members as independent farmers. 
EACs involved in markets characterized by high transaction costs can address the allocation of costs 
and benefits through systems of rules which: 
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(1) Transmit undistorted market signals directly to each member. This means that the costs and 
benefits to each member are directly related to his or her farming performance and to market 
conditions. Thus rules must prevent costs or benefits being spread among EAC members. In terms 
of Ostrom's (1990) design principles, the key is to ensure congruence between rules defining 
benefits and costs to members with those relating to market conditions. If this does not occur, then 
the EAC shoulders the difference between the farmer's performance and market conditions, and/or 
the rest of the members carry the costs. 
(2) Reduce the transaction costs of negotiating, monitoring, and enforcing agreements between the 
EAC and its members. If these costs are high, then the EAC and its members will have to choose 
between affecting the organization's income or reducing members' profits. 
Five of the 14 case study EACs (for milk, vegetables and raspberries, but not potatoes) achieved this 
tricky balance because of their: 
• Previous history of significant collective action involving many of the members. The 
formation of these EACs was just another step along a longer road of concerted action. These 
groups had the advantage of a significant stock of organizational expertise. They had learned 
to work together. They had rules, norms, tested leaders, and knowledge about how others were 
likely to behave in collective activities. Through past experiences they had often already 
weeded out those individuals who were not group players. 
• Similar farming capacities among members. If members do not have more or less equal 
production potential it is extremely difficult for them to negotiate provision and appropriation 
rules that can be met by all. Of course, in these five EACs there were differences among the 
members, but these were less significant than in other cases. It was thus easier for them to 
reach agreements acceptable to all, and to fulfil their obligations once they had done so. 
• Clear links to the local rural community. As discussed before, the geographic and social 
proximity of members helped their dealings within the organization, and were vitally 
important for reducing the cost of obtaining information, negotiating agreements through 
frequent and frank dialogue, monitoring compliance with the rules, enforcing graduated and 
fair sanctions, solving conflicts, and adjusting the rules and agreements as circumstances 
changed. 
• Lack of exit options. To put it bluntly, for all the EACs who solved the problem of dual 
allocation of costs and benefits, the members had no other affordable options other than EAC 
membership. They had to sustain their organization, any alternative approaches were 
unacceptable. Losing the EAC would mean either being left out of the market (as in the case 
of the Milk Collection Centers), or at least having to cut back significantly on their scale of 
production (as in the cases of raspberries and fresh vegetables). This position forced members 
to accept lower benefits, or even accommodate some losses when the market was unfavorable 
or when the EAC made a bad business decision. 
• Capacity to learn and adapt. A striking feature of these five EACs was their detailed 
knowledge about their position vis-a-vis market conditions and trends and especially their 
capacity to turn that information into clear plans for future action. Put simply, they knew 
where they were, where they wanted to go to remain competitive, and what they needed to do 
to get there, both at the level of the EAC and of the individual farms. This information and 
knowledge was used to refine and update their rules, their priorities and their investment plans 
whenever necessary. With the support of their advisors, they had developed a remarkable 
capacity to use their knowledge to inform action. 
13.4 Thinking about the future 
Over the past two years or so, it is becoming clear that hundreds of EACs are experiencing major 
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economic and financial problems, to the extent that many are unlikely to survive. 
This has led some to question the very notion of small farmers engaging collectively in new products, 
services and markets. To them the failure of so many EACs proves that small farmers lack the skills 
to participate in complex production systems and very competitive markets. To them, the main hope 
for small-scale agriculture lies in the adoption of a protective and interventionist economic policy in 
the agricultural sector to reduce unfair competition from heavily subsidized agriculture in the North, 
and to stabilize internal prices and production levels. 
Others argue that the failure of these EACs is due to the involvement of government agencies in 
providing technical and financial support to small farmers. This support will inevitably degenerate into 
clientelistic, politically-motivated, power-seeking machines. In this view, EACs have failed because 
they were never intended to be bona fide business-oriented organizations. The appropriate response in 
this view would include such measures as targeting only those small farmers who are 'viable', and 
terminating government-managed financial support systems, leaving it to commercial banks to carry 
out this function. 
In my view, putting the debate in these terms of 'state or market' is not very helpful. Instead, I want to 
stress that we need to take advantage of the fact that today we can leam from actual experience. This is 
where the social energies of all those who are genuinely committed to a society that includes small 
farmers should be concentrated. This must be the most valuable point of departure for rethinking 
public policies to support small-scale agriculture in the years to come. 
I believe that the public policy agenda defined in the mid-90s has run its course. If in the past decade 
our immediate goal was to facilitate and support the formation and development of as many EACs as 
possible, in the coming years we need to emphasize improving the quality of these organizations, so 
that they become: (a) effective in improving the performance of their members as independent farmers 
in a market economy, (b) increasingly sustainable as business firms, and, (c) institutionally robust as 
social platforms for collective action. 
We could make much progress towards these goals by engaging in open and constructive debate on 
the following issues: 
1. Alternatives for smallholders engaged in the production of traditional agricultural commodities 
This study has clearly shown the futility of setting up EACs to improving the position of small farmers 
as producers of raw agricultural commodities. Yet, only a fraction of Chilean small farmers are able to 
diversify into new products and markets. We have an enormous challenge to discover different 
development alternatives for those households who are unlikely to make this transition. 
What are the alternatives for those smallholders who cannot gain access to new products, new 
markets, new value-adding activities? How can these alternatives be promoted, and by whom? And, 
perhaps, most importantly, how do public programs define targeting criteria and procedures which 
avoid discriminating against certain categories of smallholders, based simply on the personal biases 
and preferences of decision-makers in government offices. 
If we continue to narrowly focus rural development on agriculture-based options, instead of aiming for 
a more broad-based approach to rural regions, we will fail to provide clear alternatives to those who 
cannot link to profitable agricultural markets. The political pressures to continue setting up ineffective 
EACs will be irresistible. 
2. Conditions that justify an EAC 
We must not always assume that having an EAC is always preferable to not having one. Public 
policies and programs over the past six or seven years have - implicitly at least - identified EACs as 
the desired outcome of any development initiative. Often, creating an EAC was an indicator of 
development progress; not forming such an organization was a sign of stagnation, or of outright 
failure, to the extent that if a local group had not set up an EAC in two or three years, technical advice 
services were supposed to be discontinued. We have seen the perverse incentives created by these 
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policy decisions, and how they often led to the formation of weak and even lifeless EACs. 
The strengthening of rural civil society, or even of rural economic organizations, should not be a one-
lane highway. We need to devise policies and programs to support a broad diversity of rural groups, 
associations and organizations. Not all the objectives or needs of rural populations or of small farmers 
can or should be addressed through EACs. 
EACs are only appropriate instruments for change and development when the following conditions are 
met: 
(a) Members' goals are clearly market-oriented. 
EACs are organizations for market exchange. If members mainly expect to gain access to public 
support programs; to improve public services and infrastructure; or to represent the corporate interests 
of a group or community before government or society at large; then EACs are not the way to go, and 
public policies and programs should support the formation of other, more appropriate types of 
organizations. 
(b) Markets fail to provide the goods and services required by the members to achieve their goals. 
Even when members' goals are market-oriented, one should not automatically assume that an EAC is 
the best or only way forward. In a sense, given the costs and risks involved in setting up an EAC, this 
should be a last resort option, not the first one in the list of development agencies or farmer groups. 
Certain types of market exchange can be most successful if individuals engage other market agents on 
their own. If a farmer wants to sell his or her wheat crop, it is unlikely that he or she could do better 
than selling it to the local mill. This fact is not going to be altered significantly even if 50 or 100 small 
farmers sell their crop collectively. 
EACs are needed when farmers' marketing objectives involve high transaction costs. An institution 
can reduce or offset such costs, by gaining access to the goods and services that the market alone will 
not deliver. If farmers do not get together, the market will not deliver cooling tanks for their milk; they 
will not have access to expert advice on processing and exporting raspberries; they will not gain a 
contract to deliver potatoes to a supermarket; the market will not deliver the long-term financing 
needed to set up a vegetable packing and storage facility. 
Often such activities require the existence of a formal organization, i.e, a legal entity recognized as 
such by other market and non-market agents. This allows the group to enter into valid and enforceable 
agreements and contracts. This is when an EAC becomes indispensable. 
3. Effective and sustainable EACs are the product of social learning processes 
We have made much progress in Chile in moving away from the linear transfer of technology 
mentality. However, we still have a long way to go in developing a widely-agreed alternative 
approach. In other words, we are much more aware of how not do things because we have seen what 
does not work. But we are less clear about how we should do things differently. 
In my view, an alternative approach to developing more effective and sustainable EACs should be 
built around the concept of social learning. I think that this study has shown that effective and 
sustainable EACs are not the product of pre-conceived social engineering initiatives, in which 
'someone' illuminates a group of farmers with the knowledge and skills they lack and which, once 
adopted, automatically produce a successful business-oriented organization. 
Instead, the development of effective and sustainable EACs involves: 
• communicating and negotiating across several public-private and private-social divides, and 
between different stakeholders, each with their own interests and own perspectives about what 
needs to be done; 
• negotiating difficult trade-offs between different actors, different objectives, and different courses 
of action; 
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• building networks linking EACs with individual farms, rural communities, government agencies, 
markets and intermediate support organizations; 
• developing a shared understanding of the gaps between initial expectations and actual outcomes of 
the collective action effort; 
• finding meaningful and constructive common ground between the expertise and skills of the 
technical, management and business specialists, and the logic of peasant economies; 
• ensuring access by EAC members, leaders, staff and advisors to the information, knowledge and 
skills required to support effective decision-making; 
• creating an ability to deal with change and a capacity to read and react to unexpected and 
surprising events; 
• developing a capacity to probe, experiment and monitor processes, performance and outcomes; 
• finding methods to embed the results of all of the above into new knowledge that can inform 
further action. 
And then we need to scale-up this learning process, to continuously adapt the design and 
implementation of the public policies and programs which support EAC development. 
None of this is happening in any systematic way today in Chile, and we are thus missing a tremendous 
opportunity to improve our work both at the level of each EAC and of the pertinent public policies and 
programs. 
I feel strongly that if we are going to make further progress in developing more effective and 
sustainable EACs, we must embark on a very significant campaign of learning to learn. We need to 
invest heavily in becoming equipped with the concepts, methods and tools for facilitating social 
learning processes for EACs. This is the only way forward. Otherwise the whole process will be 
coopted by those who think that the solution is to put good business managers in charge, just as before 
they thought that a well-organized extensionist with the support of a good 'subject matter specialist', 
could conquer all technical problems and get small farmers up to par. 
4. Investing in human capital 
Social learning is not contradictory, nor can it replace well-designed, strong and comprehensive 
training programs directed at EAC members, leaders and staff, as well as the staff of intermediate 
support organizations, and of the government agencies responsible for the policies and programs 
which support of small-scale organizations. 
EACs place small farmers and those who work with them in new contexts. We must not let an EAC 
reach crisis point before its leaders and members leam about the importance of good accounting 
systems; or the practical consequences of the difference between a firm's cash flow and the net result 
of a business operation; or why the notion of depreciation of fixed assets was invented in the first 
place. We cannot expect technical advisors to stop talking about weed control in wheat and start 
emphasizing cut-flower production if we do not give them access to the best possible knowledge and 
expertise in these new areas. We should not ask small farmers to collectively take out a loan for 
hundreds of thousands of dollars if we cannot be sure that the project has been evaluated according to 
the most rigorous technical standards. We cannot seriously talk about building robust sets of 
operational rules within the organizations if we do not prepare farmers, their leaders and advisors, with 
the skills necessary to facilitate good communication processes. It is difficult to think how we can 
build the types of networks that EACs need to perform well, if we lack the methods and instruments to 
negotiate concerted action between multiple stakeholders with their own perspectives. 
The effort to develop the human capital in and around EACs has been negligible compared to the 
hundreds of millions of dollars invested in 'brick and mortar' projects. We must debate very seriously 
the wisdom of this approach, and start thinking about more appropriate ways to make up for the time 
lost in providing all these actors in and around EACs with the knowledge, capacities, and skills that 
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are indispensable in their new domains of activity. 
5. Thinking and acting in terms of networks 
More work is needed to not only understand and learn how to work with EACs, but with EACs in the 
context of multi-agent networks. 
Too often the other participants in the network are treated as parameters external to the EAC 
development initiative. For example, we can invest thousands of dollars in financial and technical 
support to the EAC itself, whilst lessening support to members' farms; this gives the EAC the 
impossible task of adding value to and marketing low quality and expensive products. Or we 
encourage EACs to venture into very competitive and demanding markets, without considering 
whether the intermediate support organizations actually have the expertise required to provide 
meaningful advice in the new market context. Or we encourage an EAC to enter into contracts with a 
powerful supermarket chain, but fail to analyze in time what the new standards and conditions will 
mean in terms of demands for new technologies and new investments, new forms of technical advice, 
and a radically new demand on the E A C s cash flow, all of which require changes in the 
organization's operational rules. Or we form an EAC in a social setting were there is no evidence of 
any previous history of collective action. 
All of these are actual examples, taken from the case studies, of how in practice we have not been very 
good at looking at EACs as elements of multi-agent networks. Again, the need is for a concerted effort 
to invest in the development of the concepts, methods and tools that will enable us to become more 
aware and adept at working within a network perspective. 
6. EACs transmit market signals 
EACs are set up with the explicit purpose of providing an organizational platform for small farmers to 
reach more dynamic and profitable markets. Almost always this means that they will be subject to 
more, not less, intense competition. A peasant selling his or her raspberries to the traditional 
middlemen, may not make as much money as he or she could, but he or she will almost always 
manage to sell the crop, no questions asked; but if the EAC wants to get into the export market, then it 
better be prepared to do what it takes to avoid being torn apart by much tougher competitors. EACs 
cannot have it both ways, then cannot have their cake and eat it too! 
Understandably, public programs which support small farmers want to somehow protect them from 
the adverse consequences of getting into these fiercely competitive markets. This is not the issue. It 
would be foolhardy to design a public policy that does not contain mechanisms to ease the transition. 
The question is how do we do it? Until now, the knee-jerk reaction has been to make use of subsidized 
loans and direct grants that decouple EACs from market signals. I think that this study provides 
abundant evidence that, as many farmers told me, this is "pan para hoy, hambre para mahana" (bread 
for today, hunger tomorrow). 
We need to develop more appropriate, conducive and, above all, sustainable instruments for easing 
small farmers' transition into more competitive markets. What are the insurance systems, the risk-
sharing public-private contracts, the financial instruments, the forms of technical support, the training 
programs, the government regulations, the fiscal incentives, the legal frameworks, that can 
simultaneously help small farmers and their EACs learn their way around the new markets, whilst not 
creating artificial 'bubbles' which burst the day external funding stops? I don't have the answer to this 
question, but it is one that we need to address seriously and urgently. 
If we do not find good answers to this question, all our calls for government agencies and intermediate 
support organizations to stop behaving paternalistically towards small farmers, will fall on deaf ears. 
13.5 Final thought 
To reiterate, the greatest asset we have for improving the public policies which support small-scale 
agriculture is the experience of the thousands of farmers, their organizations and their public and 
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private advisors and supporters. The results have not been as good as we expected in the mid-90s 
when we were just getting started, but they rarely are when the changes introduced are meaningful and 
depart from well-travelled paths. But if we dare to take a hard, critical look at what has been done, and 
to think and act with freedom, then I am sure that many Chilean small farmers and rural communities 
will be able to secure a place in their society, one of which they will be proud of. To those who think 
that this is naive, I can only say: they have done it before. 
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Samenvatting 
Context en achtergrond van het onderzoek 
Vanaf 1990 heeft de Chileense overheid veel moeite genomen om de deelname van kleinschalige 
landbouw te bevorderen in een van de meest geliberaliseerde en competitieve economieën van de 
ontwikkelingswereld. In het bijzonder heeft het Landbouwontwildcelrngsinstituut (INDAP), een 
afdeling van het ministerie van Landbouw, bijna 1,5 miljoen US $ besteed aan technische assistentie 
en investeringsprograrnma's. Dit met het doel de capaciteiten en kwalitatieve mogelijkheden van 
kleine boeren te versterken en ze te verbinden met meer dynamische en winstgevende markten. Een 
van de sleutelelementen in deze inspanning was de oprichting en ontwikkeling van Empresas 
Asociativas Campesinas (EAC's, associatieve bedrijven van kleine producenten). 
EAC's zijn wettelijk gevormde organisaties. De leden of eigenaars zijn bijna alleen kleine boeren die 
het beslissingsproces van de organisatie in handen hebben. Dit soort organisaties voeren marketing en 
waarde-toevoegende activiteiten uit, direct verbonden aan de primaire productie van nun leden 
(voorwaarts en achterwaarts in de keten). Het belangrijkste doel van de EAC's is het verbeteren van de 
prestaties van de deelnemende bedrijven die als economische eenheden betrokken zijn in 
markttransacties. 
In het laatste decennium zijn ongeveer 780 van deze EAC's opgericht met een totaal aantal leden van 
ongeveer 58.000 kleine boeren (ongeveer een vijfde van alle kleine boeren-bedrijven in het land). Hun 
brutoverkoop bedroeg in 1998 ongeveer 100 miljoen US $. 
Dit programma behelst een nieuwe benadering om de economische prestatie van kleine 
boerenbedrijven te verbeteren alsmede het welzijn van de boerenhuishoudens. Het is een belangrijke 
trendbreuk met de traditionele stratégie van technologieoverdracht van landbouwinnovaties met de 
nadruk op het verhogen van de opbrengsten van bulkproducten. Deze nieuwe benadering, die sinds 
1990 langzaam is ontwikkeld, beoogt daarentegen: (a) vorming van kleinschalige marktgerichte 
bedrijven te bevorderen (wat in Chili een verandering van traditionele bedrijven betekent en een 
nieuwe waarde toevoegt), (b) de linéaire verhoudingen van onderzoek-voorlichting-boer te vervangen 
door meer complexe en diverse privaatpublieke netwerken en allianties, (c) de EAC's te erkennen als 
de primaire vertegenwoordigers van de kleine boeren in het ontwikkelingstraject van de landbouw, (d) 
nieuwe facilitatie processen te ontwikkelen om de nieuwe Strategie te ondersteunen. 
De onderzoeksvragen 
Het onderzoek richtte zieh op de volgende vragen: (a) Hebben EAC's nun doel bereuet om de prestaties 
van de bedrijven van nun leden en het huishoudinkomen te verbeteren? (b) Zijn EAC's duurzaam als 
economische organisaties? (c) Wat is de relatie tussen de mstitutionele en economische prestaties van 
deze EAC's? en (d) Welke veranderingen in publiek beleid zijn nodig om effect en duurzaamheid van 
deze EAC's te bevorderen? 
Conceptueel kader en methoden 
In dit onderzoek is een multidisciplinaire benadering gehanteerd, gebruikmakend van diverse 
theoretische perspectieven waaronder: de concepten van landbouwkundige kennis- en 
informatiesystemen en van innovatie als het resultaat van maatschappelijke leerprocessen (social 
learning) binnen multi-agent netwerken; het concept van transactiekosten zoals gebraikt in de 
neoninstitutionele économie; de théorie van maatschappelijk kapitaal en het concept van 
ontwerpprincipes voor de institutioneel sterke organisaties voor gemeenschappelijke acties, zoals 
voorgesteld door vergelijkende institutionele analyse. 
Het onderzoek combineert beschrijvende en analytische kwantitatieve methoden toegepast op grote 
gegevensbestanden uit nationaal onderzoek naar boerenhuishoudens, kleine boerenbedrijven en 
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EAC's, met 14 kwalitatieve verdiepende studies van specifieke organisaties betrokken bij de 
productie, marketing en waarde-toevoeging aan melk, aardappels, groenten en frambozen. 
Resultaten 
De belangrijkste resultaten zijn als volgt: 
1. De deelname van kleine boeren in EAC's is meer afhankelijk van markt- en beleidsprikkels dan 
van de hen ter beschikking staande middelen. De ärmste lagen van de boerenhuishoudens vormen 
hierop een uitzondering. Zij neigen niet naar deelname in deze organisaties. Marktprikkels zijn 
nauw verbunden aan de transactiekosten van de boeren. EAC lidmaatschap is daarom hoger onder 
kleine boeren die werken in productmarkten met hoge transactiekosten. 
2. Maatschappelijke groepen en organisaties faciliteren de vorming van EAC's, omdat zij voorzien in 
een initieel forum waar alternatieven worden bediscussieerd, afgewogen en besloten. Deze locale 
groepen 'incuberen' EAC's. De locale traditie van plattelandsorganisaties op zichzelf lijkt echter 
geen beslissende invloed te hebben, omdat veel regio's met een hoge graad van burgerorganisatie 
een laag ledenaantal in EAC's hebben, en vice versa. 
3. De steun van externe vertegenwoordigers (zoals NGO's, private voorlichtingsbedrijven etc.) is 
essentieel voor de opkomst van EAC's. Terwijl lokale leiders werken aan de bereidheid van boeren 
om de status-quo ter discussie te stellen en om actie te ondememen, voorzien externen de EAC's 
in zowel een 'wegenkaart' voor gezamenlijke actie als de netwerken die nodig zijn om informatie, 
expertise en financiering te verkrijgen. 
4. EAC's ontstaan daarom door de interactie tussen al deze actoren: individuele boeren, 
plattelandsgemeenschappen, exteme facilitatoren, overheden en markten. De aard van deze initiele 
interactie en het saldo van de bijdrage van iedere vertegenwoordiger heeft een bepalende invloed 
op de eigenschappen en toekomstige prestaties van de EAC's. 
5. EAC lidmaatschap heeft alleen een significante positieve effect op de netto winstmarges van de 
leden, wanneer ze opereren in markten met hoge transactiekosten, zoals de melkveehouderij. Een 
EAC heeft geen voordelen voor kleine boeren die in markten met läge transactiekosten opereren, 
zoals de 'spot markets' voor bulkproducten van o.a. tarwe of aardappelen. 
6. EAC deelname heeft geen aanmerkelijk effect op het totale inkomen van de leden, zelfs niet 
wanneer het gaat om markten met hoge transactiekosten. Inkomsten uit de agrarische activiteiten, 
worden ondermijnd door het corresponderende verlies van niet agrarische activiteiten en 
inkomstmogelijkheden. 
7. Een grote meerderheid van EAC's zou niet levensvatbaar zijn zonder overheidssubsidies. Slechts 
20% van de EAC's zouden waarschijnlijk overleven als de huidige overheidsprogramma's 
plotseling werden afgebroken; een extra 15 % zouden hun positie relatief snel kunnen handhaven 
als zij hun manier van werken zouden veranderen. 
8. EAC's die voornamelijk opgezet zijn om bulkproducten te verhandelen in 'spot' of 'wholesale' 
markets neigen te falen. Dat gebeult wanneer hun leden hun afspraken over het gezamenlijk 
vermarkten van hun productie niet nakomen. De betrokkenheid van de leden vermindert wanneer 
zij zieh realiseren dat, onder deze marktomstandigheden, de EAC geen voordeel in marktprijzen of 
andere marktvoordelen kan bewerkstelligen, terwijl het lidmaatschap wel een aantal aanvullende 
kosten en risico's met zieh meebrengt in vergelijking tot individuele verkoop alleen. Bovendien 
onttrekken de leden zieh selectief: soms vermarkten ze zelf hun producten maar doen nog wel hun 
voordeel met andere diensten van de EAC's zoals toegang krijgen tot overheidsprogramma's en -
subsidies. Onder deze omstandigheden worden EAC's snel ondermijnd. 
9. Aan de andere kant kunnen EAC's succesvol zijn wanneer hun kernactiviteiten gericht worden op: 
(a.) het veredelen van de ruwe grondstofproducten van de leden; (b.) het voorzien in prijs- en 
marktinformatie als het kostbaar is om die te verkrijgen en het moeilijk is om zonder die 
informatie een goede prijs te maken; (c) het overwinnen van hindernissen bij de toegang tot de 
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markt op het gebied van investeringen, technologie, of kennis en management ; en (d) net 
ontwikkelen van de portfolio van nun dienten, in het bijzonder als het om snel bederfelijke 
goederen gaat. 
10. Effectieve EAC's zijn onderdeel van effectieve multi-agent netwerken. Verbindingen naar actoren 
buiten de plattelandgemeenschappen zijn doorslaggevend bij het ondememen in dynamische en 
competitieve markten. 
11. Wanneer EAC's ingebed zijn in plattelandgemeenschappen, zijn hun interne regels en 
besbssingsprocessen effectiever en goedkoper vanwege de sociale en geografische nabijheid van 
de Ieden. Bijvoorbeeld wordt het monitoren goedkoper van het aangaan van overeenkomsten en 
verplichtingen door de leden, reduceert het de heterogeniteit van de leden en draagt op zijn beurt 
bij aan het formuleren van voor iedereen acceptabele regels; verhoogt het de maatschappelijke 
kosten en consequenties voor leden die zieh niet aansluiten aan afspraken en verplichtingen, 
verzekert het een rechtvaardige en passende sanctie van diegenen die de regels breken, (dankzij 
betere locale informatie over de context waarin de schending plaatsvindt), en het voorzdet in 
hogere en betere deelname aan organisaties. Een sociale en geografische nabijheid kan de 
operationele regels van de EAC's echter ook ondermijnen, bijvoorbeeld wanneer de handhaving 
van de overeenkomsten wordt belemmerd door familieverplichtingen, of wanneer diegenen met 
meer macht in de gemeenschap een te grote invloed uitoefenen binnen de EAC. 
12. Een EAC zal uiteindelijk mislukken wanneer het systeem van regels de leden afschermt van 
marktsignalen. Effectieve interne regelsystemen moeten zieh niet alleen richten op de verdeling 
van kosten en baten tussen de individuele leden ('profiteurs' uitsluiten), maar ook op de distributie 
van kosten en baten tussen de leden als individuele en onafhankelijke boeren en de EAC als een 
zakelijk georienteerde organisatie. De balans tussen de economische en fmanciele prestaties en de 
duurzaamheid van de EAC's aan de ene kant, en de impact van de gezamenlijke inspanning op 
individuele bedrijven en huishoudens aan de andere kant, hangt af hoe dit tweevoudige 
verdelingsprobleem wordt opgelost. Alleen wanneer de regels duidelijke marktsignalen aan de 
individuele leden doorgeven, en wanneer deze regels de transactiekosten van onderhandelen, 
monitoring, en het dwingen van overeenkomsten tussen de EAC en haar leden effectief 
vermeerderen, kan dit probleem worden opgelost. 
Denken aan de toekomst 
Het beleid en de programma's die ontworpen zijn gedurende het laatste decennium hebben hun beslag 
gehad. Tientallen EAC's verkeren in crisis, hetgeen een noodzaak aantoont van een strategiewijziging 
teneinde de kwaliteit van de huidige EAC's te verbeteren. Zulke EAC's moeten: (a) effectiever zijn in 
het verbeteren van prestaties van hun leden als onafhankelijke boeren in een markteconomie, (b) 
steeds meer duurzaam en autonoom handelen als bedrijven en (c) institutioneel sterk zijn als 
maatschappebjk platform voor gezamenlijk handelen. Om deze doelen te bereiken, zou gewijzigd 
beleid: 
1. alternatieven moeten ontwikkelen voor de duizenden kleine boeren die traditionele 
landbouwprodukten produceren en die geen kennis of mogelijkheden hebben met betrekking tot 
vernieuwing van producten en markten. Voor velen kunnen deze alternatieven gevonden worden 
in nieuwe rurale niet-agrarische activiteiten. Als de opties voor plattelandsontwikkeling beperkt 
zullen blijven tot alleen landbouw, dan zal politieke druk om EAC's op te zetten die ineffectief 
zullen zijn onweerstaanbaar zijn. 
2. niet moeten aannemen dat het vormen van een EAC altijd het goede antwoord is. EAC's zijn 
alleen effectief onder bepaalde condities en kunnen een kleiner aantal doelen bereiken dan 10 jaar 
geleden gedacht was. EAC's zijn geen panacees voor het ontwikkelen van 'sociaal kapitaal' en van 
participatie van burgers op het platteland. Dit is ook waar voor die politiek en programma's die 
ontworpen zijn om de productieve, technologische en economische ontwikkeling van kleine 
boeren te verbeteren. Om zulke beleidsdoelen te bereiken moeten overheidsprogramma's werken 
met een ruimer kader van plattelandsorganisaties en -groepen, en niet alleen maar steunen op 
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EAC's. 
3. sociaal leren moeten bevorderen als deel van de ontwikkeling van EAC's. Hoewel er significante 
vooruitgang geboekt is in het afstand nemen van de lineaire technologie overdracht benadering, is 
het nog niet voldoende. Grotendeels blijven velen de ontwikkeling van EAC's als een uitkomst 
van vooronderstelde sociale sturingsinitiatieven zien. Deze studie toont aan dat succesvolle EAC's 
het resultaat zijn van geleidelijke en complexe vernieuwingsprocessen waar diverse disciplines 
met verschilfende perspectieven bij betrokken zijn. We moeten meer investeren in het vinden van 
benaderingen en methodes om sociale leerprocessen in EAC-vorming en ontwikkeling te 
vergemakkelijken. 
4. moeten investeren in menselijk kapitaal. De inspanning om menselijk kapitaal te ontwikkelen in 
relatie tot EAC's is verwaarloosbaar in vergelijking met de honderden miljoenen dollars die 
geitnvesteerd worden in infrastructaurprojecten. We moeten dringend beslissen hoe alle actoren 
voorzien kunnen worden van kennis, capaciteiten en vaardigheden, die onmisbaar zijn in bun 
nieuwe aandachtsgebieden. 
5. moeten denken en handelen in termen van netwerken. Effectieve EAC's zijn deel van effectieve 
multi-agent netwerken. We moeten uitvinden hoe we met EAC's werken in de context van deze 
uitgebreidere netwerken. We hebben nieuwe concepten, methoden en gereedschappen, 
instrumenten nodig om dit werk te ondersteunen. 
6. moeten begrijpen dat EAC's alleen dan slagen als ze duidelijke marktsignalen doorgeven. EAC's 
bieden een organisatorisch platform om kleine boeren meer toegang te geven tot dynamische en 
winstgevende markten. Dit betekent vrijwel altijd dat zij onderhevig zijn aan meer en niet minder 
intense concurrentie. Begrijpelijkerwijs, willen publieke programma's die kleine boeren 
ondersteunen hen enigszins beschermen tegen de nadelige consequenties van het zieh begeven in 
hevig concurrerende markten. Niemand zal de noodzaak voor mechanismen om deze overgang te 
vergemakkelijken ter discussie stellen, maar de vraag is wel hoe dat te doen. Tot nu toe hebben we 
vrijwel uitsluitend gesteund op directe subsidies en gesubsidieerde leningen, die heel vaak de 
EAC's ontkoppelen van de marktsignalen waar ze op zouden moeten reageren. Hoe zien de 
verzekeringssystemen, de risicodelende privaatpublieke contracten, de trainingsprogramma's, de 
regels van de overheid en de wettelijke leaders emit, die kleine boeren kunnen helpen en de EAC's 
nun weg leren vinden in de nieuwe markten, maar die geen kunstmatige luchtbellen creeren die 
knappen wanneer de externe financiering stopt? Met deze vraag in het achterhoofd moeten we 
institutionele experimenten stimuleren en ondersteunen. 
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